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The Course of Conflict. A Study in the Thought of Paul Ricœur 
 
Gonçalo Nuno Falcão de Bettencourt Coutinho Marcelo 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this dissertation I undertake a conceptual clarification, as well as a historical 
reconstruction of the notion of conflict in philosophy. I start by analyzing the 
intrinsically conflictual intellectual landscape of the Greek source (in Homer, 
Heraclitus, Greek Tragedy, Plato and the Greek public sphere) move on to see 
what forms conflict assumes in Modern philosophy (mainly in Kant, Hegel and 
Marx) and sketch a cartography of the contemporary reappraisal of this notion in 
contemporaneity, mainly by discussing Critical Theory (Habermas, Honneth, 
Hunyadi), pragmatic sociology (Boltanski, Thévenot) and Anglo-Saxon political 
philosophy (Rawls, Walzer, Taylor) among other meaningful contributions. These 
introductory parts of the dissertation lead up to an appraisal of the way in which 
conflict appears in the works of French philosopher Paul Ricœur, in what I call a 
“course of conflict” in his thought.  
My aim is twofold: firstly, to argue that conflict is indeed a touchstone not only of 
Ricœur’s works, but also of a very important number of authors in the history of 
philosophy; secondly, that a reappraisal of this notion is necessary in the 
contemporary debate, and that Paul Ricœur offers very nuanced, supple and plural 
accounts which can be useful in this reappraisal. The “course of conflict” is thus 
divided in three main parts, encompassing “existential”, “hermeneutic” and 
“practical” conflicts and throughout the dissertation many topics are discussed, 
dealing with disciplines such as hermeneutics, psychoanalysis and practical 
philosophy (ethics, political philosophy and social philosophy).  
I ultimately argue that conflict is ineluctable in philosophy as in life, but that it 
does not necessarily amount to a strictly negative phenomenon; sometimes, 
conflicts can be creative and positive. Nonetheless, accepting this also means that 
the recognition of conflicts is intrinsically connected with the search for solutions 
for them, ways to deal and negotiate them, make them creative and positive. But in 
order to see how these procedures work, the dissertation puts forward a typology 
of different types of conflict, as well as ways to mediate, conciliate or, in some 
cases, just accepting and multiplying them, in a case-by-case scenario. 
In the last parts of the dissertation, and taking as a starting point the analyses of 
Ricœur and the perspectives of the other authors presented before, I spell out the 
project of a hermeneutic social philosophy and claim that in our own day and age 
what is called for is a new critique of reason, which I decide to call a “critique of 
miserable reason”, one that would be able to rethink the social world in other 
terms, trying to avoid the pitfalls of reductionism in its many forms.  
 
KEYWORDS: Conflict, Kant, Hermeneutics, Ricœur, Social Philosophy 
 
 RESUMO 
Esta tese leva a cabo uma clarificação conceptual e uma reconstrução histórica da 
noção de conflito, tal como ela aparece na filosofia. Num primeiro momento, 
analisa-se o fenómeno do conflito na fonte Grega (em Homero, Heraclito, Platão, 
nas tragédias gregas e nas formas de interação agonística no espaço público) e na 
filosofia moderna (principalmente em Kant, Hegel e Marx). Num segundo 
momento, estabelece-se, nos seus traços gerais, uma cartografia da recuperação 
desta noção na contemporaneidade através da discussão das contribuições 
provenientes da teoria crítica (Habermas, Honneth, Hunyadi), da sociologia 
pragmática (Boltanski, Thévenot) e da filosofia política anglo-saxónica (Rawls, 
Walzer, Taylor), entre outras. Estas partes iniciais da tese desembocam numa 
análise aprofundada da obra do filósofo francês Paul Ricœur e das muitas 
instanciações do conflito nessa obra, naquilo a que chamo o “percurso do conflito” 
no pensamento de Ricœur. 
Neste “percurso do conflito” o objetivo é duplo: por um lado, provar que o 
conflito é a pedra de toque não só da filosofia de Ricœur, mas também de um 
grande conjunto de outros autores; por outro lado, que é necessário reavaliar o 
papel desta noção no debate contemporâneo e que nesse contexto a filosofia de 
Ricœur e as suas análises finas e plurais podem ser de uma grande utilidade. 
Assim sendo, este “percurso do conflito” divide-se em três partes, as quais lidam 
com diferentes tipos de conflito: conflitos “existenciais”, “hermenêuticos” e 
“práticos”. Ao longo destas partes, várias disciplinas são chamadas à colação, 
como a hermenêutica, a psicanálise e a filosofia prática (ética, filosofia política e 
filosofia social), numa tentativa de esclarecer os diferentes fenómenos em causa. 
Em última instância, chega-se à conclusão que o conflito é inevitável em filosofia, 
tal como na vida, mas que este não é (pelo menos não em todas as suas formas e 
instanciações) um fenómeno estritamente negativo; por vezes, os conflitos podem 
ser criativos e positivos. Porém, aceitar este facto implica igualmente consentir 
que o reconhecimento dos conflitos está intrinsecamente ligado à busca de 
soluções para eles, formas de lidar com eles e torná-los criativos e positivos. Para 
que possa ser compreendido, em traços gerais, como é que estes procedimentos 
funcionam, esta tese elabora uma tipologia de diferentes tipos de conflito e 
respetivas formas de lidar com eles, mediando-os, conciliando-os ou, nalguns 
casos, apenas aceitando a sua existência e mesmo multiplicando-os. A busca da 
melhor solução tem sempre de ser operada caso a caso. 
Nas partes finais da tese, e partindo das análises de Ricœur e dos outro autores 
apresentadas ao longo da mesma, delineia-se o projeto de uma filosofia social 
hermenêutica e argumenta-se que aquilo de que precisamos hoje em dia é de uma 
nova crítica da razão, uma “crítica da razão miserável” que possa repensar o 
mundo social em novos termos e que, ao fazê-lo, possa evitar os perigos do 
reducionismo nas suas múltiplas formas. 
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Table of Contents 
 
Prologue: Ricœur and 20
th
 Century Philosophy…………………………..……1 
 
Introduction: The Course of Conflict…………………………………………...5 
 
Part One: The Significance of Conflict for Ricœur’s Theoretical Framework – 
Main Sources and Theoretical Influences……………………………………..15 
 
1.1 – The Pre-History of Conflict in Philosophy: From Ancient agon to 
Modern Struggle………………………………………………………………...24 
1.1.1 – The Greek embattled cosmogony and mythology……….……….24 
1.1.2 – Heraclitus and metaphysical conflict……………………………..27 
1.1.3 – The tragic vision of the world…………………………………….33 
1.1.4 – Plato and the conflict between the irrational and the rational 
souls……………………………………………………………………... 46 
1.1.5 – Agonistic political citizenship and public space………………….52 
1.1.6 – Modern political theory: Hobbes’s Bellum omnium contra 
omnes……………………………………………………………………..64 
 
1.2 – Kant on Critique, Negation and the Antinomies: Conflict as Reciprocal 
Limitation………………………………………………………………………..71 
 1.2.1 – Kant’s critical project……………………………………………..73 
1.2.2 – Kant on negation………………………………………………….76 
1.2.3 – Transcendental dialectic and the conflict of reason with itself in the 
antinomies…...……………...…………………………….……………....80 
1.2.4 – Kant’s practical philosophy: the conflict of maxims in moral 
philosophy, radical evil and the unsocial sociability……………………..86 
 
1.3 – Hegel on Negativity and Dialectic: Productive Conflict………………...94 
 1.3.1 – Hegel in Jena: the dawn of recognition and an alternative practical 
philosophy………………………………………………………………...95 
 
 1.3.2 – Recognition as consciousness formation. The lord-bondsman 
dialectic in the Phenomenology of Spirit………………………………..105 
 1.3.3 – Hegel’s mature philosophy: freedom and recognition in the 
Philosophy of Right……………………………………………………...117 
 1.3.4 – The definition of dialectic……………………………………….122 
 1.3.5 – The French reception of Hegel: Wahl, Kojève, Hyppolite and                     
Weil….…………………..………………………………….…………...128 
 1.3.6 – Ricœur’s conflictual assessment of Hegel: from recovery to 
mourning, the place of dialectic in human praxis and the Post-Hegelian 
Kantianism....……………………………………………………………145 
 
1.4 – Marx on History and Class Warfare: Social Conflict…………………166 
 1.4.1 – Marx’s Social Philosophy: Estranged labor, Commodity Fetishism 
and Reification…………………………………………………………..168 
 1.4.2 – Marx on dialectic, class conflict and revolution……………...…176 
1.4.3 – Ricœur’s latent Marxism: from early adhesion to mature 
moderation................................................................................................179 
1.4.4 – The affirmation of conflict in sociology: Simmel’s conflict 
theory……………………………………………………………………190 
 
 
Part Two: The Contemporary Reappraisal of Conflict…………………….193 
 
2.1– Habermas, Honneth and Hunyadi: Communicative Action, the Struggle 
for Recognition and the Virtue of Conflict…………………………………...196 
2.1.1 – The making of the Frankfurt School: Horkheimer and the task of 
critical theory……………………………………………………………197 
2.1.2 – The Pessimistic turn: Adorno, Horkheimer, and the critique of 
instrumental reason…………….………………………………………..200 
2.1.3 – Habermas: from the discovery of the public sphere to 
communicative action and the ethics of discussion……………………..204 
2.1.4 – Honneth and the struggle for recognition………………..……...220 
2.1.5 – Hunyadi and the virtue of conflict………………………..……..244 
 
 
2.2– Rawls, Walzer and Boltanski-Thévenot: The Conflict Between 
Universalism and the Plurality of Justice…………………………………….253 
2.2.1 – Rawls: society as a consensual-conflictual phenomenon……….254 
2.2.2 – Walzer: complex equality and the irreducible plurality of 
goods………………………………………………….…………………267 
2.2.3 – Boltanski and Thévenot: the multiple orders of worth, strategies of 
justification, and the exercise of critique ……………………………….279 
 
2.3– Taylor: Hypergoods and the Conflict in the Making of Modern 
Identity………………………………………………………………………….300 
2.3.1 – Hypergoods, moral sources and inescapable frameworks………300  
2.3.2 – The conflicts of modernity, our conflicts………………………..308 
2.3.3 – The fundamental and the historical (Ricœur’s reading of Sources of 
the Self)………………………………………………………………….315 
 
 
Part Three: The Existential Conflict…………………………….......………..323 
 
3.1 – Existentialism and Phenomenology……………………………………..330 
3.1.1 – Jaspers and the loving struggle………………………………….330 
3.1.2 – Marcel, mystery and concrete philosophy…..…………………..335 
3.1.3 – The secret conciliation…………………………………………..337 
3.1.4 – The lasting influence of Jaspers and Marcel in Ricœur’s 
philosophy……………………………………………………………….339 
3.1.5 – The methodological significance of phenomenology…….…......341 
3.1.6 – Personalism and Reflexive Philosophy…………………………343 
 
3.2 – The Conflict between Voluntary and Involuntary…………………….349 
3.2.1 – The overarching role of conflict and its alleged inner 
(re)conciliation in Transcendence……………………………………….350 
3.2.2 – The conflict of values and modes of life………………………...355 
3.2.3 – The conflict of duties and the value of happiness……………….357 
3.2.4 – The conflict between passion and law…………………………..360 
3.2.5 – Unconscious conflicts…………………………………………...362 
 
3.2.6 – Saying yes to a world that says no………………………………363 
 
3.3 – The Conflict Between Finite and Infinite………………………………367 
3.3.1 – The transcendental conflict: finite perspective and infinite verb..369 
3.3.2 – The practical conflict……….…………………………………...373 
3.3.3 – The affective conflict…………..………………………………..376 
 
3.4 – History, Method and Truth……………………………………………..386 
3.4.1 – The history of philosophy and the unity of truth………………..388  
3.4.2 – Perspectivism, truth and the conflict of interpretations…………392 
3.4.3 – Ricœur and Gadamer on truth and method……………………...406 
 
 
Part Four: The Hermeneutic Conflict………………………………………..417 
 
4. 1 – The Conflict of Interpretations: Structuralism, Psychoanalysis and the 
Phenomenology of Religion……………………………………………………437 
4.1.1 – The architecture of meaning in Ricœur’s early hermeneutics: the 
double meaning of symbols……………………………………………..437 
4.1.2 – Hermeneutics of suspicion and hermeneutics as recollection of 
meaning…………………….……………………………………....……441 
4.1.3 – Hermeneutics and structuralism………………..………...……...453 
4.1.4 – Hermeneutics and psychoanalysis………………………………457 
4.1.5 – Hermeneutics and phenomenology………….…………………..466 
 
4.2 – Unconscious Conflict: the Traversal of Psychoanalysis……………….472 
4.2.1 – Conflicts in our psychic life: Freud and Philosophy and the early 
texts……………………………………………………………………...472 
4.2.2 – Psychoanalysis after Freud and Philosophy: the turn towards 
psychoanalytical practice………………………………………………..480 
 
4.3 – The Conflicted Self, Part One: Archaeological vs. Teleological 
Consciousness…………………………………………………………………..484 
4.3.1 – Freud’s archeological model…………………………………….484 
 
4.3.2 – Hegel and the teleological process of consciousness-
formation………………………………………………………………...486 
4.3.3 – Taking sides in the conflict of interpretations…………………..489 
 
4.4 – Explanation vs. Understanding…………………………………………491 
4.4.1 – Interpretation as the result of the dialectic between explanation and 
understanding……………………………………………………………491 
4.4.2 – The clarifications in the debate with Gadamer………………….494 
 
4.5 – Phenomenology vs. Philosophy of Language in the Discours de 
l’Action………………………………………………………………………….498 
 
4.6 – Towards a Hermeneutics and a Philosophy of Action………………...505 
4.6.1 – The linguistification of action……………………………...……505 
4.6.2 – Ricœur’s hermeneutical critique of ideologies………………….507 
 
 
Part Five: The Practical Conflict……………………………………………..513 
 
5.1 – The Conflicted Self, Part Two: Suspicion vs. Attestation. Towards the 
Capable Human Being (Philosophical Anthropology)…………………...….517 
5.1.1 – Selfhood and the capacities: being able to describe, narrate and 
prescribe ………………………………………………………………...517 
5.1.2 – The attestation of the self (a postponed ontology)………………521  
 
5.2 – The Conflict of Duties (Ethics and Morality)…………………………..526 
5.2.1 – Ricœur’s “little ethics”: ethics encompassing morality…………526 
5.2.2 – The moral norm…………………………………………………527  
5.2.3 – The tragic of action, the conflict of duties and political 
conflicts………………………………………………………………….529 
 
5.3 – Legal Conflict (Theory of Justice)............................................................537 
5.3.1 – Judicial intervention as a way to solve conflicts without 
violence………………………………………………………………….538 
 
5.3.2 – The conflict between argumentation and interpretation………...540 
5.3.3 – The conflict between conscience and the law……………….…..542 
 
5.4 – The Invention of the Rule (Applied Ethics)……………………………544 
5.4.1 – Practical wisdom: adapting behavior through phronetical 
means........................................................................................................544 
5.4.2 – A further degree of formalization: reflective judgment…………548 
5.4.3 – The new framework of Ricœur’s practical philosophy…………549 
5.4.4 – Applied ethics: the case of medical and judicial judgments…….551 
 
5.5 – Social Conflict (Social Philosophy)...........................................................556 
5.5.1 – The ethical and political elements underlying Ricœur’s social 
philosophy: from the political paradox to the emphasis on tolerance and 
hospitality………………………………………………………………..557 
5.5.2 – The conflict between ideology and utopia………………………560 
5.5.3 – Ricœur on the phenomena of crises……………………………..562 
 
5.6 – The Struggle for Recognition (or the Recognition of a course…)…….565 
5.6.1 – The status and reception of The Course of Recognition………...565 
5.6.2 – The framework of the Course of Recognition and its take on 
conflict………………………………………………………………..…567 
5.6.3 – Ricœur on gift-giving, mutuality and the states of peace……….569 
5.6.4 – A utopia of recognition………………………………………….577 
 
Part Six: An Attempt at Systematization: Way Beyond Conflict..................585 
 
6.1 – The Typology of Conflict………………………..……………………….589 
 
6.2 – From Conflict to Conciliation and Back Again………………….…….599 
 
Part Seven: Critical Remarks…………………………………………………605 
 
7.1 – How Radical is Ricœur’s Hermeneutics? Reassessing the dialectic 
between belonging and distanciation…………………………………………607 
 
 
7.2 – How Critical is Ricœur’s Critical Theory?..............................................615 
 
Part Eight: Towards a Renewed Hermeneutic Social Philosophy………….619 
 
8.1 – Making Sense and Transforming the Social…………………………...620 
 
8.2 – The Need for a New Critique of Reason………………………………..625 
8.2.1 – The critique of miserable reason………………………………626 
 
Conclusion: Ricoeurian Philosophy After Ricœur…………………………..633 
 
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………637 
Primary Sources: Books and Articles written by Ricœur……………….637 
Secondary Bibliography on Ricœur……………………………………..645 
Other Bibliography……………………………………………………...655 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
War is father of all and the king of all; and some he has 
shown as gods, others men; some he has made slaves, 
others free. 
(Heraclitus, Fragment LXXXIII Kahn, p. 207) 
 
Even stars collide, and out of their crashing new worlds 
are born. 
(“As I began to love myself”. Poem attributed to 
Charlie Chaplin) 
 
There is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival 
“knowing”; the more affects we are able to put into 
words about a thing, the more eyes, various eyes we are 
able to use for the same thing, the more complete will 
be our “concept” of the thing, our “objectivity”. 
(Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, III, §12, p. 
87.) 
 
Le négatif est toujours le défi. Mais le fond de 
l’existence est le pouvoir de dire oui. (…) l’avenir est 
ouvert. Nous avons toujours besoin de penser la terre 
promise car nous ne pourrions penser le conflit si nous 
ne pensions pas la réconciliation. Nous portons un 
projet de réconciliation mais non monnayable en 
institution réelle. C’est la place de l’imaginaire social. 
(…) je sais où je me tiens. Je ne suis pas dans un vide 
supérieur, précisément parce que je nie qu’il y a un 
point de vue supérieur qui engloberait toutes les 
contradictions. Ici, je me tiens. 
(Ricœur, Interview with Olivier Abel, Présence 
Protestante (1991), quoted by Dosse, Les sens d’une vie, 
p. 604) 
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Prologue 
 
Paul Ricœur and 20
th
 Century Philosophy 
 
Paul Ricœur incarnated the spirit of his time. One could say that the 
corpus of his works acts as a mirror of the philosophical questions and problems of 
the whole 20th century. Actually, were the Philosophy of the past century to be 
granted the status of a conceptual character – much like Nietzsche’s or 
Kierkegaard’s conceptual characters – capable of making its own self-presentation 
in a narrative manner and depicting its own life, inner contradictions and 
metamorphoses commanded by the interactions with its Others (whether it is 
religion, psychoanalysis, literature or the human and social sciences we are talking 
about) we might very well find the main episodes of this narrative in Ricœur’s 
own oeuvre.   
This is not to say that Paul Ricœur is nothing more than a historian of 
Philosophy or that his main contribution to the “history of ideas” consists in 
providing a complex but coherent “synthesis” of 20th century philosophy. If this 
were to be the case, nothing would compel us to read his books besides the 
possibility of finding good introductions to other philosophers or philosophical 
movements. Rather, as I will argue throughout this thesis, his philosophy is 
characterized by what we could call an “informed original thinking”, enriched by 
the many readings and philosophical standpoints that pervade his works, but never 
neglecting to rethink them through, to discuss and appropriate them into his own 
enlarged standpoint. 
Many could have written a history of 20th century philosophy. But few 
could have found the similarities and the differences between so many different 
theories, established the relevant connections among them and drawn the frontiers 
at the points in which no meaningful contact could be established. And surely no 
other philosopher used this creative mixture of contexts to redefine and rewrite 
philosophy in his own way.  
As someone who started publishing at a time when the most relevant 
philosophers in France were Sartre and Merleau-Ponty and who managed to 
outlive Lacan, Foucault and even his friend and onetime assistant Derrida, 
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someone who took part in almost every major philosophical debate of his time, 
from the heated discussions with Lévi-Strauss, Lacan and Greimas, to the open-
minded and cooler interaction with the domains of historiography, literary theory 
and religious studies, Paul Ricœur occupies a very particular place in the history of 
philosophy in the last century. 
This attentiveness and respect for the perspective stemming from the other 
was probably due to his peculiar notion of truth, which we will analyze in detail 
further on. Ultimately, as Charles Reagan puts it, Ricœur was driven by the belief 
that “virtually every philosopher, ancient, modern, or contemporary, has seen a 
piece of the truth.”1 His immense erudition and his constant attitude of self-
effacement, often enrolling other authors to the immense play of his philosophical 
oeuvre in the making, never assuming a theory as his own if credit could be 
granted to others, results in a complex theoretical construction, one full of detours 
and delayed continuities. In Ricœur’s own words: “Detour/return is the rhythm of 
my philosophical respiration”.2 
This erudition and complex maze of interacting perspectives means that 
one can read Ricœur’s books – and, to a minor extent, in a modest way, some parts 
of this thesis insofar as it touches upon almost the entirety of his production – as 
an introduction to many of the philosophical key figures and topics of the 20th 
century but also, and perhaps more importantly, that Ricœur’s interventions and 
theoretical contributions not only formed several generations of philosophers, not 
only helped to establish the philosophical coordinates of the last century, but also 
contributed to transform it and to set the tone for some of the major debates we are 
witnessing in our own day.3  
It is well known that in spite of his contribution to many schools of thought 
and movements it was probably through his renewal of hermeneutics that Ricœur 
became famous. And it is also clear that one of the main features of his particular 
strand of hermeneutics consists in the equilibrium between tradition and 
                                                
1 Charles Reagan, Paul Ricœur. His life and his work (Chicago/London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996), p. 74. 
2 Interview with Charles Reagan, July 4th 1991, republished in Paul Ricœur his life and work, op. 
cit., p. 133. 
3 For instance, the debate about life and the living [vivant] that is taking place in France and 
elsewhere. See Fréderic Worms “Paul Ricœur entre la vie et le mal ou les coordonnées 
philosophiques du siècle” in La Philosophie en France au XXème siècle (Paris: Gallimard, 2009), 
pp. 530-549. 
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innovation, belonging, distanciation and appropriation. As we will see throughout 
this thesis, one constant characteristic of his was the tireless reworking of certain 
topics and the obsessive search for new theoretical grounds to explore. Up until 
Ricœur’s death, his was an open-ended philosophical exploration. Every new book 
could bring both a surprise and a major new contribution to a given philosophical 
field. With his demise, in a way, the corpus is now closed. 
But it is also, up to a certain point, open, in fieri, because Ricœur 
emphasized the role of the “engaged reader” in the making of the meaning of a 
text as well. Ultimately, every text is written to be read and without that reading it 
will remain incomplete. Philosophical research as well is constitutively incomplete 
but insofar as philosophy is made up of events in language that acquire their 
stability through the fixation in texts, and since the provisional meaning of these 
texts is only constituted in the reception they have by their readers, there are 
certainly many ways in which Ricoeurian philosophy is meaningful today, through 
the actual signification imposed on it by their readers. 
Consequently, this thesis is yet another exercise of reading Ricœur once 
again, in order that a certain rational reconstruction of his philosophy can take 
place, one that tries to be both informative and more than a mere repetition of its 
content. Rather, it tries to discuss some of its main claims, to make clear how and 
why Ricœur arrived at them but also in which ways he could have made other 
choices and how we can think the same problems differently. 
This and all similar attempts – that is: all discussion of his philosophy that 
at the same time aims to use his analyzes in order to move beyond them at some 
point and think more – are, in my view, the best homages we can pay to Paul 
Ricœur, one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th century. 
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 5 
Introduction 
 
Any reader, however vaguely acquainted with the works of Paul Ricœur, 
will most likely find that the title of this thesis has a familiar ring to it. As the 
reader has by this time certainly found out, the inspiration for it comes from 
Ricœur’s last book published during his lifetime, The Course of Recognition4, 
which is, in many respects, one of his most important works and the one book that 
shows the final stage of his philosophical anthropology. 
As Ricœur states right at the outset of this book, in page X of his preface, 
The Course of Recognition is born of a “wager”, namely that “it is possible to 
confer on the sequence of known philosophical occurrences of the word 
recognition the coherence of a rule-governed polysemy”. With this effort, Ricœur 
aims to fill a gap in the history of philosophy, namely, to provide a concrete and 
substantial grounding to the notion of recognition in philosophy, one that would be 
able to unify the scattered occurrences of this word under a given course 
[parcours]. Ricœur says course, rather than “theory” because he is well aware that 
nothing allows him to say that such different philosophical notions as Kant’s 
Rekognition (the third synthesis in the Critique of Pure Reason5) or Hegel’s 
Anerkennung will fit exactly under the same umbrella. But this does not mean that 
recognition does not play a role in philosophy, nor that we cannot make sense of 
it; that is, to find the similarities and differences between the different contexts in 
which it appears; to, as a good dialectician, “cut up each kind [of speech] 
according to its species”6, as Plato would put it. 
Correspondingly, my wager, reciprocal to that of Ricœur, is that we can 
also find a course of another notion, that of conflict, not only in the history of 
philosophy itself but particularly in the philosophy of Paul Ricœur. Therefore this 
is a twofold wager: firstly, my claim is that this is one of the fundamental notions 
of Ricœur’s philosophy, maybe even the key methodological notion that animates 
his philosophy. I am not alone in this wager, as many other interpreters chose to 
                                                
4 Paul Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, translated by David Pellauer (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2005). 
5 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
6 Phaedrus 265e, translation by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff in Plato, Complete Works, 
ed. by John Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997). 
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follow similar interpretative paths prior to myself.7 However, evidence must be 
provided to support this claim. And this brings me to the second aspect of the 
wager: that the notion of conflict is subject to many semantic nuances throughout 
the work of Paul Ricœur and that it belongs to a web of interconnected concepts 
whose semantic field we will have to determine. On the one hand, we are speaking 
of different things if we speak of a conflict of interpretations in hermeneutics or a 
conflict of duties in the context of a practical philosophy. On the other hand, 
conflict is incomprehensible if we do not define it with the aid of other concepts, 
such as dialectics, conciliation, and mediation, to name only a few. I will try to 
show in later chapters how this web of interconnected concepts is formed; in so 
doing, this dissertation will be operating a semantic analyzis with practical import. 
The result of this approach is that this thesis will affirm the primacy of the 
notion of conflict in the work of Ricœur, showing how it is animated by the 
dynamics of antithesis, but whose significance will be determined on a case-by-
case basis. Thus we will follow the course of conflict and treat each of its stages as 
if they were philosophical figures. Once we start following the footsteps of these 
particular instantiations of conflict we will find that there is a certain productive 
circularity in the movement, because conflict will reveal itself, first and foremost, 
in the domain of human existence and praxis, and it will be precisely to the 
domain of human action that it will return in the end, but not without having made 
the long detour through the domain of language. By having traversed this domain, 
conflict will have forced human existence to follow a difficult path of self-
interpretation, showing it its limits in a rather negative way.  
However, retracing this course in the works of Ricœur and thereby going 
through most of his published works, would be difficult without a preparatory 
                                                
7 In choosing this topic, I am certainly being influenced by a community of reading, namely, the 
community of Ricœur studies in my country of origin, Portugal.  Thus the wager is supported by a 
whole history of interpretation which precedes me. Amid this Wirkungsgeschichte, I am 
particularly indebted to the emphasis on conflict put forward by Maria Luísa Portocarrero and 
Fernanda Henriques. Portocarrero has emphasized very early on the significance and importance of 
Ricœur’s conflictual hermeneutics. See Maria Luísa Portocarrero da Silva, A Hermenêutica do 
Conflito em Paul Ricœur (Coimbra: Minerva, 1992). Fernanda Henriques went further, by insisting 
that conflict was the overall key to Ricœur’s work. See Fernanda Henriques, “A esperança 
escatológica e o conflito de interpretações” in A Filosofia de Paul Ricœur, edited by Fernanda 
Henriques (Coimbra: Ariadne, 2006), pp. 109-114). Olivier Abel, for his part, has come up with a 
similar notion to characterize a particular part of Ricœur’s philosophy. Concerning his theory of 
history, he speaks about the “unsurpassable dissensus”. See Olivier Abel, “The Unsurpassable 
Dissensus” in Between Description and Interpretation. The hermeneutic turn in phenomenology, 
edited by Andrzej Wiercinski  (Toronto: The Hermeneutic Press, 2005). 
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exposition of other accounts of conflict given by different authors, both in the 
history of philosophy and in Ricœur’s own contemporaneity. Therefore, what I 
properly call “the course of conflict” corresponds to parts three, four and five of 
this dissertation, namely, the existential conflict, the hermeneutic conflict and the 
practical conflict. These three broad titles seem to me to encompass the three main 
“stages” of the concept of conflict in Ricœur’s philosophy, and their arrangement 
in this order allows me to follow a rough diachronic approach, following Ricœur’s 
footsteps as his philosophy was unfolding. Each of these parts has an introduction, 
and in the introductions (or sometimes in the main sections of each chapter as 
well) I sometimes fall into the temptation of including historical or biographical 
accounts of Ricœur’s own life, in order to provide a clearer picture of why such 
and such a topic appeared in his philosophy. There is, of course, a danger of 
falling back into some sort of psychologism or, even worse, a mild determinism 
with this method, but as I understand it, I avoid the pitfalls of both these dangers. 
The historical details, which are brief, are there to provide a background picture of 
the development of Ricœur’s work and, therefore, of his take on conflict. 
Certainly, the work underwent many changes in spite of Ricœur’s plans and 
intentions (so we can not attribute the meaning of his work to his alleged motives) 
and neither did the events of his life absolutely determine the trajectory of his 
philosophy. However, somewhere in this particular mix between intentions, long-
term plans and unexpected events, the web of Ricœur’s life was formed, and the 
development of his own thought certainly has a relation with it, even though not a 
univocal one. It is to show this relation and, more than anything else, the 
meaningful shifts in his work as I see them, that the biographical details are 
included. 
It goes without saying that the three stages of the course of conflict are not 
the beginning or end of Ricœur’s philosophy, or of a philosophical interpretation 
of conflict. Many other philosophers included meaningful accounts of conflict in 
their own works, and for some of them conflict was at least as important, if not 
even more, than it was for Ricœur. In parts one and two of this dissertation I will 
present in its main traits some accounts of conflict that we can find elsewhere. Part 
one deals with the presence of conflict in the history of philosophy. I start with the 
Greek cultural landscape and end up assessing Kantian and Post-Kantian 
philosophy, namely Hegel and Marx. Most of the models analyzed in this part 
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exerted some influence in Ricoeurian philosophy, especially the philosophies of 
Kant and Hegel. Ricœur famously depicted himself as a “Post-Hegelian Kantian”. 
Thus  part one of this dissertation, after revisiting the Greek source, will provide 
an account of Kant’s antinomies in the Critique of Pure Reason (complemented by 
an analyzis of the role of negation, whose role is constitutive for conflict), a 
description of Hegelian dialectic and of the Marxist and Post-Marxist 
radicalization of conflict, leading up to a whole new field, that of the sociology of 
conflict, or “conflict theory.” This intersection between the theoretical domains of 
philosophy and sociology will prove to be decisive in part two of this dissertation. 
It goes without saying that my take on conflict is first and foremost 
philosophical. This delimitation of my field of study is what allows for a rule-
governed polysemy to be found. Thus I will not study the phenomenon of conflict 
as it is sometimes seen in political theory, namely, in the relation between States 
and the occurrence of war. However, the depiction of intersubjective conflicts at a 
societal level will sometimes bring me to the neighborhood of sociology and this 
will be fundamental in the last parts of my dissertation, where I will put forward 
some claims concerning a discipline that is many times forgotten or neglected, that 
is, social philosophy. This choice obviously has its consequences.  
Part two is dedicated to an analyzis of the contemporary reappraisal of the 
notion of conflict through some of the key authors that contributed to this 
revitalization. Many authors could have been included in this lot, authors who 
reappraise and analyze conflict in a variety of ways, from Lyotard to Rancière, not 
forgetting the many forms of Post-Marxism. The analyzis of each one of these 
authors and their possible relation to Ricœur’s own standpoint would be, in itself, 
a book-length discussion. Because I could not do justice to their own standpoints 
here, and in order to avoid this study becoming too lengthy and the mixture of 
thematics almost unintelligible, I chose to concentrate on those authors who, 
reassessing and reappraising conflict in their own ways, have the most meaningful 
connections with Ricœur. These are, for the most part, authors in the Critical 
Theory tradition like Habermas and Honneth, as well as Anglo-Saxon political 
philosophers, either from the liberal tradition (Rawls) or the communitarian 
standpoint (Walzer and Taylor). The pragmatic sociology of Boltanski and 
Thévenot is included in the lot because their analyzis of conflict was vital for 
Ricœur, and Hunyadi’s depiction of the “virtue of conflict” is included because it 
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is a powerful model for assessing conflict, alongside those of Habermas and 
Honneth. This is the reason why I dedicate chapters to each one of these authors, 
and only mention many others in passing, sometimes dedicating sections of 
chapters to them, other times only bringing up occasional contributions 
meaningful for the debate I am engaging with at the moment. In a nutshell, the 
authors and topics dealt with in the first two parts were chosen either because they 
represent the most fundamental and important models of conflict, or, primarily, 
because they exerted an influence in Ricœur’s philosophy. Thus the discussions of 
the first parts (which are not following a diachronic approach in part two, and only 
partially so in part one) somehow serve as prelude to what we will see in the 
course of conflict as such, that is, the three following parts.  
The third part of the thesis will deal with the first stage in the course of 
conflict. From this point onwards, I will adopt a method of analyzis that is both 
thematic and loosely chronological. In part three, the focus will be on Ricœur’s 
first publications from the 1940s and 1950s, as he was caught up in the problems 
of existence, finitude, and their relation to transcendence, as well as the main 
problem of the will and its dialectical relation with the involuntary, which 
circumscribes the phenomenon of human action. The last chapter of this third part 
will allude to Ricœur’s first incursion into the domain of historiography, such as 
we can find it in the first collection of essays published in the 1950s under the title 
History and Truth.8 This chapter will at the same time prepare the transition for 
part four, because I will include a discussion on method and deal with the 
epistemological consequences of Ricœur’s own version of perspectivism. This 
discussion will largely anticipate his thematic reflections on methodology – 
including the famous “long route” – that we will include in the hermeneutic phase, 
which will be the core of part four. 
Part four will therefore be dedicated to the relevance that conflict assumes 
at the hermeneutic level. It will deal with the hermeneutic turn of Ricœur’s work, 
starting with the publication of The Symbolism of Evil9 in 1960 and extending all 
                                                
8 Paul Ricœur, History and Truth, translated by Charles Kelbley (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1965). 
9 Paul Ricœur, The Symbolism of Evil, translated by Emerson Buchanan (New York, Harper and 
Row, 1967). 
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the way until the late 1980s with the publication of From Text to Action.10 This 
part of the dissertation will depict the main characterization of conflict that is 
made in the first phase of this hermeneutic turn, which broadly corresponds to the 
1960s and to the publication of The Conflict of Interpretations11, whose emphasis 
is in the conflict of symbols and the clash between psychoanalysis, structuralism 
and the phenomenology of religion. In this part, I will also look at the second 
phase of the hermeneutic turn, that is, the period of the 1970s and 1980s, in which 
the emphasis shifts from symbols to texts and the conflict takes place at the level 
of discourse and text interpretation. This last hermeneutic phase encompasses the 
conflicts taking place with metaphors, narratives and among broad methodological 
choices which define hermeneutics itself, such as the clash between “explanation” 
and “understanding”. Finally, this phase also marks the first stage of incorporation 
of the analytic philosophy of action into the philosophy of Paul Ricœur. We will 
see how Ricœur uses philosophy of language and phenomenology to try to grasp 
human action, namely in La Sémantique de l’Action12. This intersection between 
language and action was further explored in From Text to Action, where Ricœur 
uses the metaphor of the text to explain human action. At this point of his 
production, his hermeneutics includes a philosophy of action as one of its 
offshoots. The last chapter will shed some light on its main details, and with the 
hermeneutics of action the transition to part five will be accomplished. 
Part five of this thesis will deal with the last stage of Ricœur’s production 
and also of the course of conflict. This will be the opportunity to show that in the 
last analyzis this philosophy is, as Johann Michel has forcefully argued, a 
philosophy of human action.13 The passage through the domain of language and 
hermeneutics will have also inaugurated the indirect mediation between the 
immediate I and the reflexive self, between existence and self-interpretation. If the 
                                                
10 Paul Ricœur, From Text to Action. Essays in Hermeneutics II, translated by Kathleen Blamey 
and John B. Thompson (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1991). 
11 Paul Ricœur, The Conflict of Interpretations. Essays in Hermeneutics, edited by Don Ihde 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974). 
12 This work does not exist in English translation, only in the French original and in Italian and 
Portuguese translations. In chapter 4.5 I will offer a glimpse at the significance of these lectures, 
whose corrected version I edited in Portuguese. See Paul Ricœur, La sémantique de l’action, edited 
by Dorian Tiffeneau, Coll. Phénoménologie et Herméneutique (Paris: C.N.R.S., 1977). For the 
Portuguese translation, see Paul Ricœur, O Discurso da Ação, edited by Gonçalo Marcelo (Lisboa: 
Edições 70, 2013). 
13 See Johann Michel, Paul Ricœur, une philosophie de l’agir humain (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 
2006). 
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conflictual aspect of the self will by that time already been clearly signaled 
(namely in part three), this conflictuality will be deepened and further explained in 
part five. In this part, dedicated to practical conflicts, conflict will make its way all 
the way through fundamental ethics, applied ethics, the theory of justice and social 
philosophy. There, the fragile constitution of the capable human being, he or she 
who is constantly “acting and suffering”, will become fully apparent, as the 
touchstone of Ricœur’s philosophical anthropology. The last chapter of part five 
will be dedicated to analyzing Ricœur’s course of recognition. With the course of 
recognition, the course of conflict will also stop, and we will have come full circle. 
With these three stages the course of conflict will have been brought to 
completion.14 However, there will be three additional parts to this dissertation. 
These three parts will be substantially different from those that precede them. On 
the one hand, they will be shorter and very concise. On the other hand, they will 
be largely autonomous. In the first one of them, part six, I will try to give a 
systematic account of what has been said about the significance of conflict in Paul 
Ricœur, and to complement the course of conflict with an analyzis of the other 
interconnected notions that help to limit and define it. This will complete my 
rational reconstruction of Ricœur’s philosophy. It will be the synchronic 
counterpart to the mostly diachronical approach undertaken in the three preceding 
parts. It will show that even though conflict is the key to Ricœur’s philosophy, he 
himself did not understand his philosophy as a mere emphasis on conflict qua 
conflict. This part will be my provisional conclusion on his philosophy.  
Part seven will take a further step in the autonomization process, in that I 
will address some critical remarks to what has been said before. I will put forward 
a proposal of critical theory and radical hermeneutics that will largely go beyond 
Ricœur, and my critiques will aim at seeing exactly how radical is Ricœur’s 
hermeneutics and how critical is his critical theory. Finally, part eighth will be 
really autonomous, in that, largely inspired by Ricoeurian philosophy, but also by 
Critical Theory and the other meaningful influences assessed in parts one and two, 
I will put forward my proposal of a hermeneutic social philosophy, aimed at 
                                                
14 Or maybe I should rather say that my discourse on the course of conflict in Ricœur’s work will 
have come to an end. Certainly, I do not pretend to be fully exhaustive in my depiction, and it 
would be rather pretentious to assume I was. Since this is a hermeneutical study, it does not pretend 
to be more than an interpretation, and this course might have assumed different forms and 
directions. It will be up to the reader acquainted with Ricœur’s works to propose an alternative 
reading and course, should one become apparent.  
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recovering a project of emancipation and rooted in what I think will be a new 
critique of reason. 
As it is now apparent, this dissertation has a diverse and manifold 
structure. As it is a lengthy undertaking, some readers might prefer to read it 
otherwise than in a traditional way, from beginning to end. Readers interested in a 
partial history of conflict in philosophy, from the Greek source up until Marx, and 
then in some of the discussion which took place in the 20th century, more than in 
Ricoeurian philosophy itself, might choose to concentrate on parts one and two. 
Readers only interested in the diachronic approach to Ricœur’s philosophy from 
the vantage point of conflict, can skip the first two parts and read only parts three, 
four and five. A condensed version of the results of my assessment can be found in 
parts six and seven. Finally, readers uninterested or only remotely interested in 
Ricœur, but curious about my own modest attempt to put forward a hermeneutic 
social philosophy, could go straight to part eight.  
Some very concise notes on the structure of the thesis and on my 
methodology must be added. The dissertation has eight parts, besides a prologue, a 
conclusion and this introduction. Each part is divided in chapters, and each chapter 
is subdivided in sections. The number of chapters or sections in each part is 
uneven, as is their respective number of pages. This imperfection in form is 
justified by the difference in relative importance of each of the chapters or 
sections. Some subjects simply could not be dealt with in a more succinct manner. 
However, there is also a mark of contingency in my own method, and in the 
origins of the secondary bibliography I use to help me think and put forward my 
own claims. 
 Even though the corpus of Ricoeurian studies is nowadays massive, with a 
fast growing increase in the number of dissertations, papers and books written on 
Ricœur, I must acknowledge the limitations of my own reading capacities. The 
body of literature with which I am most acquainted comprises mainly studies 
written in English, French or Portuguese. Because of that limitation, the 
dissertation will mainly quote studies published in these languages, with some 
occasional exceptions. 
Whenever possible, I quote from the existing English translations. 
However, because I always read the French originals and can not always find the 
English translations, or in cases in which none exists – which is the case of 
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Ricœur’s earlier books or many of the so-called introuvables, the lesser known 
texts, mainly comprising a majority of papers or conference presentations written 
in French, many of which I quote here and to which I was granted access at the 
Fonds Ricœur – I opt for providing a translation myself, if the quotation is deemed 
important enough to appear directly in the body text. Whenever it seems to me that 
the intelligibility of the claim can do without the quotation, I include it in a 
footnote, usually in its original language. Since I am not a native English speaker, 
some of the translations might not be perfect, but I assume full responsibility for 
them. 
I always quote the English titles when translations exist, but when I 
mention the date of publication of these books or articles, I always refer to the 
original publication date, in case these are texts originally published in French and 
not in English. In the bibliography added at the end of this dissertation, I choose to 
always list Ricœur’s publications according to their original versions, but add the 
references to the translations used in English or other languages. The table of 
contents will likely prove to be useful when navigating the somewhat complex 
maze of this dissertation. 
Finally, allow me to mention that you will sometimes find a repetition of 
some topics or quotations in this dissertation. This happens, partly, because the 
evolution of Ricœur’s work is dialectical – somewhat like Hegel’s, but with 
important differences which I will discuss below – and therefore he often comes 
back to the same old topics, but revisiting them anew. I confess to having fallen 
prey to that same temptation, and I expect that readers will not feel exasperated if 
some topics resurface here and there. This amounts to a strategy that was familiar 
among ancient philosophers, and namely Plato, and which aimed at making the 
readers so acquainted with a certain topic that they eventually followed the thread 
of the argument naturally and were more easily persuaded. Whether or not I 
succeeded, if only partially, in this endeavor, I leave to the reader’s better 
judgment. 
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Part One 
 
The Significance of Conflict for Ricœur’s Theoretical 
Framework – Main Sources and Theoretical Influences 
 
From what has been said up until now and from what the reader can 
legitimately anticipate at this point, it might seem as if I am overemphasizing the 
presence and the role of conflict both in the thought of Paul Ricœur and in 
Philosophy in general. And insofar as the dynamic of conflict is in itself an 
antithetic, that is, a development brought about by a process of negation, this 
legitimate but wrong anticipation could lead to a slippery slope whose conclusion 
would be that I would be equating Ricœur’s philosophy with some hyperbolic 
philosophy of negation whose specific shape could then be compared to Sartre’s 
Being and Nothingness15 or Adorno’s Negative Dialectics.16  
Actually, this is not the case. Before offering a summary of the main loci 
of conflict in the history of philosophy, and the way they influenced Ricœur, allow 
me to also offer a caution about the role of conflict in his philosophy. This will be 
important to see at what fundamental levels he does not allow conflict to take 
over. This brief summary will function as a first delimitation of the general 
framework of Ricœur’s philosophy. As such, and after the first five parts of this 
thesis, this framework will be rendered more precise in part six. At the level of a 
fundamental ontology, Ricœur postulates the primacy of the moment of “primary 
affirmation”17 over negation, even if, as we shall see in the later chapters, 
Ricœur’s thought undergoes a process of long mediation that progressively 
postpones, transforms and even tones down ontological claims (a process that is at 
its height in Oneself as Another).18 In fact, in the article “Negativity and Primary 
Affirmation” (1956) Ricœur, disputing Sartre’s identification of being-in-itself 
with nothingness19, tries to recover a Philosophy of Being as act:  
                                                
15 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (New York: 
Pocket Books, 1978). 
16 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, translated by E. B. Ashton (London: Routledge, 1973). 
17 Ricœur, “Negativity and Primary Affirmation” in History and Truth, pp. 305-328. 
18 Ricœur, Oneself as Another, translated by Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1992). 
19 Ricœur, “Negativity and Primary Affirmation”, p. 324. 
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The function of negation is to render the philosophy of being difficult, as Plato was the 
first to have recognized in the Sophist: “being and non being embarrass us equally”. 
Under the pressure of the negative, of negative experiences, we must reachieve a notion of 
being which is act rather than form, living affirmation, the power of existing and of 
making exist.20 
 
As we shall see, this definition of philosophy as act, strongly reminiscent 
of the Aristotelian notion of energeia, as well as of Spinoza’s conatus, remained at 
the heart of Ricœur’s philosophy and existential standpoint up until the very end, 
as can easily be attested by reading Living up to Death.21 This is his attempt at a 
philosophy of life, which probably stems from the early influence of Bergson but 
that, nonetheless, never achieved a definitive, achieved form. It indicates that in a 
certain way, Ricœur wanted his philosophy to be a philosophy marked by an 
intention to say yes rather than no, or, better put, to say yes in spite of the 
overwhelming presence of the no. This assumes many forms: to affirm life in spite 
of the negative in our lives, such as suffering, the tragic choice between two bad 
options; to posit personal convictions in spite of the necessity of sharp and lucid 
demystifying critiques often associated with philosophy; to attest to the existence 
of one’s personal identity in spite of all the limitations of the cogito and the long 
detour through cultural symbols and the interpretations provided by the human 
sciences; and, ultimately, to posit Being rather than nothing. 
However, every existential consideration notwithstanding the notion of 
conflict becomes characteristic of his philosophical style. In a first approach, it can 
be argued that conflict assumes the form of a methodological constraint stemming 
from an ethical imperative to think philosophical problems from many different 
viewpoints and, therefore, to try to attain some sort of enlarged perspective, as 
well as to pay homage to every single author whose reflection was important to 
him. As Ricœur states in his small, autobiographical paper “Auto-compréhension 
                                                
20 Ibid., p. 328. 
21 Ricœur, Living up to Death, translated by David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2009). 
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et histoire” (1987): “I acknowledge, and I am grateful for having been from the 
start influenced by opposed forces and fidelities”.22  
The fact that this is a hermeneutic philosophy, and that he stresses the 
importance of the act of reading in the fulfillment and completion of the meaning 
of any text, enriched his works with an immense body of literature. And it seems 
as if, at some points, his method assumed a constructivist tendency. In dealing 
with a certain philosophical problem, for instance, the problem of the cogito, 
consciousness, and when trying to answer the question: do I have access to my 
inner consciousness, or not?, he wanted to weigh and put to the test evidence for 
both of the possible answers.  
In fact, it was the problem of consciousness that explicitly drew Ricœur’s 
attention to the existence of a “conflict of interpretations”. When writing his 
famous and polemical book on Freud,23 as he tried to provide a sufficient 
definition of interpretation, Ricœur arrived at the following conclusion: “The 
difficulty – it initiated my research in the first place – is this: there is no general 
hermeneutics, no universal canon for exegesis, but only disparate and opposed 
theories concerning the rules of interpretation. The hermeneutic field is internally 
at variance with itself.”24 And he went on to conclude that there is a “polarized 
opposition” that creates “the greatest tension”: that between two apparently 
irreconcilable hermeneutic styles, the former taking hermeneutics to be the 
“manifestation and restoration of a meaning addressed to me”, and the latter 
assuming the hermeneutic task of demystification, reduction of illusion. Ricœur 
would later drop this opposition, or at least reformulate it in different ways: one 
such way is to take the first hermeneutics to be a hermeneutics of convictions, and 
                                                
22 See Ricœur, “Auto-compréhension et histoire”, available at 
http://www.fondsricoeur.fr/photo/Auto%20compr_%20et%20histoire.pdf, p. 1 (my translation). On 
this notion of “opposed fidelities” and on the need of recognizing a debt towards others and their 
perspectives, see also Ricœur, Critique and Conviction. Conversations with François Azouvi and 
Marc de Launay, translated by Kathleen Blamey (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 
28: “my problem was to determine whether what I was doing within the philosophical field was not 
a form of eclecticism, were I really to articulate my multiple allegiances originally and honestly: 
Gabriel Marcel, Husserl, Nabert, not to mention Freud and the structuralists. This problem of 
intellectual honesty has always been agonizing for me: not to forget my debt to a given line of 
inspiration, or to any other.” 
23 Ricœur, Freud and Philosophy. An Essay on Interpretation, translated by Denis Savage (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). 
24 Ricœur, Freud and Philosophy, pp. 26-27. 
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the second one to be some sort of critical hermeneutics.25 But in 1965 he had 
reached this groundbreaking conclusion: there are at least two ways to understand 
consciousness, one archeological, demystifying, borrowed from Freud, and 
another that is teleological, Hegelian, that recollects the meaning of each “figure” 
of consciousness in the figure that supersedes it. These two alternative models are 
also types of the two broader, conflicting hermeneutic styles that we have just 
mentioned, hermeneutics as restoration of meaning, and what Ricœur decides to 
name “hermeneutics of suspicion”. 
By “hermeneutics of suspicion” Paul Ricœur understands a general 
tendency, to be found in the works of thinkers such as Marx, Nietzsche and Freud 
(even though, we could say, Foucault, Derrida and Critical Theorists could also be 
added to the lot), who are significantly dubbed the “masters of suspicion”, to 
distinguish between two types of meaning: one that is blatantly patent, and another 
which is latent, hidden. Thus these thinkers go on to try to unmask this first 
meaning in order to uncover what is “really” going on; in the case of 
consciousness, the common denominator that Ricœur finds among the three of 
them is the denunciation of consciousness as being “false”, “illusory”. Thus in the 
different spheres of economy, morality and our psychic life these three “masters of 
suspicion” proceed to dethrone the almighty Cartesian subject and its pretention to 
have immediate, transparent access to him or herself, to identify the ego cogito 
with immediate apprehension of the contents of consciousness, to understand its 
wills and desires, and even to determine him or herself rationally. This 
confrontation between two radically divergent positions concerning the 
constitution of human consciousness and, more broadly, the significance of the act 
of interpretation, does not result in a stalemate, as we will see in more detail in 
part four. 
 What I want to focus in on now is Ricœur’s appropriation of this type of 
conflict and the way in which it will slowly become pervasive in his philosophy. 
In fact, this conflict has important epistemological implications. If “the 
hermeneutic field is internally at variance with itself” and if, following Gadamer’s 
                                                
25 This is explicitly assumed by Ricœur, and this project is the core of his intervention in the 
important debate between Gadamer and Habermas. See Ricœur, “Hermeneutics and the Critique of 
Ideology” in From Text to Action, pp. 270-307. For a development of this project with the help of 
Habermas and Ricœur, see John B. Thompson, Critical Hermeneutics. A Study in the Thought of 
Paul Ricœur and Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
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assertion with which Ricœur seems to agree, at least up to a certain extent, that the 
“being that can be understood is language”26, then the result could very well be 
Nietzsche’s aphorism, stating that “facts is precisely what there is not, only 
interpretations”.27 And thus we would be stuck in some sort of linguistic relativism 
in which, at most, we would have different “language games” and “family 
resemblances” among them.28 The fact that there is a metatheoretical conflict in 
hermeneutics, a dispute about the very rules that guide interpretation, and that at 
least one of the parties, in this 1965 conflict, disputes the reality of consciousness 
and even the existence of truth29 certainly confronts all epistemology in a possible 
fatal way. The result of this conflict will determine the noesis and the noema, both 
how we can “know” or “interpret” and the specific contents that are presented to 
us in that act of knowledge or interpretation. 
Ricœur’s solution is to integrate both conflicting parties in his response. 
Conscience is neither omnipotent, omniscient, nor is it totally inexistent. 
Knowledge is neither direct, nor is it impossible. Hermeneutics will entail a 
movement that goes from the first, naïf meaning (sometimes understood as a pre-
comprehension) to a broader, more informed and more accurate meaning, that 
involves letting both parties in conflict enlarge our perspective30 and our access to 
the phenomenon in question. Most important of all, this process, which is, in a 
                                                
26 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Continuum, 2004), p. 470. 
27 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power translated by Walter Kaufmann and J. Hollingdale (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1968), §481, p. 267. 
28 This seems to be the type of philosophical standpoint best expressed in the second Wittgenstein. 
See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 4th edition, translated by G. E. M. 
Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009). 
29 This is one of the claims of the so-called “hermeneutics of suspicion” and, actually, one of its 
boldest assertions. The attack on consciousness depends on the suspicion concerning the existence 
of truth itself. It can be found in Nietzsche’s early writings. See Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and 
Lying in a Non-Moral Sense” in The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, edited by Raymond 
Geuss and Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
30 This is akin to what Kant called, in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, the “broad-minded 
way of thinking” (erweiterte Denkungsart). See Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of 
Judgment, translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), §40, pp. 174-175. This is part of his definition of reflective judgment, and it will be given a 
very specific use by Hannah Arendt and Ricœur in later writings. I will come back to this essential 
feature of Ricœur’s philosophy (or at least of my own interpretation of it) in parts three and four, 
when I discuss Ricœur’s perspectivism and the conflict of interpretations. For my own 
interpretation of this aspect in Kant, I am particularly indebted to Mário Jorge de Carvalho. See O 
egoísmo lógico e a sua superação – um aspecto fundamental do projeto crítico de Kant” in Kant: 
Posteridade e Actualidade (Lisboa: C.F.U.L., 2007), pp. 229-256 and also Mário Jorge de 
Carvalho, “Problemas de Desconfinamento de Perspectiva: pensar por si, o pensamento de outrem 
e alguns preconceitos sobre a filosofia actual e o passado da filosofia” in AAVV., Os Longos 
Caminhos do Ser – Homenagem a Manuel Barbosa da Costa Freitas (Lisboa: Universidade 
Católica Editora, 2003), pp. 117-138. 
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specific sense that we will have to further explain in later parts of this dissertation, 
dialectical, really becomes the methodological touchstone of his philosophy. The 
conflict of interpretations becomes part of his specific grasping of philosophical 
problems. In fact, Ricœur’s own approach to philosophy usually involves the 
analyzis of local, well-delimited problems:  
 
What I believe, or at any rate what I can tell about myself, is that each book is determined 
by a fragmentary problem. I very strongly hold to the idea, moreover, that philosophy is 
addressed to specific problems, to well-circumscribed difficulties of thought. (…) My 
books have always been limited in scope. I have never posed massive questions of the 
type: what is philosophy? I deal with particular problems.31 
 
The end-result of this process is that in order to solve each one of these 
particular difficulties he adopts what he calls “the long route” [voie longue], one 
full of detours, the detour of the confrontation with the several possible angles of 
response to the specific problem he is addressing, one in which the conflict of 
interpretations plays itself out until the philosophical object at stake has been 
properly grasped and defined. 
One could call this process “dialectical”, in that, at its best, this conflictual 
procedure is creative, that is, it is not only the dissolution of a false opposition, a 
choice between a “good” description of the phenomenon and a “bad” one, but 
rather an immanent development stemming from the clash of the two conflicting 
positions. Not a simple mixture, not a raw eclecticism, but a third, comprehensive 
position that does not exhaust the description of the phenomenon but makes it 
move forward. Now, this all sounds very Hegelian, but it is not, as such, fully 
Hegelian. 
Among the many influences that we can count as having been fundamental 
for this philosophy, I think that the ongoing debate between Kant and Hegel 
probably is the most decisive. If the whole of German idealism took place, 
chronologically, between Kant and Hegel, and if the theoretical discussion that 
this gigantomachia sparked entailed the destiny of reason, philosophy, human 
freedom and, ultimately, the whole of human history, then we can say that this 
debate never reached its endpoint. And we can also say that Ricœur, as many 
                                                
31 Ricœur, Critique and Conviction, p. 81. 
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others in his time – let us just mention Eric Weil – felt divided in this debate and, 
simultaneously, understood the drama this discussion occasioned.   
Paul Ricœur’s own definition of his philosophical standpoint in the 60s 
was, following Weil, a bit perplexing; echoing this gigantomachia, he defined 
himself as practicing some sort of “post-Hegelian Kantianism”: 
 
The Kantianism that I wish to develop now is, paradoxically, more to be constructed than 
repeated; it would be something like a post-Hegelian Kantianism, to borrow an expression 
from Eric Weil, which, it appears, he applied to himself. For my own part I accept the 
paradox, for reasons that are both philosophical and theological. 
First, for reasons that are philosophical: chronologically, Hegel comes after Kant, but we 
later readers go from one to the other. In us, something of Hegel has vanquished 
something of Kant; but something of Kant has vanquished something of Hegel, because 
we are as radically post-Hegelian as we are post-Kantian. In my opinion, it is this 
exchange and this permutation which still structure philosophical discourse today. This is 
why the task is to think them always better by thinking them together – one against the 
other, and one by means of the other. Even if we begin by thinking something else, this 
“thinking Kant and Hegel better” pertains, in one way or the other, to this “thinking 
differently from Kant or Hegel”, “something other than Kant or Hegel”.32 
 
this “thinking Kant and Hegel better”, as pompous as it might sound at the 
beginning, is nothing other than a methodological and epistemological declaration. 
Ricœur is trying, or so I am arguing, to put forward a Hegelian dialectical method, 
even though one that has original contents, is strictly hermeneutic, and is 
rigorously delimited by the Kantian framework of a “philosophy of limits”. 
And why does Ricœur’s philosophy assume such a shape? Because by 
saying that it is a “hermeneutic” philosophy, we are also affirming that it is a 
philosophy of finitude, i.e., one that takes human finitude and, moreover, the 
finitude of every act of interpretation as its starting point. According to Ricœur’s 
words at the end of his Lectures on Hermeneutics, one must choose between 
Absolute Knowing and Hermeneutics33. It is the gap left by the impossibility of 
                                                
32 Ricœur, “Freedom in the light of hope” in The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 412. 
33 Ricœur explicitly states “entre le savoir absolu et l’herméneutique, il faut choisir”. See Paul 
Ricœur, Cours sur l’herméneutique, Cours polycopié  (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie 
de l’Université Catholique de Louvain, 1971), p. 228. 
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the Hegelian Absolute Knowing that must be filled by the competition between 
finite interpretations, in a process of perpetual reinterpretation. 
This means that in this type of philosophy, and even if Ricœur is a 
Christian believer, there is no equation between faith and reason, theology and 
philosophy, no self-presentation of the Absolute. He makes this clear in an article 
about his friend Pierre Thévenaz. In this piece, when depicting Thévenaz’s 
standpoint, Ricœur is really presenting his own standpoint at the same time: that of 
a philosopher “without Absolute”.34 So Hegelian he is, but not completely 
Hegelian. His position can more accurately be described, in Johann Michel’s 
words, as a kind of “broken Hegelianism” [hégélianisme brisé]35, that is, a 
philosophy of incomplete mediations between fragmentary conflicts that never 
closes itself of in the form of a complete system. It is, if we dare say, a plurality 
without a totality or, perhaps, one whose totality is only ideal and that contains a 
multiplicity of possible unities, each of which is just the perspective on the whole 
grasped from a particular, situated viewpoint. 
We can therefore understand how the dynamic of conflict is the driving 
force of this philosophy; it is that which makes it move forward. Nonetheless, we 
are still far from having grasped the many particular forms or figures in which it 
instantiates itself, or the different ways in which Ricœur deals with it. If we are to 
grasp it we must follow the “long route”, the incomplete mediations of its 
instantiation.  
This is, in short, a very condensed summary of how conflict works in 
Ricœur’s philosophy, its methodological significance and ontological limit. As it 
is easy to conclude from these introductory remarks, the main figures of conflict in 
the history of philosophy that exerted an influence in Ricœur are to be found in 
                                                
34 Allow me to include a longer quotation which makes fully explicit what is a philosophy “without 
Absolute”. “La foi, la foi dans la Croix du Christ, telle qu’il la comprend et la vit dans un contexte 
ecclésial et dogmatique protestant, ne le condamne pas à la non-philosophie : elle le rend au 
contraire à l’autonomie de la réflexion. Mais cette liberté de philosopher à quoi il est remis par sa 
foi, il ne la dépense pas non plus à accorder, à harmoniser les énoncés de sa philosophie à ceux de 
sa foi : la philosophie, selon lui, n’a pas la charge de parler sur Dieu, encore moins du point de vue 
de Dieu; on verra même qu’elle atteint son authenticité quand elle avoue son impuissance, mieux, 
son renoncement à devenir philosophie du divin, philosophie divine. A une philosophie divine il 
opposera constamment une philosophie responsable devant Dieu, une philosophie où Dieu n’est 
plus l’objet suprême de la philosophie, mais où il est impliqué à titre de pôle d’appel et de réponse 
de l’acte philosophique lui-même.” Ricœur, “Un philosophe protestant: Pierre Thévenaz” in 
Lectures 3. Aux frontières de la philosophie (Paris: Seuil, 1994), p. 246. 
35 See the section “Hégélianisme inversé et hégélianisme brisé” in Johann Michel, Ricœur et ses 
contemporains (Paris: P.U.F., 2013), pp. 47-56.  
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Kant and Post-Kantian philosophy (above all, in Hegel). Or, better put, the 
Kantian antinomies provide Ricœur with the framework within which his Hegelian 
inclinations are forced to restrict themselves. Within this framework, he has to 
recur to hermeneutics and the conflict of interpretations in order to be creative, 
without transgressing the bounds strictly imposed by his Kantianism. 
I could have started the pages that follow by going straight into Kant and 
Post-Kantian philosophy, given its admitted influence in Ricoeurian philosophy. 
However, in philosophy, one must start from the beginning. And in the beginning 
(at least for philosophy) there were the Greeks, and already in Greece conflict was 
taken to be a major source for speculation. Conflict had to be accounted for. And 
we find in the Greeks many forms of conflict which, in turn, influenced other 
thinkers (let me mention Nietzsche and Hannah Arendt as two obvious examples) 
who, in turn, also left a strong impression on Ricœur. 
As such, my historical account of the models of conflict will take the 
Greek cultural source as its point of departure and then, ignoring the major gap 
and centuries of history of philosophy overlooked, fast forward into modernity, 
making a short stop in Hobbes and Rousseau, in order to afterwards go straight 
into Kant and Post-Kantian philosophy. This brief presentation will find in Greece 
the sources of cosmic, metaphysic conflict (for instance, in Heraclitus), 
interpersonal conflict (as in Hobbes’ depiction of the state of nature) or the 
conjunction of both in Greek tragedy. Kant will provide us with the theoretical 
model of conflict as reciprocal limitation, whereas in Hegel conflict will be the 
metaphysical motor of history. In Marx, where our historical depiction stops, 
conflict will be instrumental in bringing about revolution. 
Ricœur was acquainted with all these sources, and I will often mention 
his comments on all these models of conflict. I will walk with Ricœur, but not 
necessarily following his footsteps. Throughout these two following parts of the 
dissertation, besides assessing the theoretical consequences of the authors and 
phenomena I am alluding too, I will also be gathering the elements to be later used 
in my proposal of social philosophy. 
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1.1 – The Pre-History of Conflict in Philosophy: From Ancient 
Agon to Modern Struggle 
 
1.1.1 – The Greek embattled cosmogony and mythology 
 
This dissertation will discuss at length many aspects of conflict in 
contemporary philosophy. However, a certain historical background is necessary 
in order to grasp the way in which the acknowledgment of a tensional aspect of 
existence seems to be present even in our oldest cultural sources. We who inhabit 
the West – or, better put, the North Atlantic – are the spiritual offspring of two 
main sources, namely the Greek and Hebraic cultures. I will focus very briefly in 
the Greek source, not only because it witnessed the birthplace of philosophy, but 
also because the conflictual and agonistic character seems to be more present in it 
than in its Hebraic counterpart. 
For most of our philosophical and cultural tradition, Greece was by and 
large considered as the embodiment of rationality; there is no reason to be amazed 
by this assessment since it was in that very particular juncture that spectacular 
developments in mathematics and astronomy took place, as well as the first 
systematic and serious attempts to develop disciplines such as history, geography 
and zoology. Nonetheless, paradoxically as it may at first glance seem, the same 
culture that invented logos also contained within itself strong elements of a 
fundamental and powerful irrationality. 
Nietzsche, in the early article “The Dionysiac worldview”, which is 
reprinted in English alongside The Birth of Tragedy36, his seminal first book that 
develops and expands the early article, insightfully spoke about what he took to be 
the two major influences rocking Greek culture, namely, the “Apolline” and the 
“Dionysiac”. In Nietzsche’s description, these were not only the names of the cults 
respectively dedicated to the Gods Apollo and Dionysus. Rather, they are taken to 
be the inspiring principles guiding Greek art, thought and action. And they are also 
seen as being, in some way, complementary even though opposed – or, in other 
words, dialectical. The Apolline creator embodies individuality, order and 
rationality whereas his Dionysiac counterpart is inspired by intoxication and 
                                                
36 Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Dionysiac Worldview” in The Birth of Tragedy, pp. 117-138. 
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ecstasy. In Dionysiac art subjectivity allegedly disappears, as it is swallowed by 
“the erupting force of the general element in human nature”.37 
This is a very powerful and compelling depiction, whatever its historical 
truth. The accuracy of the historical details presented is somewhat disputed38, but 
Nietzsche certainly captured an essential conflict in Greek culture; he himself 
explicitly asserts that Apollo and Dionysus “represent stylistic opposites which 
exist side by side and in almost perpetual conflict with one another”.39 Whether or 
not it is true that only in dream and intoxication, as Nietzsche contends, do we find 
delight in existence, he also significantly contributed to the contemporary 
reappraisal of tragic conflict, and tragic wisdom. I argue that he did so, because 
what he called the “Dionysiac elements” of Greek culture were a sign of a deep-
seated violence, madness and irrationality that occasionally burst out into the 
open. 
This can, in fact, be understood against the backdrop of the Greek 
struggle between reason and unreason. The best depiction of this irrationality 
paradoxically mixed with the effort to impose rationality is given by E. R. Dodds 
in his The Greeks and the Irrational.40 Dodds’s seminal book is an attempt to 
uncover the elements of mystery and the less conscious levels of human 
experience that we can find in Greek culture.41 His was the first systematic attempt 
to critically assess the image of Greek life as a monolithic expression of 
rationality. He shows how the actions of Homeric heroes are overdetermined, in 
that there is a two level explanation for their behaviour: on the one hand, their 
subjective freedom, but on the other hand, the will of a god, or moira.42 
                                                
37 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 120. 
38 Nietzsche’s particular style is very peculiar and idiosyncratic. His depictions are not always 
accurate but this should not blind us to their philosophical pertinence. Whatever the historical 
accuracy of what he says, we should bear in mind that his interpretation of the Greeks, of 
Christianism, Buddhism, and so on, convey his own philosophy. If he at times misreads or reads 
them too quickly and in a problematic manner should not surprise us, because this approach is 
meant to produce effects, it is a performative. I will say a little more about his style below. As for 
the reception of the Birth of Tragedy, it was promptly criticized by the German scholars of the 19th 
century, following a harsh review by Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorf and not taken as serious 
scholarship for more than 40 years. A more detailed account of this can be found in the 
introduction to the Birth of Tragedy by Raymond Geuss (p. xxviii). This harsh criticism and 
Nietzsche’s subsequent biographic events (including his failed Professorship) might account for the 
later deepening of his pessimism. 
39 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 119. 
40 E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley: California University Press, 1951). 
41 Ibid., p. 1. 
42 See p. 7 of the first chapter, “Agamemnon’s apology”. 
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Furthermore, they are sometimes carried away by some sort of perversion of their 
thumos (which can roughly be translated as the organ of feeling) to the point of 
blindness, when they cease to act rationally. Other forms of madness (mania) will 
be later emphasized by Plato who, in the Phaedrus, attests that  “in reality the 
greatest of blessings come to us through madness, when it is sent as a gift of the 
gods.”43 
Allow me now to take a step back and to try to trace back this conflictual 
aspect of Greek culture to the very early expressions of their religion and 
mythology. These aspects are well known and I will be doing nothing more than 
recalling the most salient of them. Perhaps the conflict between rationality and 
irrationality, which we already alluded to, can find its earliest locus in Greek 
poetry in the role chaos and cosmos play in the Greek cosmogony. According to 
the poet of the Theogony44, “Chaos was first of all” (v. 116), and only after do we 
begin to discern the individuation of particular forms. From Chaos came the night, 
and from night the day was born. 
The examples of violence in this cosmogony are so plentiful, that it seems 
almost redundant to bring them up. Each generation that comes into being has to 
struggle for its existence, over against the preceding one, and this is not without its 
symbolic force. The episode of Kronos mutilating the genitals of his father 
Ouranos and tossing them into the sea (vv. 189 and ff.) is particularly striking, but 
it is hardly an exception. The Giants, the Titans and finally the Olympians display 
a wide array of power struggles that we do not need to recall in detail in order to 
make our point. Even the venerated Olympians needed to fight their Titanomachy 
before the poet of the Theogony could deem them fit to rule over people. 
Likewise, there is no denying that courage is the main virtue that we can 
find in the Iliad45, whose characters are sometimes taken by a divine madness, a 
sort of frenzy (menos), many times embodied in Hector, Ajax or Achilles. We can 
therefore speak of a certain identification of the Greek arete with the virtues of the 
warrior (and no wonder that this period is significantly called the heroic age), at 
least before the classical period. In a way, at least one notable polis, Sparta during 
the golden period from the VI to the IV centuries B.C. significantly identified its 
                                                
43 Plato, Phaedrus, translated by Harold North Fowler, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1914) (Loeb Edition) 244a, p. 465. 
44 Hesiod, Theognis (London: Penguin, 1973). 
45 Homer, The Iliad, translated by Robert Fagles (London: Penguin, 1991). 
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civic arete with this warrior ideal. Werner Jaeger, for instance, has rightly 
emphasized how the civic and military elegies of the Spartan poet Tyrtaeus 
provided a strong cultural model that was respected throughout Greece.46 
Nietzsche often lauded these warrior virtues, or aristocratic virtues as he 
sometimes called it, and opposed them to what he dubbed “slave morality”, 
“morality of the weak”, “inversion of values” or simply “ressentiment”.47 
Now, the theological-cosmogonic background of omnipresent violence 
certainly played a part in the apology of heroism and, later, in a certain 
rationalization of competition in the form of argument in the public space, which 
we will see in section 1.1.5 below. However, the conflictual backdrop also 
assumed other forms in Greek thought. I want to emphasize one of them that is 
specifically metaphysical. 
 
1.1.2 – Heraclitus and metaphysical conflict 
 
Of all the Pre-Socratic philosophers, Heraclitus is perhaps the one whose 
philosophy – alongside the one of his monadic counterpart Parmenides – has had a 
more profound influence in all subsequent history. Like all the other Pre-Socratics, 
Heraclitus’s writings – namely, his influential book – are all completely lost, 
except for a few fragments that survived in later literature; he was considered one 
of the best writers in Ancient Greece but in spite – or perhaps because – of this 
fact, his words display a fundamental ambiguity that makes any interpretation of 
them extremely risky and unsure. Charles Kahn insightfully noted that this is in 
part due to the fact that he was both a philosopher and a poet, and usually chose to 
express himself in a prophetic tone.48 Not surprisingly, he was known as “the 
Obscure”. Thus we can say about Heraclitus what he himself declared about 
Apollo: “The lord whose oracle is in Delphi neither declares nor conceals, but 
gives a sign” (fragment XXXIII Kahn)49, if we interpret “giving a sign” as 
                                                
46 Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture. Volume 1: Archaic Greece, The Mind of 
Athens, translated by Gilbert Highet (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946), p. 87. 
47 These topics resurface in many of Nietzsche’s writings. However, we can find the essential 
claims in Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, translated by Carol Diethe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
48 Charles Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus. An edition of the fragments with translation 
and commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 7. 
49 There are several different ways to organize and a fortiori to translate these difficult fragments, 
according to what philologists believe was the structure of Heraclitus’s book and also to which of 
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“speaking symbolically”. The importance of the symbolic element of human 
language will be time and again emphasized by Ricœur, as we will see in the 
Symbolism of Evil and elsewhere. 
Heraclitus is mainly known for his theory of the universal flux, which is 
somewhat scolded by Plato; this is mainly expressed metaphorically in the famous 
fragment L: “As they step into the same rivers, other and still other waters flow 
upon them.” The same metaphor eventually led many commentators to assume 
that they had to “dive” in the thought of Heraclitus so that they could grasp it in all 
its “depth”.50 He is also known for his assertions concerning the underlying 
harmony and even unity of opposing elements, as we can easily attest in fragments 
CIII:  “The way up and down is one and the same” and CXXIV: “Graspings: 
wholes and not wholes, convergent divergent, consonant dissonant, from all things 
one and from one thing all.” For the Post-Hegelian philosopher, this resonates well 
with the dialectical mode of thinking to which we will come back many times over 
the course of this dissertation. In fact, Hegel wholeheartedly stated “There is no 
proposition of Heraclitus which I have not adopted in my own Logic.”51  
As far as we can understand in a more or less straightforward manner 
what Heraclitus is proposing, we can say, in a nutshell, that his is a metaphysical 
depiction of the order of things – both human and cosmic – based on an 
underlying equilibrium of conflicts. This is very plain in his apology of the heroic 
virtues that we have alluded to above; fragment C states: “Gods and men honor 
those who fall in battle”. But the most striking aphorisms are evidently those that 
are expressed metaphorically, because those are the ones whose indeterminacy 
makes them applicable both at a micro and a macro level, both in human and 
cosmic affairs. I think we can assert that throughout his whole depiction of 
conflict, a fundamental paradox is expressed; that much we can find in fragment 
LXIVV: “The path of the carding wheels is straight and crooked.” Perhaps what 
he is stating is, again, that an underlying straightness supports what he takes to be 
                                                                                                                                 
these fragments are considered credible. I have chosen to follow Charles Kahn’s organization, and 
translations. See Kahn, op. cit. When fragments are in square brackets, it means that it is not clear 
whether or not these are really the words of Heraclitus, or whether commentators quoted them 
from apocryphal sources. 
50 See the description in Anthony Kenny, A New History of Western Philosophy, volume 1: Ancient 
Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), p. 13. 
51 Hegel, Lectures in the History of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1968), p. 279 (quoted by 
Kenny, op. cit., p. 13). 
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crooked; that an order, or a cosmos, can be discerned among chaos. That indeed 
the Logos is that all things are one or, as Copleston puts it, that the main kernel of 
his philosophy “consists in the conception of unity in diversity, difference in 
unity.”52  
Once again, the claim is expressed metaphorically, this time not with 
water, but with fire: “The ordering, the same for all, no god nor man has made, but 
it ever was and is and will be: fire ever living, kindled in measures and in 
measures going out.” (fragment XXXVII) It is perhaps not a coincidence that in 
this case, the metaphor is fire, with all the potential of destruction that this image 
brings. However, the insistence on the measure, perhaps an effect of the ordering 
imposed by logos, also seems to bring a relative stability, at least in certain phases. 
A whole cycle theory of destruction, birth, death and rebirth through tragedy could 
be drawn here; however, the overdetermination of Heraclitus’s words is such, and 
the language games and interpretations that they allow for are so varied53, that 
there is no sure way of knowing whether or not this metaphoric is really 
ontological or even, as many have put it, pantheistic54; but let us assume, even if 
only for the sake of the argument, that this metaphoric does intend to have an 
ontological grasp. What has been said up to now is sufficient to see the dynamic 
that moves his philosophy, and the ground has been laid to quote and analyze in a 
row several different fragments specifically dealing with conflict: 
 
LXXV 
[ [The counter-thrust brings together, and from tones at variance comes perfect 
attunement, and all things come to pass through conflict.] ] (Aristotle, Nichomachean 
Ethics VIII 1155b4) 
 
 
                                                
52 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Volume 1: Greece and Rome (New York: Image 
Books, 1993), pp. 39-40. 
53 Kahn speaks about the “linguistic density” of these fragments, namely, that they display a 
multiplicity of ideas in a single word or phrase. But he adds that if we take into account the 
phenomenon of resonance, enriching the meaning of each fragment by taking them together into 
consideration, we have better chances of interpreting them correctly. (Kahn, op. cit., p. 89). This is 
more evident in the fragments that can be grouped together in virtue of their sharing a common 
topic. This is what I am doing here when analyzing together the group of fragments thematically 
alluding to conflict. Kahn himself notes (Ibid., p. 90) that a “non-formal resonance” exists between 
words such as War (polemos) and Conflict (eris) which appear many times in these fragments. 
54 See for instance Copleston, op. cit. p. 43. 
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LXXVIII 
They do not comprehend how a thing agrees at variance with itself; it is an attunement 
turning back on itself, like that of the bow and the lyre. 
 
LXXXI 
[[Homer was wrong when he said 'Would that Conflict might vanish from among gods 
and men!' (Iliad XVIII, v.107). For there would be no attunement without high and low 
notes nor any animals without male and female, both of which are opposites.] ] 
 
LXXXII 
One must realize that war is shared and Conflict is Justice, and that all things come to pass 
(and are ordained?) in accordance with conflict. 
 
LXXXIII 
War is father of all and king of all; and some he has shown as gods, others men; some he 
has made slaves, others free. 
 
These five main fragments display a deep resonance. Three of them 
mention conflict (eris), another uses the term war (polemos) and fragment 
LXXVIII manifests the fundamental paradox of an agreement “at variance with 
itself”. Fragments LXXV and LXXXI are suspected of being paraphrases or 
reminiscences, rather than direct quotations, while the other three seem to be, to 
the best of our knowledge, the words of Heraclitus himself. However, for the sake 
of some coherence, I will consider all the fragments as statements of his 
philosophy, whether direct or indirect. This might be an unfounded assumption, 
but whether or not these are his own words, they entered in the history of 
philosophy as being so; and because they are part of this Wirkungsgeschichte, I 
will take them as providing a certain model of conflict, even though we must be 
cautious in what comes down to authorship. 
Fragment LXXV, which is reproduced by Aristotle in his Nichomachean 
Ethics provides us with the most general description of the generative power of 
conflict in the philosophy of Heraclitus: “all things come to pass through conflict”. 
Almost that much is asserted in Fragment LXXXII and Kahn considers that 
LXXV is a paraphrase and a partial quotation of LXXXII, which would amount to 
Heraclitus’s own words. In both of these fragments, there is an assertion of the 
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inner interdependence between conflict and what fragments LXXV, LXXVIII and 
LXXXI call “attunement”. Fragment LXXXII takes a step further and instantiates 
this attunement, calling it justice. 
Now, when he speaks about “attunement” what is at stake is evidently a 
musical metaphor, as is clear from fragment LXXXI. But its reach seems once 
again to be ontological: attunement is understood as what produces harmony, not 
only in music but also, or at least in seems, both in the cosmos and in human 
affairs. Things “are ordained” (fragment LXXXII) through conflict, and it seems 
to be that the attunement leading to harmony and justice is an attunement 
produced by conflict. Or, as fragment LXXVIII puts it: “it is an attunement 
turning back on itself”. 
Kahn provides some important comments concerning the possible 
meaning of these fragments. He explains that at the time of Heraclitus, what he has 
translated as “attunement” (and that can be more literally translated as “harmony”, 
harmonie) had basically three possible meanings: physical fitting together of parts; 
military or social agreement; and musical attunement55 and he claims that all these 
three meanings come together in these fragments in order to form the Heraclitean 
notion of the “fitting together as the cosmic order as a unity produced from 
conflict”.56 Fragment LXXVIII makes explicit Heraclitus’s scorn of those who can 
not grasp this intrinsic constitution of things, and fragment LXXXI pushes further 
this claim, by putting Homer himself in this lot.  
I think we can assume, from the reading of this latter fragment, that the 
novelty of Heraclitean philosophy in the context of the already intrinsically 
conflictual Greek cultural landscape is that for him it is not sufficient to affirm the 
existence of scattered conflicts in individual figures, whether we are talking about 
Gods in a poetic fashion, or trying to empirically describe war among humans. 
And even though he remains at a fundamentally ambiguous level, his philosophy 
is already a step ahead in the generalization and universalization of claims; no 
longer do we find the personification of “conflict” in figures such as Chaos like it 
was the case in Hesiod. Now, conflict is internal and omnipresent, whatever that 
might mean. His second claim implicit in the scorning of Homer is the assertion 
that we can never do away with conflict because it is precisely the inner workings 
                                                
55 Kahn, op. cit., p. 196. 
56 Ibid, p. 197. 
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of this generalized and internalized conflict that assure that harmony and order are 
established. Concerning harmony, Kahn insightfully defines it as “an intelligent 
structure or purposeful activity, a unified whole whose essential parts (or stages or 
tendencies) are related to one another by polar contrast.”57 
Finally, fragments LXXXII and LXXXIII introduce war as a meaningful 
concept. The fact that in fragment LXXXII war is identified with justice is in itself 
an innovation; we find no such thing in Homer, Hesiod or in the early Pre-
Socratics. Kahn interprets this as a transposition of the human into the cosmic 
order: “The point of this paradoxical equivalence can be understood only if we 
bear in mind that warfare has become a figure for opposition in general: only at 
the cosmic level can Conflict and Justice be reconciled and seen as one.”58 This is 
a plausible interpretation because the most important “order” or “harmony” for 
Heraclitus is the “hidden” one; as such, in the context of his monism, warfare 
might be seen as an “apparent” evil which, ultimately, is all part of the greater 
order of things. In this order of things, not only do these conflicts exist, but they 
are also necessary. Without them, balance would be lost. 
In fragment LXXXIII war is hypostasized as a principle superior even to 
Gods; it is war that decides who is a slave and who is not. This can be understood 
literally, because in ancient warfare those defeated could in fact be enslaved. But it 
can in fact also have a metaphorical sense, and Hegel’s master-slave dialectic will 
later provide us with a significant use of this notion in a different form. And 
ultimately, as Kahn suggests, here it probably assumes the specifically Heraclitean 
meaning of a universal principle of opposition. If war governs everything, even 
Gods are subject to it. If, in the ancient Theogony, even the Olympians had to 
conquer their place by waging war against the Titans, the result is that it is war 
itself which decides everything. And if we recall the Heraclitean belief in the 
perpetual flux, it is perhaps likely that the situation will change and the perpetual 
state of conflict will bring about a new configuration of the great order of things. 
As Kahn suggests, this is the recognition of “a positive role for what is prima facie 
a negative term”.59 
                                                
57 Ibid., p. 200. 
58 Ibid., p. 206. 
59 Ibid., p. 210. 
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Now, this last suggestion by Kahn is very important. Heraclitus might 
indeed have been the first to positively assess conflict (or war) instead of only 
acknowledging its existence. Throughout this thesis, many positive assessments of 
conflict will be alluded to. But none in fact seems to accord conflict so general and 
widespread a role, except, in a significantly different way, Hegel’s.  
Summing up what has been said in these last few pages, we can say that 
Heraclitus presents a generalized theory of conflict as universal opposition where 
both human and cosmic oppositions are conflated. He does this by positing an 
interdependence between conflict and universal equilibrium in ontological terms. 
This results in a monism where dispersed fragments are almost, as it were, 
integrated into a systematic whole. There is no such thing as a category of totality 
in Heraclitus as there will be in German idealism, but we modern readers are 
almost compelled to read him in these terms. And there is no doubt that he 
provides us with an overarching, metaphysical model for conflict. This model will 
be picked up by later philosophers in different ways. His influence is almost 
surprising, given the scarcity of his writings. Kenny reminds us that the whole of 
Heraclitus’s surviving fragments amounts to no more than 15000 words and that, 
as a consequence, his enormous influence over later philosophers must be a matter 
for astonishment.60 
I do not want to suggest that the philosophy of Heraclitus can serve as a 
basis for contemporary conflict theory. However, it is important to acknowledge 
the existence of this vague, overdetermined model where conflict is the 
overarching principle. Many of the later models will be much more self-contained 
and restricted. But it is important to keep Heraclitus in mind because he will be, 
alongside Hegel and Marx, one of the fiercest advocates of this notion in the 
history of philosophy. 
 
1.1.3 – The tragic vision of the world 
 
Now let us turn to a different cultural phenomenon, namely Greek 
tragedy. Tragedy is not in itself philosophical in the strict sense. It does not stem 
                                                
60 Kenny, op. cit., p. 16. 
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from a conceptual effort. But it can be considered, as Ricœur argued, one of the 
non-philosophical sources of philosophy. 
My goal in these next few pages will not be to analyze in detail the 
tragedies that survived up until our day, nor to delve into its technical details, such 
as the functions of mimesis and catharsis that Aristotle emphasized in his Poetics61 
and which Ricœur later reshaped in Time and Narrative.62 Much like everything 
else that I am writing in this chapter on the Greek cultural world, these pages on 
tragedy are only meant to recollect certain traits that can be interpreted as 
symptoms which display an agonistic background. My claim will be, over against 
Steiner’s early work, that the tragic worldview is still a strong source for our 
contemporary culture, even though it is now radically transformed. 
Much has been said about Attic tragedy. Allow me to come back to the 
young Nietzsche as a paradigmatic figure of this reappraisal. Raymond Geuss, in 
his introduction to the English translation of The Birth of Tragedy reasserts that 
Nietzsche considered tragedy, beyond any reasonable doubt, “the highest form of 
culture”63. He also emphasizes that when Nietzsche was writing his first book, he 
was also explicitly trying to defend a specific cultural model, one that, he hoped, 
nineteenth century Germany could embrace. His later disappointment and the 
meaningful shifts in his philosophical standpoint are widely stated and I do not 
need to recall them here. However, the young Nietzsche still was a fierce advocate 
of Dionysiac culture forms and probably envisioned a particular form of 
redemption in them. Thus, Geuss emphasizes that Nietzsche’s tragic model can be 
seen as his remedy to the “ills” of modern society. As such, the young Nietzsche is 
also Nietzsche, the social philosopher; certainly the musical influence of Wagner 
played an important role in this solution, as did the Romantic emphasis on the 
retrieval of meaningful traditions of the past, but I cannot fully explain this here. 
Geuss goes so far as to state that in providing this solution, Nietzsche is somehow 
contributing to the history of theodicies: his is a post-Christian theodicy in which 
what justifies the existence of the world is its aesthetic contemplation. This view 
will later be combined with a sense of affirmation that will be dubbed the “will to 
                                                
61 Aristotle, Poetics in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Volume 
II, edited by Jonathan Barnes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 2316-2340. 
62 Ricœur focuses on mimesis and not really on catharsis. See the chapter “Threefold Mimesis” in 
Ricœur, Time and Narrative. Volume 1, translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 52-87. 
63 Geuss, op. cit., p. x. 
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power”. This later affirmation will also be intrinsically agonistic, but it will be 
largely independent from the Greek source. Geuss sees the possibility of 
affirmation even in the Birth of Tragedy, stemming from a correct combination 
between the Apolline and Dionysiac principles.64 This is perhaps the best 
interpretation of what Nietzsche himself dubbed the “pessimism of strength”.  
What interests me the most in this first book is precisely Nietzsche’s 
depiction of the Dionysiac. This element of our nature is described as being 
“contradiction, bliss born of pain”.65 As for the Dionysiac musician, his music is 
described as stemming from “primal pain”, as being the “primal echo of it”66, as if 
to emphasize its strong but diffuse pathos, in stark contrast with the figurative 
character of Apolline art. 
Nietzsche puts forward the thesis according to which tragedy was born 
from the chorus67 and also that it is precisely in the chorus that we find the essence 
of tragic drama. This thesis underlines the organic nature of the Dionysiac 
element; in it “state and society, indeed all divisions between one human being 
and another, give way to an overwhelming feeling of unity which leads men back 
to the heart of nature.”68  
Now, whatever its historical accuracy, this depiction is interesting 
because it situates the Dionysiac as a state of primal violence (thus of overt 
conflict, in some sense) while at the same time providing some sort of liberation. 
In the recurring conflict between the Apolline and the Dionysiac, the Apolline 
reins in on the Dionysiac impulses through a certain repression, an imposition of 
order and control. We find some parallels of this description in Freud’s 
psychoanalytic theory, namely in the relation between the id and the superego. 
Now, it cannot be stated with enough force how much the early Nietzsche valued 
the Dionysiac element. To be sure, he did also recognize the need for the Apolline 
element, in order that a certain balance could be reached.69 The Dionysiac qua 
                                                
64 Ibid, p. xxvi. 
65 Nietzsche, ibid., p. 27. He also has an insightful comment when describing the Greeks as having 
a “unique gift for suffering” (pp. 23-24); indeed was not the pathos of the tragic art form a 
recognition of human fragility and an acknowledgement that the condition of the tragic hero was at 
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66 Ibid., p. 27. 
67 Ibid., p. 36. 
68 Ibid., p. 39. 
69 That much is stated by Geuss: “The construction of a higher culture requires both a sympathetic 
recognition of the existence of the Dionysiac and an integration of it into an alliance with what 
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Dionysiac, would be untenable if it were a permanent state, because it would 
amount to total chaos and a denial of subjective individuation. But what he does 
highlight is the way in which after Doric art, and after Attic tragedy (in fact, 
already after Sophocles) the Apolline, rational element radically took over, to the 
point of almost doing away with the Dionysiac altogether. 
And of course that the fault for this radical shift had a name; the name of 
Nietzsche’s target, as often, was none other than Socrates. But Nietzsche’s attack 
comes through an indirect source; Socrates is depicted as embodying the principle 
of rationalism, and as having decisively influenced Euripides. This influence, in 
turn, symbolized for Nietzsche the death of tragedy. In fact, has he forcefully put it 
in the following strong words, tragedy as he sees it eventually committed suicide: 
 
Greek tragedy perished differently from all the other, older sister-arts: it died by suicide, 
as the result of an irresolvable conflict, which is to say tragically, while all the others died 
the most beautiful and peaceful deaths, fading away at a great age.70  
 
Why did it commit suicide? Because, according to Nietzsche, in the tragedies of 
Euripides, “the thinker”, tragedy betrayed its own principles and vision. These are 
tragedies “in their decadent form”.71 And why was this so? Nietzsche puts forward 
several reasons: firstly, because Euripides brought the spectator on to the stage, 
that is, everyday ordinary people were brought to participate in the spectacle; he 
also claims that because Euripides taught oratory to the public, he radically 
changed dramatic art: he democratized it. Public speech in general was thus 
rationalized by Euripides (and we know how radically anti-democratic Nietzsche 
was). This was seen by Nietzsche as a betrayal of the artist’s high ideals: “Why 
should the artist be obliged to accommodate himself to a force which is strong 
only by virtue of its numbers?”72 
Among this concession to “spectators”, Nietzsche emphasizes two of 
them: he argues that Euripides the poet made concessions to Euripides “the 
thinker” (as if there was an internal doubling, akin to Hegel’s analyzis of the 
                                                                                                                                 
Nietzsche calls 'Apollo' and what he calls 'the daimonion of Socrates'. Different cultures are 
different ways of negotiating and renegotiating the terms of this 'alliance', probably a never-ending 
process. (Geuss, Ibid, p. xxx). 
70 Ibid, p. 54. 
71 Ibid., p. 55. 
72 Ibid., p. 57. 
 37 
division between acting consciousness and judging consciousness, or even, more 
radically, Pessoa’s heteronyms) and to Socrates himself. This is seen, according to 
Nietzsche, in Euripides’ tendency to “moralize” his tragedies and to question the 
form, and even the content of the older tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles.73 
Now, Socrates was, according to Nietzsche, the spectator that “did not 
understand tragedy” in its older form; thus he saw fit to criticize it and, in this 
view, command the very form and content of Euripides’ tragedies.  
In fact, Nietzsche goes so far as to argue that with Euripides the ancient 
struggle between the Apolline and the Dionysiac is replaced by a struggle between 
the Dionysiac and the Socratic.74   
The result of this struggle, according to him, was the elimination of the 
Dionysiac elements for they were morally blamable. And this because, or so the 
argument goes, the Socratic stance entailed a conflation between the beautiful and 
the good; this is his definition of “aesthetic Socratism”: “In order to be beautiful, 
everything must be reasonable”.75 Therefore, for Nietzsche, everything in 
Euripides’ tragedies is touched by this overemphasized rationality. The 
introduction of the prologue is seen as a proof thereof. By explaining at the 
beginning of the play who he is, what preceded the action and even what will 
happen during the course of the action the audience is about to see, the character is 
undermining the tragic effect of the drama. In fact, Nietzsche argues, by adopting 
these procedures, all the pathos of tragic action is lost. 
Paragraphs 13-14 of The Birth of Tragedy are testimony to a virulent 
attack ad hominem where Nietzsche, not content with criticizing Euripidean 
tragedy in the name of the lost Dionysiac elements, chooses to destroy the figure 
of Socrates. It is all Socrates’ fault, he argues, because he was actually the one 
writing these tragedies. Nietzsche describes the ancient poets and creators such as 
Homer, Pindar, Aeschylus and so forth, as being capable of “the deepest abyss or 
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the highest peak”76 and Socrates as being, by contrast, a monster, a freak of nature, 
whose overdeveloped logical ability dissected and killed everything profound in 
the Greek culture around him. 
This virulent attack is obviously exaggerated and lacking in historical 
accuracy, as is much else in Nietzsche’s works. Alexander Nehamas has argued 
two things about this: firstly, he claims that Socrates (and, to a lesser extent, Plato) 
was the hidden target of Nietzsche, because he was also considered as his fiercest 
adversary and rival77; Nietzsche wanted to be the anti-Socrates, such as Pessoa 
wanted to be the supra-Camões. Secondly, he shows how Nietzsche’s style heavily 
relied on the figure of hyperbole78 in order to make its points. As such, perhaps the 
best attitude we can adopt towards Nietzsche’s writings is to take them as being 
hyperbolic, many times historically inaccurate, but very often able to make 
interesting points that should be considered and discussed. 
Namely, I do think that his depiction of the Dionysiac captured well the 
essence of the irrational phenomenon in Greece, its specific pathos and the way it 
revealed itself in poetry and the early tragedies. The opposition he makes between 
the Dionysiac and the Apolline is also probably inaccurate. In the 20th century, 
scholars like Dodds79 and Giorgio Colli80 have shown how there was a strong 
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op. cit. chapter three: “The blessings of madness”, pp. 64-101). He claims that there is a core of 
irrationality in the rites practiced by the Apolline Pythia (and even the Sybil). This seems to me to 
be undeniable. He traces back these types of ecstatic prophecy to western Asia; arguing that 
“Apollo was originally an Asiatic of some sort”  (p. 69) he concludes that “the prophetic madness 
is at least as old in Greece as the religion of Apollo” (p. 70). However, Dodds also recognizes that 
there was a difference between Apolline and Dionysiac rituals, namely that whereas Dionysus 
offered freedom, Apollo promised security (p. 76). 
80 See the third chapter (“Il dio della divinazione”) of Giorgio Colli, La Nascita della Filosofia 
(Milano: Adelphi Edizioni, 1975), pp. 37-46. In this chapter, on “the god of divination”, Colli 
recalls the mystical character of Apollo. He situates this characteristic against the backdrop of 
pervasive irrationality in ancient Greek culture. In chapter one “La folia è la fonte della sapienza” 
(madness is the source of wisdom), pp. 11-22, he traces back this cult of madness to the ancient 
cults and connects it with the Pythia, in order to later emphasize its rationalized form in the 
platonic theoretical defense of mania. Finally, in chapter six “Misticismo e dialettica” (mysticism 
and dialectics), pp. 71-82, Colli examines the shift from the ancient mystical critiques to the 
instauration of dialectics as an art of discussion which would, eventually, transform the whole 
Greek cultural landscape. 
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element of irrationality in Apollo himself and, on the other hand, was not the 
presence of the daimon in Socrates’ life sufficient proof that even him was not the 
reified figure of logic and rationality that Nietzsche pretended him to be? Rather, 
was he not the living proof of the paradoxical character of Greek culture, animated 
by this mix of reason and unreason? 
Ultimately, a significant part of the importance of The Birth of Tragedy 
resides in its last paragraphs (§§16-25), where Nietzsche diagnoses what he 
perceives to be the crisis of 19th century Germany and its overemphasized 
rationalistic culture. Part of the solution to this state of affairs, he argues, would be 
to recover the Greeks ancient tragic worldview which is, evidently, based on 
conflict. This attempt to put forward a social philosophy which makes of conflict 
one of its guiding elements resonates with similar attempts (albeit with very 
different diagnoses and results) by Marx, Habermas and Honneth, which will be 
further specified below. 
Ricœur also comments on Greek tragedy many times throughout his 
published work. Two of the most important occasions in which he does so provide 
some of the hermeneutical keys for his books: namely, his comments on the 
Oedipus myth in Freud and Philosophy and his analyzis of Antigone in Oneself as 
Another. I will briefly mention these two analyzes, but I do not want to anticipate 
too much their discussion, which I will leave for later chapters. However, I do 
wish to mention right now the way in which Ricœur saw a fundamental place for 
the Greek tragic Weltanschaaung in his earlier work. 
The second part of the Symbolism of Evil is dedicated to analyzing the 
myths of the beginning of cosmos in several different cultures; chapter two of this 
second part is called “The Wicked God and the ‘Tragic’ Vision of Existence”. In 
this chapter Ricœur starts by asserting that the name of the chapter was chosen 
precisely because of the existence of Greek tragedy, and by claiming that in spite 
of the existence of other “tragics” (Christian, Elizabethan, modern), Greek tragedy 
is not one particular case among others but rather its essence. For Ricœur, the 
Greek tragic is “its origin – that is to say, both its beginning and its authentic 
emergence.”81 It is also noteworthy that by choosing to name the chapter the 
“tragic vision of existence” he is also deciding to take Greek tragedy not only as a 
                                                
81 Ricœur, Symbolism of Evil, p. 211. 
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particular art form that attained excellence in its Attic form, but as providing a 
whole vision of existence. 
To explain the origin of this world vision, Ricœur takes a step back and 
roots it in what he calls the “pre-tragic themes”, namely the cosmogony and 
Theogony to which I alluded at the beginning of this chapter. There is a 
connection, Ricœur argues, between the myth of chaos in the drama of creation 
and the tragic vision.82 He also mentions the utter helplessness of the Homeric 
heroes when faced with Zeus, the Erinys or the Moira; these are, he argues, 
expressions of non-personalized power that override personal choice83; moreover, 
the Moira is precisely the most impersonal aspect of that power: man is seen as 
having been granted a “lot” to which he must conform. This is the reason why the 
hybris will be so harshly punished. The Gods are jealous (phtonos) of any human 
greatness. Allow me to quote in passing the strong, magnificent tragic words of 
Sophocles in Antigone, precisely when depicting the destruction brought upon 
human beings because of them having committed hybris. These words are perhaps 
the most penetrating account of the tragic world vision. 
 
For time approaching, and time hereafter, 
And time forgotten, one rule stands: 
That greatness never 
Shall touch the life of man without destruction. 
 
Hope goes fast and far: to many it carries comfort, 
To many it is but the trick of light-witted desire  – 
Blind we walk, till the unseen flame has trapped our footsteps. 
For old anonymous wisdom has left us a saying 
‘Of a mind that God leads to destruction 
The sign is this – that in the end 
Its good is evil.’ 
Not long shall that mind evade destruction.84  
 
                                                
82 Ibid., p. 213. 
83 Ibid., p. 215. 
84 I am here following Dodd’s translation of verses 611 of Antigone; See Dodds, The Greeks and 
the Irrational, op. cit., p. 50. 
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Now, Ricœur’s depiction of tragedy in 1960 reflects precisely his own 
problematic at the time, and which is echoed in the words of Sophocles just quoted 
– evil. When, Ricœur asks, is the tragic problem born? It is born, according to him, 
when there is a conflict between heroic greatness and the predestination to evil85; 
this clearly presupposes an understanding of freedom much different from our 
own. The tragic hero implicitly believes in the positive outcome of his own action 
but over and again we are shown that he cannot escape his own fate. His hybris is 
at the same time an expression of evil, that of going against the grain, against the 
order of things. Ricœur here speaks of a dialectics between fate and freedom86; we 
face a hostile transcendence; human freedom is squashed, but from the angle of 
the audience, the affirmation of freedom in the heroic actions delays the fulfilment 
of fate (to the point of sometimes seeming contingent) and this is the reason there 
is a tragic drama. The spectacle depends on this tension. Thus, even though fate is 
inescapable, to the eyes of the audience, it might appear as a surprise. As Ricœur 
puts it: “the unstable mixture of certainty and surprise is turned to terror by the 
drop of transcendent perfidy that tragic theology lets fall on it”.87 Perhaps the most 
significant example of this annihilation by transcendence due to human hybris is 
given to us in the myth of Prometheus. As Ricœur contends, Prometheus embodies 
destructive freedom, in that he has the secret that would allow the fall of Zeus (his 
union with a mortal woman would result in the birth of the son who could 
dethrone him). This kind of power is seen, in Greek culture, as deserving 
punishment. The reason for this might also be the need to reaffirm being as it is: 
such a threat to the order of things contains, in itself, the power to unleash chaos 
over against cosmos; and this is something which the Greek mind does not seem 
prepared to accept, in spite of all the irrational elements present within it. 
It has been widely stated, following Aristotle, that there was a function to 
the Greek tragic spectacle. This function was catharsis, a sort of identification 
with the fate of the tragic hero, and an emotional discharge that allowed the 
spectators to suffer with the tragic hero without however being directly affected by 
it in their own lives. This was thus the result of a sort of pity, as well as a certain 
reconciliation with the order of things as they stood. 
                                                
85 Ricœur, Symbolism of Evil, p. 218. 
86 Ibid., p. 220. 
87 Ibid., p. 221. 
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There is, to be sure, and Ricœur notes it in passing, a difference in the 
tragedies of the different tragic writers. This is evident in the distinction between, 
for instance, Sophocles and Euripides, as Nietzsche contended. But Ricœur insists 
on another difference, the one between Sophocles and Aeschylus. According to 
Ricœur, Aeschylus envisions the end of the tragic itself: even though the hero is 
volatilized (like Orestes in the Eumenides) there seems to be an affirmation that 
Zeus is not wicked after all.88 But Ricœur also emphasizes that for Sophocles the 
tragic is at its height. Analyzing for the first time Antigone, he claims that it is a 
tragedy of “insoluble contradiction”.89 Whereas Aeschylus, in the Eumenides, saw 
the city as the locus of a possible reconciliation, the contradiction between law of 
the city and divine law reaches its height in Antigone. 
As such, what is the possible reconciliation provided by Greek tragedy? It 
is only a reconciliation with the order of things as they exist; Ricœur invokes the 
“suffering for the sake of understanding” that we find in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon; 
thus we find a positive function for suffering: suffering relieves us from hybris by 
showing us things as they are. And Ricœur invokes Jaspers in order to claim that 
this is precisely the meaning of “tragic wisdom”. Now, this is perhaps one of the 
true meanings of catharsis: we also suffer because we have been proven wrong, 
and we see how the tragic hero lost his life because of it. But the positive result is 
a better understanding of what is. This is perhaps an early version of Spinoza’s 
consenting to necessity. 
Ultimately, Ricœur believes that Greek religion does not or cannot 
provide a full reconciliation to tragedy. Apollo is the great counsellor, but he 
cannot forgive sins, only wash away the defilement by means of ritual 
purification; Dionysus provides us with an escape from ourselves, a temporary 
freedom from responsibility, but no total reconciliation either. The only 
reconciliation provided by tragedy is precisely the one which the spectacle brings 
about: “it is we who are frightened and lament, because we have put ourselves into 
the scene”90 
That the tragic hero is potentially each and everyone of us, that he is in 
itself a symbol of our own condition, is given an even clearer meaning five years 
                                                
88 Ibid., p. 228. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid., p. 231. 
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after The Symbolism of Evil, when Ricœur publishes Freud and Philosophy. In this 
book, he dedicates special attention to the Oedipus myth taken as an 
overdetermined symbol. In fact, for Ricœur in 1965, the Oedipus myth contains 
the kernel of both the origins of our conscience (through a Freudian, 
psychoanalytic reading) and the possibility for the future meaning of it, if we read 
it as a teleological tragedy of truth unveiled. A fuller account of this stage of the 
Ricoeurian hermeneutics of the self can be found in part four of this thesis, chapter 
4.3. 
In Oneself as Another, on the other hand, Ricœur takes up once again 
Antigone in what could be called a didactic manner. Indeed, his strategy is to use 
the myth in order to show how it can serve as an allegory for daily situations of 
conflicts of duties, whose solution and outcome can only be reached through a 
“judgment in situation”, that is, some sort of phronesis that does not apply a 
universal rule to a specific case but rather invents the rule to solve the difficulties 
in a case-by-case scenario; because, as he will argue, some conflicts of duties are 
inescapable, such as the conflict between law of the city and divine law that he 
chooses to emphasize in Antigone. Once again, I will leave a fuller discussion of 
this for a later chapter.91 But this persistence of the analyzis of Greek tragedies 
throughout his work is sufficient proof of the unwavering influence of the tragic 
vision stemming from the Greek source; indeed, the Greeks appear to him as the 
best example of the capacity of suffering, one of the main poles of the expression 
“the acting and suffering human being” which he often chose to encapsulate his 
philosophical anthropology. 
In the 20th century, other scholars besides Ricœur put forth strong 
evaluations concerning the positive value of tragedy and the tragic. George 
Steiner, for instance, seemed to echo Nietzsche’s concern over the demise of 
tragedy due to the effects of an overtly rationalistic Western society. 
Enlightenment, so the claim went, killed the metaphysics that made tragedy 
possible. This early view of Steiner, expressed in The Death of Tragedy92 in 1961 
was subject to much criticism.93 And indeed Steiner was forced to come back 
                                                
91 In this case a fuller account can be found in part five, section 5.2, “the conflict of duties”. 
92 George Steiner, The Death of Tragedy (Yale: Yale University Press, 1996). 
93 See for instance Thomas Van Laan treatment of the subject. Laan traces the history of what he 
calls the “Death-of-Tragedy Myth” in the 20th century, through Steiner and many other scholars, 
and he argues that believing that tragedy is dead prevents us from understanding and grasping the 
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many times to re-evaluate his assessment of Greek tragedies, a topic which never 
ceased to haunt him. 
Recently, in a paper titled “‘Tragedy’ reconsidered”94, Steiner added a 
further clarification. He conceded that the words “tragedy” and “tragic” are “an 
elusive branch of tangled ramifications” and that it might be that we do not know 
what we are talking about when we use these words95 but he chose to center his 
own working definition of tragedy as being based on the notion of an “original 
sin” or “dis-grace”. The tragic man is a fallen man.96 Now, in this reading, instead 
of focussing the “essence” of tragedy in the Greek world, Steiner chooses to locate 
some other loci in which something akin to the “Greek tragic” might take place. In 
The Death of Tragedy he had chosen to emphasize that tragedy was almost absent 
from the Hebraic source, except for the book of Job. In 2004 he instead underlines 
that the Judeo-Christian and Pauline myth of the disobedience and inherited guilt 
of Adam have a strikingly tragic tone. And the next step in his argument is to 
retrace other occasions in the history of our culture where models appeared that 
impute to our history or pre-history a fault that made things worse: he cites Marx’s 
1844 Manuscripts and Marxism in general as reproducing such a model: 
something fatal occurred as soon as our relation to others ceased to be one of trust 
and love, and was transferred to property and money relations. He accordingly 
also sees in Freud, Lévi-Strauss and Rousseau other examples of our fall from 
original innocence; a fall that deserves the epithet “tragic”. 
This is Steiner’s definition of the “tragic sense of life”: an ontological fall 
from grace. But in 2004 he seems much more willing to concede that this 
metaphysical or even theological dimension of tragedy is in permanent interaction 
with the work of (at least some) philosophers, like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and 
Benjamin. He goes so far as to state that Rousseau’s and Marx’s descriptions of 
alienation presuppose an “ontological weight” that concedes them their gravity.97 
Likewise, he is willing to see in Shakespeare or Goethe reminiscences of the tragic 
sense of life. The whole article, which displays Steiner’s immense erudition, is an 
                                                                                                                                 
specific viewpoint of authors such as Ibsen or Tennessee Williams. See Thomas F. Van Laan, “The 
Death-of-Tragedy Myth” in Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism vol. V, 2 (1991): 5-31. 
94 George Steiner, “‘Tragedy’ reconsidered” in New Literary History 35/1 (Winter 2004): 1-15. 
95 Ibid., p. 1. 
96 Ibid., p. 2. 
97 George Steiner, “‘Tragedy’ reconsidered”, p. 4. 
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intricate and very condensed report of the many tragic aspects that we can find in 
the several art forms of the last few centuries. All these cultural productions 
convey, he argues, “an aristocracy of suffering, an excellence of pain”98 even 
though, all in all, “there are very few absolute tragedies”.99 Steiner cites 
Aeschylus’ Seven Against Thebes or Sophocles’ Antigone or Euripides’ The 
Bacchae as some of the few examples of the latter category. He takes the final 
scene of The Bacchae as the most striking example of the disproportionate 
punishment inflicted on the city. 
Thus Steiner’s current diagnosis seems to be that even though we can no 
longer really find absolute tragedies (and he mentions the influence of Christian 
optimism as one reason for it), even though their purest expression can only be 
found in some of the tragedies produced in the Attic fifth century B.C., we can still 
find vestiges of the tragic throughout later history and even in our day and age. 
The theatre of the absurd, for instance, is one of the expressive forms it assumed in 
the twentieth century. 
Ricœur would probably disagree with Steiner’s insistence on the 
metaphysics of the original sin; for Ricœur, fault / guilt are only secondary 
phenomena; he adopts a fundamentally Kantian stance towards the problem of 
evil. Evil can be radical, but it is not originary. And even though there might have 
been a fall, it is not irremediable. Thus, although he emphasizes tragic wisdom, he 
eventually remains an optimist.  
Ultimately, what is the core of the tragic vision of the world? It is 
probably some sort of metaphysic pessimism, one that displays human beings as 
being radically overcome by powers that are far stronger than we are. These can 
be Gods, or fate itself. Tragedy can display, as in the case of The Bacchae and its 
strong, thick description of Maenadism, the limits of rationality and the possibility 
of overwhelming experiences of ecstasy. These ecstatic experiences, in turn, 
reveal how little self-control human beings ultimately have; they make explicit 
what we can call the conflict between the rational and the irrational elements of 
our self. This conflict will be given a deeply metaphoric sense in the philosophy of 
Plato. 
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But other conflicts are apparent too, such as the tension between human 
will and the inescapable necessity, ananke. Oedipus wants to know the truth, and 
yet when he does he is crushed by it. He is doomed, literally. Creon wants to 
impose his law, and yet divine law opposes him. As such, the experience of 
conflict is, for the Greek main tragic characters, an experience of failure and utter 
destruction. It is, properly speaking, tragic. Part three of this dissertation will 
analyze in further detail inner conflict; however, a word about Plato is needed, 
because it is with him and Socrates that for the first time philosophy asks specific 
ethical questions, questions about how ought we to live, and thus makes explicit 
how different courses of action are possible, how they are ethically qualified, and 
to what extent their causes (even though not necessarily their motives) can be 
rational or irrational. 
 
1.1.4 – Plato and the conflict between the irrational and the rational souls 
 
Before we delve into Plato’s depiction of the struggle between the 
rational and the irrational souls, let me start by recalling that the birth of 
philosophy in its technical sense, with Socrates and Plato, took place in a context 
that was in itself embattled. I have been mentioning how there was a strong clash 
between rationalism and irrationalism in Greek culture; by the time of Socrates 
and Plato, a new alternative had developed, putting forward a new kind of paideia 
and upheld by what could be called in somewhat anachronistic terms a new 
professional group. These were, of course, the Sophists, and it is against both their 
ideas and practices that we can grasp the significance of the Socratic phenomenon. 
In a nutshell, the type of paideia upheld by the Sophists was technical and 
instrumental in a strict sense. Some of them boasted the capacity to teach anything 
to anyone. In the Greek world, they were the closest we can find to the figure of 
the modern intellectual or, better put, the modern Professor, he who teaches for a 
living and therefore gets paid for it. They cannot, of course, be considered a 
coherent movement or a school; many of them defended different ideas. However, 
there is a certain tone that can be discerned and that encompasses many of them: 
the insistence on the instrumental character of knowledge (after all, they insist, 
arete can be taught) results in a certain relativistic stance. This is clear in 
Protagoras (man as “the measure of all things”) and taken to an extreme in 
 47 
Gorgias’s nihilism. As such, we can understand Plato’s metaphysics as an attempt 
to put forward substantive ideals (even though, evidently, in a problematic manner 
expressed in dialectical form) over against the relativistic and instrumental stance 
of the Sophists. Hence his insistence on the search for truth qua truth and on the 
need to find stable, never changing ideals, which “neither wax nor wane”.100 
This context has been dealt with in depth by Werner Jaeger, who 
dedicates the third volume of his magnificent Paideia to what he calls “the conflict 
of cultural ideals in the age of Plato”.101 His insistence, for instance, on the 
rhetoric ideal put forward by Isocrates as an alternative to Plato and his school 
deserves some attention. I will come back to it in the next section. 
I will evidently not provide a full picture of Platonic philosophy; it is 
impossible to do so here. However, I do want to explicate how this conflict 
between the rational and the irrational that we have been tracing in Greek culture 
fits within the brightest and most complex philosophy of the ancient world. 
Let me start by recalling that Plato’s writings almost always reveal an 
ambiguity that constitutively opens them to a conflict of interpretations. It is 
always difficult to know whether or not in certain passages he is being ironical. As 
to what his beliefs on the “human soul” are, as Dodds points out, “it is not always 
easy to decide where Plato is expressing a personal faith and where he is merely 
using a traditional language”.102 
This caution notwithstanding, allow me to delve on the significance of 
Plato’s poetic depiction of the human soul, such as we can find it in the 
Phaedrus.103 I will offer a brief comment on Plato’s apology of madness (mania) 
which we can find in Phaedrus 244a – 245b, as well as on the famous Chariot 
Allegory which succeeds it (246a – 254e).  As often in Plato’s dialogues, his own 
                                                
100 This is probably the most strong and beautiful description of the world of Ideas, such as we can 
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standpoint is presented through the words of Socrates. So it is in a long discourse 
of Socrates that we will find Plato’s claims concerning madness and the inner 
conflict within the human soul. 
The ground for these claims is laid in 244a, when Socrates explicitly 
claims: “but in fact the best things we have come from madness, when it is given 
as a gift of the god.”104 This is reasserted afterwards, with Socrates saying “(…) 
madness (mania) from a god is finer than self-control of human origin, according 
to the testimony of the ancient language givers”.105 Plato then proceeds to 
distinguish a typology of the types of madness sent by the god, stating that “the 
right kind of madness finds relief from present hardships”106, i.e., actually has a 
therapeutic function. The higher type of madness is taken to be “possession by the 
Muses”, that is, poetic madness in which the poet “awakens to a Bacchic frenzy of 
songs and poetry”. In contrast, verses written by anyone with expert knowledge 
and self-control “will be eclipsed by the poetry of men who have been driven out 
of their minds.”107 
It is after this prelude in the form of warning that Plato proposes to show 
us “the truth about the nature of the soul”.108 But as often in his works, the “truth” 
is put forward by recurring to a myth or, better put, to an allegory. The exuberance 
of Socrates’ discourse is in here at its peak. Souls are described as being winged, 
and immortal; they are driven by desire: “All soul looks after all that lacks a 
soul”109. The analogy is assumed as such: “Let us then liken the soul to the natural 
union of a team of winged horses and their charioteer”110 
However, as is often the case in Plato, man is described as having a 
“mixed” nature. Unlike gods, who possess horses and charioteers that are 
themselves “all good” because they “come from a good stock”, we ourselves have 
a situation in which our driver has to deal with two very different sorts of horses: 
“one of his horses is beautiful and good (…) while the other is the opposite 
(…)”.111 So we have a good horse and a bad horse; in symbolic terms, a white 
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horse and a black horse. But the result of this mixture is the drama of human 
existence: “This means that chariot-driving in our case is inevitably a painfully 
difficult business.”112 
At some points in Socrates’ discourse, the violence of this orientation is 
emphasized: “Another soul rises at one time and falls at another, and because its 
horses pull it violently in different directions, it sees some real things and misses 
others”.113 As we can see, Plato’s depiction points towards a tripartition of the 
soul: two horses and a charioteer. After having given the historical details of the 
myth, describing how souls tend towards beauty and are driven by love (Eros), and 
the intricate process of reincarnations they are engaged in, the superiority of the 
philosophical life and so on, we come to the end of the allegory and find a more 
detailed description of each of the soul’s three parts. It might be that these 
correspond to the division of the soul presented in the Republic114, namely, that 
between reasoning (logos), spirited (thumos) and appetitive (epithumia) parts of 
the soul. However, the analogy might not be complete because the way these 
“parts of the soul” behave in the allegory is not completely straightforward. In a 
way, the Phaedrus has a more embattled description than the Republic, because 
whereas the Republic looks at the conduction of our soul in different moments 
(sometimes driven by appetites, other times by reason, etc.), the Phaedrus looks at 
the conflict medias in res, as it is happening, and offers a very violent – albeit 
mythical and poetic – illustration of it. Allow me to quote the long, final passage 
of this allegory, in order to show how our inner drama unfolds in Plato: 
 
The horse that is on the right, or nobler, side is upright in frame and well jointed, with a 
high neck and a regal nose; his coat is white, his eyes are black, and he is a lover of honor 
with modesty and self-control; companion to true glory, he needs no whip, and is guided 
by verbal commands alone. The other horse is a crooked great jumble of limbs with a 
short bull-neck, a pug nose, black skin and bloodshot white eyes; companion to wild 
boasts and indecency, he is shaggy around the ears – deaf as post – and just barely yields 
to horsewhip and goad combined. Now when the charioteer looks in the eye of love, his 
entire soul is suffused with a sense of warmth and starts to fill with tingles and the 
goading of desire. As for the horses, the one who is obedient to the charioteer is still 
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114 See Plato, Republic, book IV in Complete Works, 435a-442e, pp. 1066-1074.  
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controlled, then as always, by its sense of shame, and so prevents itself from jumping on 
the boy. The other one, however, no longer responds to the whip or the goad of the 
charioteer; it leaps violently forward and does everything to aggravate its yokemate and 
its charioteer, trying to make them go up to the boy and suggest to him the pleasures of 
sex.115 
 
The rest of this narrative describes the ongoing struggle between these three 
parties (the charioteer and the white-coated horse versus the black horse), with the 
charioteer eventually winning, but at the cost of violently having to repress the 
black horse’s instincts: “[the charioteer] violently yanks the bit back out of the 
teeth of the insolent horse (…) so that he bloodies its foul-speaking tongue and 
jaws, sets its legs and haunches firmly on the ground, and ‘gives it over to 
pain’.”116 
Now, let us assume the traditional stance and acknowledge that the 
charioteer embodies, up to a certain point, the interests of reason. What is 
interesting to note is that he eventually wins, but not without exerting significant 
violence. G. Ferrari comments that even though the black horse is supposed to 
stand for brutish, inhibited lust, it seeks to persuade the charioteer, while it is the 
charioteer who resorts to violence.117 Allow me to pursue this line of reasoning, by 
commenting that the use of reason is accompanied by an exercise of power. The 
charioteer eventually reins in the black horse, but this dominance over inner nature 
is tantamount to repression. And even though there is a party that wins, we cannot 
overlook the inner tension that remains. 
Divine mania can in fact be attributed to the behaviour of all the parties. 
Because the charioteer himself has desires; he too is attracted by beauty. However, 
what Plato is upholding certainly is none other than a right ordering of desires, 
such as it leads us to correct behaviour. He has in mind the “right” kind of 
devotion towards beauty and the Beautiful, through living a properly philosophical 
life. But this too entails a kind of mania, a philosophia, such as it is so well 
                                                
115 Plato, Phaedrus, 253d-254a, p. 531.  
116 Ibid., 254e. 
117 See G. R. F. Ferrari, Listening to the Cicadas. A Study of Plato’s Phaedrus (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 186: “Although the charioteer seems to stand for the control 
of reason and the bad horse for brutish, uninhibited lust, in the struggle between the two it is the 
bad horse who adopts persuasive language and the methods of reason, while the charioteer 
maintains control by sheer strength and wordless violence.” 
 51 
described in the Phaedrus, the Symposium, the Republic and elsewhere. It seems 
as if a certain curbing of “irrational” or “brute” desires is needed, in order to let 
one let be guided by “nobler”, “higher” objects, as we can see in Diotima’s 
discourse in the symposium. Or, in fact, this can all be attributed to a type of 
instrumental, rational-purposive behaviour. Establishing means to attain different 
types of goals. 
E. R. Dodds, who in his The Greeks and the Irrational has a chapter 
precisely called “Plato and the Irrational Soul” hints at what I am trying to 
emphasize here: that Plato offers us a model of inner conflict. Dodds sees the best 
example of this in the tale of Leontius, which we find in the Republic: 
 
Leontius, the son of Aglaion, was going up from the Piraeus along the outside of the 
North Wall when he saw some corpses lying at the executioner’s feet. He had an appetite 
to look at them but at the same time he was disgusted and turned away. For a time he 
struggled with himself and covered his face, but, finally, overpowered by the appetite, he 
pushed his eyes wide open and rushed towards the corpses, saying, “Look for yourselves, 
you evil wretches, take your fill of the beautiful sight.”118 
 
This is an interesting story, because it offers a meaningful counterexample to the 
chariot allegory. In Leontius, the inner conflict is won by the appetitive part of the 
soul. However, as Dodds also recalls, Plato’s take on this example is that of a 
moral condemnation.119 In the Sophist, this outcome is diagnosed as a kind of 
“sickness of the soul”.120 
Ultimately, and like so many other theories in Plato, there is a 
fundamental ambiguity of Plato’s diagnosis of inner conflict or discord. On the 
one hand, it seems to be inevitable and pertain to human condition, on the other 
hand it is taken as sickness. Perhaps it is sickness only if we let the “bad horse” 
win, but is also not clear why this should be so. Finally, the appraisal of madness 
and the emphasis on reason are also partly contradictory and ambiguous. Or 
perhaps we should say that they are dialectical. 
                                                
118 Plato, The Republic, 439e-440a, p. 1071.  
119 Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, op. cit., p. 213. 
120 Plato, The Sophist, in Complete Works, op. cit., 228b, p. 248: “there’s dissension in the souls of 
people of poor condition, between beliefs and desires, anger and pleasures, reason and pains, and 
all of those things with each other (...) So we’d be right if we said that wickedness is discord and 
sickness of the soul.”  See also Dodds, op. cit., p. 213. 
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In the last analyzis, it seems to me that Plato in a sense encapsulates the 
whole Greek world, and that his works are the tipping point in which the 
“inherited conglomerate” (as Dodds calls it) of ancient beliefs (namely, the 
irrational ones) finally give in to rationality. Or, better put, that there is a 
fundamental tension between that inherited conglomerate, still fully present in 
Plato, and the move towards rationalization. In a way, that tension is gone in 
Aristotle who very clearly chose reason’s side. And this is why Plato is probably 
the most interesting ancient philosopher for a study on conflict. The very presence 
of an interesting mixture of myth and philosophy in his works is a testimony to 
this assessment. 
The condemnation of “instincts” or “appetites” will be recurrent in the 
history of philosophy. Leontius’ tale will have an Augustinian counterpart in the 
story of Alypius and the circus games, and the humbling of the black horse will be 
given a more formalized version in Kant’s humiliation of self-love through respect 
for the moral law. All this is conflict, inner, psychological conflict, given a 
philosophical and/or theological and/or moral solution. But in all of this there is an 
aspect of inner violence, of repression. Reason and violence can sometimes go 
together, as Critical Theorists will often emphasize, and as we shall see in the first 
chapters of part two. In a nutshell: reason “wins”. But this comes at a price. 
 
1.1.5 – Agonistic political citizenship and public space 
 
With Plato, we have seen the tipping point of the inherited conglomerate 
of unreason being won over by rationality. However, this is all seen at a micro 
level. Up until now, we have followed the thread of conflict in different Greek 
cultural phenomena, from epic poetry to tragedy and philosophy. However, I will 
still have to say a word about, let us call it, political conflict, not in the form of 
wars or competing factions, but rather in the competition between fellow citizens. 
In order to do this, we will have to take a short detour through the ancient 
agonistic practices, and the role philosophy played in these practices. 
The art of dialectic, such as we can find it in Plato, is already a written 
word, proper to hermeneutics. However, something akin to dialectics was already 
practiced in other forms prior or contemporary to Plato; namely, in live, face-to-
face, competitive discussion. In chapter six of his La nascita della filosofia, 
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Giorgio Colli analyzes the transition from mysticism to dialectics (or, if we want 
to put it as I have been putting it from irrationality to rationality). He defines it as a 
“real discussion”, an “art of discussion”, an exchange between two living 
people.121 Dialectics as a meaningful exchange, a competitive dialogue can be 
traced back to Zeno of Elea, if not even (as Colli argues) to Parmenides himself, 
insofar as there was a possibility for non-Being even within the affirmation of 
Being. This art of dialectics made its way through Gorgias, with his treatise on 
non-existence (or non-being) and to Plato himself. 
A detailed historical account of the origins of dialectics as this art of 
discussion, and the many possible arguments and forms contained within it can be 
found in Aristotle’s Topics122, which are part of his Organon. Nonetheless, and 
evidently, Aristotle’s reconstruction is already an historical, detached account, 
more worried about the logical possibilities entailed in the discussion than in the 
competition itself. Colli, however, has an interesting working hypothesis. He 
claims that dialectics was born as an offspring of agonism. According to him, 
when the religious background started waning, the competition no longer required 
men to have divination powers and so a whole new field was opened up: that of an 
all too human agonism.123 He also sees in dialectics the birth of the effort of 
universalization and abstraction, i.e., the search for categories as universal 
predicates. Thus Aristotle’s (and all subsequent) table(s) of categories would be 
the development of the earlier art, the one born with Zeno. 
Colli’s further claim is that there is an intrinsic cruelty in these 
procedures.124 The argument serves only as mediation to a postponed victory, 
which is there only for the enjoyment of the dialectician. Dialectics, especially in 
the hands of Gorgias, assumed a destructive purpose. Its consequence is that 
whichever claim one takes to be true can be refuted.125 According to this claim, 
dialectics was therefore the precursor of nihilism and relativism; ancient dialectics 
was, as such, a devastating weapon. Its further evolution would transform it from 
an agonistic technique into a general theory of logos. 
                                                
121 Colli, op. cit., p. 71. 
122 Aristotle, Topics in The Complete Works of Aristotle, volume I (The Revised Oxford 
Translation), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) edited by Jonathan Barnes, pp. 167-277. 
123 Colli, op. cit., p. 75. 
124 Colli, op. cit., p. 80. 
125 Colli, op. cit., p. 86. 
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A different application of agon was to be found in rhetoric. Whereas in 
dialectics there was some sort of direct, one on one duel, in rhetoric every speaker 
is potentially in competition with all other speakers, i.e., with a universal audience. 
This leads Colli to believe that everything about this art form is agonistic, 
conflictual.126 The matter is even more serious, and manipulation sought at an 
higher level, because its stakes revolve around political power while in ancient 
dialectics the dispute centered on knowledge. 
Ultimately, rhetoric and its instrumental use (represented by the major 
figures of the sophistical movement) provided philosophy with its main rival. This 
was true already in the fourth century B.C., with Socrates’ and Plato’s definition 
of philosophy coming precisely from a bitter polemic against the Sophists. Of 
these, Isocrates most clearly provided an alternative notion of paideia. His 
emphasis is the importance of rhetoric and practical politics.127 
And the truth of the matter is that both dialectics and rhetoric played a 
huge role in Greek cultural and political life. They were instrumental in 
democratic Athens and elsewhere. And in fact, a few modern or contemporary 
philosophers saw in ancient Greece a model of agon with which we should renew. 
Agonism can, in fact be useful in a democratic manner, and in the making of a 
political and social philosophy. Let me now turn to two reconstructions of Greek 
agon and their respective relations – one pejorative, another highly appraising – 
with the democratic ideals and practices. I will come back to Nietzsche’s 
assessment of Socrates, and then mention Hannah Arendt’s political philosophy, 
and with these assessments our brief incursion in the Greek source will be 
complete. 
We have seen above Nietzsche’s reconstruction of Greek tragedy and his 
attack on Socrates. In a later work, Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche once again 
delivered devastating blows to the figure of Socrates128. However, this time 
around, he curiously credits him with having been responsible for the discovery of 
a new type of agon, namely dialectical agon. This assessment is historically 
inaccurate since, as we shown above, dialectics can be traced back to Zeno. 
                                                
126 Colli, chapter eighth, “Agonismo e Retorica”, pp. 97 ff. 
127 On Isocrates, see chapters two “The rhetoric of Isocrates and its Cultural Ideal  (pp. 46-70) and 
six “Isocrates defends his Paideia” (pp. 132-155) of Werner Jaeger’s Paideia. Volume III, op. cit. 
128 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), especially 
“The problem of Socrates”, §§1-12, pp. 162-166. 
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However, according to Nietzsche, Socrates’ emphasis on dialectics explains why 
he was so fascinating for the Athenian citizens of his time: “He fascinated by 
appealing to the agonistic drive of the Greeks – he introduced a variation into the 
wrestling matches between young men and youths. Socrates was a great erotic 
too.”129 However, this depiction is done not with admiration but scorn. 
Nietzsche sees in the Greeks an ideal of health and strength. In his 
idealized reconstruction, ancient Greece was the homeplace of the strong and the 
beautiful. Now, for him, in his rather crass – and exaggerated, even if only for 
stylistic purposes – physiological interpretation of Socrates and his legendary 
ugliness, Socrates was indeed the anti-Greek: “ugliness, an objection in itself, was 
almost a refutation for the Greeks” 130 
Nietzsche sees in Socrates’ appearance a supposed insight into his alleged 
corrupted essence: monstrum in fronte, monstrum in animo. In this respect, 
curiously enough, Kierkegaard has a suppler reading which is the exact opposite 
of Nietzsche’s.131 This is evident also in the way they interpret differently 
Socrates’ last words in the Phaedo, when he claims owing Asclepius (taken to be 
the God of medicine) a rooster.132 This alleged sacrifice is interpreted by 
Nietzsche as a sign of debt towards the God, for having done Socrates the favour 
of lifting the burden of life from his shoulders. Thus Socrates and, to a lesser 
extent Plato, are for Nietzsche the sick, decadent doomsayers, those who condemn 
life. 
And what was Socrates’ fault, according to Nietzsche? Here we have to 
be reminded of Nietzsche’s blatant anti-democratic taste. In fact, if he saw in 
Greece an ideal to be upheld, this was mainly in his own reconstruction of archaic 
Greece (or maybe in Sparta in the classical period) an ideal of noble taste and 
behaviour – in the sense of strength, evidently. What is Socrates accused of? Of 
bringing democracy to agonistic disputes, by allegedly introducing dialectics and 
emphasis on reason – logon didonai: 
 
                                                
129 Ibid., §8, p. 165. 
130 Ibid., §3, p. 163. 
131 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, with Continual Reference to Socrates, translated by Howard 
Hong and Edna Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 
132 Plato, Phaedo, in Complete Works, 118a, p. 100: “As his belly was getting cold Socrates 
uncovered his head – he had covered it – and said – these were his last words – ‘Crito, we owe a 
cock to Asclepius; make this offering to him and do not forget’”.
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With Socrates, Greek taste suddenly changed in favour of dialectics; what really happened 
here? Above all, a noble taste was defeated; with dialectics, the rabble rises to the top. 
Before Socrates, dialectical manners were rejected in good society: they were seen as bad 
manners, they humiliated people. The young were warned against them. People were 
generally distrustful of reasons being displayed like this. Honourable things, like 
honourable people, do not go around with their reasons in their hand.133  
 
Therefore, in this depiction, Socrates is the plebeian who, because of his 
overwhelming ressentiment, took revenge on his noble counterparts by 
dialectically humiliating them. 
Ultimately, the reason for Socrates’ success, Nietzsche claims, was his 
being able to provide an apparent solution for the decadent anarchy of instincts 
that was starting to take a hold of Greece already in the 4th century B.C. Socrates’ 
response, or so the claim goes, is to turn reason into a tyrant, into an overarching 
instinct, so as to override and master all other instincts. Thus Reason = virtue = 
happiness, seen as Socrates’ diagnosis and proposed cure to Greek illnesses, came 
to pass, states Nietzsche, as their apparent last resort.134 
Nietzsche’s last word on Socrates in this virulent attack is to conclude 
that Socrates was a deceiver – a self-deceiver, and a deceiver of his counterparts. 
He was not the doctor – even though he wanted to be so, and he convinced others 
that he was indeed one – but the sick man, and this is why he gladly accepts the 
poisoned drink.135 “To have to fight the instincts – that is the formula for 
decadence.”136 
What can we say about Nietzsche’s musings? That they are yet another 
testimony to the agonistic power of the Greek cultural source (and this, once 
again, independently of Nietzsche’s historical accuracy or lack thereof). Many of 
Nietzsche’s views are of course unacceptable for our own democratic taste. His 
own pessimism of strength and his attack on the “morality of ressentiment”, slave 
morality and so on, as well as the emphasis put on “the noble mentality” and the 
affirmation of strength that we find in the will to power, probably leads him to a 
valorization of agon that we can not follow. The result of his rendering of Greek 
                                                
133 Ibid., §5, pp. 163-164. 
134 Ibid., §10, p. 166. 
135 Ibid., §12, p. 166. 
136 Ibid., §11, p. 166. 
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agon is probably closest to violence, to the squashing of the feeble and the meek, 
than we can allow for, at least if we take him at face value and do not concede that 
some times, other than exaggeration, there is irony in Nietzsche too – and so that 
what he is really wanting to say is as hard to reconstruct as were Socrates’ own 
sayings. 
Be that as it may, his denunciation of the overemphasis of reason, of 
reason as being capable of assuming the form of tyranny, vindictiveness, and so 
on, is important and will have its echoes on the Post-Nietzschean and Post-Marxist 
early Critical Theory – and I will come back to this both in the next part, and in 
the last chapters of this dissertation. 
However, there are much more positive assessments of this agonistic 
frequentation of the public space. In The Human Condition137, Hannah Arendt 
forcefully makes the case for an agonistic model of public space, which is 
somehow an alternative to the Habermasian model (of which more in section 
2.1.3). Unlike Habermas, who takes his examples from the 18th century bourgeois 
public sphere and ultimately aims at rationally reconstructing a model of public 
sphere based on a formalized principle of communication, Arendt takes inspiration 
from the Greeks (arguing that modernity radically changed our worldview for the 
worse with the victory of homo faber) and makes conflict, not communication, the 
overarching principle. 
Arendt’s philosophy occupies a unique place in the context of 20th 
century philosophy. It left a lasting impression on Ricœur who took from Arendt a 
number of significant aspects which he later adapted to his own philosophy, such 
as the notion of narrative identity, the depiction of the capacity to promise and to 
forgive as well as, significantly, the emphasis put on the initiative of human action 
with its corollaries of novelty, unexpectedness and utter rejection of determinism. 
Arendt’s goal is to reappraise what she dubs vita activa (the original title 
of her book), that is, the life of action, political life in the strictest sense 
(Aristotle’s bios politikos) over against the theoretical mode of life. Of course she 
recognizes the tension, latent in Ancient Greece and most of all in philosophers, 
between this ideal of vita activa, and that of vita contemplativa. Let us recall how 
in the Protrepticus Aristotle lauded theoretical life, described it as being more 
                                                
137 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). 
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autonomous than any other mode of life, and thus superior to them all; in fact, 
theoretical life seems to be, in Aristotle, the task (ergon) proper to man. However, 
at the end of Nichomachean Ethics138, he also comes to the conclusion that for 
men a purely theoretical life is impossible to pursue and therefore that the most 
noble task for us is the political one. 
Arendt does not wish to deny this tension. However, she seems to take a 
detour, emphasizing the Greek’s drive for public recognition through competition, 
in the form of a love of glory begotten out of struggle (literally, Plato’s philotimia) 
and showing how, by this yielding to philotimia, even philosophers as writers 
indulged in the love of immortality and thus participated in the overall agon of 
Greek life. This is depicted by her as a latent struggle between the desire of 
contemplating all things eternal, and the drive to become immortal through our 
own deeds: 
 
By their capacity for the immortal deed, by their ability to leave non-perishable traces 
behind, men, their individual mortality notwithstanding, attain an immortality of their own 
and prove themselves to be of a “divine” nature. The distinction between man and animal 
runs right through the human species itself: only the best (aristoi), who constantly prove 
themselves to be the best (aristeuein, a verb for which there is no equivalent in any other 
language) and who “prefer immortal fame to mortal things”, are really human; (…) 
for it is obvious that, no matter how concerned a thinker may be with eternity, the moment 
he sits down to write his thoughts he ceases to be concerned primarily with eternity and 
shifts his attention to leaving some trace of them.139 
 
With this analyzis, Arendt emphasises how much the Greeks were attached to the 
public recognition of their arete. Even philosophers, who seemed to be content 
with a merely theoretical life, as soon as they started to objectify their thoughts in 
writing, somehow conceded to this drive. 
Certainly, for non-philosophers (or for all those who did not seek 
recognition through their “spiritual children” as Plato puts it in the Symposium140) 
                                                
138 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics in The Complete Works of Aristotle, volume 2 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 1729-1867. For an elucidation of the main concepts in the 
Nichomachean Ethics, see also the comments of António Caeiro to the Portuguese translation: 
Aristóteles, Ética a Nicómaco, translated by António Caeiro (Lisboa: Quetzal, 2004). 
139 Arendt, The Human Condition, pp. 19-20. 
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the competition assumed different forms, like sports and public speech. By thus 
emphasizing the need for “public visibility” in the display of excellence, Arendt 
construes what has been called a “theatrical” conception of the public space, in 
that citizens somehow constructed a public “persona”. 
Nonetheless, she displays an admiration for the way in which Greek life 
was organized in this respect, namely, the strict separation from the private and the 
public realms. The public realm was the realm of the political; the polis was one 
thing, the household was another, completely different thing. Her work has been 
dubbed anti-modern because when she describes “the rise of the social” in chapter 
two141 she explicitly criticizes the occlusion of the political by the social realm. 
And this because, even though the construction of the persona already occurred in 
the Greek public sphere, there was still room for genuine political action, because 
the polis was the domain of the (politically) equal, whereas in modern life society 
is seen as exerting immense pressure on individuals and therefore “imposing 
innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to “normalize” its members, to 
exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement.”142 
Now, again, exactly like in Nietzsche, Arendt’s critique of the modern 
way of life and of society as it seemed to be organized in her own day and age, 
implicitly contains a prospect of social philosophy and an appraisal of alternative 
values. Her critique is, first and foremost, a critique of “mass society”. With the 
dawn of mass society the social comes to embrace and control all members, 
“equalizing” them. However, for Arendt political and social equality are very 
different matters. Social equality, so the claim goes, amounts to conformism143 
whereas political equality is a formal equality which, instead, allows for really 
meaningful action: 
 
To belong to the few “equals” (homoioi) meant to be permitted to live among one’s peers; 
but the public realm itself, the polis, was permeated by a fiercely agonal spirit, where 
everybody had constantly to distinguish himself from all others, to show through unique 
deeds or achievements that he was the best of all (aien aristeuein). The public realm, in 
                                                                                                                                 
140 Plato’s words are: “children that are more beautiful and more immortal (...) offspring, which, 
because they are immortal themselves, provide their parents with immortal glory and 
remembrance.” See Plato, Symposium, 209d, p. 492. 
141 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 38 and ff. 
142 Ibid., p. 40. 
143 Ibid., p. 41. 
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other words, was reserved for individuality, it was the only place where men could show 
who they really and inexchangeably were. It was for the sake of this chance, and out of 
love for a body politic that made it possible to them all, that each was more or less willing 
to share in the burden of jurisdiction, defense and administration of public affairs.144 
 
This last passage is decisive in many ways. I have hinted at before, throughout this 
chapter, how conflict was deeply embedded in Greek culture, from Homer 
onwards, and how the strive for excellence145 was deeply motivated by the desire 
for conquest in conflict. But the decisive claim is now apparent through Arendt’s 
description: not only was conflict present in the cultural forms of the heroic and 
archaic ages, not only it occasionally resurfaced in metaphysical reifications like 
those of Heraclitus, not only did it show in the sporadic dialectical or rhetorical 
disputes; it was also an overarching element and, as far as we can attest it, a deep 
motivation behind everyday public life. 
Bearing this is mind, Arendt’s claim about public visibility and 
affirmation of individuality as motives behind this process strikes me as being 
very illuminating. This is evident in military matters, as we can see in Sparta’s 
warrior ideal, or in Plato’s bold and inventive idea of an “army of lovers”.146 
However, as Arendt shows, it was also present in the daily tasks of upholding 
democracy, like in 5th and 4th centuries B.C. Athens, “out of love for a body 
politic”. 
Arendt’s description needs to be unpacked. According to her, political 
equality was the element that made action possible. That is, because in the sphere 
of the polis citizens were allegedly free from the realm of necessity, political 
action was as much as possible free and unconstrained. Now, this freedom, in turn, 
made creative and innovative action possible. The later rise of the social and 
namely the rise of the economic sphere (its detachment from the household) and 
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145 For an excellent phenomenological account of excellence (areté) mainly in Plato and Aristotle, 
see António Caeiro, A Areté Como Possibilidade Extrema do Humano (Lisboa: INCM, 2002). 
146 We find this proposal in Phaedrus’ discourse in Plato’s Symposium, 178d, p. 464: “If only there 
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to the “Sacred Band of Thebes”, which apparently was an elite core of the Theban army around the 
time of Plato, but it is uncertain whether it preceded or not the Symposium. 
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its subsequent invasion into the political sphere complicated matters and 
significantly curtailed this freedom and spontaneity of action. In Greece, as Arendt 
sees it, political equality was what made true action possible in the public sphere, 
and by being politically equal, citizens could try to assert their excellence, to prove 
that they were the best, and thus affirm their individuality through public visibility. 
According to Arendt’s own vocabulary, in modernity, with the rise of the 
social, what we have is an increasing scarcity of true “action” and instead an 
overabundance of rule-bound conformist “behaviour”. Her own version of 
political and social philosophy thus amounts, at least in part, to a radical 
reappraisal of action as initiative, as the power to start something new and thus to 
distinguish oneself among equals. This is the core of her proposal: human plurality 
is an inescapable fact that should be acknowledged and protected as such; we are 
equals by right and yet irreplaceable and it is by speech and action that we reveal 
and make ourselves. 
Word and deed are therefore what make us truly human, they are our 
insertion in the world and this insertion is like a “second birth”.147 Arendt argues 
forcefully that there is something radically new in human action, that it is a “new 
beginning”. And because it is new, it is also unexpected: “This character of 
startling unexpectedness is inherent in all beginnings and in all origins.”148 And 
the corollary of this argument is that “the unexpected can be expected”.149 
This last claim is of the utmost importance. It resonates well with many 
of the main notions that animate Ricœur’s political philosophy and approach to the 
history of philosophy, like hope and utopia. I will delve in more detail in these 
notions both in part five and in my own autonomous part eighth. The important 
detail to bear in mind right now is that this approach to human action and the 
history of philosophy strictly excludes determinism as a tenable philosophical 
standpoint (as well as, of course, every philosophy of history that aims at 
determining the course of human history). 
Arendt’s standpoint is reminiscent of Kant’s antinomy of freedom and 
necessity, which we will see in more detail in the next chapter. Evidently, human 
beings cannot start anything absolutely in the universe, but the power of action is 
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the power to start something anew, albeit in relative terms, in the realm of human 
affairs. Thus Arendt’s (and Ricœur’s after hers) is a strong case for agent 
causation.150 This belief in human action, and the emphasis in the unexpected, 
more than mere wishful thinking, strikes me as a strong counterweight and 
solution to the political situations in which there is not only a lack of foresight, but 
also the attempt to impose the T.I.N.A. (There is no alternative) discourse. 
I will not dedicate more attention to Arendt’s proposals here, for lack of 
space. But to sum it up I will say that her emphasis is on action and the way it is 
disclosed in the public realm, as is explicit in the following passage: 
 
Because of its inherent tendency to disclose the agent together with the act, action needs 
for its full appearance the shining brightness we once called glory, and which is possible 
only in the public realm.151  
 
And the paradigm of this disclosure, again, she saw in the Greeks. There are, of 
course, critiques that can be addressed to this depiction, and Arendt has had her 
fair share of polemics, including strong feminist critiques.152 Namely, and 
evidently, the realm of political equality among citizens in Ancient Greece 
entailed the significant exclusion of slaves, foreigners and women. Nonetheless, 
some prominent feminists (most notably of which Seyla Benhabib) did a 
remarkable job of recuperating Arendt’s notion of the public sphere by somehow 
proposing a mixture between this agonistic model and the more proceduralist 
Habermasian model.153 
But let me now sum up what has been said about the conflict forms that 
can be found in the Greek source. Throughout the last sections I have been 
emphasizing the plurality of conflict forms we can find in Greek culture. One 
particular form I have been underlining is the conflict between rationality and 
irrationality, and I have shown how there are both irrational elements of violence, 
madness, and so on, in Greek culture, and also how conflict can take up a rational 
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form, in philosophy or agonistic public discussion. These few pages and their 
synchronic diagnosis might convey the wrong impression of an oversimplistic 
picture. I am well aware that I cannot do justice to the whole of Greek ancient 
culture in this manner. In fact, beliefs in reason or in its irrational counterparts 
were of course mutable in ancient Greece, as they are in our own contemporary 
cultures. Rationalism might have had its acme in Ancient Greece around the fifth 
to fourth centuries B. C., especially in Athens; but the archaic beliefs in 
shamanism, Maenadism, and so on, persisted for a time, and were often 
contemporary to the affirmation of rationalism. Often, in the same period of time, 
different people have different beliefs and behaviour. As Dodds rightfully claims, 
“A new belief-pattern very seldom effaces completely the pattern that was there 
before: either the old lives on as an element in the new – sometimes an 
unconfessed and half-unconscious element – or else the two persist side by side, 
logically incompatible, but contemporaneous accepted by different individuals or 
even by the same individual.”154 These three possibilities are in fact real: the 
survival of the “old” can assume an inner or an outer form. If assumed, the 
persistence of the old can lead to an overt cultural conflict with the “new” that 
tries to impose itself: Kuhn’s study of paradigm shifts in science shows this in a 
forceful manner155; but the inner forms of persistence, either conscious or 
unconscious, can in fact lead to inner conflict, a conflict of beliefs, if the believer 
is convinced that he has different but equally valid reasons to believe both in the 
new and the old paradigm. 
As such, I acknowledge the complexity of the mix between rationalism 
and irrationality in Ancient Greece, and both the certain historical shifts that the 
beliefs in these elements underwent, and their probable inner and/or outer 
juxtaposition in certain periods. What I do think this depiction attests is that the 
complexity only underlines the conflictual character of Greek culture whose lead I 
have been following in these sections. 
We have thus seen conflict in the Greek cosmogony, epic poetry and 
theology, conflict as an overarching metaphysical paradigm in Heraclitus, conflict 
as the humiliation of human being in tragedy, inner conflict in Plato’s depiction of 
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the human soul, and political and social conflict in civic life, mainly through the 
reconstruction of Arendt. As I stated, conflict is testimony to a particular mix of 
reason and unreason in the Greek world, and philosophy’s own role was to try to 
overcome the old beliefs and practices of the inherited conglomerate, but this was 
only partially fulfilled, and at the price of a certain violence exerted over inner and 
outer nature. 
Nonetheless, with the Greeks, we are still, up to some extent, living in an 
ordered universe which pre-exists us and that we shall respect. Their stance was 
one of listening to Being, as Heidegger would put it. Now, the “all too human” 
agonistic which Colli saw already in the Greeks with the birth of dialectics is 
perhaps a phenomenon more characteristic of modernity itself. The utter 
destruction of properly metaphysical foundations and the need to found an 
“artificial” social contract without which we would allegedly be at each other’s 
throats, could only be a modern phenomenon. As such, and up to some extent, 
modernity deepens the dramatic touch of agon in human existence and philosophy. 
 
1.1.6 – Modern political theory: Hobbes’s Bellum omnium contra omnes 
 
This thesis does not aim to be an extensive historical reconstruction of 
conflict in philosophy, only of some of its most significant loci. As such, and for 
lack of possibility of dedicating book-long sections to each of the authors I would 
want to make justice to, I will skip the whole history of the Middle Ages, and, in 
terms of political theory, go straight from the Greeks to Hobbes and modern 
contract theory. 
Modernity is an intrinsically complex and contested phenomenon, one 
that allows for many concurrent descriptions. One possible way of describing it 
takes into account the scientific revolutions put forward by Copernicus, Kepler, 
Galileo, Newton and so forth, the rise of scientific knowledge and, ultimately, 
through a dominance of technique over purely contemplative knowledge, the 
apparition of the model of the homo faber as a possible world vision. Another 
possible description, closely connected to this former possibility, is the political 
corollary of the alleged loss of foundation (whether it is an ordered kosmos or a 
metaphysical first principle): namely, the need to articulate an artificial ersatz in 
order to ground what up until that point had been seen as a natural result of the 
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pre-established world order. This will be evident in the way the moderns 
conceived the constitution of their institutions, and of societies themselves. In a 
word, the fiction of a social contract imposed against the backdrop of a no less 
fictional state of nature became popular from the 17th century onwards. 
Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant all had their particular versions of the 
social contract theory, and this theory would undergo a significant reactualization 
in the 20th century with John Rawls, as we will see in more detail in chapter 2.2 
below. My aim will not be to reconstruct their particular versions of the social 
contract. Actually, I am more interested in their depictions of the state of nature, 
and namely in the Hobbesian account of it because in his very influential 
rendering of the alleged state of nature (or, as he prefers to call it, “the natural 
condition of mankind”), Hobbes detects an inner conflictuality that really becomes 
an anthropological feature. 
This is very important because, as it is widely stated, Hobbes’ theorizing 
of the Leviathan is a metaphor for the State, which is imposed by necessity, 
because it is the lesser of two evils. Namely, Hobbes calls upon the Leviathan so 
that he can avoid the existence of the dire Behemoth, with its uncontrolled 
violence and chaos. While the Behemoth stands for anarchical, civil-war style, 
gratuitous violence, the Leviathan is more akin to controlled, civilized use of 
force. Hobbes’ own insistence in the sovereignty of the state is thus meant to 
curtail the worse evil, and the influence of his own political theory in the 
reinforcement of the Westphalian state paradigm has been huge. In some ways, the 
sovereign national state as we have seen it in the last few centuries is a Hobbesian 
state. But let me reiterate that within the frame of Hobbes’ own political 
philosophy, were it not for the alleged violence of the state of nature, the solution 
could probably have been different. 
So let us now turn to his depiction of this alleged initial state. Other 
political thinkers more or less contemporary with Hobbes, such as Grotius, 
Pufendorf and Locke also strived to describe this situation which was supposed to 
have preceded society itself. Nonetheless, none of these states were as turbulent as 
Hobbes’. And even though it is in the Leviathan that we find the most articulate 
account of it – as well as the proposed solution that allows for it to be overcome –, 
the most famous formulation that encapsulates what is supposed to happen in the 
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state of nature precedes Hobbes’ magnum opus. In fact, it is in the preface to De 
Cive that Hobbes writes 
 
I demonstrate in the first place, that the state of men without civil society (which state we 
may properly call the state of nature) is nothing else but a mere war of all against all;156 
 
Now, this “war of all against all” (or Bellum Omnium contra Omnes, the title of 
this section) epitomizes in a perfect manner the whole account to be found in the 
Leviathan. In this work, Hobbes clarifies that “in the nature of man, we find three 
principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, 
glory.”157 
These are, according to Hobbes, the three main drives. The third, glory, is 
reminiscent of Plato’s philotimia. The first, competition, could be read as some 
sort of overall agonistic feature, but Hobbes clarifies that it is none other than 
strive for “gain”. However, it will be the second cause – diffidence – that will 
prove decisive in the transition to an organized state through the social contract. 
Through competition, men resort to violence, as Hobbes elucidates in a rather 
prosaic manner “to make themselves masters of other men’s persons, wives, 
children, and cattle”.158 The consequence, according to the formulation of the 
Leviathan, is that “it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common 
power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and 
such a war, as is of every man, against every man.”159 
Ultimately, it will be for the sake of diffidence, i.e., self-preservation or 
“continual fear, and danger of violent death”160 that individuals will engage in the 
social pact, whereby “I will authorize and give up my right of governing myself”161 
as will all the others; the result will be a sovereign power made up of “mutual 
covenants” for the sake of peace and common defense.162 
Thus without a state, or, in Hobbes’ own terminology, a Commonwealth, 
there is a situation of perpetual tension, one in which no industry can take place. 
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As Glen Newey points out, “Hobbes uses “war” in an extended sense, to include 
not just armed hostilities but any situation where there is no reasonable 
expectation that hostilities will not erupt.”163 Therefore, any non-organized 
situation is, if not actual mayhem, at least potential strife. From this follows the 
diagnosis of man’s natural unsociability and the need to curb it through artificial 
means: “Human beings had to be educated to live in society. From this it followed 
that they were not born fit for society, and thus were not naturally sociable.”164 
With this diagnosis, we could not be further from Aristotle’s own depiction of the 
human being’s organization in society. Ultimately, Hobbes seems to consider that 
even notions of what is just or unjust are not natural but acquired: “Where there is 
no common power, there is no law: where no law, no injustice. Force, and fraud, 
are in war the two cardinal virtues.”165 In a word, in Hobbes, we are further from 
natural right than in anyone of his contemporaries. 
As I stated before, Hobbes’ depiction of the natural condition of mankind 
was very influential in the modern period, and it still is today. In his own 
controversial manner, Carl Schmitt recovers the Hobbesian state theory, and goes 
even further than Hobbes, criticizing his liberalism166; and Leo Strauss goes so far 
as to consider Hobbes as the founder of modern political philosophy.167 Now, this 
is a somewhat disputable claim, but it might be argued that with his picture of the 
natural condition of human kind as one of potential all-out mayhem, withdrawal 
from natural right and insistence on the need for an artificial covenant, Hobbes 
really is the founder of something new. He is perhaps a significant step towards 
what some have called post-traditional societies.168 Furthermore, with his political 
philosophy, the imputation of conflictuality that bears upon our shoulders is taken 
to a whole new level. No longer do we find an attestation of agon as a potentially 
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fertile, creative and positive trait, as it could be found in the Greeks. For Hobbes, 
conflict is (real or potential) violence, and so interpersonal conflict must be 
avoided by a “common power” that “keeps us in awe”. 
The possible authoritarian consequences of this political philosophy are 
obvious, and if Hobbes is the founder of modern political philosophy, I am glad to 
have seen Kant, Hegel and Marx reform it. And in fact, the influence of the 
Hobbesian portrait of the state of nature notwithstanding, there were many who 
strongly opposed it. Firstly, as Helen Thortnton has pointed out, “for many of 
Hobbes’ contemporaries, the state of nature was understood to be a description of 
the pre-historic origin of society, and in this way it was also related to the Edenic 
condition”169, so his readers were left to reconcile his own vision of the natural 
condition with the Biblical account of it, even if they felt compelled to agree with 
him. Secondly, a different, and perhaps almost as influential depiction of the state 
of nature was to appear in the following century, namely Rousseau’s. 
Now, Rousseau’s own portrait of the state of nature, which I mention here 
only in passing, is essentially almost antithetical to the Hobbesian standpoint, and 
in this discussion the origin, effects and significance of civilization are decided. So 
these are no small stakes. In his Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau explicitly 
defends: 
 
Above all, let us not conclude, with Hobbes, that because man has no idea of goodness, he 
must be naturally wicked; that he is vicious because he does not know virtue (…) In 
reasoning on the principles he lays down, he ought to have said that the state of nature, 
being that in which the care for our own preservation is the least prejudicial to that of 
others, was consequently the best calculated to promote peace, and the most suitable for 
mankind. He does say the exact opposite, in consequence of having improperly admitted, 
as a part of savage man's care for self-preservation, the gratification of a multitude of 
passions which are the work of society, and have made laws necessary.170 
 
Indeed, in Rousseau’s state of nature, the main feelings associated with human 
beings are not fear and competition, but rather “love of self” (amour propre) and 
pity. Therefore, as it is evident in the passage quoted above, this self-preservation 
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is especially attuned to peace. Not only is self-love not necessarily a pathological, 
negative phenomenon – as Frederick Neuhouser has skillfully shown171 – but even 
if it were, in Rousseau’s state of nature this drive is corrected by pity or 
compassion. In this assessment, Rousseau comes close to the Scottish 
Enlightenment and namely to Adam Smith’s early insistence on sympathy.172  
The corollary of this diagnosis is, for Rousseau, that the main ills in 
intersubjective relationships – most notably of which inequality – are specifically 
social ills that come as a result of the creation of society and its institutions. 
According to this depiction, it is civilization itself, and not the state of nature, that 
is responsible for our vices, and so it is civilization that must be kept under control 
through education. As such, the social philosophies that can be derived from 
Hobbes and Rousseau are almost antithetical. 
But there were other responses to Hobbes too. As Ricœur has contended, 
Hegel’s own early depiction of the phenomena of recognition during the Jena 
period can be seen as an indirect response to Hobbes173, one that does not deny the 
existence of intersubjective conflict, but which radically displaces its motivation 
from naturalistic to moral sources. In a word, with Hegel’s depiction of 
recognition, conflict will become struggle, struggle for recognition. Ultimately, the 
portrayal of intersubjective relations as a particular mix of sociability and 
unsociability traversed the whole modern era in political philosophy, as different 
philosophers tried to sort out our own way out of – or at least through – conflict. 
In the next few chapters I want to go beyond Hobbes and Rousseau and to 
try to grasp, at least in a partial manner, the complexity of the mutations of 
conflict in the works of Kant, Hegel and Marx. However, it goes without saying 
that Kant transformed the whole of philosophy. As such, even though I will 
eventually end this part by coming back to social conflict, and at that point in the 
works of Marx, I will first have to make a detour through the ontological 
significance of conflict as such – mainly through the figures of negation and 
dialectics – in these authors, because in the context of German idealism this topic 
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acquired an immense complexity. With that detour, we will also grasp other 
meaningful models of conflict which were decisive for Ricœur. 
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1.2 – Kant on Critique, Negation and the Antinomies: Conflict as 
Reciprocal Limitation 
 
Since we have to sort out the debate between Kant and Hegel that is 
taking place within Ricœur’s philosophy, it makes sense to make Kant our starting 
point, and namely the Kant of the first critique. And this not only because Kant 
comes chronologically before Hegel, but also because even if Ricœur tries to 
adopt a somewhat Hegelian inspiration, the philosophical grounds to reject 
Absolute Knowing and the overwhelming power of reason are to be found 
primarily in Kant, even if Ricœur will find confirmation of this standpoint also in 
existentialism and phenomenology, as will be apparent in part three of this thesis. 
This link between hermeneutics and Kantianism is explicitly assumed by Ricœur: 
“I would say today that all hermeneutics are Kantian to the degree that the 
powerlessness of self-knowledge is the negative counterpart of the necessity to 
decipher signs given in me and outside me. It is the limited character of self-
knowledge which imposes the indirect strategy of interpretation.”174 
 I mentioned before that conflict has close ties with the notion of 
negation. This assertion is self-evident, almost tautological, because if there was 
not something as an inner contradiction in reality, in life, in thought, the positive 
existence of conflict would not even be conceptually possible. Thus it is the role of 
negation, or negativity, in philosophy, that will help determine the outcome of the 
several conflicts that appear along the way, and also how far can they go. That 
Ricœur understood this we can be certain, because we now know that he 
entertained for long the project of developing a philosophy of negation in its many 
instantiations, from the Pre-Socratics to Sartre.175 An instrumental part of this 
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meticulous study he undertook on negation are five lectures, probably from the 
60s, that delve precisely on Kant’s use of negation.176 
Right at the outset of these lectures, Ricœur lets us know, in a comment 
added on the margin of the manuscript, that the refusal to accept Absolute 
Knowing sends us back from Hegel’s dialectic to Kant’s “Philosophy of Limits”. 
He thus proposes that we read Kant from the vantage point of some texts on 
negation, namely the Pre-Critical 1763 essay Attempt to Introduce the Concept of 
Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy177 and the chapters of the Critique of Pure 
Reason that mention negation or can be considered as expressions of negation. 
This means that when dealing with the topic of negation in the first critique, 
Ricœur will not only analyze what is most obvious, that is, the place of negation as 
a category of quality, alongside those of reality and limitation. Rather, he will try 
to grasp the multiple roles that negation plays in the first critique: the 
determination and limitation of reality, the ideality of time and space in the 
“transcendental aesthetic”, the noumenon as that which is not a phenomenon, and 
also, in what constitutes a more complex approach, a semantic analyzis of the 
linguistic negative formulations used in Kant’s discourse that ties their polemical 
and refutational intentions with a deeply ontological grounding: the role of 
negation in determining the boundaries of phenomenality itself and in keeping 
reason from going beyond all possible experience. 
I will come back to these lectures. However, since this chapter is 
dedicated to Kant, and because of Kant’s Copernican revolution and its 
consequences, which abruptly changed the fate of all subsequent philosophy and 
turned it sharply in a critical direction, I will start by recalling the heart of his 
outstanding contribution to philosophy: the critical project. After having recapped 
the main traits of the critical project, such as it appears in the Critique of Pure 
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Reason, I will proceed to show how the topic of negation came to the fore in 
Kantian philosophy, how Ricœur read it and appropriated it and, finally, I will 
outline the main traits of the Antinomies of pure reason, which exemplify a first 
type of conflict, one that has illusion as its source and that can, to that extent, be 
utterly dissolved by destroying its originary illusion. I hope to show, in this way, 
how it is Kantian philosophy that provides the overall boundaries of Ricœur’s 
project, how he appropriates philosophical critique and also in which way the 
model of conflict that we find in the Antinomies will later be used by Ricœur, 
even if this is not explicitly acknowledged as such. Towards the end of the 
chapter, I will go beyond this general characterization of conflict and negation in 
Kantian philosophy, and briefly allude to some specific points in which conflict 
resurfaces in his moral and political philosophy. 
 
1.2.1 – Kant’s critical project 
 
Kant undertakes a critique and delimitation of reason in its three uses. 
This critique will, on the one hand, determine what we can legitimately claim to 
know and, on the other, what we ought to do. These are the two aspects I will be 
focusing on, leaving aside the critique of judgment.  
 Right from the start of the first critique, Kant presents the paradoxical 
position in which human reason is, and that is to be dissolved by the critical 
procedure: it is “burdened by questions it cannot dismiss, but which it also cannot 
answer178. And since these questions “never cease”, it falls into “obscurity” and 
“contradictions”.179 The striking conclusion of the second paragraph of the first 
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason is that “The battlefield of these endless 
controversies is called metaphysics”.180  Therefore, right at the outset, Kant 
prepares the ground for a depiction of all pre-critical philosophy in terms of 
conflicts, these same fundamental conflicts that will fill the painstakingly long and 
complex section on the dialectic of pure reason. His proposal is ambitious, in that 
this critique, understood as a treatise on the method of transcendental philosophy, 
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is supposed to “catalog the entire outline of the science of metaphysics”181 both by 
determining its boundaries, and internal structure. 
The famous passage in the preface to the second edition shows us Kant 
depicting this critique as having both a negative and a positive utility.182 It is 
negative insofar as, by showing how synthetic a priori judgments are illegitimate 
in philosophy, it prevents us from venturing with speculative reason beyond the 
boundaries of experience – and therefore it narrows the domain of our theoretical 
knowledge; but precisely by doing this, it removes, according to Kant, an obstacle. 
Theoretical reason will be prohibited to extend beyond sensibility, beyond 
phenomena, and forbidden to try to know noumena, but in so proceeding we will 
have, in fact, allowed practical reason to venture in these domains. This claim will 
eventually attain its proper ground in the second critique, where what was object 
of antinomical treatment in the Critique of Pure Reason, eventually attains the 
status of several practical postulates. I do not wish to comment on God, the 
beginning of the universe or the immortality of the soul; but at least this elaborate 
solution will have had the merit of firmly grounding human freedom. 
Critical philosophy, understood as the critique of transcendental 
philosophy, will thus provide an alternative both to dogmatism and skepticism. 
According to Kant, in the last few lines of this first critique, after all said and 
done, “only the critical path is still open”.183 I will not delve into the details of how 
Kant tries to transform metaphysics as a natural disposition – present in each and 
every one of us (metaphysica naturalis), constantly putting problematical 
questions that lead us to transcend experience – into a philosophical science that 
puts reason in check and controls the strive for the unconditioned, because doing 
so would go beyond the boundaries of this succinct exposition. Suffice it to say 
that in my opinion, Kant’s outstanding contribution to theoretical philosophy 
resides precisely in this: showing how an immanent critique, that is, a critique that 
finds and reveals the boundaries of a given universe can have both a positive and a 
negative utility. The negative utility, in Kant’s case, is to show how the 
transcendent aim, when pointed beyond experience, is useless; the positive utility, 
besides the whipping into shape of human reason, is to find new domains in which 
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this purged faculty, now rid of its illusions of grandeur, can be applied, without its 
transformative and operational capacity being lost. This will be evident in Kant’s 
depiction of regulative ideas, when applied to the practical domains of the ethical 
or the social. 
In 1954, in an article simply called “Kant et Husserl”184 Ricœur discerns 
another use for the Kantian critical operation, besides the ones I just mentioned. 
Analyzing the abovementioned preface to the second edition185 he sees the first 
Critique as bearing in itself the seeds of an implicit phenomenology186, because 
the “internal structure” which the Critique wants to fully determine obviously 
contains the entire depiction and description of the phenomena of the world, 
insofar as they can be legitimately known by us. To the extent that the critical 
operation also determines, as we have seen, the limits of knowledge, it acts as an 
ontological foundation of the whole phenomenological analyzis. If, Ricœur argues, 
we assume that the Critique contains in itself more than a simple epistemological 
signification, than we can argue that its scope is the internal constitution of 
phenomena, a process very similar to the phenomenological reduction (in the 
Husserlian sense) that aims at describing the phenomena themselves.187 
Now, this phenomenology is evidently very different from Husserl’s, 
because it is, first and foremost, a phenomenology of judgment188; however, a 
close reading of the Critique in phenomenological terms reveals important aspects 
both of the noetic constitution (namely in the section on the schematism of pure 
understanding) and of the noematic analyzis of the objects of the world, mainly in 
the sections concerning the analogies of experience. Besides, for Ricœur, it is 
precisely the active positing of the limits of sensibility and the forceful affirmation 
of the limitation of the act of knowing that will, in turn, provide Husserlian 
phenomenology with an ontological grounding and limitation of all 
phenomenality.189 By withholding from positing the world as an absolute, I gain 
for myself the comprehension of it as a phenomenon (or the totality of 
phenomena) and also the possibility of describing it. 
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Finally, Ricœur finds in Kant’s practical philosophy not only the 
systematic counterpart and complement of the theoretical philosophy of the first 
Critique, but also the only possible foundation of the other person that appears 
before me. Therefore, the solution to Husserl’s problematic grounding of 
intersubjectivity is precisely the Kantian positing of something purely practical in 
itself, the in itself of the person that I must respect when obeying the categorical 
imperative. Respect, as a rational feeling, appears thus in Kant’s practical 
philosophy as the only guarantee of the absolute existence of the other that I 
perceive, the only real limitation for my action; the “kingdom of ends” is the real 
grounding of intersubjectivity and the only guarantee that the other that I perceive 
is someone towards whom I must behave ethically: “The glory of phenomenology 
is of having elevated, through ‘reduction’, the investigation of appearing to the 
glory of science. But the glory of Kantianism is of having being capable of 
coordinating the research of appearing with the limit function of the in itself and 
with the practical determination of the in itself as freedom and as the whole of 
persons. Husserl does phenomenology. But Kant limits it and grounds it.”190 
So there are several functions of critique for Kant. But allow me first to 
emphasize its negative function, in order to better grasp how this negative function 
frees up the possibility of a positive, creative function. Nonetheless, so that we can 
see from where negation springs in Kant’s philosophy, let us take a step back to 
pre-Critical philosophy. 
 
1.2.2 – Kant on negation 
 
It is interesting to note that negation is, for the early Kant, first and 
foremost a mathematical concept that he wants to import and apply to philosophy. 
In Negative Magnitudes (1763) the whole operative concept of negation that he 
wants to put forward and use in philosophy is that of negative magnitude, which is 
an intensive magnitude that stems from what he calls real opposition or nihil 
privativum. The whole point is to show that there are some types of oppositions or 
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clashes that are different from logical contradiction. Logical contradiction, which 
he dubs nihil negativum (or, nothing at all) consists in simultaneously affirming 
and denying the same predicate about the same thing191; thus the result is self-
contradictory and, in this binary logic, nothing ensues. 
The examples he gives of real oppositions are basically physical 
examples; if we imagine a body at rest, one who is subject to the action of two 
forces of the same magnitude exerting their influence on opposite directions, the 
result we have is the forces annul each other, they play each other out; but this 
corollary is not a logical contradiction that simply vanishes, eradicating the 
predicate; rather, the result is precisely a body at rest, kept in some sort of 
homeostatic balance by an equilibrium of opposing forces. In what concerns its 
movement, the result of the opposition is nothing=0.192 Another example is that of 
a financial debt: if person A owes person B a certain amount of money but, in turn, 
person C owes person A the exact same amount of money, we can argue that the 
debts cancel each other out and therefore A has 0 debt. 
Ultimately, negative magnitudes are not negations of magnitudes, but 
rather positive magnitudes affected by a negative sign (more or less like in 
mathematics). However, what Kant has in mind is that negative magnitudes, qua 
intensive magnitudes, are basically uncountable magnitudes193; this is the reason 
why negation will belong to the category of quality, not quantity, in Kant’s mature 
philosophy. Ricœur comments that one of the important aspects of the 1763 essay 
is that it shows us that there is a type of logic which is different from formal logic: 
this is a logic of the real.194 We could further argue that this “logic of the real”, 
both different and more fundamental than formal logic, is already a step towards 
Kant’s transcendental logic, namely in the combination between reality and 
negation that produces limitation and the detachment of the phenomenal world 
from the noumenal. Evidently, Hegel would further develop this “logic of the 
                                                
191 Kant, Negative Magnitudes, p. 211. 
192 Ibid. 
193 On this point, see Marco Giovanelli’s comment. Intensive magnitudes are magnitudes of level 
that “allow differences in the distribution of a quality (e. g., heat) to be measured relative to 
situations in which the quality is uniformly distributed”, whereas in extensive magnitudes “one can 
measure by juxtaposing a standard unit of measure in order to determine how many units the given 
magnitude contains.” Marco Giovanelli, Reality and Negation – Kant’s Principle of Anticipations 
of Perception. An Investigation of its impact on the Post-Kantian Debate (Heidelberg: Springer, 
2011) p. 10. 
194 Ricœur, “Kant et la négation”, p. 8452. 
 78 
real”, with entirely unforeseen ambition and consequences, in his Science of 
Logic.195 
Kant tries to provide examples of these positive magnitudes affected with 
a negative sign; some of them are vaguely psychological (hate is a negative love), 
others properly moral (vice is a negative virtue)196, but he is at a loss when trying 
to deliver properly philosophical examples of the utility of this type of negation. 
Ultimately, he ends up describing all natural changes in the world as cancelling 
each other out: the natural world as a zero-sum game.197 His ultimate definition of 
real opposition is “because something is, something else is cancelled”.198 
So what we have here is the depiction of a specific type of conflict. It is a 
conflict between real forces (and let us take this to be either physical forces or any 
other kind of forces, as we can say, for instance and in a metaphorical manner, that 
there are tensions in a certain philosophical system or political environment) but 
one whose result is always a zero-sum game. In this conflict no one wins, as there 
seems to be a perfect symmetry of forces. The conflicting forces cohabit and 
reciprocally limit each other. No man is the better man. Furthermore, the actual 
dynamic of forces, the fact that there are opposing forces, only contributes to the 
immobility of the system. Let us say that if this was Being we were talking about, 
it could well be in inner tension and perpetual Heraclitean change: at the surface it 
would be as calm as Parmenides’s spherical Being: “one, eternal and immutable”. 
We are very far from the Hegelian master and slave dialectic, where we go from 
an initial state of struggle and inevitable supremacy of one over the other – indeed, 
can two forces really be exactly reciprocal in the human order of things, without 
one of them eventually faltering? –  to a reciprocity that is actually positive, in that 
it stems from mutual recognition. 
This dyadic depiction of negation is not really kept in the Critique of 
Pure Reason. As Paul Guyer and Marco Giovanelli have shown199, there is an 
intrinsic connection between the notion of real opposition and the principle of the 
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anticipations of perception that appears in the Critique of Pure Reason.200 
Perception is different from sensation in that perceptions seem to attest to the 
presence of an objective element, namely, Reality.201 It is important to remember 
that reality is here Realität, not Wirklichkeit, which is a modal category, and can 
be better translated by Existence. These two terms, in Kant like in Hegel, have two 
different meanings. Suffice it to say that here, reality, has to do with the 
determination of the thing, what that thing is202, not with the positing of its 
existence. 
Now in every perception such as in every sensation, Kant argues, there is 
a mix of reality and negation (“a transition from reality to negation, that makes 
every reality representable”203), of what the object is and what it is not; 
phenomena can admit different degrees between reality and negation, i.e., their 
magnitude can vary. At the end of Transcendental Analytic, right before we enter 
the vast kingdom of illusion that is the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant presents a 
table that shows the four different meanings that the category of negation assumes 
in the Analytic. These are, respectively: 1) the concept of none, that is, a concept 
without an object, e.g., the noumena (ens rationis); 2) the absence of an object, 
such as its shadow (nihil privativum); 3) the mere form of intuition, that is, space 
and time as the conditions of possibility of all phenomena, such as they have been 
presented in the transcendental aesthetic; 4) the object of a concept that contradicts 
itself (nihil negativum). We can see how two other forms of negation are added to 
the ones that were listed in 1763.  
All these forms of widespread negation could lead to the impression that 
it is everywhere, but that it is not as important as in 1763, when all the world was 
described in terms of negation.  However, we must stress the fact that while, in the 
transition from 1763 to 1781, negation seems to be diluted among many other 
categories, in fact, it is reasserted as probably the key-category, alongside reality. 
Indeed, when asserting the steadfast distinction between phenomena and noumena, 
the negative utility of the critique is at its height: we simply learn what we can, 
and what we cannot legitimately expect to know. Therefore, our faculty of 
knowing is limited, and this limitation, which is tied with the impossibility of 
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synthetic a priori knowledge in philosophy, is simultaneously a limit of my 
perception, of my possible experience, and of all philosophy that wants to avoid 
the pitfalls of both dogmatism and skepticism. Thus it is not only a limited 
philosophy but, as Ricœur will often insist, a “philosophy of limits”. 
We have seen how Kant’s 1763 dynamical notion of real opposition 
resulted in a reciprocal limitation, or a conflict whose forces annulled each other, 
while still remaining active. Now it remains to be shown how the mobilizing 
category of negation actually totalizes itself in the opposition of reason to itself, in 
its effort to think the unconditioned, and to provide answers to the questions it 
cannot help but formulate, because they appear to it not only as theoretical, but 
also as practical problems. This is precisely what Kant calls the Transcendental 
Dialectic. 
 
1.2.3 – Transcendental dialectic and the conflict of reason with itself in the 
antinomies 
 
It goes without saying that the Kantian sense of “dialectic” is radically 
different from the positive meanings attributed to dialectic in the philosophical 
tradition, from Heraclitus and Plato to Hegel and Marx. While all these kinds of 
dialectics are radically different from one another, they all share a positive 
appreciation of dialectic as a moving force; now, for Kant, dialectic is 
fundamentally “error”, or even “illusion” and “sophistry”. As such, it must be 
reigned in, and dissolved by the critical philosopher. What Kant strives to do in the 
“Transcendental Dialectic” section of the Critique of Pure Reason is a “critique of 
dialectical illusion”. In so doing, Kant roughly adopts an Aristotelian definition of 
dialectic – Aristotle opposed demonstrative reasoning to dialectical reasoning, the 
latter stemming from commonly held opinions, proper to rhetoric more than to 
science204 – as simple opinion. 
Now the problem is, Kant claims, that the “subjective grounds of 
judgment” are taken to be “objective grounds”, or as he puts it, that sensibility 
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exerts an “unnoticed influence” on understanding.205 The result of this undue 
influence is that instead of restricting ourselves to reason within the limits of all 
possible experience, we are impelled to transcend them, in our search for unity. 
Thus our reason formulates transcendent principles rather than sticking to merely 
immanent principles that stem from understanding itself. The result is that, in our 
search for the unconditioned, we think we find it in appearances, and thus grant 
them the status of things in themselves. And this is, for Kant, totally unacceptable, 
because it is an illegitimate use of our faculties. It rests on a confusion between 
noumenon and phenomenon. Ricœur notes that the noumenal object is an 
invitation to transform into a determinate object what must remain 
undetermined.206 
Curiously enough, Kant says that the dialectic of pure reason is “natural 
and unavoidable” and that “even after we have exposed the mirage it will still not 
cease to lead our reason on with false hopes, continually propelling it into 
momentary aberrations that always need to be removed.”207 Allow me to note in 
passing that this description reveals an important aspect of Kantianism: its rigid 
discipline. It is almost, we could say, an asceticism. This has often been 
commented about his practical philosophy, with its emphasis on duty, respect for 
the law, and so on. Nevertheless, even in theoretical philosophy this aspect is 
present: never do we cease to be, let us say, tempted by illusion, and never must 
we fall prey to it. Now, the quest for unity through dialectical reason has of course 
been a characteristic of Hegelian philosophy. When Ricœur comes back to assess 
his post-Hegelian Kantianism in the late 80s, as we will see in the next chapter, he 
seems to refer to Hegelianism as a temptation that must be resisted and he 
mentions Hegel as someone who needs to be “mourned”. And why? Precisely in 
virtue of Ricœur’s allegiance to the Kantian framework. Earlier, in “Kant et la 
négation” he emphasized that it is precisely because of the temptation that 
negation is permanent, rather than circumstantial.208 
 Now, the Transcendental Dialectic is comprised of three different parts. 
These are, respectively, the paralogisms, the antinomies and the ideal of pure 
reason. This is, again, a division inspired by Aristotle. Each of these three parts is 
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an application of an idea of reason, defined as “a concept made up of notions, 
which goes beyond the possibility of experience”209 These will, in turn, analyze 
the objects of the three traditional metaphysical disciplines – the three parts of 
“special metaphysics”, that is, the scholarly elaboration of metaphysics, as against 
metaphysics as a natural disposition – as they were defined by Christian Wolff; 
namely, rational psychology, rational cosmology and rational theology and whose 
objects are the self, the world and God. Whether or not we are free, our soul is 
immortal and God exists will be the main questions troubling the transcendental 
dialectic. Again, Ricœur is clear that we cannot elaborate a philosophy of limits 
without a triple analyzis of paralogism, antinomy and ideal.210 He also emphasizes 
that it is noteworthy that each of these modes of illusion adheres to a specific 
object, which shows us that they pertain to a transcendental type of logic (and not 
to logic as such): they do not display a lack of coherence but rather produce false 
objects.211 
Kant takes up from Aristotle the definition of a paralogism as an incorrect 
syllogism. However, more than logical paralogism, defined as a false syllogism 
due to its form, Kant will explore the transcendental paralogism, taken to be “a 
transcendental ground for inferring falsely due to its form”. Now, it is not clear 
what this transcendental ground is but, as Guyer explains, paralogisms look like 
valid arguments but are not, because the major and the minor premises use the 
same term in two different senses.212 Perhaps the transcendental ground Kant is 
alluding to is only our tendency to fall back into the suprasensible because of our 
inclination towards the unconditioned. 
Through his critique of the four paralogisms presented (which affirm that 
the soul is substance, simple, a person and that outer appearances are of doubtful 
existence) Kant is refuting “rational psychologists” such as Descartes, Leibniz and 
Wolff. I will not follow the thread of Kant’s refutation of the four paralogisms; 
suffice it to say that the main objection, as Guyer points out, resides on an 
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equivocation about the representation of the self. The self is, evidently, a 
subjective condition for thinking; but the error resides in extrapolating that 
subjective condition, the “I think” that accompanies all my representations and 
making it an affirmation of the self as an independent substance, different from all 
other objects in the world.213 Nevertheless, in here, Kant’s refutation is pretty 
straightforward: that is, the theses of the paralogisms are not given enough 
strength and emphasis to be taken seriously. The contrary happens in the following 
section of the Critique of Pure Reason, where both theses and antitheses are given 
their due emphasis. 
The “Antinomies of pure reason” deal with our representation of the 
world and our beliefs about it. Nowhere else than in this section is Kant’s attempt 
to provide a solution for the quarrel between dogmatism and skepticism more 
evident, or the constitutive conflicts inhabiting human reason rendered more 
explicit. As Victoria S. Wike contends “the antinomy of pure reason plays a 
central role in leading both Kant and future readers to a critique of reason”214, and 
as she also points out, Kant did not fail to recognize its centrality, going to the 
point of having claimed that it was the antinomy itself – so, in this case, not David 
Hume… – that awoke him from his dogmatic slumber so that the critique of 
reason could “resolve the scandal of ostensible contradiction of reason with 
itself.”215 Ricœur draws a link between this ostensible contradiction and the notion 
of real opposition from Negative Magnitudes; according to him, the concept of 
real opposition transforms and expands itself with the antinomies. They are the 
complete internalization of universal opposition.216 
Right at the outset of the section, Kant states that the antinomies deal with 
the “objective synthesis of appearances”217 and that the fact that there are two 
equally plausible possibilities configures a “wholly natural antithetic”.218 As 
Guyer explains, the antinomies arise when we apply the idea of the unconditioned 
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to the intuition of the world.219 However, as we have seen, we cannot find the 
unconditioned in experience. Kant will present four antinomies, that is, four theses 
and four antitheses concerning the world, which all seem plausible. Nevertheless, 
this group is divided into two different cases. In one case, the unconditioned 
sought after could hypothetically only be found in sensible experience (but it 
actually cannot), in which case both thesis and antithesis are shown to be false. In 
the other case, the unconditioned is conceived as something beyond experience but 
on this occasion it is an object of belief rather than knowledge, and so, as belief, 
thesis and antithesis are both true.220 This is the kernel of Kant’s solution of the 
quarrel between skepticism and dogmatism and so both a concrete application for 
critical philosophy and a setting of the limits within which our knowledge 
operates. This is also a strict separation of knowledge and belief, as is evident in 
the resolution of the third and fourth antinomies. As Kant famously stated in the 
preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason: “I had to deny 
knowledge in order to make room for faith”.221 But let me briefly mention each 
one of the antinomies before summing up the importance of the whole section. 
The first antinomy concerns the beginning of the world in time and its 
boundaries in space. Is it finite or infinite as regards time and space? The second 
antinomy is the antinomy of substance. Does the world consist of simple parts and 
nothing exists except what is simple or is it the other way around, and there is 
nothing simple in the world? The third antinomy, which is probably the most 
important one – since it will occupy the whole Critique of Practical Reason222, 
where we, who were taken to be mere phenomena in nature, will be granted the 
status of things in themselves in the kingdom of ends –, deals with the existence of 
freedom as a specific type of causality. The thesis assumes the existence of 
causality through freedom, while the antithesis asserts that everything in the world 
happens solely in accordance with the laws of nature. Finally, the fourth antinomy 
concerns the existence of a first cause, that is, whether or not there exists, either 
inside or outside the world, a necessary being as its cause (this is the antinomy of 
the contingency or necessity of the world). Allow me to remind, to reiterate, that 
the theses and antitheses of the first two antinomies are considered to be both 
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false, while the second group has theses and antitheses that are taken to be both 
true, but in different orders, one in the order of phenomena, and the latter in the 
order of noumena. I will not follow the thread of Kant’s intricate argumentation to 
demonstrate how this is so, and rather only sum up the conclusions to be drawn.223  
One important aspect to note, and which Ricœur mentions in passing, is 
that since the antinomies are deeply ingrained within our own reason, all we can 
do is to neutralize them, never fully destroying them.224 This is testament to the 
fact that reason is impelled to fall prey to the aforementioned temptation of 
looking for an object of totality and that in doing so and by reaching contrary 
compelling possibilities, this conflict of reason with itself is almost ineluctable. 
Critical philosophy is there to exercise constant vigilance, but this active stance 
must be perpetually reinforced. Ultimately, Kant pretends to have solved the 
conflict of the antinomies with his distinction between phenomena and noumena. 
This is why the noumenon is a limit phenomenon, and it is here that Ricœur finds 
Kant’s “philosophy of limits” which he tries to appropriate for himself. The result 
is that this limit configures the frontier which Ricœur constantly – or almost – 
forbids his philosophy to cross. So even though Ricœur’s philosophy will be 
mutable and ever-changing in its own creative hermeneutical way, some limits are 
never crossed, and these limits are, properly speaking, the objectification of 
totality, the grasping of the unconditioned. So the pieces of the Ricoeurian puzzle 
keep changing, but let us say that its outer contours remain the same, because they 
are provided by the Kantian framework. At the same time, this theoretical 
affirmation of finitude opens up in Kant a space to be filled by his practical 
philosophy and the affirmation of freedom through the subject’s autonomy. As 
Victoria S. Wike emphasizes, “theoretical reason makes possible the discovery of 
the object and the task of practical reason.”225 Theoretical reason makes way for 
practical reason as the domain of human freedom and autonomy, since its 
cartography was chartered since the first critique. 
Nevertheless, to assert that within the framework of Kantian practical 
philosophy human beings are postulated as being free and autonomous is not 
tantamount to saying that action is unimpeded and free from conflict. If, in its 
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theoretical use, reason was directly at odds with itself, in its practical use reason 
will be in conflict with what Kant calls pathological inclinations. So a whole new 
conflictual domain will open up as a consequence. And even though this new 
domain will be less important for Ricœur’s theoretical framework than the first 
critique was – even if, moreover, Ricœur is far more critical of Kant’s practical 
philosophy than of his theoretical philosophy, especially in Oneself as Another – 
this new domain, and Ricœur’s reaction to it deserve to be briefly mentioned. 
 
1.2.4 – Kant’s practical philosophy: the conflict of maxims in moral philosophy, 
radical evil and the unsocial sociability 
 
This section will take a look at the main occurrences of conflict in Kant’s 
moral and political philosophy, as well as in his philosophy of religion. Kant 
defined moral action as obedience to the categorical imperative. This notion, 
introduced for the first time in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals has 
three main formulations, but it is the first one which interests us the most here: 
“act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time 
will that it become a universal law.”226 
According to Kant’s own terminology, a maxim is a “subjective principle 
of volition”. Since Kant adopts a strictly universalist standpoint, the goal of moral 
action is to adapt one’s subjective maxim to the “objective” principle of volition, 
i.e. “the practical principle for all rational beings”.227 This is the exact definition of 
moral law, in the context of Kant’s practical philosophy. However, Kant 
acknowledges that our maxims can be guided in different directions. Moral action 
entails respect for the law, but there might be occasions in which I am inclined to 
proceed otherwise. These are all key concepts in Kant’s practical philosophy. 
While inclination stands for empirical motivations (i.e., in the most prosaic form, I 
am inclined to eat because I am hungry) or at most to serve hypothetical 
imperatives, like the quest for happiness (in which case, the deed done serves an 
instrumental purpose). However, as is well known, Kant’s stance is anti-
eudaimonist; in case of doubt, if one should have to choose between obeying the 
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moral law, or being happy, Kant certainly chooses the former, even if it comes at 
the cost of the subject’s misery. 
This anti-eudaimonist stance leads Kant to treat self-love in a rather harsh 
manner. Self-love is in fact an empirical inclination and as such must be excluded 
from the moral law.228 Kant goes so far as to state that what motivates us to do the 
right thing, namely, our feeling of respect for the law, is in itself a feeling of 
humiliation – humiliation of self-love. And this because, it seems, only if we let go 
of our attachment to our own particular self do we take the universal standpoint 
and become autonomous. In his practical philosophy, Kant thus rejects inclinations 
as being pathological (either immediate inclination, or instrumental inclination), 
probably because they are empirical, and can have the power of distracting or 
removing us from the strict obedience to moral law. 
What I want to emphasize in this process is that, therefore, Kant 
acknowledges that in order for an action to be done “from duty” (and not merely 
in accordance with duty) there is a conflict of maxims that is played out, and if I 
am to act morally, respect for the law must ultimately win over all types of 
pathological inclination. Doing the right thing for the right type of motive (or 
maxim) is precisely what Kant defines as having (or being) a “good will”. 
Now, Ricœur is heavily critical of this exclusion of the empirical from 
moral philosophy. In Oneself as Another, adopting a neo-Aristotelian stance (of 
which more in part five of this thesis) Ricœur seeks to ground the moral norm in 
the eudemonistic desire to live well. But for it to be possible, he needs to find the 
mediations between the two notions; and in adopting this procedure he follows a 
strategy very different from Kant’s. Indeed, he characterizes Kant’s formulation of 
the categorical imperative as “a logic of exclusion”.229 Indeed, for him, there is no 
valid reason to morally oppose self-esteem. And this because in Ricœur’s own 
ethical proposal, self-respect will be the formalized version of self-esteem. 
Another critique that Ricœur addresses to Kant’s moral philosophy 
concerns Kant’s belief that what must be done is always in each case self-evident. 
In fact, Ricœur contends, there might be occasions in which there is not one duty 
but rather several duties in conflict, but I will leave this discussion for chapter 5.2 
below. This brings the presence of conflict within Kant’s moral philosophy to a 
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229 Ricœur, Oneself as Another, p. 211. 
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new level, not only is there a conflictual process of selection of maxims through 
the exclusion of pathological inclinations, but even if the goal is moral action (for 
its own sake) irreconcilable moral duties might be at stake. I think this is sufficient 
proof of how negation is also at stake as a formal procedure in Kant’s practical 
philosophy. Once again, the temptation – in this case, to act according to our 
inclinations – must be avoided. 
But this depiction assumes a more dramatic tone when we change the 
background from Kant’s moral philosophy to his philosophy of religion. I 
mentioned above how Kant strongly asserted that he had to “deny knowledge” so 
that there could be room for faith. For obvious reasons, nowhere will this assertion 
be made more evident than in his philosophy of religion. Indeed, in Religion 
within the Boundaries of Mere Reason230 what we find is some form of 
rationalized religion with strong links to moral philosophy, and maintaining the 
strict separation from phenomena and noumena inherited from the first Critique. 
Kant still places the “good will” as a supreme value, as he did before in the 
Groundwork, and he still discusses the maxims of our will. Nevertheless, in what 
is a striking mix of a Protestant Christianism tradition and a strongly rationalistic 
background that has often been highlighted by Kantian scholars231, Kant postulates 
a far darker possibility: what happens if our will wants evil? 
In the first part of the book, the so-called “essay on radical evil”, Kant 
argues that human beings have a “natural propensity” to evil, which, however, is 
not to be confused with our “original predisposition” to good. This terminology 
can be somewhat puzzling, but Kant seems to be asserting that even though we are 
originally good, there is a certain perversion that conditions us to want evil. The 
subtlety resides in considering that the original predisposition is necessary, 
whereas the natural propensity is contingent (as this can be read as the fall from 
good to evil). As human beings, we are equally drawn by the moral law, and by 
the inclinations stemming from our moral nature. As Gordon Michalson points 
out, the problem lies in the priority of the sensuous over the moral: “radical evil is 
the freely-willed choice of an evil "ground" of maxim-making that results in the 
                                                
230 Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, translated by Allen Wood and George di 
Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
231 See for instance the introduction to Gordon E. Michalson, Jr, Fallen Freedom. Kant on Radical 
Evil and Moral Regeneration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
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subordination of the moral incentive to the sensuous as a regular, ongoing policy 
in one's successive acts of maxim-making.”232 
Therefore, it is because the moral incentive is given a secondary role that 
one’s actions can be deemed evil. The fault is not on sensuous inclinations or 
desires themselves; it rather lies on the ground which makes possible the 
formulation of maxims itself, and the motives to which priority is given. Whether 
or not we are really free in choosing this ground is a matter of contention, because 
the propensity to evil certainly conditions our, let us say, empirical capacity of 
following the moral law. 
So we can see that in Kant’s mature philosophy of religion there is a 
battle between two principles which is, in a way, not very different from Plato’s 
chariot allegory, in that they are mutually contradictory and both deeply ingrained 
within our soul. The mere title of the second book of Religion within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason, namely “Concerning the battle of the good against 
the evil principle for dominion over the human being” is sufficient proof of this 
pervasive conflict of, as Kant sees it, good and evil in the exercise of our freedom. 
The third book will precisely try to establish the principles through which we 
could restore our freedom, that is, our capacity to act morally in following the law 
and this will be, for Kant, the object of religion. 
Kant’s claims in this respect might seem somewhat perplexing, and even 
clash with the strong affirmation of freedom and autonomy of his practical 
philosophy. The way I see it, they only emphasize the dramatic experience of 
existence: without denying autonomy, they emphasize the heavy burden of 
heteronomy constitutively weighing in on existence and human choice. Ricœur 
notes in passing, with Nabert, that the way these two principles clash in the 
formation of maxims is seen as a recovery of the early notion of real opposition 
from the 1763 essay, which seemed to have been diluted in the first Critique and 
now resurfaces in the Religion essay233 – that is, that they are both intensive 
magnitudes with opposing forces. It is perhaps not exaggerated to say that for Kant 
this ultimate clash was decisive for the fate of human freedom and moral action. 
Ricœur, for his part, adopted the Kantian framework in his philosophy of religion 
                                                
232 Michalson, Ibid., p. 30. 
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too; he emphasizes the place of hope in philosophy and religion234, and puts 
forward analyzes of evil inspired by Kant.235 
Ultimately, Kant wanted to restore us to our own original condition as he 
saw it. This wish of restoration or reconciliation – always mixed up with conflict – 
also resurfaces in his political philosophy. In The Idea for a Universal History 
with a Cosmopolitan Aim236, which is a brief article that was published in the 
Berlinische Monatsschrift in Kant’s mature period – much like the famous “What 
is Enlightenment?” had been years before – we find a programmatic political 
proposal mixed up with an attempt at devising a philosophy of history geared 
towards peace and progress. In spite of its brevity, this is an important text that has 
been given much attention in recent decades, given the Kantian framework that 
has dominated Anglo-Saxon political philosophy in recent years, as well as the 
establishment of supranational political institutions in the second half of the 20th 
century. 
Through his depiction of progress, Kant is attuned with one of the most 
overarching beliefs of the Enlightenment; and in fact, in this small text, we find an 
early elaboration of the teleological judgment that he would develop in the third 
Critique. The text is divided in nine theses, or “propositions” which Kant 
enunciates without giving them more than a cursory explanation. Kant states that 
our natural predispositions develop purposively (teleological judgment, first 
proposition) and that in our case this is to happen completely in the species, and 
not the individual (second proposition). After asserting that this completion is to 
be attained through the powers of our reason (third proposition), Kant arrives at 
what is for us the most important proposition, namely the fourth, where he claims:  
 
The means nature employs in order to bring about the development of all their 
predispositions is their antagonism in society, insofar as the latter is in the end the cause 
of their lawful order. Here I understand by “antagonism” the unsociable sociability of 
                                                
234 Ricœur, “Freedom in the light of hope” in The Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 402-424. 
235 Other than the Symbolism of Evil, see Ricœur, Evil: A Challenge to Philosophy and Theology, 
translated by John Bowden (London: Continuum, 2007). 
236 I am following the translation found in Amélie Oksenberg Rorty and James Shmidt (ed.), Kant’s 
Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim. A Critical Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
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human beings, i.e. their propensity to enter into society, which, however, is combined 
with a thoroughgoing resistance that constantly threatens to break up this society.237 
 
Now, as a social philosopher, this is Kant at his best. He captures the 
inner tension that makes up our two “predispositions”, as he calls them: tendency 
to socialize, tendency to isolate oneself. Propensity to autonomy, propensity to 
community. According to Kant, it is because we find (social) resistance in the 
accomplishment of our own will that “our powers” are “awakened” and we are 
propelled to overcome indolence. And this happens amid our fellows, whom we 
“cannot stand” but also “cannot leave alone”. We can evidently see in this 
depiction something of the liberal principles of competition leading to market and 
prosperity; something akin to Kant’s own version of the invisible hand. However, 
much more is at stake. It is this process that leads human beings towards society as 
a “moral whole”.238 
This “moral whole” evidently reminds us of an organic image of society, 
and which brings Hegel to mind; Kant goes even further, suggesting something 
also not very far from the Hegelian guile of reason: “The human being wills 
concord; but nature knows better what is good for his species: it wills discord.”239 
As we can see, the desire for reconciliation is present; but discord is kept as an 
instrumental way of getting there. At the same time, this seems very close to the 
Heraclitean standpoint we have mentioned above. In other words, and evidently 
without being aware of it, Kant is describing a process whose formulation could 
very well be called “dialectical”, no longer in the sense attributed to it in the first 
Critique, but in the sense that Hegel will later develop, and which will be one of 
the main objects of the next chapter. 
In the remainder of the essay, Kant postulated the need for the 
establishment of a “civil society universally administering right” in which there 
would be something like a rule-governed antagonism, that is, a mutual 
coordination of different freedoms (more or less like in Hobbes) but at the 
international level; evidently, Kant foreshadows what our own supranational 
institutions attempted to emulate in the 20th century. But he does this while at the 
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239 Ibid. 
 92 
same time admitting that this is “the most difficult” problem to be solved by the 
human species, and also the one who will probably be solved the latest. In this 
forecast, he was probably right. 
I will not venture any further in my incursion in Kantianism. I hope to 
have shown how negation is pervasive in Kant’s philosophy, and how it 
instantiates itself in so many different conflicts, of which the antinomies are the 
apex. I think I have also shown that Ricœur finds in Kant a model of conflict 
whose result is a standstill, a 0, nothing, lack of movement, not because there are 
no forces at stake, but because they mutually cancel each other out. This is the 
model of real opposition from the 1763 essay. What Ricœur also draws from Kant, 
as we have seen, is the distinction between noumenon and phenomenon, and the 
restriction of knowledge in a philosophy of limits that leaves some space open for 
different possibilities, but whose status is that of belief, or faith. Finally, I think it 
has been demonstrated that there is a hint of something like a dialectical type of 
thinking in Kant too (albeit taking into account the strict limits of the first 
Critique) but one whose real productivity will only be apparent in Hegel. In his 
philosophy, this paradoxical mix of conflict and reconciliation will attain a 
different status. As we will see in the next chapter, in Hegel Ricœur will find a 
different model of conflict, one whose productivity is immense. But the Kantian 
framework will be there to prevent it from spinning out of control, or falling into 
temptation. Ricœur will also continue to draw inspiration from Hegel, both in form 
and content, throughout his whole career. Kant will resurface, with a greater or 
lesser degree of influence, in the depiction of human fallibility in Fallible Man, in 
the analyzes of the phenomenon of evil in The Symbolism of Evil, in one of the 
instances of recognition in The Course of Recognition, in the post-Hegelian 
Kantianism of the Conflict of Interpretations, and so forth. However, I prefer not 
to anticipate now these reflections, and postpone their respective discussions for 
the remainder of the thesis. As we will see in the next chapter, there is one 
particular article, namely “Freedom in the Light of Hope”, the programmatic text 
in which Ricœur defines his “Post-Hegelian Kantianism”, that recaps in a 
condensed manner almost all the features of Kant’s philosophy that we have seen 
were important for him, in this chapter. This will be the proof of his strong 
adhesion to Kantianism, amid the heart of Hegelianism. But for now, we will have 
to depict Kant’s counterpart, Hegel. 
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Surely, much has happened in German philosophy, between Kant and 
Hegel. Nonetheless, I will need to keep the discussion of German Idealism out of 
this thesis, as I would be utterly incapable of doing justice to it; to this subjective 
limitation is added an objective ground: Fichte and Schelling, to name only the 
two great representatives of this period, were for Ricœur far less important than 
Kant and Hegel. For this reason, I will jump straight into Hegelian philosophy. 
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1.3 – Hegel on Negativity and Dialectic: Productive Conflict 
 
As Robert Williams discouragingly reminds us, there are more than ten 
thousand books written on Hegel and his philosophy240 (and counting). Indeed, 
Hegelian thought is as fertile as it is painstakingly complex. Now, this complexity 
of his writings and the overabundance of secondary bibliography notwithstanding, 
allow me to try to tackle some of the main questions of his philosophy which 
interest me for the purposes of this thesis, and this in a mere chapter of half a 
hundred pages. The audacity of the enterprise will perhaps be forgiven if the 
reader keeps in mind that no one was fully Hegelian except perhaps Hegel himself, 
that his thought allowed for more different and conflicting interpretations and 
schools than perhaps any other thinker in history, and that I am only interested in 
the parts of the system which we can, and in fact do use, in our own – some call it 
“postmetaphysical” – day and age. 
I will divide this chapter into the analyzis of Hegel and the reception of 
Hegel and Hegelian philosophy in 20th century France, in order to then reach its 
reception in Ricœur. The detour through the French reception will provide us with 
a clearer picture of the context and significance of Hegel(ianism) for Ricœur. In 
Hegel, I will mostly concentrate on the phenomena of his practical philosophy, 
and more specifically on recognition, taking Habermas, Honneth, Pippin and 
Williams as my guides, as well as in his own definition of dialectic. This will 
provide me the opportunity to isolate (if it even makes sense to isolate anything 
whatsoever in the thought of Hegel) the two major occurrences of conflict – or at 
least the two which interest me the most – in Hegelian philosophy. With the 
struggle for recognition, we will see conflict as a practical phenomenon, guiding a 
theory of intersubjectivity – mostly in the Jena period – and consciousness 
formation (in the Phenomenology of Spirit). For the definition of dialectic, I will 
refer to Hegel’s more complex, mature philosophy, such as it appears in the 
Encyclopedia and in the Science of Logic, only to see how through his own 
definition we find a notion of “creative conflict” configuring the most ambitious 
and powerful speculative system ever devised in the history of mankind. I will also 
mention, in a cursory manner, Jean Wahl, Jean Hyppolite and most of all Eric 
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Weil as three instances of the reception of Hegel which were decisive for Ricœur. 
Of these, the most important is perhaps Weil, because of his professed Post-
Hegelian Kantianism. I will also mention in passing the Philosophy of Right and 
Hegel’s philosophy of objective spirit because, at one point in the critical juncture 
of the 1970s, Ricœur will define the “place” of dialectic as being situated in 
human praxis, and the philosophy of objective spirit as the main trait he wishes to 
recover from Hegel. It is at this critical juncture, I will argue, that Ricœur will be 
closer to Hegel(ianism). 
In the second part of the chapter I will thus follow the thread of Ricœur’s 
reception and assessment of Hegel and Hegelianism. This reception and 
assessment was, to say the least, in itself conflictual, as Ricœur seems to have 
struggled with Hegel’s shadow for a long time, ultimately a bit uncertain about 
how best to deal with his philosophy. Ricœur’s use of Hegelian philosophy ranges 
from enthusiastic apology to painful mourning, with a meaningful recuperation of 
specific parts of Hegel’s analyzes and many cautions against the “dangers” 
involved in Hegelianism. Nonetheless, in the last analyzis, Hegel proves to be an 
influence almost as decisive for Ricœur as was Kant; as such, I will provide a 
diagnosis of Ricœur’s Post-Hegelian Kantianism at the end of the chapter. These 
will necessarily be extremely succinct analyzes, for lack of space, but in this 
condensed gigantomachia, we will find a very important key to Ricœur’s 
philosophy. 
 
1.3.1 – Hegel in Jena: the dawn of recognition and an alternative practical 
philosophy 
 
Before delving into the very technical and difficult definitions of 
dialectics provided in Hegel’s mature philosophy, allow me to mention the 
renaissance of Hegelian studies nowadays. Indeed, after the rejection of Popper 
and many Post-Modern thinkers, after the persistent emphasis on methodological 
(or plainly ethical, psychological or logical) individualism and Rawlsian-style 
contractualism and constructivism, I think it is fair to say that the second half of 
the 20th century was by and large anti-Hegelian. Some notable exceptions 
appeared in France, where Hegel was very popular during a period of time. But 
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even there he was criticized as much as he was popular. Today, a different kind of 
Hegelian renaissance is taking place. 
But the neo-Hegelian recovery has come through very specific means and 
topics. It is not his metaphysics, his philosophy of history or even his aesthetics 
that have been given much attention. Rather, in recent years, it has been his ethics, 
his social theory, his philosophy of “objective spirit” and institutionalism that have 
been reassessed and translated to contemporary terms.  
What interests political philosophers and social scientists alike is Hegel’s 
holism, his depiction of ethical and communal life, his views on intersubjectivity, 
consciousness formation, purposive rationality, agent causation, origins of 
normativity, the birth and death of institutions, and so forth. This is the reason why 
I strongly agree with Robert Pippin when he underscores that at the heart of 
Hegelianism there is a strong emphasis on practical philosophy.241 This practical 
philosophy can be understood in contemporary terms as going against the grain of 
methodological individualism and as attributing free action to an agent if and only 
if this makes sense to him or herself. According to Pippin, this practical reason is 
“a kind of interchange of attempts at justification among persons each of whose 
actions affects what others would otherwise be able to do, and all this for a 
community at a time.”242 Central to his account is a depiction of individual 
freedom that is not independent from one’s own institutions, already-existing (not 
abstractly constructed) normative frameworks and historical evolution. As Pippin 
makes clear, Hegel thinks “we make ourselves into actual agents over historical 
time.”243 If I recognize myself in my actions, I will have to own up to them, to 
recognize myself in them. This is consistent with Ricœur’s own phenomenological 
analyzes of action, and also with what he called  imputation of oneself in Oneself 
as Another and recognition-attestation of oneself in The Course of Recognition. 
Pippin also forcefully underscores that freedom for Hegel is “a 
collectively achieved relational state, ‘being with self in an other’”244 (or, as Hegel 
poetically put it, Das ich im wir). What I want to start looking at, also because of 
the status this notion attained in our own contemporary world, is one of the main 
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processes through which this collectively achieved relational state is arrived at, 
namely, recognition. 
Now, recognition is almost omnipresent in Hegel’s philosophy, from its 
inception up until the late works. As early as 1802-1803, when Hegel was working 
on his draft of the System of Ethical Life245 (“ethical life” here being the translation 
of Sittlichkeit, with all its communitarian connotations), still a work inspired by 
Schelling, we can find a depiction of recognition as an intersubjective process. In 
this writing, Hegel starts by describing what he calls “natural ethical life”, which 
is nothing more than the transition of different levels of intersubjective 
relationships, from mere natural forms such as family, to legal relations and 
ultimately to state. The same account of intersubjective recognition holds for his 
first attempts to devise a philosophy of spirit, the so-called “Real Philosophy”246 
of the Jena period (which had two versions and comprises both a philosophy of 
nature and a philosophy of spirit). 
Throughout Hegel’s whole career, recognition will be depicted as a 
dialectical phenomenon bouncing back and forth between conflict and 
reconciliation. Its ties with other cardinal notions of Hegel’s philosophy, such as 
freedom, institutions and spirit, are important. As Robert Williams contends, 
“recognition is not only the existential phenomenological shape of the concept of 
freedom but also the general intersubjective structure and pattern of Hegel’s 
concept of spirit.”247 However, nowhere else than in the Jena period is this process 
more clearly situated in the realm of human affairs and the intersubjective 
constitution of human relationships. As both Honneth248 and Ricœur249 
emphasized, Hegel’s early political philosophy can be understood as a 
recontextualization of the motives of social conflict. Over against Hobbes’ own 
depiction of the state of nature as a struggle of every man against every man, and 
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the need to establish a covenant for fear of violent death, Hegel sees social conflict 
as being motivated by moral reasons. 
When Hegel speaks about Sittlichkeit he is alluding to the specific 
conformation of a collective ethos. For him, the ideal model of a city and its 
people was the Greek ancient polis and when he criticizes what came to be known 
as “atomism” as a social ill, he is alluding to pre-established intersubjective 
consensuses that exist through collective mores. These, in turn, are grounded in 
processes of reciprocal recognition through which each partner of interaction is 
supposed to validate and accept his or her fellow citizens. As such, and over 
against Kant’s and the liberal tradition’s own insistence on individual autonomy, 
Hegel will contend that our own individual freedom constitutively depends upon 
collective contexts of meaningful interaction and support. 
And this is, I think, the touchstone of Hegel’s ethics of recognition. 
Robert Williams insightfully speaks about recognition as an “operative concept” in 
Hegel (in the sense attributed to it by Eugen Fink250) in that even though Hegel 
does not explicitly turn it into a category and often refrains from describing it 
thematically, it is nonetheless almost omnipresent and serves to explain other, 
thematic concepts. Thus spirit is born out of reciprocal recognition in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, for instance. In a nutshell, and to continue using 
Williams’ masterful analyzes, the cornerstone of Hegel’s ethics reaches us through 
his own analyzis of recognition: “The threshold of the ethical is reached when the 
other comes to count”.251 And through Hegel’s own evolving views on the 
particular organization of the patterns of recognition (from the intersubjective 
standpoint of Jena to the more institutional standpoint of his mature philosophy) 
we learn where and how recognition can unfold: according to Hegel, in love, 
abstract right, civil society, and the state. 
But let me summarize, first of all, how the concept appears in the Jena 
period, as well as its conceptual origins. As Honneth, Williams, and other Hegel 
scholars contend, there seems to have been a direct influence of Fichte, as well as, 
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perhaps to a minor extent, of Rousseau. Honneth reconstructs the Fichtean 
influence: 
 
In his essay, 'The Foundations of Natural Law', Fichte had conceived of recognition as the 
'reciprocal effect' [Wechselwirkung] between individuals that underlies legal relations: by 
both mutually requiring one another to act freely and limiting their own sphere of action 
to the other's advantage, subjects form a common consciousness which then attains 
objective validity in legal relations.252 
 
Honneth then proceeds to show how Hegel extends Fichte’s model of recognition, 
stripping it from its transcendental status, and transforming those spheres in 
“communicative forms of life”. Moreover, Fichte’s model of recognition and its 
emphasis on “summons” displays an interesting mode of interaction which 
curiously comes close to Ricœur’s own model of voluntary, one-sided recognition 
which is supposed to elicit a response not by forcing it, but by inviting our partners 
of interaction to recognize us, as we recognize them. This similarity has been 
detected by Williams, in his book review of The Course of Recognition.253 The 
alleged influence from Rousseau, on the other hand, comes from the Discourse on 
the Origins of Inequality which we have considered above, namely, when 
Rousseau speaks about “mutual esteem” and “reciprocal honor” among men, such 
that any crime transforms itself into insult. One of Hegel’s most striking 
innovations in relation to both Fichte and Rousseau, however, is the way 
alternating phases of conflict and reconciliation are seen as the evolution between 
recognition patterns in a dynamic process. 
And this is why, Honneth argues, Hegel finds a different and original 
solution, opposed to Hobbes’s own depiction. Rather than going from an all-out 
struggle to a definitive pacification through social contract (whose sole motivation 
is, we have seen, self-preservation) in Hegel “this struggle leads, as a moral 
medium, from an underdeveloped state of ethical life to a more mature level of 
ethical relations.”254 This will be rather self-explanatory in Hegel’s later writings. 
But it is already present in the System of Ethical Life, and namely in its second 
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chapter, “The negative freedom, or transgression”. In it, and when commenting all 
sorts of possible crimes encompassed under the heading of “transgression”, Hegel 
asserts that what is at stake is honor itself, and thus, recognition. So we have a first 
glimpse of what will be the struggle for recognition, and its value over against the 
value of life itself: 
 
Denial here is an injury to life. But because this indifference has over against it the 
abstraction of the injured particularity, through the latter the former is posited ideally too, 
and what is injured is honour. Through honour the singular detail becomes something 
personal and a whole, and what is seemingly only the denial of a detail is an injury of the 
whole, and thus there arises the battle of one whole person against another whole person. 
(...) honour indeed has been injured, but honour is distinguishable from life. And since life 
is brought into play in order to restore to honour its reality, which as injured honour is 
only ideal, the linking of the ideality of honour with its reality is achieved only by raising 
to full reality the specific aspect injured; and honour consists in this, that once one 
specific aspect is negated, then life, or the totality of specific aspects, is to be affected too. 
Thus the man’s own life must be brought in question as the means whereby alone that 
negation of a single detail is made into a whole as it should be.255 
  
Commenting on this and close passages, Honneth notes that honor is tied to a 
positive appreciation of the totality of one’s peculiar features; this positive relation 
to self as a totality adopting many different shapes will later assume particular 
relevance in the context of Honneth’s own reactualization of recognition. But the 
particular point to emphasize is how Hegel uses negation or the negative in order 
to advance from one sphere to another. Admittedly, at this point, Hegel’s 
philosophy is still a sketch, a draft. He already includes a chapter on the state as 
the point in which the individual becomes a concrete universal, but he cannot fully 
develop and ground it. 
A further step towards a more systematic depiction of the struggle for 
recognition as a social model of evolution through conflict is given in the so-called 
“Real philosophy” of the Jena period. In these lectures Hegel definitively 
abandons both the terminology and the method of Schelling. These are his first 
attempts at a philosophy of spirit and the formation of consciousness. From this 
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moment on, Hegel will conceive spirit as having the capacity to go out of itself, in 
order to later come back, in its development process. This movement, in turn, will 
be seen as structuring and providing meaning to the whole of reality. In this 
particular work, spirit will go through the three stages of its concept (part I), what 
Hegel calls Actual Spirit (Part II) and Constitution (Part III). 
In its first stage, spirit is conceived as intelligence and will. Hegel 
contends that immediately, spontaneously, spirit is intelligence and thus maintains 
a purely cognitive stance towards nature. As soon as it begins developing a 
practical relation towards nature, it becomes will.256 Now, at this stage, Hegel 
distinguishes between different types of relation we can develop towards the 
world, such as the drive (Trieb), work (Werk), labor (Arbeit) and the development 
of instruments (Werkzeuge). What distinguishes human beings from animals is 
that we do not necessarily immediately consume objects as soon as there is a 
feeling of lack; the logic of our desire is more complex than that. On the contrary, 
we produce objects by means of labor; eventually, by the construction of 
instruments and machines, we come to dominate nature through cunning (List). 
It is also at this stage that Hegel includes some of the first detailed 
descriptions of love as a positive phenomenon of mutual recognition: 
 
To be sure, they approach one another with uncertainty and timidity, yet with trust, for 
each knows itself immediately in the other, and the movement is merely the inversion 
whereby each realizes that the other knows itself likewise in its other. This reversal also 
rests in the fact that each gives up its independence. (…) This self-negation is one's being 
for another, into which one's immediate being is transformed. Each one's self-negation 
becomes, for each, the other's being for the other. Thus the other is for me, i.e., it knows 
itself in me.257 
 
As we can see, love is taken to be the most natural, and first form of recognition, 
as well as the one in which the relation can tend towards a state of fusion, 
mutually letting go of one’s own independence. Also in the same section, Hegel 
for the first time mentions the state of nature258 and explicitly refutes Hobbes’s 
need for a social contract. In fact, according to this claim, we do not need the 
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fiction of a social contract artificially conferring rights to each individual because 
even in the state of nature, and in virtue of the natural rights recognized in 
intersubjective reciprocal relationships, we already have what the artificial 
contract is supposed to establish. Allow me to quote the passage where this is 
made clear. 
 
Right is the relation of persons, in their behavior, to others. It is the universal element of 
their free being—the determination, the limitation of their empty freedom. I need not spell 
out this relation or limitation for myself and produce it; rather, the object, in general, is 
itself this creation of right, i.e., the relation of recognition. (…) Man is necessarily 
recognized and necessarily gives recognition. This necessity is his own, not that of our 
thinking in contrast to the content. As recognizing, man is himself the movement [of 
recognition], and this movement itself is what negates (hebt auf) his natural state: he is 
recognition;259 
 
Commenting on this passage, Honneth spells out Hegel’s claim. 
According to Honneth, what Hegel shows is that in natural situations of 
competition, the solution need not come by the means of the law (i.e., by a social 
contract). Even in such cases, attention must be drawn to pre-existing social 
relations which, as Honneth sees them, “guarantee a minimal normative consensus 
in advance”.260 In a nutshell, for Honneth, “subjects must have already recognized 
each other even before the conflict.”261 The contract, in other words, is just the 
spelling out of a pre-existing normative standpoint. 
Therefore, the remaining conflicts that Hegel analyzes in the “Real 
Philosophy”, and Honneth’s own interpretation of them, are all geared towards 
moral motivations: social struggles are struggles for recognition. Even when what 
is at stake is possession, the whole of one’s existence becomes entangled in the 
conflict. This is consistent with the prior analyzes of the System of Ethical Life we 
have seen above. Already in Jena, this struggle is seen as a struggle for life and 
death, and in which the desire for recognition is put over and above the value we 
grant to our own life. Honneth interprets the life-and-death struggle as a sign that 
each partner engaging in the struggle acknowledges that the other is a vulnerable 
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subject like him or herself, also a bearer of rights and normative expectations.262 
He traces back the source of the crime to the feeling of disrespect one experiences 
and that leads to the struggle. 
In the subsequent parts of these Jena lectures, Hegel delineates the 
multiple spheres of recognition, and their respective negative counterparts (this in 
part two, with its descriptions of recognition in love, contract, and the negative of 
crime) and ultimately end up, as always, in a theory of the state and constitution. 
The state is seen to embody objective spirit and we are geared toward Hegel’s 
model of a constitutional monarchy. 
Both Habermas and Honneth see in these early Jena lectures the model 
for a Hegelian theory of intersubjectivity that they claim he drops in subsequent 
writings. Habermas, who was one of the first to systematically recover the value of 
these lectures for Hegel’s practical philosophy, argues that the peculiar model of 
development through interaction and labor that Hegel presents in the Jena period is 
completely forgotten afterwards.263 In the early article “Labor and Interaction” 
Habermas emphasizes that in the Jena lectures Hegel includes the possibility of 
liberation through labor; with this remark, not only does the Hegelian analyzis 
foreshadow Marx’s later conceptualization of alienation, but he is also inscribed in 
what later would become the Critical Theory tradition. As Habermas puts it in this 
early essay, “Hegel links together labor and interaction under the viewpoint of 
emancipation from the forces of external as well as internal nature.”264 Later, 
Habermas would come back to reassess Hegelian philosophy and to reappraise 
recognition. In the Philosophical Discourse of Modernity265 Habermas takes up 
once again Hegel’s model of intersubjective recognition and considers it deserves 
the status of a “counterdiscourse of modernity”. He tells us that Hegel could have 
followed that path, but instead chose to fall back into a philosophy of the subject 
hypostasized into absolute idealism. Thus it is, let us say, in the “spirit” of Hegel’s 
early philosophy, not in the letter of the philosophy Hegel explicitly adopted for 
himself, and through a reconstruction of a Hegelian early intuition, that Habermas 
finds the means to counteract what he sees as a tendency in modernity to privilege 
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monological reason. Williams, for his part, refuses Habermas’s and Honneth’s 
criticism of Hegel and their account, and argues that Hegel was not a proponent of 
monological reason or the closed system.266 He rather sees the dynamic version of 
recognition and collective Sittlichkeit as being present all the way through Hegel’s 
mature reflections. In this criticism and cautions against the final form of Hegelian 
philosophy, Ricœur is probably closer to both Habermas and Honneth, than he is 
to Williams’s standpoint. 
In The Course of Recognition Ricœur follows in its main traits Honneth’s 
reconstruction of the Hegel from the Jena period, complemented by Jacques 
Taminiaux’s own commentary and translation of the “Real Philosophy” 
lectures.267 He further adds that “the specific spheres of recognition distinguished 
by Hegel do not constitute immutable configurations. They are historical 
compromises between speculative exigencies and empirical experience (…) They 
open a history of a struggle for recognition that continues to make sense in our 
own day so long as the institutional structure of recognition remains inseparable 
from the negative dynamism of the whole process, each institutional conquest 
responding to a specific negative threat.”268 This last claim is in itself sufficient to 
attest that for Ricœur an attempt such as the one put forward by Honneth, that is, 
of “reactualizing recognition” in contemporary terms is a legitimate task. In later 
chapters, we will follow the thread of this possibility. 
These lectures and drafts from the Jena period can be seen as a 
preparation for the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel’s masterpiece from 1807 and 
which closes the Jena period. The Phenomenology is probably Hegel’s most 
influential book, even if he himself was later to supersede it in his Encyclopedia 
and Science of Logic. It is also, by far, the book from Hegel that made a more 
lasting impression in 20th century French philosophy, including the philosophy of 
Paul Ricœur. It is also one of the books in which the struggle for recognition is 
more evident. Let me now turn my attention to it. 
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1.3.2 – Recognition as consciousness formation. The lord-bondsman dialectic in 
the Phenomenology of Spirit 
 
The Phenomenology of Spirit is something like a history of the spirit’s 
struggle to overcome the obstacles to its own self-knowledge. As Hegel later saw 
it, the Phenomenology was meant to serve as an introduction to his own system, 
taken from the subject’s viewpoint. As J. N. Findlay recalls in his foreword to the 
English translation of the Phenomenology, the book “is meant to be a forepiece 
that can be dropped and discarded once the student, through deep immersion in its 
contents, has advanced through confusions and misunderstanding to the properly 
philosophical point of view.”269 There is therefore an ascetic dimension to this 
exercise; by embarking in this journey of the spirit, which is also our own journey, 
we leave the ordinary standpoint and arrive, through many pains, at the threshold 
of science. If successful, we could proceed as Wittgenstein suggests that his reader 
should do at the end of the Tractatus, namely, to “throw away the ladder after he 
has climbed up it”.270 However, as Charles Taylor contends, there is more to the 
Phenomenology than this, insofar as “The very nature of Hegel’s system of 
thought is that it shows all partial reality to be dependent on an absolute which in 
turn necessarily generates this partial reality. From this point of view, there is no 
reality, however humble and fragmentary, which can be thought to fall outside the 
system, and no transition between levels of reality whose explication could be 
considered a kind of hors d’oeuvre.”271 
Taylor’s caution against the easy disposal of the Phenomenology is there to 
remind us that there is an essential feature of the whole Hegelian system that is 
perhaps best captured in the Phenomenology than anywhere else, namely, the 
conflictual character of the struggle to attain self-knowledge. This is evidently 
omnipresent in Hegelian philosophy. But perhaps nowhere else is this conflictual 
character asserted more vividly than in the chapter “Independence and dependence 
of self-consciousness: Lordship and Bondage” of the Phenomenology. Now, there 
have been many readings of this chapter, and its significance has sometimes been 
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synonymous with Hegel’s overarching contribution to the history of philosophy. 
This is perhaps an oversimplification. But I will have to mention some of these 
readings, starting with Alexandre Kojève’s, for its historical importance in the 
context of Hegel’s French reception in the 20th century. 
But let me first offer a few introductory remarks to the book before 
analyzing its most famous chapter. In the Phenomenology of Spirit we learn that 
consciousness is self-contradictory. Each new stage is brought forth as a negation 
of the preceding one, whose truth is only revealed a posteriori. It might seem as if 
the different objects which occupy consciousness, from perception to culture, 
history, religion and finally Absolute Knowing, were different objects coming to 
occupy center stage and be analyzed by consciousness in the traditional Cartesian 
distinction between subject and object. However, as the final paragraphs (§§86-89) 
of Hegel’s introduction make clear, this is the same object all along, seen from a 
different perspective. Consciousness is a self-perceiving whole, whose alienation 
and return to itself is properly a process of clarification. The process is called 
phenomenological because it is supposed to describe things as they appear to 
consciousness, even if this description is very different from the ones that would 
later be given by Husserl and the phenomenological movement. 
In terms of its form, the movement within the whole assumes a triadic 
shape and even though the final endpoint will be Absolute Knowing, it is 
important to stress that many different courses could be taken within the system. 
Hegel’s own decision is to start from “sense-certainty” because this seems to be 
for him the most immediate, natural content of our own consciousness and to 
proceed from there by means of an organic development of the particular figures 
and shapes consciousness will assume. Unlike Kant, whose divisive and limiting 
function of the understanding Hegel often derides, the whole process assumes the 
form of a synthetic unity. As Hegel states in §20 of his magnificent preface, “The 
True is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating 
itself through its development.”272 Thus, for Hegel, as for Kant, albeit in a very 
different and more inclusive way, the development is immanent. In the Marxist-
Hegelian tradition, the dialectical advance through negation and exploration of 
already-existing practices, ideals and so on will be granted the name of immanent 
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critique. The sources of this notion, and the form of determinate negation it puts 
forward, are to be found in §59 of the preface: “in speculative thinking the 
negative belongs to the content itself, and is positive, both as the immanent 
movement and determination of the content, and as the whole of this process. 
Looked at as a result, what emerges from this process is the determinate negative 
which is consequently a positive content as well.”273 This process, in turn, is 
supposed to assume, in Hegel, the consistence of a rationality that pervades and 
encompasses reality itself and that in order to be understood must be elevated to 
the dignity of philosophical concepts. 
Also as in Kant, it seems to me that there is a certain type of ascesis 
present in Hegel, even if they assume radically different forms in each of these 
two philosophers, and lead to entirely different results. If, on the one hand, for 
Kant it is the ascesis of knowledge that keeps us from stepping outside the bounds 
of all possible experience and disrespecting the limit, for Hegel the ascesis comes 
through the form of the long mediation of reflection. But its result is precisely to 
go beyond immediate knowledge and, instead of conceiving the subject through 
already-made a priori forms, to have the patience to follow the painstakingly 
contradictory forms of human consciousness up until the Absolute itself. Hegel 
explicitly asserts the infringement of the category of limit through the concept of 
consciousness itself: “Consciousness, however, is explicitly the Notion of itself. 
Hence it is something that goes beyond limits, and since these limits are its own, it 
is something that goes beyond itself.”274 This ascesis can be grasped also by his 
use of certain expressions such as the labor of the negative – or as he famously 
puts it in §32 of the preface “looking the negative in the face, and tarrying with 
it”275, the labor of the concept (or, as Miller translates it, “the Notion”, i.e., Begriff 
– “True thoughts and scientific insight are only to be won through the labor of the 
Notion”276), or the patience of the concept. This patience and the ascesis it requires 
seem to me to be evident from the reading of §29: “But the length of this path has 
to be endured, each moment has to be lingered over, because each is itself a 
complete individual shape, and one is only viewed in absolute perspective when 
its determinateness is regarded as a concrete whole, or the whole is regarded as 
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uniquely qualified by that determination”.277 This passage also offers further 
evidence of the circularity of the process and mutual interdependence between 
each moment of the course and its respective signifying whole. The result of this 
ascesis might be – or is perhaps intended to be – that philosophy again be 
considered a “serious business” as Hegel asserts in §67.278 It is perhaps ironic that 
Hegel’s own very complicated vocabulary and sometimes baffling and 
overambitious assertions have been the target of frequent critique and even 
mockery, perhaps as much or even more than praise and admiration. 
Now, to reiterate, Hegel’s starting point in this particular occasion is in the 
act of knowledge. But consciousness will have to become self-consciousness or, in 
Hegel’s own terminology, what is “in itself” must become “for itself”. And this 
comes about by the work of Reason itself. Thus Hegel in §21: “Though the 
embryo is indeed in itself a human being, it is not so for itself; this it only is as 
cultivated Reason, which has made itself what is is in itself.”279 I will not delve 
into §§90-165, or consciousness “in itself”, since they are not very important for 
our investigation. Hegel goes through the immediacy of sense data, its 
organization in perception and ultimately in the understanding. 
However, it is as soon as consciousness becomes self-consciousness and 
when the process of knowing is superseded by a logic of desire that matters 
become interesting. At this point, it might be useful to distinguish the progress of 
the phenomenology and the priority of its elements quoad se and quoad nos. 
Judith Butler, in her masterful Subjects of Desire. Hegelian Reflections in 
Twentieth-Century France notes that it is curious that while we can argue that the 
whole progress of the Phenomenology is impelled by desire, the thematic 
exposition of desire and its figures only appear in the fourth chapter of the book.280 
This is explained by a (somewhat artificial, I concede) distinction between the 
ontological and the phenomenological levels. Indeed, desire is prior quoad se, as it 
is part of the immanent development logic of spirit; but its appearance to 
consciousness and, let us say, to the reader of the Phenomenology (so, quoad nos), 
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takes place as soon as the figures of self-consciousness come into play, that is, 
after the exposition of consciousness in itself. 
In virtue of this ontological status and primacy of desire, it must be grasped 
that this is in fact one of the keys for understanding the Phenomenology. The 
progress of consciousness is a progress of desire; not pure, simple desire, but 
rather desire of desire. As such, Hegel’s odyssey of spirit can be seen – and setting 
aside for a moment its overambitious claim to explain world history, progress 
through purposive rationality, and so forth – as another philosophical attempt to 
explain human desire, to be added to the classical attempts of such descriptions 
like Plato’s, and confronted to more contemporary attempts such as the ones 
provided by Freud, or Deleuze. This explains, in part, Kojève’s own effort to re-
read Hegel in strictly anthropological and political terms. Nonetheless, it must be 
added that perhaps in no other philosophical system did desire occupy such center 
stage, and in no other standpoint did it reach such speculative heights. 
The thematic exposition of the dialectic of desire starts in the fourth 
chapter of the Phenomenology281 with the section on “self-certainty” and “truth”, 
that is, as Charles Taylor explains, respectively what we claim to be, and what we 
truly are.282 Taylor stresses how this dialectic is different from the preceding one. 
When the emphasis shifts from knowledge to desire and its fulfillment, no longer 
can we pretend to occupy a detached standpoint. Indeed, we are passionately 
attached to it. Certainly, when our notion of ourselves, when our self-
understanding is proved to have been wrong and we are therefore forced, as it 
were, to adapt ourselves to a new truth (or let us say in more contemporary terms, 
a new interpretation) about our own being, this is not done without effort and pain. 
These specific instances of conflict and contradiction are therefore particularly 
virulent for the one who undergoes them. In the third part of this dissertation we 
will see Ricœur’s own version of inner conflict and rift, not entirely Hegelian, but 
not without its resonances with Hegel either. 
Ultimately, for Hegel, the closing of this dialectic will come at the end, 
when the subject is supposed to identify him or herself with his notion of infinity 
and the Absolute.283 Charles Taylor calls it the aspiration for “a state of total 
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integrity”.284 At the end, we are supposed to picture ourselves as an emanation of 
the Absolute Spirit; as an embodied instance of the universal whole. This should 
be kept in mind. But for now let us concentrate on the struggle for recognition. 
At the threshold of the chapter on lordship and bondage, right before the 
struggle begins, we find individuals as independent life-forms.285 In §174 Hegel 
equates for the first time self-consciousness with desire: “self-consciousness is 
Desire” (es ist Begierde)286. However, shortly afterwards, this assertion is 
complemented by its decisive qualification in §175: “Self-consciousness achieves 
its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.” (Das Selbstbewusstsein 
erreicht seine Befriedigung nur in einem andern Selbstbewusstsein).287 Earlier in 
the same §175, Hegel explains that satisfaction (Befriedigung) depends on the 
object. And since the object of desire, in this case, is another consciousness, 
satisfaction must be attained through a dialectical process of negation. Thus the 
other is for me an object, but for him or herself he is a consciousness, and so it is I 
who am objectified by him or herself. As Taylor explains, in this process, I am 
(and so is the other) two things: both conscious life in the universal, and a living 
thing.288 But the particular kind of negation entailed here is not one that simply 
abolishes its object. The desire is constituted in such a form that new desires just 
keep being formed; as soon as one desire is satisfied, a new desire replaces it. To 
reiterate, this is what distinguishes human desire from animal desire. In animal 
desire, the consumption of the object (its negation) leaves the subject facing 
nothingness. In human desire, however, what is sought after is the recognition of 
other fellow human beings. Or, as Taylor puts it, “If he is to be fully at home this 
external reality must reflect back to him what he is”289 or at least this is what we 
strive for. 
The last lines before the section on lordship and bondage reassert the 
positive unity that is provided through the insertion in universal spirit: “What still 
lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is – this absolute 
substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses 
which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 'I' that is 'We' 
                                                
284 Charles Taylor, Hegel, p. 148. 
285 Hegel, Phenomenology, §171, pp. 107-108. 
286 Ibid., §174, p. 109. 
287 Ibid., §175, p. 110. 
288 Charles Taylor p. 152. 
289 Ibid. 
 111 
and 'We' that is 'I'. It is in self-consciousness, in the Notion of Spirit, that 
consciousness first finds its turning-point, where it leaves behind it the colorful 
show of the sensuous here-and-now and the nightlike void of the supersensible 
beyond, and steps out into the spiritual daylight of the present.”290 As such, the 
importance of the following passage could not be overemphasized. 
From the outset, Hegel asserts that self-consciousness “exists only in being 
acknowledged”291 and that it is the duplication of this spiritual unity that will grant 
us access to the phenomenon of recognition. In §179 he describes the mutual 
objectification attested when two self-consciousnesses confront each other: “it 
does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other sees its own self”292 
and in §180 we are told that self-consciousness needs to “supersede the other 
independent being in order thereby to become certain of itself as the essential 
being”.293 The ground is therefore laid for all-out conflict to explode. 
The following paragraphs could almost be read as a game of mimicry, with 
the dialectical style reaching a peak. There is in fact a reciprocal mirroring of each 
other’s actions: “Thus the movement is simply the double movement of the two 
self-consciousnesses. Each sees the other do the same as it does; each does itself 
what it demands of the other, and therefore also does what it does only in so far as 
the other does the same. Action by one side only would be useless because what is 
to happen can only be brought about by both.”294 Ultimately, as §184 makes clear, 
this interdependence in action is explained by a shared status: “They recognize 
themselves as mutually recognizing one another.”295 
Opposition will start playing itself out as soon as there is a further division 
in self-consciousness. This is described in §185: “At first, it will exhibit the side of 
the inequality of the two, or the splitting-up of the middle term into the extremes 
which, as extremes, are opposed to one another, one being only recognized, the 
other only recognizing.”296 §186 proceeds by showing the dual status of the 
“other” as it is considered by each of the self-consciousnesses, both as an object 
and another self-consciousness: “What is 'other' for it is an unessential, negatively 
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characterized object. But the 'other' is also a self-consciousness; one individual is 
confronted by another individual. Appearing thus immediately on the scene, they 
are for one another like ordinary objects, independent shapes, individuals 
submerged in the being [or immediacy] of Life-for the object in its immediacy is 
here determined as Life.”297 So, at this moment, self-consciousness is still holding 
on to dear life, that is, to immediate and simple existence. Its processes of 
interaction – with itself in its doubled form, to be sure – still does not aim beyond 
mere existence.  
And yet, suddenly, in §187, things take a dramatic turn. For its importance, 
I’ll allow myself to quote it more fully: 
 
The presentation of itself, however, as the pure abstraction of self-consciousness consists 
in showing itself as the pure negation of its objective mode, or in showing that it is not 
attached to any specific existence, not to the individuality common to existence as such, 
that it is not attached to life. (…) Thus the relation of the two self-conscious individuals is 
such that they prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle. They 
must engage in this struggle, for they must raise their certainty of being for themselves to 
truth, both in the case of the other and in their own case. And it is only through staking 
one's life that freedom is won; (…) The individual who has not risked his life may well be 
recognized as a person, but he has not attained to the truth of this recognition as an 
independent selfconsciousness. Similarly, just as each stakes his own life, so each must 
seek the other's death, for it values the other no more than itself.”298 
 
Judith Butler interprets this paragraph as a logic of desire that leads to the 
destruction of the body: “Whereas destructive desire in its first appearance sought 
to internalize otherness into a self-sufficient body, this second appearance of 
destructive desire endeavors to overcome bodily life altogether, i.e., to become an 
abstract identity without corporeal needs.”299 According to her, this is a 
continuation of Hegel’s “erotic” by other means. In this paragraph, corporeal 
existence is seen as the ultimate limit to freedom. Now, were this desire to be 
entirely satisfied and taken to its extreme point, there would be no dialectic left, 
and the struggle for recognition would result in utter annihilation. But Hegel’s 
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point is of course to prove that there is a mediation to be made here; and this 
mediation entails that destructive desire be curtailed; in other words, the winning 
self-consciousness must refrain from destroying its other. 
The result of this most famous of dialectics, as has been widely stated, is 
that one self-consciousness wins, the other loses; one comes therefore to dominate 
the other, and the result is a pattern of interaction in which two figures emerge: 
“one is the independent consciousness whose essential nature is to be for itself, the 
other is the dependent consciousness whose essential nature is simply to live or to 
be for another. The former is lord, the other is bondsman.”300 Butler does an 
excellent job of analyzing how the fact that the desire to kill the other is kept in 
check does not necessarily entail its full elimination. Indeed, the bondsman is still 
alive, but living a particular type of death: “The Other must now live its own 
death. Rather than become an indeterminate nothingness through death, the Other 
must now prove its essential nothingness in life.”301 The bondsman is subdued 
and, as such, is transformed in a “lifeless” object which is there only to fulfill his 
master’s desires. Butler reads this dialectic as a dialectic of disembodiment. The 
lord now adheres to the fullest extent to the universal. Freedom does not, in itself, 
require bodily experience for its exercise: “For the lord, bodily life must be taken 
care of, but just as well by an Other, for the body is not part of his own project of 
identity. The lord's identity is essentially beyond the body.”302 
The evolution of the dialectic has also been widely commented upon. The 
lord comes to provide for his needs through the mediation of the bondsman. The 
lord’s relation with things in the world becomes a relation of pure enjoyment.303 
As for the bondsman, he works on it, and consequently he transforms it. Therefore, 
he uses his body as an instrument, i.e., an expressive medium through which he 
transforms the world. We can see how Marx’s analyzes of labor and alienation are 
somewhat foreshadowed here. The lord and the bondsman consequently come to 
negate things in a radically different way: one by consumption, the other by labor. 
And it is precisely in virtue of this second type of negation that the bondsman 
recovers his freedom. By working, he finds a creative mean to express his 
selfhood: “Through work, however, the bondsman becomes conscious of what he 
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truly is.”304 And a few lines below, towards the end of the section: “in fashioning 
the thing, he becomes aware that being-for-self belongs to him, that he himself 
exists essentially and actually in his own right. (…) Through this rediscovery of 
himself by himself, the bondsman realizes that it is precisely in his work wherein 
he seemed to have only an alienated existence that he acquires a mind of his 
own.”305 Work is therefore seen as an essential means for shaping our identity. 
Butler claims that both lord and bondsman resist the synthesis proper to 
human beings, that of embodied freedom, and that only the dissolution of this 
dialectic allows for a fully human life: “The lord and the bondsman turn against 
life in different ways, but both resist the synthesis of corporeality and freedom, a 
synthesis that alone is constitutive of human life; the lord lives in dread of his 
body, while the bondsman lives in dread of freedom. The dissolution of their 
antagonism paves the way for an embodied pursuit of freedom, a desire to live in 
the fullest sense.”306 
Evidently, this section and the master-slave dialectic aren’t but a moment 
in Hegel’s Phenomenology; also, this figure of spirit will readily be superseded by 
the figure of stoicism, whereby the slaves, through work and the fear of death 
come to recognize the universal. I will not follow the rest of the Phenomenology 
up until Absolute Knowing; we have already seen how the movement is circular 
and each figure constantly sends us back to the teleological goal of the Absolute 
through purpose rationality. My aim, in articulating the logic of desire as Hegel 
saw it, was merely to explain and emphasize this most famous of all the figures of 
conflict in the history of philosophy. Ultimately, what is the lesson to be learned 
from this short, condensed and often disputed section of the Phenomenology? For 
Marx, Kojève and many in the Marxist-Hegelian tradition, this dialectic has served 
as some sort of allegory to describe the actual oppression of individuals under 
capitalist social organization. Moreover, as Charles Taylor points out, it seemed to 
entail that “servitude prepares the ultimate liberation of the slaves, and indeed 
general liberation”.307 The idea that the slave becomes a universal consciousness 
through his work would later be taken up in a slightly altered manner by Georg 
Luckács who considered the Proletariat as the truly universal class, the one whose 
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interests are really identified with universal interests and thus tends to identify 
itself with universal consciousness.308 
So there is a tendency to emphasize this allegoric conflict, to conflate it 
with a Marxist theory of history, and to make of dialectical materialism the 
ultimate key to understand social conflict and its eventual pacification in the end 
of history identified with the socialist society. Or, in a more secular and post-
metaphysical version, to assert the same vision and goals without, however, 
resorting to a deterministic stance; instead choosing to reconstruct the Hegelian 
master-slave dialectic in purely anthropologic and political terms. Kojève seems to 
stand halfway between these two possibilities. 
A source of contention seems to be the diagnosis that should be attributed 
to the struggle for recognition (in this particular version) in social-theoretical 
terms. I mean, is the struggle absolutely inevitable, and is its outcome necessarily 
the enslavement of one of the parties? Does intersubjectivity necessarily lead to 
domination, and does this domination need to be broken by violent means? Or is 
there after all a possibility for reconciliation through recognition? Ultimately, is 
this a monological account, or not? 
These are too many questions at a time, and I do not want to bite off more 
than I can chew, even though, with Hegel, one ultimately always runs that risk. 
Habermas and Honneth do see in Hegel a possibility for reconciliation through 
recognition, but only by recovering, completing and reactualizing his early Jena 
lectures. Kojève and Sartre seem to read Hegel with a dualist bias, through an 
ontology of negation and finitude. In their reading, the possibility of reconciliation 
seems to be precluded, and conflict seems to be ineluctable. For Kojève thus, the 
identification of recognition with the struggle between master and slave seems to 
be final. Many Hegel scholars, and Williams most of all, refuse this account and 
choose to see in this particular dialectic only one of the possible shapes of 
recognition, and strive to show that the opposition is not final. He also attempts to 
show that the intersubjective paradigm is implicit in Hegel’s account throughout 
his whole work. Others choose to read the Phenomenology as a grand narrative of 
the logic of desire or as a kind of “interpretive dialectic”, that is, a particular kind 
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of hermeneutics – in the first case we have Butler’s reading, in the second, 
Taylor’s. Some choose to see in Hegel the negation of otherness and the 
metaphysical absurdity of the closed system – and this accounts for Levinas, the 
positivists, and so many others – while others, like Taylor, see in Absolute 
Knowing the mere recapitulation of the whole content of the Phenomenology, 
which is then nothing more than a peculiar form of exposition. Ricœur, for his 
part, will see many things in the Phenomenology (still Hegel’s book that played a 
more important role for him) but he will definitely reject the system and its 
philosophy of history. 
As for me, to sum up my position, I agree with Williams that the master-
slave dialectic is only a particular form of the struggle for recognition, but I concur 
with Habermas and Honneth when they say that from the Phenomenology onwards 
Hegel’s philosophy is more monological than anything else, and so that the 
paradigm of interaction and relationship-formation through work, more suitable in 
recognition-theoretical terms adapted to our own day and age, must be found in 
the early lectures. Simultaneously, even though I see in the Phenomenology one of 
the best, most ambitious and strikingly full of brilliant intuitions philosophy books 
ever written, I too must reject the standpoint of the Absolute and see, like Ricœur 
sees in it, an unfounded ontological claim. Likewise, I too find in Kojève/Sartre’s 
reading a very narrow and one-sided interpretation of Hegel. However, their 
reading of the master-slave dialectic, coupled with the Marxist lens, still has the 
merit of providing us with a very clear conflict model for political and social 
philosophy, one that will help explain the appearance of social conflicts and 
society’s evolution through the struggle for emancipation. As such, even if it 
misconstrues Hegel, that reading deserves some credit, not really by its 
philological accuracy, but more for its descriptive and even normative power. I 
will come back to this reading in section 1.3.5 below, when briefly mentioning the 
French reception of Hegel, in order to pave the way for Ricœur’s interpretation of 
Hegel. But let me first mention in a very cursory manner both Hegel’s mature 
philosophy, and his own overarching definition of dialectic. 
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1.3.3 – Hegel’s mature philosophy: freedom and recognition in the Philosophy of 
Right 
 
The Outlines of the Philosophy of Right309 is a book originally published 
in 1820, and which contains a very important part of Hegel’s political philosophy, 
as well as his very influential, and very often criticized, theory of the state. It is 
one of the best expressions of his mature philosophy and indeed corresponds to the 
extended version of what he called his philosophy of spirit, of which a first version 
had appeared in 1817 in the first edition of the Encyclopedia. In it what we find is 
both a historical and a normative account of freedom, of its different conceptions 
and possibilities, and also of the way in which real freedom can be instantiated 
through institutions such as law and the state. It so happens that Hegel was living 
in the Prussian state and that his “end of history” thesis seemed suitable for 
conservative political appropriation. This, and other misreadings such as Popper’s 
contributed to make of Hegel the quintessential backward thinker, and his 
philosophy was sometimes even relegated to the category of totalitarianism. This 
is, I think, an essentially wrong picture. 
In France, one of the few – or at least one of the first – to make a serious 
attempt to read the Philosophy of Right not like an apology of the Prussian state, 
but in a systematic, normative manner, was Eric Weil in his doctoral thesis, 
entitled Hegel et l’État,310 originally published in 1950. Indeed, Weil defines his 
own attempt as “a critique of the traditional critique according to which Hegel 
would be the supporter of the Prussian state and the prophet of what is usually 
called statism”.311 Weil puts forward an image of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right 
as a much more dynamic evolution. While Weil believes in the “reconciliation of 
man with himself in the concrete universality of reasonable organization”312, he 
does not believe that this was provided in the state of Hegel’s time, nor does he 
think Hegel believed in it either. The Hegelian state is thus for him a perishable 
state: “The Hegelian state dies: and the proof thereof resides in the fact that the 
Hegelian philosophy of the state was possible. Because that form depleted itself, 
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because it penetrated reality, it must give way to something else, and spirit, in its 
unconscious and subterranean work, tends towards a new Wirklichkeit.”313 Weil 
thus did an important job of freeing up at least a partial plausibility for the 
Hegelian philosophy of right in the French context, and this at a time when the 
French intellectual public was almost totally dismissive towards this part of 
Hegelianism. 
In the English-speaking world this recovery was slower. It is taking place, 
perhaps, in our own day. I will give a rapid overview of its main argument, 
specifically from the angle of freedom and recognition, because of the recovery of 
Hegelian practical philosophy I have been alluding to. The Preface to the 
Philosophy of Right provides us with some of Hegel’s most famous and also 
polemical assertions, such as “What is rational is actual and what is actual is 
rational”314 and the metaphoric passage which expresses philosophy’s 
retrospective character: “The owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the falling 
of dusk”.315 These were, of course, the passages that led to the accusation of 
quietism, conservatism. But the fact that what is identified with rationality is 
actuality, Wirklichkeit, and not empirical reality as such, suffices perhaps to prove 
that matters are far more complicated. 
Be that as it may, the course of history is for Hegel a rational process of 
free self-determination. And it is free determination by spirit, of course, one which 
must be grasped philosophically by the concept (or the notion), as he makes clear 
in the Logic. What the Philosophy of Right discloses is what Hegel calls the 
instantiation of objective spirit, that is, the institutions that are necessary for this 
march of spirit towards freedom. In developing this intuition, Hegel is somewhat 
revolutionary in his own context. He clearly postulates a unification between 
subject and object, in what is a radical refutation of Descartes and Kant; and in the 
domain of “objective spirit” this means, for him, that in order to really become 
actual, human freedom must go beyond its merely subjective moment and, as it 
were, objectify itself in structures like civil society, the state, laws, rights and 
institutions. This is, I think, an enormously important intuition that must be taken 
into account, regardless of what we think of other aspects of Hegelianism. 
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Allow me to concentrate very briefly on the several notions of right 
emphasized by Hegel. The first moment of freedom is that of subjective freedom, 
or what he incisively calls “negative freedom”. In §5 he describes it as “pure 
indeterminacy”, “pure thought of oneself”, “abstraction from every determination” 
and “freedom as the understanding conceives it”.316 Hegel means by all these 
expressions that this is individual freedom conceived as freedom from external 
impediments, but conceived in such a, let us say, egoistic and solipsistic way that 
it eventually leads to destruction: “it takes shape in religion and politics alike as 
the fanaticism of destruction (of the whole subsisting social order), as the 
elimination of individuals who are objects of suspicion to a given social order, and 
as the annihilation of any organization which tries to rise anew from the ruins.”317 
This type of freedom is for Hegel grounded in abstractness, in my ability to negate 
every determination that forms me. 
The second type of freedom, explained in §6, is the beginning of the 
process of determination. It is what we would call freedom of choice, the “positing 
of a determinacy as a content and object”318 it is, a Hegel explicates in the 
addition, a “willing of something”. What is, however, this something? It might be 
an inclination, a desire, and so on. Determination is needed. “Only by resolving 
can a human being step into actuality”, says Hegel in §13.319 However, since these 
are natural inclinations, he concludes in §15 that this freedom is mere arbitrariness 
(Willkür) or, as he puts it, “contingency manifesting itself as will”.320 
Nonetheless, Hegel is also not content with this type of freedom because 
contingency is still far from rational freedom; it is not, as such, self-determination. 
The next step of the dialectic is to affirm that freedom needs to reflect upon itself 
and become an object for itself; moreover, in order for the will to be free, it needs 
to want freedom; or, as Hegel phrases it: “The abstract concept of the Idea of the 
will is in general the free will which wills the free will.”321 But in order for free 
will to become free, it must objectify itself. And its object will be given by the 
several different rights that it will come to strive for. 
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Thus Hegel starts to speak about different rights. In his own vocabulary, 
morality, ethical life, and even world history count as “rights”. Hegel then 
dedicates a whole section to “abstract right” in its many forms, like property, 
contract, the many types of wrongdoing, and so on. In the section on morality he 
depicts the standpoint of what he takes to be Kant’s empty formalism. However, it 
is only when he reaches the section on ethical life that he tackles “the concept of 
freedom developed into the existing world”.322 This is where we find his depiction 
of the multiple relationships of mutual interdependence in recognition in spheres 
like the family or civil society. It is also in this section that we find the famous 
analyzes of the rabble of paupers (Die Arme Pöbel), characterized by “an inner 
indignation against the rich, against society, against the government” and that 
breeds evil due to a condition of “lacking sufficient honour to secure subsistence 
by its own labour and yet at the same time of claiming the right to receive 
subsistence”.323 This depiction ends with Hegel claiming that “Against nature a 
human being can claim no right, but once society is established, poverty 
immediately takes the form of a wrong done to one class by another”324, an 
assertion which clearly anticipates Marx and that certainly left on him a lasting 
impression. 
As is well known, Hegel’s book ends up with a depiction of the state, 
defined as the “spirit of a people, both the law permeating all relationships within 
the state and also at the same time the custom and consciousness of its citizens”325, 
that is, it is allegedly an embodiment of the people. The remainder of the book 
describes the many properties of this state, and has some questionable remarks 
about the duties of citizens towards it. But regardless of these, let us say, 
contingent affirmations about the nature of the state and the somewhat 
monological character that they entail, what deserves to be salvaged is the 
depiction of the stage of “true freedom”, or the objective side of it, that is “the 
right to freedom”.  
In §29 Hegel asserts that “Right is any existence at all which is the 
existence of the free will”326, which seems to entail that without rights, freedom 
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remains utterly abstract. In his introduction to the Philosophy of Right, Stephen 
Houlgate is very clear about the importance of this connection between right and 
freedom: “It should be clear why Hegel introduces this idea of right at this point in 
his account of freedom: for the free will that has its own freedom as its object, and 
that must will and affirm its freedom if it is to be truly free, necessarily regards its 
freedom as its right.”327 This means that the notion of right stems from freedom 
and its exercise but that, in turn, it is right that guarantees and safeguards objective 
freedom. Freedom thus originates the creation, protection and promotion of rights, 
and, most of all, of the right to freedom. Moreover, it entails and demands 
recognition; recognition of rights, surely, but also recognition of the right to one’s 
freedom. As Houlgate puts it: “right is nothing but freedom that requires 
recognition”.328 
Now, all this analyzis points to the social and institutional prerequisites 
for the actual exercise of freedom. Right is concerned with freedom. Freedom 
entails social realization. And this, in turn, is embedded in a certain Sittlichkeit and 
in a plurality of meaningful institutions without the existence of which the most 
significant possibility of freedom would be curtailed. This standpoint leads to what 
Pippin calls “institutional rationality”, and to which he gives a meaningful 
reactualization.329 Simultaneously, it calls for the actual instantiation of 
recognition and rights and thus points towards an intrinsic connection between 
rights and recognition. And it is the exploration of this connection that Honneth 
undertakes in his latest and very important book, Das Recht der Freiheit.330 I will 
briefly come back to analyze this last book, and Honneth’s recovery of Hegel to 
which I feel so close, in the first chapter of part two. But for now, and for the 
purposes of the fleshing out of the definition of conflict and dialectic at stake in 
Hegel, I need to directly tackle his Logic. In so doing, we will increase the level of 
abstraction, but only in order to later come back down to earth and see exactly 
what is there in Hegel to be saved and recovered after all. 
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1.3.4 – The definition of dialectic 
 
Up until now, we have seen Hegel’s dialectical method implicitly at work 
in both the Jena’s early writings, the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy 
of Right, mainly because of issues pertaining to the realm of human praxis: 
agency, intersubjectivity, recognition and freedom. However, if we want to tackle 
the main issue of dialectics and negativity, in order to eventually find in it the 
notion of creative or productive conflict, we have to briefly take into account 
Hegel’s Logic. The Logic is one of the most brilliant and complex works in the 
history of philosophy and I certainly cannot do it justice here, but I will try to 
grasp the definition of dialectics that is here relevant for my own purposes. 
Hegel’s Logic had two versions. The most extensive version is the 
Science of Logic331, published in the period between 1812 and 1816, and which 
was revised for a second edition in 1832. In the meantime, Hegel published a more 
condensed version of his logic, as the first part of his Encyclopedia332, which is, by 
Hegel’s own account, the accomplished form of his system. This condensed 
version was also revised, and republished in a different form in 1827, and yet 
another, third form, in 1830. The recent Cambridge translations I am using take 
into account the revisions of the definitive versions of both of these writings. 
Charles Taylor contends that the Logic is “the only real candidate for the role of 
strict dialectical proof”, because “If the real exists and has the structure it has by 
conceptual necessity, then the task of the Logic is to show this conceptual structure 
by pure conceptual argument.”333 And this is indeed the enormous task that Hegel 
would undertake. 
Unlike Marx, whose references to his dialectical method are scarce and 
meant for popular divulgation, Hegel actually strives to provide his dialectical 
method a conceptual consistence, if not always clarity. The most direct and 
succinct account he provided for it can be found in the Encyclopedia and because 
of that, I will take that definition as my starting point and guiding thread. In the 
second version of the Encyclopedia, published in 1827, Hegel indeed adds an 
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explanation of his dialectical method in §§79-83, and which is meant to provide an 
overview of the structure of the book.334 
As I hinted at before, after the publication of the Phenomenology, Hegel 
wanted to complement it with a logic, a philosophy of nature, and a philosophy of 
spirit, which would be his complete philosophical system. The Science of Logic 
was published with that goal in mind. However, shortly afterwards, Hegel decided 
that it would be better to publish a more concise demonstration of the system, and 
thus the Encyclopedia was born. This was, as it were, a condensed version of the 
whole system. It might seem difficult to fit the Absolute in a few hundred pages, 
and yet, this was Hegel’s attempt. It should be kept in mind that the book was 
meant to be introductory, a sort of manual for his students in Heidelberg. 
I will not follow in its entirety – that would be a book-size comment – the 
dialectic of categories of reality of the Encyclopedia. I will restrict myself to the 
main driving force of the movement of these thought-determinations. I have 
described earlier how it ends with the standpoint of Absolute Knowing and we 
shall see for what reasons the category of the Absolute will be rejected by most 
readers of Hegel, and sometimes transformed and recovered by others, such as 
Eric Weil and Jean Hyppolite. Suffice it to say that as we have already seen in the 
Philosophy of Right, there is an identification between rationality and actuality, 
Wirklichkeit, and that this connection is kept tight by spirit, Geist, and its inner 
development. As for the fundamental operations guiding the movement, they will 
be given by the logic of the real itself. So let us see how Hegel defines the 
fundamental dialectical movement underlying this logic. 
In §79 Hegel asserts that the logical domain has three sides, namely its 
abstract side (that of the understanding), its dialectical, or “negatively rational” 
side and the speculative, or “positively rational” side.335 He further clarifies that 
these are not “parts of logic” but “moments of every properly logical content”, that 
is, every concept of anything that is true in general. In §80 we find the depiction of 
the understanding as a “limited abstraction”, i.e., an art of limitation. In the 
addition, Hegel quotes Goethe and the “need to limit oneself”, in order to achieve 
something great (by avoiding dispersion, etc.). These concrete, limited 
                                                
334 This section is called the “More Precise Conception and Division of the Logic”, pp. 125-133. 
335 Hegel, Encyclopedia, §79, p. 125. 
 124
undertakings (such as the pursuing of a specific profession) are tasks for the 
understanding. 
Then, in §81, comes the fundamental definition of dialectic. Hegel states 
that “the dialectical moment is the self-sublation of such finite determinations by 
themselves and their transition into their opposites”.336 As such, the self-sublation 
(Aufhebung), indicates that this is the essential moment of negativity at work. In 
the subsequent development and explanation of this paragraph, Hegel specifies the 
difference of his own take on this method, and the way in which philosophical 
tradition considered it. Claiming that he wants to go beyond the “subjective 
seesaw system of back-and-forth rationalizing where the basic content is missing” 
he therefore defines it as follows: 
 
In its distinctive determinateness, the dialectic is far more the proper, true nature of the 
determinations of the understanding, of things, and of the finite in general. Reflexion is at 
first a process of going beyond the isolated determinacy, i.e. a relating of it, whereby it is 
brought into a relationship, despite its being maintained in its isolated validity. The 
dialectic is, by contrast, this immanent process of going beyond [such determinacy] 
wherein the one-sided and limited character of the determinations of the understanding 
presents itself as what it is, namely as their negation. Everything finite is this, the 
sublating of itself. Thus, the dialectical moment constitutes the moving soul of the 
scientific progression and is the principle through which alone an immanent connection 
and necessity enters into the content of science, just as in general the true, as opposed to 
an external, elevation above the finite resides in this principle.337 
 
We can see, in Hegel’s definition, how for him the finite determinations of the 
understanding are constitutively meant to be superseded. Isolated elements must 
be grasped against the backdrop of their relation and dialectic will be the 
immanent development of such a connection, movement and transformation. 
In the addition, Hegel characterizes this movement in very strong and 
clear terms. He asserts that “recognizing the dialectical dimension is of the highest 
importance” and that dialectic “is in general the principle of all movement, all life, 
and all actual activity”; as a consequence, it must be also “the soul of any truly 
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scientific knowing”.338 He provides examples of this. Life and death are not, as 
such, two different things. Rather, life carries within itself the germ of death, and 
death is seen as a natural development of life. In the same way, Hegel argues, the 
finite supersedes itself in the infinite, and this something that science (i.e., the 
philosophical concept) must grasp. He strongly emphasizes that there is an 
objective component to this logic, that it is not sophistry. For him, sophistry is a 
technique that mobilizes isolated contents “depending on the individual’s 
respective interests and particular situation”. We could say, in more contemporary 
terms, that the Hegelian dialectic is not perspectivistic. He definitely wants to go 
beyond subjective principles, subjective freedom, and the one-sided 
determinations of the understanding. In his own words, dialectic “aims precisely at 
contemplating things as they are in and for themselves”.339 Finally, he reminds us 
that dialectics is an ancient technique in philosophy, recalling Plato and Socrates, 
reading in them a display of a technique of negation, ultimately directed at 
showing the “finitude of all fixed determinations of the understanding in 
general”.340 Obviously, he is projecting his own philosophy in Plato and Socrates; 
but the real differences between his philosophy and that of “divisive 
understanding” become apparent when he addresses Kant. 
In the same addition to §81, Hegel mentions Kant’s antinomies. He 
asserts that even though the understanding tends to resist dialectic, this movement 
cannot be considered as a mere presence in philosophical (subjective) 
consciousness. It is rather much more than that. So what in Kant (and Ricœur, 
ultimately) has the status of a temptation – that is, going beyond the bounds of 
experience –  attains for Hegel an objective status. Allow me to note, in passing, 
that the logic of illusion is here inverted. For Kant, what is illusory is the dialectic 
of contrary affirmations and its attempt to produce absolute objects. For Hegel, in 
contrast, what is illusory is the subject’s attempt to escape dialectic and thus refuse 
to grasp the whole, whose movement is everywhere identified. Hegel is very 
assertive in this point: 
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Instead, what is in play here is already found in all other forms of consciousness and is 
found universally in experience. Everything that surrounds us can be viewed as an 
example of the dialectic. We know that all finite things, instead of being something fixed 
and ultimate, are really changeable and perishable, and this is nothing but the dialectic of 
the finite. By virtue of this dialectic, the same thing (as in itself the other of itself) is 
driven beyond what it immediately is and turns over into its opposite.341 
 
With this passage, the model of dialectics and negativity through conflict attains 
its height, and can be compared to no other such model in philosophy, except 
perhaps Heraclitus’s. Ultimately, for Hegel, let us not forget, everything can be 
viewed as an example of the dialectic. A few lines down, Hegel recalls that the 
same dialectic is at work in the natural and the spiritual world “as, for instance, in 
the movement of the celestial bodies”, and the “physical elements” as well, and he 
finds a “proof” thereof in the meteorological process. As for the ethical domain, 
Hegel sees in the interaction of extremes further evidence of dialectic as a logic of 
reality. He cites the interaction between extreme justice and extreme injustice, the 
similarities between anarchy and despotism, and also feelings like pain and joy. 
In the second addition to this paragraph though, he makes a general 
observation that is of the utmost importance for our assessment of his dialectical 
method. He asserts that philosophy “does not rest with the merely negative result 
of the dialectical as is the case with skepticism” because the latter clings to 
dialectic’s negation abstract result. But as we know, Hegel’s dialectics is 
determinate negation. So Hegel adds: 
 
Because the dialectic has the negative as a result, the negative is equally positive, 
precisely as a result, for it contains within itself that from which it results, containing the 
latter as something it has sublated, and is not without what it has sublated. This, however, 
is the fundamental determination of the third form of the logical, namely of the 
speculative or positively rational.342 
 
Now this is, in fact, Hegel’s clearer definition of Aufhebung. The new 
development contains in itself what has been superseded; in the new development, 
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something of the old reality remains, but it remains in a negated manner, assuming 
a new form. 
And indeed, in §82, this new outcome is expressed in conceptual terms, 
under the banner of the speculative: “The speculative or the positively rational 
grasps the unity of the determinations in their opposition, the affirmative that is 
contained in their dissolution and their passing over into something else.”343 In his 
explication of this conceptual moment, he in fact defines the whole of his 
philosophy, and the way in which this seemingly abstract logic is in fact a logic of 
the concrete, of the real: 
 
The dialectic has a positive result, because it has a determinate content or because its 
result is in truth not an empty, abstract nothing, but instead the negation of definite 
determinations that are contained in the result precisely because it is not an immediate 
nothing, but a result instead. Therefore, although it is something thought, even abstract, 
the rational is at the same time something concrete, because it is not simple, formal unity, 
but a unity of distinct determinations.344 
 
Hegel is thus claiming that what at first glimpse might seem only an ossified, dry 
and abstract system of logic is in fact the underlying structure of reality itself, of 
the whole. And nothing encapsulates and defines this whole and its dynamic 
movement as dialectic itself. This is, in sum, Hegel’s definition of dialectic, the 
most ambitious, encompassing – and some would argue, a bit delusional – of any 
such attempt in philosophy. 
The “Greater Logic”, i.e., the Science of Logic would of course be an 
even more complex attempt to carry this effort through. I will not delve in its 
intricate details because, the way I see it, it does not radically alter the definition 
of dialectic we have seen. The same process of evolution through contradiction is 
blatant. And thus we get to the notion of “productive conflict” I wanted to grasp. 
Hegel proceeds, in each step, by showing that there are categorial contradictions 
and that the only way to solve them is to move to the next step of the stage of 
development, which thus, becomes necessary. As Charles Taylor argues, “the 
contradiction in Hegel’s Logic comes from the fact that certain concepts are both 
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indispensable and incoherent: that is, as concepts of reality they are in conflict 
with their own criterial properties; and yet being indispensable they must be 
instantiated. This is the key to Hegel’s enterprise”.345 Because of this incoherence, 
concepts will be destroyed, and when destroyed, they will be maintained in their 
negated form at the higher stage. The Logic is thus the chain of these necessarily 
connected concepts. 
As we know, for Hegel, as far as we can tell, the outcome is not only 
positive and systematic, but necessary and absolute. Hegel’s optimism and 
overambitious claims were often derided and object of refutation, first by Marx, 
then by many others. In our own day, some philosophers, and I want to mention 
Karin de Boer as one notorious example346, seek to criticize modernity through 
Hegel and by tempering his dialectical method with his tragic view. Ultimately, I 
think Ricœur has a similar project. At the end of this chapter, I will sum up the 
provisional conclusions regarding Hegel’s thought and Ricœur’s appreciation of it. 
But first I will set up the historical background for it, by making a small detour 
into the French reception of Hegel in the 20th century. 
 
1.3.5 – The French reception of Hegel: Wahl, Kojève, Hyppolite, Weil 
 
Unlike in Anglophone philosophy, where the “Hegelian renaissance” has 
been more vivid in the past two decades, Hegel had a strong reception in France in 
the 20th century, even if this reception was sometimes more critical than 
enthusiastic. In this section, which will be very condensed, I will mostly 
concentrate on the French reception of Hegel that preceded Ricœur or influenced 
the early Ricœur (or that we could prove was known by Ricœur, who sometimes 
adhered, other times vehemently contested those readings), so that I can prepare 
the next section.347 It would be entirely impossible to give an accurate account 
here of the more recent French discussion of Hegel, which includes Lacan, 
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Levinas or Deleuze. I will take Judith Butler as one of my guides in this cursory 
historical reminder. I will also only mention Sartre and Merleau-Ponty in passing, 
because their philosophies are too well known. For the purposes of this chapter, 
the reception as it took place with Kojève, Hyppolite and Weil was more 
important (with Kojève because it is his reading that will influence all the others, 
and with Hyppolite and Weil because it was through the critiques of their work 
that Ricœur shaped his own position). 
Ultimately, however, the two Hegelians with whom Ricœur shared most 
affinities in his early years were Weil and Jean Wahl. Jean Wahl was probably the 
author of the most influential early book on Hegel in this context. His Le malheur 
de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel348 offers a very peculiar reading of 
Hegel, which mixes Hegel’s dialectics with Kierkegaard’s existentialism. From 
the standpoint of the reception of Hegel in France, this was yet another influential 
mix, preparing in some way Sartre’s own existentialism. The fact that his book 
was published even before the 1930s made him a figure almost as influential as 
Kojève – even though certainly less flamboyant – because in the context of, let us 
say, anti-academic and anti-idealist philosophy, he was indeed probably the first to 
strongly recover Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s philosophy in France. In his 
existential reading of Hegel he strongly emphasizes, like Kojève, the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, but unlike him, he also highlights the “unhappy 
consciousness” and its bad infinity, instead of the master-slave dialectic. It should 
be noted that this topic of the unhappy consciousness will be recurrent in Ricœur, 
and even in The Course of Recognition he eventually accuses the logic of the 
struggle of recognition of being a logic of bad infinity. But perhaps the most 
important trait that Ricœur finds in Wahl and that will surely be incorporated in 
his philosophy is Wahl’s particular grasp of dialectics.  
Ching-Kai Shen insightfully calls our attention to this fact. In 1953 Wahl 
publishes his Traité de Métaphysique.349 Ricœur then publishes a review of it in 
1957 in Esprit, a text later included in Lectures 2.350 In this review, Ricœur 
chooses to accentuate a particular trait of Wahl’s understanding of metaphysics. 
He comments that for Jean Wahl “true dialectics is the one that remains 
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fragmentary, in crumbs (Kierkegaard); its end is ecstasis and silence”.351 Allow 
me to recall that Kierkegaard adopted a very polemic stance against Hegelian 
dialectics and its pretention to put itself in the standpoint of the Absolute and the 
universal. One of his most famous essays is precisely the Philosophical Fragments 
(or, translated literally, Philosophical Crumbs, “miettes philosophiques” in 
French). As a result, Wahl’s reading of Hegel is heavily paradoxical. But then 
again, this paradox, and the notion of paradox itself was to become essential in 
French existentialism, coupled with that of mystery, especially for Ricœur and 
Gabriel Marcel (and also through the influence of Karl Jaspers). I will leave more 
detailed analyzes of these notions and of this phase of Ricœur’s philosophy for 
part three of this thesis. However, the fact is that Ricœur was influenced by both 
Wahl’s existential reading, and his emphasis on, let us say with a certain 
reservation, “Kierkegaardian dialectics”. Curiously enough, if the topic of 
“existence” can be allocated to a specific phase of Ricœur’s thought, in tune with 
the spirit of his time, that is, the France of the 1940s and 1950s, and if he would 
later more or less drop that terminology and replace it with other, connected 
notions, the notion of “fragmented dialectics” will indeed stick with him, and his 
method, up until the end. This notion will be recovered and deepened by the 
conflict of interpretations, in strictly methodological terms. 
Nevertheless, Wahl’s own insistence in the “unhappy consciousness” was 
far less influential than the many books trying to explore Hegelian philosophy as a 
logic of desire. These were mainly the interpretations that started gaining currency 
in the 1930s and 1940s but that ultimately had many echoes in later philosophers. 
Judith Butler does a wonderful job of retracing this history. Butler’s own 
standpoint in 1987 was somewhat Hegelian, even if in later works she has taken 
different directions. In Subjects of Desire she reconstructs the reception of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit in France as a history of desire that she claims fascinated 
its readers, even if they wanted to expose it: “The subject of desire remains a 
compelling fiction even for those who claim to have definitively exposed his 
charades.352 Indeed, with the dawn of Postmodernism, it seems as if Hegel was 
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more polemic than ever, as authors tried to escape him. As Michel Foucault puts it 
in The Order of Discourse: “our entire epoch, whether in logic or epistemology, 
whether in Marx or Nietzsche, is trying to escape from Hegel”.353 But why should 
this be, why should Hegel appear as someone the generation of Foucault wanted to 
escape from? Why not just ignore him, like Anglophone philosophy did for so 
long? The reasons for this reaction, which is a combination of repudiation and, as I 
have said for Ricœur, temptation, must be sought after in the influence Hegel 
exerted in the previous generations. 
Now, the genesis of this influence can be traced back to the 1930s and can 
be seen as silently maturing during the World War II years, and as exploding in 
the post-war juncture and the two following decades. Indeed, in the beginning it 
was Kojève. Kojève was a Russian intellectual who had studied in Germany and 
who, like many others such as Eric Weil, eventually established himself in France. 
He delivered a series of introductory lectures to Hegel’s thought in Paris from 
1933 to 1939. These lectures were widely influential and left a lasting impression 
(either direct or indirect) in Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Bataille, and many others. But 
in fact, this was no ordinary introduction to Hegel’s philosophy; instead it was a 
very peculiar, oriented reading. It was not an introduction to Hegel’s thought in 
general but a particular emphasis in the Phenomenology of Spirit, and most of all 
in the master-slave dialectic, taken as paradigmatic of Hegelian philosophy. 
Furthermore, it was a reading that introduced Marxist and Heideggerian 
elements, providing a mix (Hegel-Marx-Heidegger) that was extremely popular in 
Continental Philosophy for a certain period of time, if, to that lot, we also add the 
Post-Nietzschean variants. Additionally, it was meant to be an anthropological, 
“post-historical”, political reading of Hegel emphasizing conflict and rejecting 
Hegelian mediations. As Judith Butler claims, by rejecting the premise of 
ontological harmony, Kojève is free to extend Hegel’s doctrine of negation.354 
However, while doing it, he traced back, in his anthropological reading, Marx’s 
doctrine of class struggle to the Hegelian struggle for recognition, which in fact 
allowed him to see all the progress of human history as a dialectical struggle for 
recognition between masters and slaves. As such, he recovers what we could call 
                                                
353 Michel Foucault, “The Order of Discourse” in Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader, 
edited by Robert Young (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981) p. 74. 
354 Butler, Subjects of Desire, p. 63. 
 132
Marx’s social philosophy, and namely the theory of alienation of the early Marx, 
alongside a certain expressivist qualification of the Marxist writings (with which I 
tend to agree), but re-reads them through the Hegelian perspective of the struggle 
for recognition. Consequently, social change is reduced to a single, overarching 
motivation and even though it seems as if he strives to maintain the dynamics of 
human action, the truth is that he fails to see the plurality of motivations that can 
lead to struggle; furthermore, to reiterate, he also fails to capture the positive traits 
of the phenomena of recognition, other than its supersession in the slaves’ struggle 
for liberation. 
The lectures were later edited by Raymond Queneau and published under 
the title Introduction to the Reading of Hegel;355 in them, we find a mixed genre. 
They are both a translation and in-depth commentary of the first chapters of the 
Phenomenology, and some theoretical claims that are revelatory of Kojève’s own 
attempt at putting forward an original philosophy. Now, like many other 
interpreters of the Phenomenology, Kojève approaches it through the angle of 
desire.356 Commenting upon the difference between animal and human desire in 
the Phenomenology, he underscores how the desire of self-consciousness, the 
specifically human desire, is not only a desire of desire, but an agonistic desire: 
“To be human, man must act not for the sake of subjugating a thing, but for the 
sake of subjugating another Desire.”357 That the specific human desire, in the 
description of Kojève, is not in itself a desire for recognition (in its generic, 
reciprocal sense) but qualified as a desire to subjugate (so, of unequal recognition) 
speaks volumes about his own interpretation of Hegelian philosophy. Kojève 
describes the struggle in extremely blunt terms: 
 
A Fight, since each will want to subjugate the other, all the others, by a negating, 
destroying action. A life and death Fight because Desire that is directed toward a Desire 
directed toward a Desire goes beyond the biological given, so that Action carried out for 
the sake of this Desire is not limited by this given. In other words, Man will risk his 
biological life to satisfy his nonbiological Desire. And Hegel says that the being that is 
incapable of putting its life in danger in order to attain ends that are not immediately vital 
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– i.e. the being that cannot risk its life in a Fight for Recognition, in a fight for pure 
prestige – is not a truly human being.358 
 
All emphases in this quotation are Kojève’s. And the fact that Kojève chooses to 
speak about prestige rather than honor also accentuates the perverse character he 
sees in the struggle. Kojève’s conclusion is laconic, but at the same time we can 
see in it a huge leap in his argument: 
 
In fine, then, we can say this: Man was born and History began with the first Fight that 
ended in the appearance of a Master and a Slave. That is to say that Man – at his origin – 
is always either Master or Slave; and that true Man can exist only where there is a Master 
and a Slave. (If they are to be human, they must be at least two in number.) And universal 
history, the history of the interaction between men and of their interaction with Nature, is 
the history of the interaction between warlike Masters and working Slaves.359 
 
This is, evidently, too narrow a reading of Hegel’s philosophy of history. Kojève 
follows Hegel and his diagnosis of the “end of history”. Accordingly, in good 
Hegelian fashion, he believes that history ceased with the Napoleonic wars and 
namely the battle of Jena, because this was the moment in which the condition of 
both master and slave were superseded. Therefore, for Kojève, he and his 
contemporaries already live in a post-historical time, in that the essential structures 
of social progress have been unveiled. So, for him, the Hegelian account can be 
rendered in anthropological terms, much like the early Marx depicted social 
relations in anthropological terms. 
I believe this is a fundamentally wrong picture – but then again, doesn’t 
everyone else? – for reasons already explained above, when analyzing Hannah 
Arendt’s take on human action and the unpredictability of the future, in virtue of 
action’s capacity to bring about something new in the world. Time and again, 
Post-Hegelians who have tried to declare the end of history have been proven 
wrong by reality, Francis Fukuyama having been only the latest failure.360 
Kojève’s reading is exaggerated in yet another account, namely, its claim that man 
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is a “Nothingness that nihilates”361, that is, in his own words, a “project” that 
works by negating Being, that is, by changing the given. This could be read as 
only an emphasis on human agency. But in fact it is much more; it is an altered 
Heideggerian graft onto Hegelianism, resulting in the ontological claim that we 
really do identify ourselves with the power to negate. This overblown appraisal of 
negation in the characterization of the human condition of course paved the way 
for the Sartrean interpretation with which Ricœur – and me, let me note in passing 
– strongly disagrees. Moreover, as Butler rightly notes, Kojève’s depiction is 
individualistic. For him, “Recognition does not have the effect of assimilating the 
individual into a more inclusive community; following the tradition of classical 
liberalism, Kojève views recognition as a process in which individuals form 
communities, but these communities facilitate the development of individuality 
and not its transcendence.”362 However, I do see in Kojève a strong and powerful 
model for grasping social reality: the emphasis on recognition, the anthropologic 
toning down of Hegel and the highlighting of the early Marx’s social philosophy 
open the way to a dynamics of human action possibly leading to social change, 
namely the emancipation of oppressed social groups. All this can be compared to 
the Frankfurt Critical Theory tradition, at least in its later stages. Ultimately, 
Kojève’s model is flawed because he had some of the right intuitions, but mainly 
the wrong conclusions. Nonetheless, in spite of its flaws, botched philosophy of 
history and insufficient social model, Kojève’s effort must be lauded for having 
put Hegelian philosophy, and namely the struggle for recognition, in a central 
position in contemporary social terms. In terms of Wirkungsgeschichte, this effort 
was fundamental in bringing back Hegel, and recognition, to contemporary social 
theory and philosophy. Moreover, his analyzis of the Phenomenology of Spirit 
sparked an interest and a debate that was vital for French philosophy in the 20th 
Century. Indeed, many of the authors who chose to delve in Hegel were all, one 
way or another, responding to Kojève. 
Let me now turn to Jean Hyppolite as someone who offered a different, 
but also influential, reading of the Phenomenology – Deleuze and Foucault were 
introduced to Hegel by him in khâgne and Derrida studied under him at the École 
Normale supérieure –, and also as a thinker which had a more direct contact with 
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Ricœur. Hyppolite was a profound commentator of Hegel, as well as the translator 
of the Phenomenology into French. His monumental explanation of the 
commentary of the text is available in English.363 Hyppolite shares with Kojève a 
somewhat anthropological reading of the Phenomenology; however, the main 
difference of his approach resided in his insistence on also using the Logic, and of 
trying to unveil the possible meaningful connections between these two major 
Hegel works. He acknowledged the difficulty of such a task: “The leading 
difficulty of Hegelianism is the relation of the Phenomenology and the Logic. 
Today we would speak of anthropology and ontology. The one studies the 
properly human reflection, the other the absolute reflection that passes through 
man”364; but he considered it as being essential. Consequently, his interpretation 
and recovery of Hegel could be dubbed a logico-ontological one (albeit heavily 
influenced by the Hegelian phenomenological standpoint also). Accordingly, his 
two major books on Hegel, respectively Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit and Logic and Existence can be seen as being 
intrinsically connected to one another, the later book further developing the earlier 
analyzis of the Phenomenology. Furthermore, like Kojève and Sartre, he was 
basically an atheist interpreter of Hegel; as such, not only was he, like them, a left-
Hegelian, but he also chose to stress negation – both in phenomenological and 
logical terms – as the key to Hegelian philosophy: “Hegel's philosophy is a 
philosophy of negation and negativity. The Absolute is only by determining itself, 
that is, by limiting itself, by negating itself.”365 Consequently, the ontology he 
proposes is basically a materialist one. 
There is also, apparently, an influence of Heidegger, insofar as our 
temporality towards death is emphasized; Butler recalls this feature: “Hyppolite 
extends the domain of negation, arguing that human subjects are negativity 
inasmuch as they are temporal beings comported toward death.”366 She further 
explains that while for Kojève our grasp of the absolute resides in human 
historical acts, in Hyppolite’s resolutely more speculative interpretation these acts 
are revealed as less than absolute by temporality. The Heideggerian tone is 
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reinforced when Hyppolite affirms that man is “the House of the Universal, of the 
Logos of Being”.367 This last passage is an attestation to the fact that even though 
Hyppolite’s is an anthropologic and materialist reading, it still wants to place itself 
in the standpoint of the Absolute, of concept, of the universal, in Hegelian terms.  
In my very brief analyzis, I want to focus on the significance of Hyppolite’s 
second book, Logic and Existence, because it triggered a response from Ricœur 
that allows us to see to what extent Ricœur’s reading of Hegel is really not logico-
ontological. 
Even if for Hyppolite, the Absolute is determined by negation, this does 
not mean that we can refrain from taking the viewpoint of the Absolute into 
account. As he explicitly states:  
 
Experience and the Logos are not opposed. The discourse of experience and the discourse 
of being, the a posteriori and the a priori, correspond to one another and mutually require 
one another. There would be no possible experience without the presupposition of 
absolute knowledge, but the path of experience points ahead to absolute knowledge.368 
 
The result is some sort of immanent logic. He goes so far as to affirm that Hegel’s 
logic is a “doctrine of complete immanence which Spinoza had not been able to 
realize.”369 The effort to develop an immanent logic has of course been hugely 
influential in the writings of the next generation of French philosophers, with its 
peak probably in Deleuze. In this logic of immanence, and in the correspondence 
between the standpoints of Hegelian logic and phenomenology, the translators of 
Logic and Existence see a huge influence in later French philosophy, and namely 
in the emphasis put on the notion of difference: “In short, Logic and Existence 
opened the way for the theme that would dominate French thought after Sartre's 
Being and Nothingness; the concept of difference found in the philosophies of 
Deleuze, Derrida, and Foucault would not exist without the publication of Logic 
and Existence. Correspondence implies not only that the phenomenology and the 
logic mutually presuppose one another but also that there is a difference between 
them.”370 In short, (immanent) being, contradicts itself, doubles itself. This is of 
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course full of possibilities. And many French philosophers, from Levinas to 
Derrida, Deleuze, and even Ricœur, saw in this an occlusion of alterity.371 
Logic and Existence was published in 1953. In 1955 Ricœur published a 
review of it in Esprit. This review, called “Philosophie et Ontologie I. Retour à 
Hegel”372 is heavily critical of Hyppolite’s take on the Absolute, and “Absolute 
Knowing”; this is, indeed, an important article for our understanding of Ricœur’s 
stance toward Hegel. The rejection of the Absolute that we find here is more or 
less from the same epoch but indeed precedes for a few months the article he 
writes about Pierre Thévenaz, which I already mentioned, and in which he defines 
Thévenaz – and by extension, himself – as a philosopher “without absolute”.373 
From the outset of “Retour à Hegel”, Ricœur places his reflection under 
the banner of humanism. This article from 1955 – so, in the passage from the first 
to the second volume of the Philosophy of the Will, that is, from the 
phenomenological method to philosophical anthropology and hermeneutics – 
chooses to speak from the standpoint of a philosophical anthropology; and this 
anthropology, in turn, is equated with humanism.374 It is thus against this backdrop 
that Ricœur voices his protestation against an emphasis in ontology attained at the 
cost of negating humanism or rejecting the primacy of philosophical 
anthropology.375 
Ricœur seems to conceive the possibility of returning to Hegel as being 
legitimate; but he questions precisely the choice of trying to do it from the 
standpoint of the Logic, rather than the Phenomenology. Ricœur’s main objection 
lies in the following assertion: if the figures of the Phenomenology correspond to 
human experience, even if it is an idealized version of it, we can still recognize 
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ourselves in them. However, a discourse on the logical categories culminating in 
Absolute Knowing? That possibility seems for Ricœur untenable. 
The logic is a dialectical movement of the contents themselves; so 
Hyppolite could not, argues Ricœur, write a mere historical introduction to it, or 
simply comment on them. His only solution, argues Ricœur, was to make an 
apology of the system.376 He proceeds by questioning the option between the 
absence of knowledge and Absolute Knowing: “to speak the truth, we are never 
faced with that kind of alternative; our life is more likely to take place in 
imperfect, imprecise discourses”377 
The objection is turned afterwards against the insistence on ontological 
negation. Ricœur comments on Hyppolite’s critique of Kant’s and Plato’s use of 
negation, his diagnosis of the insufficiency of these takes on negation; against 
Hyppolite, he considers that Plato’s dialectic was already a moving dialectic.378 
Let me recall that during this period, Ricœur was lecturing on Plato in Strasbourg.  
Ultimately, Ricœur’s objection is indeed an historical objection. 
Rejecting Absolute Knowing is also tantamount to rejecting the end of history. 
 
It is a great embarrassment when existence is organized in a history that has a certain 
sense but which is not a logical sense, and reflects itself in a reflection that is not the Self 
of being. Here’s something that cannot be understood, or reduced by Logic. Furthermore, 
this reduced historical element takes revenge in several different ways. 
This revenge of the existential as historical can be read in the first place in Post-Hegelian 
history; it is because there is something such as Post-Hegelian history, coming out of the 
system, because there has been a decomposition of Hegelianism, because there has been 
Marx, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, that Hegel’s own work “presents almost insurmountable 
difficulties”379 
 
So Ricœur’s definitive objection is that history and system do not coincide (and 
that experience and system do not coincide either) and so Hyppolite’s conflation 
of the Phenomenology and the Logic appears to him as fundamentally wrong. His 
                                                
376 Ibid., pp. 1380-1381. 
377 My translation: “A vrai dire, nous ne sommes jamais devant ce genre d’alternative; notre vie se 
passe plutôt dans les discours imparfaits, approximatifs;” Ibid., p. 1382. 
378 Ibid., pp. 1386-1387. 
379 Concerning the “insurmountable difficulties”, Ricœur is quoting Hyppolite, p. 186. My own 
quotation of Ricœur is from page 1390. 
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last objection is a protestation against the subsumption of plurality in what he 
seems to interpret as a monological system.380 
Now, this objection not only against Absolute Knowing but also against 
any attempt to produce a Hegelian type of logic was directed by Ricœur not only 
at Hyppolite but also at Eric Weil. We have seen how Weil was instrumental in 
rehabilitating Hegel’s philosophy of right. And he had an important role in the 
intellectual life of the 1950s in France, being one of the co-founders of Critique. 
However, of all the intellectual figures hovering in Paris’ intellectual scene at the 
time, of all the group drawn to Hegel and Kojève, and which counted, aside from 
the more obvious figures, also members like Bataille, Weil (probably unjustly) 
remains today as one of the most forgotten philosophers. 
However, at the time, he left a lasting impression on Ricœur and on many 
others. Ricœur will follow him when defining himself as a “Post-Hegelian 
Kantian” and will be heavily influenced by his take on the state, his depiction of 
philosophy and violence as a strict alternative, his views on the “non-violent man”, 
and so forth. I will briefly come back to Weil’s influence on History and Truth in 
part three of this thesis. However, for the moment, let me briefly account for 
Ricœur’s reading and reaction to Weil’s Logique de la philosophie. 
Eric Weil was born in Germany and, like so many other intellectuals of 
his time, fled to France when the NSDAP seized power in Germany in 1933. He 
was heavily influenced by the Neo-Kantianism movement, having studied under 
Ernst Cassirer in Germany. However, I think it is fair to say that he embodied one 
of the most serious attempts to recover Hegelian philosophy, and namely his logic, 
in contemporary terms. Unlike Hyppolite, he was more than a commentator of 
Hegel and his philosophy; instead, he attempted to adapt some of the Logic’s main 
principles to his own original philosophy, which was an effort to devise a logic of 
discourse. There are even some similarities between his own project and an 
hermeneutic project, and his notion of reprise can be compared with both Hegel’s 
Aufhebung and Ricœur’s own notion of the conflict of interpretations381; if we 
                                                
380 “Le Logos et les discours, la réflexion et les réflexions, la négation et les négations: autant de 
manières de faire apparaître la difficulté centrale résumée dans le texte précédent.” Ricœur, 
“Retour à Hegel”, p. 1391. 
381 A longer version of this section, dealing with the relationship between Weil and Ricœur in a 
more extensive manner, can be found in French in Gonçalo Marcelo, “Paul Ricœur et Eric Weil: 
Histoire, Vérité et Conflit des Interprétations” in Cultura, special volume dedicated to Eric Weil La 
reprise, les reprises, edited by Luís Manuel Bernardo and Patrice Canivez (forthcoming).  
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consider that it is through Aufhebung that Hegelian philosophy advances but that 
ultimately what is constantly presupposed is the movement of the Absolute and the 
perfection of the system, and that, in turn, Ricœur’s own notion of the conflict of 
interpretations, while resorting to a similar process of negation, is instead 
fragmentary, open to revision and sometimes aporetical, Weil’s reprise is 
somewhere between the two.382 
Weil published his Logique de la philosophie383 in 1950, when Ricœur 
was writing a series of texts that would later become History and Truth. The book 
tries to reconstruct a logic of categories in purely discursive terms. Weil takes a 
definition of man as an animal which makes use of language and reason and is 
thus capable of producing reasonable language or discourse.384 This becomes the 
human being’s distinctive trait. Indeed, argues Weil, if we want to be recognized 
fully as human beings, we must have access to  reasonable discourse and make use 
of it.385 Adopting a standpoint close to so many others in his time, Weil 
characterizes our condition as that of a “project”, of “becoming”386 through a 
dialectical process of negation. Nevertheless, as we have seen in Hegel, there are 
several modes of negation and Weil chooses to underline two: reasonable 
discourse and violence. 
One of his strongest claims is that philosophy and violence are mutually 
exclusive. Whenever philosophy is exercised violence is stopped, and vice-versa. 
And this because philosophy is essentially language, discourse, and is geared 
towards rationality, which entails an exclusion of violence. The language of the 
philosopher is described as a liberation from dissatisfaction387 and his or her role 
                                                
382 The similarities between the two projects do not reside only in their respective uses of reprise 
and the conflict of interpretations. The two projects can be compared in what comes down to their 
takes on history, the reappropriation of Kant and Hegel, and language. These similarities have been 
noticed, among others, by Gilbert Kirscher, Pamela S. Anderson, Francisco Valdério and Luís 
Manuel Bernardo. See Gilbert Kirscher, La Philosophie d’Eric Weil (Paris : P.U.F., 1989) p. 10 ; 
Pamela Sue Anderson, Ricœur and Kant. Philosophy of the Will (Atlanta : Scholars Press, 1993) 
pp. 8-9; Francisco Valdério, “Linguagem Violência e Sentido, a propósito de um debate entre Eric 
Weil e Paul Ricœur” (unpublished conference, I Colóquio Internacional Eric Weil : Lógica, Moral 
e Política (Fortaleza, May 2011) ; Luís Manuel Bernardo, “Paul Ricœur lecteur d’Eric Weil” 
(unpublished conference, Reading Ricœur Once Again: Hermeneutics and Practical Philosophy, 
Lisbon, July 2010) and also Linguagem e Discurso. Uma hipótese hermenêutica sobre a filosofia 
de Eric Weil (Lisboa : INCM, 2003), p. 23. 
383 Eric Weil, Logique de la philosophie (Paris: Vrin, 1985) for the 10th edition. 
384 Ibid., p. 3. 
385 Ibid., p. 5. 
386 Ibid. 
387 Ibid., p. 9 ff. 
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will therefore be to become an educator, to teach reasonable discourse to others, 
and to help curtail the unwanted offshoots of negativity. We will never be 
satisfied, because satisfaction is presence, being, while we are desire and negation. 
But since there are several ways of exercising negativity, violence should be 
avoided. Evidently, we can see in these elaborations a tacit response to Kojève. 
Weil’s standpoint is a curious mix of idealism (although allegedly 
purified from metaphysical intentions) and a strong practical standpoint, leading to 
very clear choices in the ethical domain. The whole book is a course between the 
several discursive categories as the coherent effectuation of reasonable discourse, 
from Truth to Wisdom, and with a controversial depiction of the last categories, 
those of the Absolute, Finite, Action, Meaning, and Wisdom. The core of 
Ricœur’s disagreement with Weil would be, not surprisingly, Weil’s decision to 
include the Absolute in his logic, as well as its consequences for the whole 
undertaking. So let me distinguish between Ricœur’s general assessment of Weil’s 
theoretical ambitions, and his appraisal of some of the broad choices made by 
Weil, with which Ricœur identified. In a nutshell, Ricœur rejected the standpoint 
of the Absolute, accepted the distinction between philosophy and violence, which 
went well with his pre-WWII pacifism, and accepted in its main traits the Post-
Hegelian Kantianism. But let me start with the first of these assessments, in order 
to then mention the Post-Hegelian framework and from there move to Ricœur’s 
own complicated relationship with Hegel and his philosophy. 
In the first place, it is important to understand how Ricœur read Weil’s 
Logique de la philosophie and his evaluation of the status of the category of the 
Absolute in the context of the whole work, as well as its consequences for Weil’s 
philosophical project. In the article “De l’absolu à la sagesse par l’action”, 
originally pronounced as the closing conference in the Symposium dedicated to 
Eric Weil which took place at Chantilly in 1982, published in 1984 and reprinted 
in Lectures I388, Ricœur undertakes an analyzis of the category of Absolute in 
Weil. His aim is to see to what extent the category of Action allows for the 
possibility of maintaining a coherent discourse even after the category of the 
Absolute (let me recall that the Absolute precedes the categories of Finite, Action, 
Meaning, and Wisdom). Furthermore, he specifically wants to check the conditions 
                                                
388 Ricœur, Lectures 1. Autour du Politique (Paris : Seuil, 1991) pp. 115-130. 
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of possibility of such a discourse from the standpoint of the categories of Meaning 
and Wisdom. 
Ricœur starts by noting that there is an “anthropologic turn” in Weil’s 
depiction of the Absolute: “We are no longer Hegelians when we enter the 
category of the Absolute”.389 Nevertheless, he still sees a strong association with 
Hegel, because the function of totalization is still there, even if the link is really 
only functional. He concedes that the content of the category is not Hegelian. But 
he sees totalization in the fact that the type of discourse found in that category 
seems to exclude that there might be something coming after that category.390 
However, Weil indeed chose to place other categories after this one. And Ricœur 
pinpoints what is for him the main difficulty of the Weilian discourse on this 
specific occasion: Weil’s admitted goal of trying to fully explicate, or even 
eliminate, conflicts. In the category of the Absolute such as it is presented by Weil 
we find a discourse which is “unique and absolutely coherent”. Now, Ricœur 
understands why we should want to leave that category; but he fails to understand 
how one could utter a fully coherent discourse after having left it.391 In fact, he 
rejects such a possibility. Outside the category of the Absolute there is no 
discourse that can pretend to be “unique” and “absolutely coherent”. 
This is indeed one of the main disagreements between Weil and Ricœur, 
and with it we touch the kernel of their main beliefs concerning the relation 
between philosophy and history of philosophy, systematicity and openness, 
repetition, circularity and singularity of the dialogues and conflicts with other 
philosophies and categories. Ultimately, what is at stake is the status of the 
coherence and whether or not this coherence is only one among many other 
possibilities of “coherent discourse”. In other words, what is at stake is Ricœur’s 
                                                
389 Ibid., p. 116, my translation. 
390 “L’Absolu, c’est le bond de l’attitude hors du conflit pour le placer sous le titre de la 
particularité comprise. Alors ? Hégélien ? Non-hégélien ? La réponse, me semble-t-il, est difficile à 
décider, sinon indécidable. Je dirai : contenu non hégélien, fonction hégélienne. Contenu non-
hégélien : la séquence « Art-Religion-Philosophie » ne joue ici aucun rôle ; mais le transfert du 
conflit personnel dans un médium non personnel et son issue dans un résultat qui n’est pas 
personnel n’en sont pas moins humains. Fonction hégélienne, en ce que le discours dans lequel 
l’Absolu se comprend a un caractère total qui paraît exclure qu’il y ait un après, un au-delà de 
l’Absolu. C’est par cette fonction de totalisation que le discours weilien répète, sans le redoubler, 
le discours hégélien.” Ibid., p. 118. 
391 “La difficulté majeure pour moi est l’apparente identification du discours cohérent avec le 
discours totalisant atteint avec la catégorie de l’Absolu. Je comprends assez bien pourquoi et 
comment on quitte l’Absolu, mais je comprends mal comment on maintient le projet de discours 
cohérent au-delà du discours de l’Absolu, qui est appelé ici ‘discours unique et absolument 
cohérent.’” Ibid.,p. 119. 
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perspectivism, but this is an issue that I will only develop in parts three and four of 
this thesis. In a nutshell, Ricœur argues that the only chance to save the coherence 
of Weil’s categorial discourse is to let it open itself up to the conflict of 
interpretations. Ricœur sees two possibilities in the reading of Weil’s Logique de 
la philosophie. Either we see in it a “symphonic composition” that would allow for 
a pacific coexistence of the many categories and interpretations – each of which 
would not annul the others – or we see in it a progress more likely to resemble a 
linear order leaving no place for an alternative rearrangement or interpretation. 
Ricœur seems to lament having to see in Weil something closer to the second 
alternative.392 As for his own standpoint, if it should be fitted in any one of these 
alternatives, it should be the first. 
Ricœur’s conclusion forces us to see in Weil a philosophy that ultimately 
is less open than we would like it to be; this was perhaps the price to pay for 
having wanted to maintain a coherent and all-encompassing discourse. As Luís 
Manuel Bernardo has shown, through the emphasis on these features of his 
discourse, Weil stayed very close to the traditional model of philosophy which he 
nonetheless proclaimed to criticize.393 Weil always refused to fall back into a 
philosophy of the Finite and interpretation. Now these will be two assumed 
features of Ricœur’s own philosophy, and which we will see in more detail in 
parts three and four of this thesis. To summarize, without anticipating too much, 
let me just underscore that Ricœur wagers less in the coherence of reality, 
language and philosophy than Weil. For Ricœur, the discourses on philosophy or 
of philosophy will always only be partially coherent; history and human action, in 
turn, will only be partially good and they will only make sense up to a certain 
point. Ultimately, for Ricœur, there will remain an ineluctable degree of opacity in 
human history and reality, as the existence of evil widely attests. 
Now, Ricœur is closer to Weil in a number of other aspects, and namely 
in his political philosophy and the appropriation of Kantianism. Logique de la 
                                                
392 “Le projet de cohérence du discours catégorial de Weil, sans cesse menacé par sa propre 
réalisation, ne se sauve in extremis que si la seconde lecture communique au lecteur la conviction 
d’une cohérence seulement récurrente. Cohérence récurrente ouverte elle-même à plusieurs 
interprétations, comprises entre les deux extrêmes d’une composition symphonique qui laisserait 
attitudes et catégories coexister pacifiquement sans s’abolir mutuellement – ou l’ordre linéaire qui 
ne laisse place à aucune alternative. Le pari de Weil me paraît plus prés du second pôle, celui 
d’un : il ne peut en être autrement. C’est le pari de Weil.” Ibid., pp. 129-130. 
393 Luís Manuel Bernardo, Linguagem e Discurso, p. 379. 
 144
philosophie is followed by Weil’s own proposal of a political philosophy. 
Philosophie Politique is thus published in 1956394 and shortly thereafter Ricœur 
publishes in Esprit a very positive review of this book.395 As Pamela Sue 
Anderson has pointed out, Ricœur’s own review of Weil reveals – in this very 
short and early text, let me recall – many resonances with Ricœur’s later work. In 
Anderson’s words: “The value of Ricœur’s review for us lies in the fact that what 
he says reveals important affinities between Weil’s post-Hegelian Kantian 
discussions of history, narrative, and identity and Ricœur’s early work on history 
and the subject, as well as his mature work on historiography and narrative 
identity. Like Weil, Ricœur begins with a Kantian grounding, next he confronts 
the challenges posed by Hegel – as well as by Husserl, Heidegger, and those who 
follow – but then he claims to return to Kant’s philosophy; in this regard they both 
use the self-description of post-Hegelian Kantian.”396 Anderson proceeds to assert 
that in fact it might be claimed that both Weil and Ricœur never “left” Kantianism, 
insofar as they always kept a certain grounding in Kant’s transcendental subject. 
She cites Ricœur’s claim that all hermeneutics are to a degree, Kantian – which we 
alluded to above – in that they are an act of finitude, as proof of that claim. 
Whether or not Anderson is right in her assertion – which should be modulated in 
the case of Ricœur, given his toning down of the pretentions of the subject in later 
works such as Oneself as Another – she is definitely right in pointing out that the 
kernel of Ricœur’s Kantianism resided in a trait he shared with Weil: they both 
recovered Kant through an anthropological stance: 
 
Here it should, at the very least, be kept in mind that Ricœur’s post-Hegelian reading of 
Kant is clearly informed by Weil’s view that “Il apparaît que le fondement dernier de la 
philosophie Kantienne doit être cherché dans sa théorie de l’homme, dans l’anthropologie 
philosophique”397 (it appears that the ultimate foundation of Kantian philosophy must be 
sought in Kant’s theory of man, in his philosophical anthropology).398 
 
                                                
394 Eric Weil, Philosophie Politique (Paris: Vrin, 1956). 
395 Ricœur, “La philosophie politique d’Eric Weil” in Esprit 25/10 (1957), pp. 412-28. Republished 
in Lectures 1, pp. 95-114. 
396 Pamela Sue Anderson, Ricœur and Kant, pp. 8-9. 
397 Anderson is quoting Eric Weil, Problèmes kantiens (Paris: Vrin, 1963), p. 33. 
398 Anderson, Ricœur and Kant, p. 9. 
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I strongly concur with Anderson’s last claim that one of Ricœur’s strongest 
Kantian groundings lies in his anthropology. That is, Ricœur will put forward a 
philosophical anthropology, and in his philosophical anthropology – as elsewhere 
– he will also draw on Kantianism and sometimes on Kant’s own philosophical 
anthropology. This will be evident in his emphasis on the notion of hope, drawing 
on Kant’s third question of his anthropology: what may we hope? Indeed, as I 
already hinted at, Ricœur will give a Kantian treatment to many topics, restricting, 
like Kant, the objects of knowledge, so that he could leave them for belief or faith; 
so that he can hope for them. Let us see how in more detail in the next section. 
With these last notes on Eric Weil, and on Ricœur’s reception of Weil, 
I conclude my very brief section on the early reception of Hegel in France. The 
reception later grew in scope and acuity, and it can be divided among those who 
drew an inspiration but also heavily criticized and tried to escape Hegel, like 
Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze, and the most serious Hegelians, who tried to 
recuperate the meaning, breadth and scope of Hegel’s own writings within a 
Hegelian framework. Let me mention the works of Gwendoline Jarkczyk and 
Pierre-Jean Labarrière399 as two notorious examples of this serious work. This 
thesis will not discuss their works or interpretations, because it is focused on 
Ricœur. But let me emphasize that today, as before, the Hegelian recovery is 
taking place in France, as elsewhere, in renewed terms. 
 
1.3.6 – Ricœur’s conflictual assessment of Hegel: from recovery to mourning, the 
place of dialectic in human praxis and the Post-Hegelian Kantianism 
 
Like Kant, Hegel was omnipresent in Ricœur’s philosophy. Nonetheless, 
if Ricœur finds no trouble in adhering to Kantian philosophy, if Kant lies there as 
the silent giant guarding the gates of Ricœur’s philosophy and preventing it from 
unwanted trespassing, his relation with Hegel is far more complicated; dialectical, 
even. At least from the 1950s onwards, all his books and many of his articles 
occasionally mention Hegelian topics, sometimes to recover, others to criticize 
them. More often than not, the rediscovery or discussion of Hegel is done through 
                                                
399 See for instance Gwendolyne Jarczyk and Pierre-Jean Labarrière, Hegeliana (Paris: P.U.F., 
1986) and Les premiers combats de la reconnaissance. Maîtrise et servitude dans la 
“Phénoménologie de l’esprit” de Hegel (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1987). 
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the mediation of other Post-Hegelian authors, with Eric Weil as the leading figure 
(at least for Ricœur). 
Ricœur’s insistence on conciliation in his very first books on Jaspers and 
Marcel is an evidence of the Hegelian influence. In History and Truth he discusses 
the Hegelian state theory through the lens of Eric Weil. Throughout this whole 
time he strongly opposes the Sartrean emphasis on reified negation, and this even 
if, as I mentioned before, he worked for decades on negation and kept unpublished 
lectures on the topic, now carefully analyzed by Alison Scott-Baumann. In the 
1960s, Ricœur will for the first time include Hegel as the key of one of his books. 
Namely, in Freud and Philosophy, Hegel’s teleological model of consciousness 
formation from the Phenomenology of Spirit will provide Ricœur with the perfect 
complement to Freud and his archeology of desire. 
Later, in books like Oneself as Another and The Course of Recognition, 
Ricœur would recover and use many specific parts of Hegel’s practical 
philosophy, with a special emphasis on Sittlichkeit and recognition-theoretical 
concepts and practices. Ultimately, his positioning towards Hegel will consist in 
rejecting Hegel’s philosophy of history, closed system, monological account of 
absolute idealism, and so forth, while recovering many of Hegel’s meaningful 
analyzes and intuitions, that is, specific parts of the system. By thus proceeding, he 
is not taking a very different standpoint from those assumed by Habermas and 
Honneth. 
Nonetheless, his more or less “definitive” account of Hegel was shaped 
earlier, and it underwent a specific evolution. I could mention many, many texts. 
But since I will delve in more detail in most of Ricœur’s books in parts three, four 
and five of this thesis, I will keep the discussion in this chapter to a strict 
minimum. Therefore, I will only mention four texts to which I will not come back 
in detail in later chapters, and I will analyze these in a chronological order, so that 
we can have a glimpse at Ricœur’s evolution on the matter. First, I will draw upon 
“Freedom in the light of hope”, Ricœur’s programmatic affirmation of a Post-
Hegelian Kantianism. Then I will proceed to analyze two texts from the same 
epoch, namely  “Le lieu de la dialectique” and “Hegel aujourd’hui”. In the first of 
these texts, Ricœur chooses to carefully circumscribe dialectics to the realm of 
human praxis; in the latter, he undertakes an assessment of the different phases of 
Hegelian philosophy that he deemed important, and acceptable, at that time. 
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Finally, I will mention a section from the third volume of Time and Narrative, 
where Ricœur has his most violent rejection of Hegel. This painful rejection and 
the subsequent mourning notwithstanding, Hegel – or at least some parts of his 
philosophy, as I have been often repeating – would ultimately prove to be 
inescapable for Ricœur up until the very end. But let us start with the 
programmatic text that sets the tone for his Post-Hegelian Kantianism. As we will 
see, the text is far more Kantian than Hegelian. But if in this text Ricœur has a 
deeply ambiguous stance towards Hegel – accepting some intuitions, but mostly 
lambasting him in comparison with Kant – and if some rejections are definitive, 
others were later reassessed in the 1970s. As such, we will find partial 
contradictions in these texts (with the most notorious case of Ricœur’s assessment 
of Hegelian dialectic), but I will follow the thread of them, paying attention to 
detail and eventually trying to give a more systematic, if brief, account at the end 
of the chapter. The first of these texts will provide the Kantian background against 
which the texts of the 1970s will rebel, before the stage of mourning of the 1980s. 
“Freedom in the light of hope” is an article written in 1968 and originally 
entitled “approche philosophique du concept de liberté religieuse”400, later 
republished in The Conflict of Interpretations.401 Its main topic is supposed to be 
religious freedom, but in fact its original title can be misleading, because what is at 
stake is much more than what we usually understand by religious freedom. Ricœur 
starts by distinguishing several levels in which we can analyze the phenomenon of 
religious freedom: the freedom of the act of faith, the right to profess a specific 
religion and “the quality of freedom that pertains to the religious phenomenon as 
such”.402 Very early on, we can feel the Kantian tone. Ricœur tells us that his 
approach in the text is a “philosophical approach” (to religion). But he then 
proceeds to explain what he understands by “philosophical approach” in this 
context: 
 
I take “approach” in its strong sense of “approximation”. I understand by this the 
incessant work of philosophical discourse to put itself into a relation of proximity with 
kerygmatic and theological discourse. This work of thought is a work that begins with 
                                                
400 Ricœur, “Approche philosophique du concept de liberté religieuse” in Archivio di Filosofia 38 
2/3 (1968): 215-234. 
401 Ricœur, “Freedom in the light of hope” in The Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 402-424. 
402 Ibid., p. 402. 
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listening, and yet within the autonomy of responsible thought. It is an incessant reform of 
thinking, but within the limits of reason alone.403 
 
This quotation has a twofold implication. On the one hand, we can strongly feel 
one of the poles implied by Ricoeurian hermeneutics: its pole of passive, 
respectful listening, in order to understand. It is a pole that will be 
counterbalanced by critical hermeneutics and the conflict of interpretations, as we 
will see in part four. On the other hand, there is an active side of interpretation. 
Ricœur reasserts the autonomy of responsible thought and the “incessant reform” 
that thinking must undergo. But he stresses that this is to be done “within the 
limits of reason alone”. With the allusion both to autonomy and to Kant’s religion, 
we could not be more clearly situated within a Kantian framework. 
Speaking about an hermeneutics of resurrection, Ricœur states that the 
task of such an hermeneutics is to “reinstitute the potential of hope”.404 
Accordingly, he further claims that “a hermeneutics of religious freedom in an 
interpretation of freedom in conformity with the Resurrection interpreted in terms 
of promise and hope.”405 Clarifying the psychological implications of such a 
standpoint, he invokes Kierkegaard’s passion for the possible406 and further adds 
that within the scope of this hermeneutical exercise, we need to activate 
imagination. In his own words: 
 
[Hope] is allied with the imagination insofar as the latter is the power of the possible and 
the disposition for being in a radical renewal. Freedom in the light of hope, expressed in 
psychological terms, is nothing else than this creative imagination of the possible.407 
 
Again, we have the summoning of a Kantian faculty, namely, that of productive 
imagination. Now, let me note in passing, and as we shall see in part four, that 
while Ricœur is here speaking against the backdrop of the hermeneutics of 
religion, he is in fact mobilizing concepts that will be given a huge application in 
other domains (semantic innovation, the social imaginary, and so on) of his 
hermeneutics in the following two decades. 
                                                
403 Ibid., p. 403. 
404 Ibid., p. 406. 
405 Ibid. 
406 Ibid., p. 407. 
407 Ibid., p. 408. 
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However, even if this is a Kantian and hermeneutic framework, Ricœur 
soon rushes to add a Hegelian element to the mix, allied with a practical import: 
 
A freedom open to new creation is in fact less centered on subjectivity, on personal 
authenticity, than on social and political justice; it calls for a reconciliation which itself 
demands to be inscribed in the recapitulation of all things.408 
 
With this passage we learn that, in a single move, both the Kantian liberal 
emphasis on the individual and Heidegger’s solipsistic insistence on authenticity 
are disavowed. With the focus on social and political justice and reconciliation, 
Ricœur is pointing to a Hegelian, probably communitarian goal. 
In the remainder of the article Ricœur elaborates on this particular mix of 
Hegelianism and Kantianism he wants to put forward. He announces his desire, 
which is really a programmatic declaration, to creatively develop a Post-Hegelian 
Kantianism “more to be constructed than repeated”.409 He declares that he is aware 
this position entails a paradox, but he also asserts that he accepts the paradox, he 
owns up to it, both for philosophical and theological reasons. He argues that the 
exchange between Kant and Hegel still structures the philosophical discourse of 
his day and age, insofar as the philosophers of his time are “as radically post-
Hegelian” as they are post-Kantian and so the task must be “to think them always 
better by thinking them together – one against the other, and one by means of the 
other”410 which amounts to thinking differently from them, because what we think 
is a combinatory, a particular mix of Kant and Hegel. 
And how exactly does he intend to do that? We have no need to take his 
programmatic declaration at face value. We might even argue that he fails in this 
Post-Hegelian Kantianism, or claim that such a project is in itself unfounded and 
relies on a superficial reading of Kant and Hegel. I am not saying that. But I agree 
that such an objection might be raised, and that the project is in itself inherently 
paradoxical. But not, in my opinion, self-defeating. Indeed, I think that in many 
domains of his philosophy, if not in his philosophy overall, Ricœur tried to live up 
to this programmatic statement. And this precisely through the conflict of 
                                                
408 Ibid., p. 409. 
409 Ibid., p. 412. 
410 Ibid. 
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interpretations. Whether or not he succeeded must be assessed in a case-by-case 
scenario. But I do think he tried. 
In this particular occasion, he invokes the “fissuring power” of hope, 
which is capable, or so Ricœur argues, to reorganize meaning and breach closed 
systems. The topic of hope, Ricœur suggests, is a privileged example of the 
exchanges and permutations he is talking about. He then proposes to recover the 
Kantian distinction between reason and the understanding in order to enforce his 
own – and this almost becomes a mantra for Ricœur – philosophy of limits: 
 
The route I propose to explore is opened up by the important distinction instituted by 
Kantian philosophy between understanding and reason. This split contains a potential of 
meaning whose suitability to an intellectus fidei et spei I would like to demonstrate. How? 
Essentially by the function of horizon that reason assumes in the constitution of 
knowledge and will. That is, I address myself directly to the dialectical part of the two 
Kantian Critiques: Dialectic of theoretical reason and Dialectic of practical reason. A 
philosophy of limits which is at the same time a practical demand for totalization – this, to 
my mind, is the philosophical response to the kerygma of hope, the closest philosophical 
approximation to freedom in the light of hope. Dialectic in the Kantian sense is to my 
mind the part of Kantianism which not only survives the Hegelian critique but which 
triumphs over the whole of Hegelianism.411 
 
As we can see, this article is rich in strong, eloquent assertions by Ricœur. Here, 
he recovers the Kantian sense of dialectic we have delved into in the preceding 
chapter, and emphasizes what he takes to be its most important part: the limiting 
function, the distinction between understanding and reason that he had already 
asserted in his lectures “Kant et la négation”. This is his limit to Hegelianism. 
However, we should not read in his reappraisal of Kantian dialectic a critique to 
Hegelian dialectic – or if so, only to its totalizing features and the temptation to 
reach the absolute – because, as we will see, already as soon as five years later, he 
will set positive goals for Hegelian dialectics. 
Shortly after this passage he comes back to Hegel, reasserting what he 
rejects from Kant, namely, his ethical formalism and specifically his theory of 
duty. This, he will reassert over and again. And in fact he mentions §4 of the 
                                                
411 Ibid., p. 413. 
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Philosophy of Right to affirm that for him “realization of freedom” is indeed the 
key to a philosophy of the will. All the following paragraph is dedicated to a 
reappraisal of Hegelian practical philosophy and the several levels of the 
actualization of freedom and recognition in concrete communities: family, 
economic collectivity, political community.412 Ricœur wants in fact to pay homage 
to the Hegelian philosophy of the will which is “an inexhaustible reservoir of 
descriptions and mediations”.413 And this, while simultaneously always refusing to 
allow Hegelian philosophy to deplete all meaning. 
Ultimately, the conflict between Kant and Hegel is coalesced, for Ricœur, 
in an opposition between a philosophy of limits and a philosophy of the system. 
And in this war, Ricœur is definitely on the side of Kant. Ricœur reaffirms the 
distance that goes between Denken and Erkennen. The end of the article draws the 
connection between Kant’s two dialectics and his anthropological third question: 
what are we allowed to hope for, which structures his philosophy of religion. 
Ricœur recalls that the domain of hope is coextensive with the region of 
transcendental illusion: “I hope, there where I necessarily deceive myself, by 
forming absolute objects: self, freedom, God.”414 He recaps the main traits of the 
Kantian dialectic in its three domains, underlining that there is a legitimate thought 
of the unconditioned and that this is the reason why transcendental illusion is 
possible; he also sees in Kant’s critique of the paralogism of subjectivity the 
foundation of all the critiques of the modern subject, a critique of the cogito avant 
la lettre. 
Ultimately, Ricœur follows Kant in placing “pure will” as the “highest 
good” and he argues that this completion of the will assumes in the context of 
Kant’s architectonics the same place that Absolute Knowing assumes in Hegel’s 
system – with the important difference that instead of being an absolute 
standpoint, something which we could be tempted into filling with a concrete 
content and claim to know, it is only a demand: “Now this totality is not given but 
demanded; it cannot be given.”415 
As we know, freedom, immortality of the soul and the existence of God 
reenter the Critique of Practical Reason as postulates; Ricœur chooses to 
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concentrate on the postulate of freedom (here understood as the demand of the 
totality of freedom, not its object as such) and asserts that this demand, this 
expectation, this hope, corresponds to his notion of freedom in the light of hope.416 
And his definitive move is to compare this demand for total, uncoerced freedom 
with its actual conditions of possibility, within Kantianism, and to draw the 
consequences of this comparison. In order to do so, he turns to the problem of evil 
and its dramatic implications for human freedom: 
 
What the Essay on Radical Evil teaches about freedom, indeed, is that this same power 
that duty imputes to us is in reality a nonpower (…) 
This descent into the abyss, as Karl Jaspers has seen very well, expresses the most 
advanced point of a thought of limits, which henceforth extends from our knowledge to 
our power.417 
 
So here we have an accentuation of the philosophy of limits that Ricœur reads in 
Kant. Not only are there limits to what I can know, but also limits to what I can 
do. This was of course already established as the result of the Critiques because, as 
we know from theoretical reason, our freedom is not an absolute, merely a relative 
beginning in the world; and even if in the exercise of our practical reason we are 
allegedly operating in the realm of ends and thus moral legislators acting in a 
completely free manner, it is easy to see that its effectuation might be problematic. 
The turn to radical evil, as we have seen before, dramatizes the situation, because 
the origin of the formulation of the maxims might have been corrupted. But this 
should not be read, in my opinion, as a caution against the power of our agency, 
which will be highlighted in such a forceful manner by the Ricœur of Oneself as 
Another and The Course of Recognition. Rather, it should be read as an attempt to 
reinforce the affirmation of our capabilities: 
 
The “postulate” of freedom must henceforth cross through, not only the night of knowing, 
with its crisis of the transcendental illusion, but also the night of power, with its crisis of 
radical evil.418 
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Ricœur acknowledges the limitations of the doctrine of radical evil. He subscribes 
to the critiques of rigorism and formalism of Kantian ethics. But his ultimate 
stance in this very important article is a recovery of evil as totalization or, in other 
words, a critique of Hegel through a particular reading of Kant, and pointing 
towards a critical social philosophy: 
 
True evil, the evil of evil, is not the violation of an interdict, the subversion of the law, 
disobedience, but fraudulency in the work of totalization. In this sense, true evil appears 
only in the very field where religion is produced, namely, in the field of contradictions 
and conflicts determined, on the one hand, by the demand of totalization which constitutes 
reason, both theoretical and practical, and, on the other hand, by the illusion which 
misleads thought (…) The demand for a complete object of the will is basically 
antinomic. The evil of evil is born in the area of this antinomy. 
(…) if the evil of evil is born on the way of totalization, it would appear only in a 
pathology of hope, as the inherent perversion in the problematic of fulfillment of 
totalization. To put it in a few words, the true malice of man appears only in the state and 
in the church, as institutions of gathering together, of recapitulation, of totalization.419 
 
These last few words can be read as a strong critique of alienation in institutions 
like churches and the state because, according to Ricœur, they can lead to a 
“falsified expression of the synthesis”.420 So true liberation, for Kant and Ricœur, 
can only happen when “figures of hope are liberated from the idols of the market 
place”421 (he is here quoting sir Francis Bacon). 
I delved deep into this article, because I believe it provides a very 
important key to understand Ricœur’s Post-Hegelian Kantianism. Not only do we 
find there its programmatic statement, but also some articulations of it, even 
though they are sketched very rapidly. We must admit, from the reading of the 
article, that Ricœur seems much closer to Kant than to Hegel, even if he admits the 
recovery of Hegelian practical philosophy at some point. But what Ricœur omits 
in this particular article, and which will only be recovered afterwards, is the way in 
which the radical critique he starts to emphasize towards the end of the article can 
gain from the Marxist-Hegelian standpoint. Wasn’t a critique of alienation a 
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striking overarching feature of the Marxist-Hegelian tradition? Aren’t the “idols of 
the marketplace” heavily battered by this tradition in their recovery of meaningful 
human agency and expressivist model? 
In fact, even Ricœur’s appraisal of Hegelian dialectic would change in the 
years to come, in later texts, which we shall see in a moment. As for the critique of 
the standpoint of the absolute and totalization in a given object our analyzes have 
by now crossed these critiques so many times that they might be taken as acquired. 
Ricœur later dedicates many other texts to the hermeneutics and philosophy of 
religion, some of them to Kant and Hegel. I could mention “Une herméneutique 
philosophique de la religion: Kant” (written in 1992) and “Le statut de la 
Vorstellung dans la philosophie hégélienne de la religion” (written in 1985), both 
later republished in Lectures 3422 but while these texts emphasize different points 
and follow different leads, they do not alter the significant background of 
Ricœur’s assessment of Kant’s and Hegel’s take on religion, or his self-professed 
Kantian “philosophy of limits”. 
So the Hegelian recovery had to follow other courses for Ricœur. 
Accordingly, in 1973423, Ricœur took upon himself the important but dubious task 
of both trying to “define” dialectic and to find its proper “place” [lieu] within 
philosophy. Five years after “Freedom in the Light of Hope”, in “Le ‘lieu’ de la 
dialectique” what we see is Ricœur coming back to Hegel’s definition of dialectic 
(as he saw it), and setting Kant aside for a while. Thus for the Ricœur of the mid-
70s the task was neither to totally embrace nor totally reject Hegel and the 
dialectical method; rather, the challenge was to accept its productivity while also 
narrowing down its scope, finding a proper place where it would fit and bring 
about something new. We have seen in the last chapter how, for the pre-critical 
Kant, (real) opposition is reciprocal limitation that ultimately results in zero, a 
standstill; now, in 1973, Ricœur comes back briefly to the Negative Magnitudes 
essay precisely to insist that the type of opposition at work in (Hegelian) dialectic 
configures a third type of opposition, different from the two listed by Kant in his 
1763 essay, namely, productive opposition, “by which we understand an 
                                                
422 See Ricœur, “Une herméneutique philosophique de la religion: Kant” in Lectures 3. Aux 
frontières de la philosophie (Paris: Seuil, 1994), pp. 19-40 and “Le statut de la Vorstellung dans la 
philosophie hégélienne de la religion”, Ibid., pp. 41-62. 
423 The article was published in 1975, in a book edited by Chaïm Perelman. See “Le ‘lieu’ de la 
dialectique” in Dialectics. Dialectiques (Entretiens de Varna, 1973), ed. C. Perelman (The Hague: 
M. Nijhoff, 1975), pp. 92-108. 
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opposition that, one way or another, allows, facilitates or produces a new thing, in 
reality or experience, different from the opposing terms.”424 
Ricœur acknowledges that hypothetically there could be three different 
“places” for dialectic, exactly those that make up the three parts of Hegel’s 
Encyclopedia: logic, nature and objective spirit. He evidently states that there is no 
priority that could be established between any of these domains because, in 
Hegel’s system, each one of them can mediate the others and the end is the 
absolute self-knowing whole; but he does claim that from the moment we accept 
the impossibility of Absolute Knowing, which we by now know Ricœur does, this 
question of priority must be stated. If dialectic does not form a coherent whole, 
there must at least be some domain in which it can be exercised. And this domain 
is to be respected, as dialectic must be protected even if, and maybe to the extent 
to which Absolute Knowing is rejected. Ricœur even formulates the hypothesis 
that the Hegelian system itself might not be more than a putting together of 
processes that are, in themselves, fragmentary and which, ultimately, are not so 
much a result of the system as they are its main motivations425, i.e. the phenomena 
that led Hegel to try to form a system in the first place. If this interpretation is 
correct, I think it probably might be possible to recover Hegelian philosophy 
altogether, except for the systematic closure. Progress might still be possible, in 
world history as in philosophy. In fact, this brief hint from Ricœur might be a 
suggestion of a post-metaphysical reading of Hegel, much like the ones proposed 
by Habermas and Honneth. 
In “Le ‘lieu’ de la dialectique”, Ricœur goes on to argue that the 
privileged place for dialectics is human reality; this is coherent with Hegel’s 
assertion that his logic is not, by far, formal logic; it is rather the movement of the 
things themselves. But if we cannot accept (has anyone really, anyway?) the 
positing of this kind of movement of nature or the cosmos, than the only place for 
dialectic is in human affairs, that is, those processes which depend on human will 
                                                
424 My translation. “Si la dialectique a un sens, une troisième sorte d’opposition doit être supposée, 
que l’on peut appeler une opposition productive, en entendant par là une opposition qui, d’une 
manière ou d’une autre, permet, favorise ou engendre  une chose nouvelle, dans la réalité ou dans 
l’expérience, qualitativement distincte des termes opposés.” (Ricœur, “Le ‘lieu’ de la dialectique”, 
p. 92). 
425 “On ne peut écarter l’hypothèse que le système soit lui-même une sorte d’arrangement ultime de 
procès dialectiques fragmentaires, capables de survivre au système d’une manière ou de l’autre, 
parce qu’ils n’en résultent pas, mais parce qu’ils l’ont plutôt motivé” (Ibid., p. 93) 
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and deed, on human action. Or maybe we could also include the hermeneutic 
realm of interpretation as a “place” for dialectic, as the conflict of interpretations 
will blatantly show. At this point, Ricœur proposes to distinguish between action 
and praxis. We must recall that in this period, 1970-75, Ricœur is starting to 
systematically delve into the analyzis of action in its many aspects; it was from 
1971-72 that he would prepare his Louvain-Chicago-Paris lectures on the 
semantics of action, which deal mainly with the descriptive and analytical aspects 
of human action, combining for the first time in his philosophy, phenomenology 
and analytical philosophy. But his claim in “Le ‘lieu’ de la dialectique” is that 
there are aspects of action that deserve to be called dialectical, and to the process 
of those dialectical aspects he calls praxis. These are all aspects that have in 
common the fact that they entail both an opposition and a dialectical suppression 
of that opposition through the dynamism of its own process. 
He proceeds to develop three aspects (the fact that they are three, each of 
which more encompassing than its predecessor, speaks volumes of Ricœur’s wish 
to appropriate, in his own way, the Hegelian tone) of praxis: the dialectic between 
desire and deliberation in the human will, the dialectic between understanding and 
will; finally, the dialectic between subjective will and objective will. Each of these 
dialectics is of course only possible because the oppositions are mediated in what 
gradually becomes an ever more encompassing perspective. However, Ricœur 
only goes this far: his last step is the integration of the subjective into the objective 
will, that is, borrowing the Hegelian terms of the Philosophy of Right, the 
realization of freedom, as well as the unification of a philosophy of the will and a 
political philosophy in what Hegel calls objective spirit. Therefore, we can see 
how Ricœur, like Honneth, Eric Weil, and so many others, acknowledges the merit 
of the mature Hegel’s theory of institutions as instances of the rationalization of 
collective action; and this is, ultimately, what he will take from Hegel at this point: 
“The rational history of freedom is nothing else than the history of these [three] 
interwoven dialectics. It is in this sense that we can say that praxis is dialectic at 
work.”426 
                                                
426 [My translation] “L’histoire sensée de la liberté n’est pas autre chose que l’histoire de ces 
dialectiques enchainées. C’est en ce sens qu’on peut dire que la praxis est la dialectique à l’œuvre.” 
(Ibid.,p. 101) 
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So in 1973 Ricœur is decidedly on the side of Hegel. In this article, he 
deepens the Hegelian pole: he tells us that nothing shows better the superiority of 
dialectics than the comparison between Kant and Hegel, between creative dialectic 
and the “divisive understanding”, the one that results in the antinomies we have 
seen before; and that, ultimately, even if we have to go “through” Kantianism, we 
cannot stay within it, because what we need is a philosophy that distinguishes, 
articulates, hierarchizes and totalizes the moments that the antinomies have 
divided; ultimately, for the 1973 Ricœur, “this philosophy can no longer be that of 
the historic Hegel. But it must be a philosophy instructed by him.”427 We can see 
how different this is from the standpoint shown in “Freedom in the light of hope”. 
But not necessarily totally contradictory. 
Ricœur finishes this reflection by saying that dialectics can at most be a 
“semi-formal style”428 and that probably the only part of dialectics that can be 
fully saved is its semantic root that ties it to “dialogue”429; however, he does seem 
to believe in the possibility of dialectics in the domain of human praxis as the 
articulation of the objective spirit. As such, other than the exploration of dialectics 
in the domain of human praxis, and the appraisal of Hegelian dialectics as 
“productive opposition”, I think that what we must retain from this article is this 
description of Ricœur’s grasp of dialectics as a “semi-formal style”. This is 
perhaps the kernel of his reappropriation of Hegelian dialectics in a 
methodological fashion. But we still have two more stops in our course of 
Ricœur’s complicated assessment of Hegel, before we can summarize it and draw 
our conclusions. 
Shortly after “Le ‘lieu’ de la dialectique” Ricœur writes another article on 
Hegel, more broad and encompassing in its scope, and perhaps providing a more 
complete diagnosis of the way he saw Hegelian philosophy in this very important 
period of his production. “Hegel aujourd’hui” is a text written and published in 
                                                
427 [My translation] I will allow myself to quote this text more extensively: “Rien ne montre 
davantage la supériorité du traitement dialectique que la comparaison entre Hegel et Kant. La 
philosophie de ce dernier reste prise dans des dichotomies insolubles : entre nature et liberté ; entre 
raison théorique et raison pratique, entre entendement et sensibilité, entre devoir et plaisir (…) 
Mais s’il faut entrer dans le kantisme, on ne peut y rester. (….) Nous avons besoin d’une 
philosophie qui distingue et enchaîne, qui hiérarchise et totalise les moments que l’antinomie a 
séparés. Cette philosophie ne peut sans doute plus être celle du Hegel historique. Mais ce devra 
être une philosophie instruite par lui.” (Ibid., p. 102) 
428 Ibid., p. 108. 
429 Ibid., p. 104. 
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1974, and republished in Esprit in 2006.430 It is an article in which he tries to 
provide the most complete account possible of the several possible entries in 
Hegelianism and a justification for the interest in Hegel in that particular juncture; 
furthermore, he also strives to express as clearly as possible what he accepts, and 
what he refuses, in Hegel. 
Firstly, he manifests his surprise for the renewed interest in Hegel since, 
as we saw in the preceding section, Hegel’s recovery in France was done through 
a  mix of “ungrateful” successors: Kierkegaard, Marx, and so forth. The first part 
of the article has an introductory character – the text was originally delivered in a 
conference for a wide, non-specialized public, at the Maison de la Culture de 
Grenoble – and is meant to be a cartography of the main moments of Hegel’s 
thought and its reception (Marx’s attack on Hegel’s “theology”, Kojève’s 
interpretation of the atheist Hegel, the existential interpretations, etc.). Ricœur 
chooses to concentrate on the connection and relation between the Phenomenology 
and the Encyclopedia, with only very brief and cursive references to both the 
Logic and the Philosophy of Right. Additionally, he divides his text in a very 
pedagogical manner; after having presented the outlines of Hegel’s philosophy, he 
puts forward his “questions”, “fascinations” and “resistances” towards Hegel’s 
philosophy, that is, the parts of the system towards which he has doubts, those he 
willingly embraces, and those he decides to criticize and abandon. For its clarity 
and bluntness, this is a fundamental text to understand Ricœur’s use of Hegel. I 
will skip his presentation of Hegel and go straight to his “fascinations” and 
“resistances”. 
The section on the “fascinations” reflects Ricœur’s own work in the 
preceding decade. He recalls how he turned to Hegel to complement the 
psychoanalytical approach, which we will see in more detail in section 4.3. 
Commenting on that phase, he retraces the parallelism between the 
Phenomenology of Spirit and Freud to the link between recognition and conflict: 
“Man wants to recognize another human being in that reciprocity of desire. Desire 
becomes desire for recognition. Now, this is also the central problem of 
                                                
430 See Ricœur, “Hegel aujourd’hui” in Études théologiques et philosophiques 49, 3 (1974): 335-
354 and Esprit 323, 3-4 (2006): 174-194. I am quoting from the version republished in Esprit. 
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psychoanalysis, which is also born from conflict, not the one between master and 
slave, but the battle between every offspring of man and his parental figure.”431 
The second focus of his interest seems to be closely related with his own 
personal experience. He mentions Hegel’s theory of objective spirit, and namely 
the relation between freedom and institutions and adds: “This problem haunts me 
simultaneously because of an effort to understand my own time and to think a 
certain administrative experience I have had.”432 No doubt he is alluding to his 
traumatic experience as Dean of Nanterre in the late 1960s. But whatever the 
reasons of his interest, Ricœur deplores that in his own time institutions become 
more and more bureaucratic, while freedom only takes its course in the form of 
anti-institutional protest.433 Recognizing in Hegel the main thinker that has tried to 
conceive of institutions as realms of freedom, Ricœur regrets that this take seems 
increasingly difficult to undertake in his own day and age. He also revisits his own 
earlier work on the will, namely the one developed in Freedom and Nature and, 
albeit in a very rapid manner, hints at the ways in which the Hegelian mature 
philosophy could complement this earlier work. 
He mentions that Freedom and Nature was a very “subjectivistic, almost 
solipsistic” work.434 It did not take into account what happens when “a will meets 
another will”.  “It only displayed a lonely man, alone with his body and the 
world.” Of course that this was a Husserlian-inspired work, written 25 years 
before. But now, in 1974, Ricœur asserts that “all begins when a will meets 
another will”.435 He further adheres to the Hegelian principle according to which 
freedom must renounce its negative power of saying “no” in order to adhere to 
something concrete, limited, and therefore fully realize itself and he goes as far as 
to strongly assert the Hegelian standpoint according to which “right is not the 
enemy of freedom, but freedom’s way.”436 His conclusion is that the Hegelian 
claim about the right not being an autonomous system but rather the passage from 
abstract to real freedom is “brilliant and insurmountable”.437 
                                                
431 Ricœur, “Hegel aujourd’hui”, p. 186 [My translation]. 
432 Ibid.,  p. 187. [My translation] 
433 Ibid., p. 188. 
434 Ibid. 
435 Ibid. 
436 Ibid. [My translation]. 
437 Ibid. 
 160
A few lines below we find the key to understand Ricœur’s take on Hegel: 
“the heart of Hegel’s thought is not his theory of Absolute Knowing, but rather the 
theory of objective spirit”.438 In objective spirit, says Ricœur, Hegel shows that all 
human situations are “dialectical situations in which meaning is constructed by the 
means of superseded contradictions”439 and to ram the point home, so to speak, he 
adds that if we do not make ourselves clear about this, we cannot give an account 
of what is properly human.440 Now, this is as far as Ricœur will get in his Hegelian 
recovery. At the same time, his assertions here are of vital importance for our 
proposal, and the course of conflict: without giving an account of conflict and 
contradiction (whether or not it is superseded) we fail to grasp what is properly 
human. Again, Ricœur pays his homage to Hegelian dialectics. 
Among his resistances, not surprisingly, we find the rejection of Absolute 
Knowing, the affirmation that there are aspects of human life that resist 
totalization and elude the narrative of human history as the history of 
rationalization; he names evil (again) but this time around also the historical event 
(this is the time he starts thinking about history and narrative, leading up to what 
ten years later will be the three volumes of Time and Narrative) as examples of 
that which can not be predicted, or rationalized. He chooses to encapsulate Kant 
and Hegel in his usual formula, but with a new twist: Kant thought the limits, 
Hegel thought the whole; and he continues to side with Kant in that battle, this 
time around completing Kant with a certain perspectivism that is characteristic of 
his hermeneutic phase: “Kant reminds us tenaciously that human experience can 
not elevate itself to the standpoint of the whole: it is always from somewhere, in 
what is a certain perspectivism, that we catch a glimpse of the whole of things.”441  
Between limit and mediation, Ricœur chooses the limit. Which does not 
mean that he will not take mediations into account or use them in his philosophy. 
He indeed will do that, almost always. But the mediations stop at the limit of the 
antinomies. According to the particular formulation of this text: “even freedom 
entails taking responsibility for the limits of existence and knowledge”.442 Ricœur 
draws from this assertion the practical conclusion that freedom is a risk. If 
                                                
438 Ibid. [My translation] 
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441 Ibid., p. 191. [My translation] 
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knowledge were to become absolute, all hope, and all risk, would be gone. He 
goes so far as to state “after all, what Hegel called knowledge is perhaps only the 
disguised name for hope”.443 Finally, at  the practical level he connects that risk of 
freedom with the utopian function of imagination, as he will do in more detail in 
the Lectures on Ideology and Utopia.444 At the theoretical level, he connects the 
rejection of Hegelianism with his choosing of a hermeneutical philosophy, for 
reasons which will be made explicit in part four of this thesis. Suffice it to note, to 
anticipate, that it is in the name of conflict itself that Ricœur ultimately rejects 
Hegelianism: 
 
The Hegelian pretention would be to swallow the point of view of the interpreter. And 
that pretention is untenable. From that follows the most disquieting of consequences: 
there are interpretations. A conflict of interpretations is born out of a sort of 
disappointment regarding the possibility of making a system. (…) This conflictual 
situation can never pacify itself, to be reconciled in a total knowledge; we are left with 
confrontation.445 
 
So, in a way, Ricœur is more radical than Hegel in what comes down to conflict. 
Or at least, let us say, hermeneutic conflict. He rejects the final reconciliation in 
Absolute Knowing, where all the pluralism of interpretations would be lost. But 
this is not to say that he rejects conciliation or reconciliation altogether. As always 
with Ricœur, matters are far more complicated, and there is a whole history of his 
use of conciliation and reconciliation, both theoretical and practical, that can be 
drawn from his writings, as I am doing with conflict. Part six will further explicate 
this relation between conflict and conciliation. But at least Ricœur’s reasons to 
reject an ultimate, definitive type of reconciliation have already become apparent. 
In 1974, this specific article ends with a very telling conclusion. Ricœur 
states that “the philosophy of interpretation is an unhappy Hegelian philosophy”, 
insofar as it is spurred by a meditation of Hegel, but renounces its consolation. 
This is a tragic conclusion. It seems as if hermeneutics is Hegelianism without its 
proper means. A modest, fragile Hegelianism. This might be true, up to a certain 
                                                
443 Ibid., p. 192. [My translation] 
444 Ricœur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, edited by George H. Taylor (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986). 
445 Ricœur, “Hegel aujourd’hui”, p. 193. [My translation] 
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point. But Ricœur then turns the burden of proof, claiming that ultimately maybe 
Hegelianism was only “a philosophy of interpretation disguised (maquillée) as a 
philosophy of knowledge”.446 Or, in other words, in its speculative claims, 
Hegelianism was ultimately nothing more than a fiction. Maybe Hegel was 
delusional. This is a strong claim. But I think it is final. 
This diagnosis notwithstanding, he realizes that the task of thinking 
meaning, of thinking the social, of thinking our own day and age is a “Hegelian, or 
quasi-Hegelian task”447 and these are his final words of this article. Hegel was thus 
biting off more than he could chew but through his overambitious system and 
speculative claims he created a model that is immensely seductive for all the other 
philosophers who came after him and which nonetheless are simultaneously 
enticed by his dialectical methodology and pretentions and yet incapable of 
following him all the way trough. All we have is a pale Hegelianism. And yet, 
through our own partial, conflicting standpoints, we are sometimes able to recover 
some of the main intuitions of Hegel and adopt them as vital tasks. This is what 
Ricœur does with Hegel’s theory of the objective spirit, Sittlichkeit, recognition, 
and so on. 
But in 1985 in the third volume of Time and Narrative Ricœur decides 
to use strong language to describe his relation and his standpoint towards Hegel. In 
a chapter called “Renoncer à Hegel” (the English translation is here somewhat 
misleading, because it translated “Should We Renounce Hegel?”448 while in the 
French original the title has the status of an assertion rather than an interrogation) 
Ricœur speaks about the “mourning” of Hegel. Before, he was given the status of 
a temptation. Now, he is “mourned”. Over and above the religious qualification of 
the terms used, we can see how Hegel and Hegelian philosophy were important for 
Ricœur, and how ambiguous his relation towards them was; also, how difficult it 
was for him to “renounce Hegel”. 
The particular text he is referring to in 1985 are the Lectures on the 
Philosophy of World History: Introduction – Reason in History.449 This is, of 
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course, a polemic against Hegel’s philosophy of history, since Time and Narrative 
provides Ricœur’s mature reflections on history and narrative. He asserts that this 
is a philosopher’s history and not a historian’s history (like he had said for Weil 
before) because only he who traversed the Encyclopedia and understood the 
conditions that make freedom both rational and real is capable of writing such a 
history.450 
Ricœur acknowledges that he cannot refute Hegel from inside 
Hegelianism. Such a task is utterly impossible. But he cannot and will not accept 
the possibility of a total mediation. Consequently, his detachment from Hegel 
stems from “the simple expression of our incredulity as regards his major 
proposition, to wit, (…) ‘the idea that reason governs the world, and that world 
history is therefore a rational process.’”451 But this detachment comes at a price. 
The loss of credibility of the Hegelian philosophy of history is dubbed “an event in 
thinking”. Ricœur admits that he does not know whether it is “indicative of a 
catastrophe that still is crippling us” or “a deliverance whose glory we dare not 
celebrate”. It is, admittedly, a new beginning. But a beginning that must be more 
sober, if not more somber, than its Hegelian past. Because it is tantamount to the 
admission that history and human reality are not in themselves, rational, or at least 
that there is no possible way that Hegel could know whether or not they are 
rational. 
To follow Hegel would mean to accept that “philosophy can attain not 
only the present, by summing up the known past, taken as the seed of the 
anticipated future, but also the eternal present, which assures the underlying unity 
of the surpassed past and the coming manifestations of life that already announce 
themselves by means of what we understand.”452 But this eternal present, and the 
possibility to grasp it, has been refused by everyone except Hegel. The step that 
we cannot take, claims Ricœur, is precisely to equate development, the Stufengang 
der Entwicklung, with the eternal present. If we do it, history is abolished by 
philosophy. And later history in fact proved Hegel wrong. 
Ultimately, for Ricœur, what Hegel did was just to extrapolate some 
particular events of his own time: “It now seems to us as though Hegel, seizing a 
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favorable moment, a kairos, which has been revealed for what it was to our 
perspective and our experience, only totalized a few leading aspects of the 
spiritual history of Europe and of its geographical and historical environment, ones 
that, since that time, have come undone.”453 The corollary that Ricœur draws from 
this is that moving away from Hegelianism signifies renouncing the attempt to 
decipher the supreme plot. 
Ricœur’s last words on this chapter are a denunciation of Hegel’s own 
condition of finitude. What Hegel did was just to produce an interpretation. But an 
interpretation that lived above its means, because it tried, as it were, to cease being 
only an interpretation, and become absolute. And thus Hegel is disavowed, Ricœur 
dominates the temptation, but himself admitting that something dies with it: 
 
It simply testifies to the fact that we no longer think in the same way Hegel did, but after 
Hegel. For what readers of Hegel, once they have been seduced by the power of Hegel's 
thought as I have, do not feel the abandoning of this philosophy as a wound, a wound that, 
unlike those that affect the absolute Spirit, will not be healed? For such readers, if they are 
not to give into the weaknesses of nostalgia, we must wish the courage of the work of 
mourning.454 
 
So mourning it is. But a mourning that will not prevent Ricœur and his 
Post-Hegelian Kantianism to meaningfully recover Hegelian themes in the 
definitive version of his philosophical anthropology in the 1990s and up until The 
Course of Recognition. 
At the end of these two complex chapters on Kant, Hegel, and Ricœur’s 
relation towards them, what can we conclude? That, in comparison with his 
relation with Kant, Ricœur’s relation with Hegel was very complicated. And that 
while Ricœur rejects the standpoint of the absolute in the name of a hermeneutic, 
finite philosophy, he does see in Hegel both an interesting and creative notion of 
dialectics, and very meaningful intuitions of Hegel and applications of his dialectic 
in the realm of human praxis. The conflict of interpretations will recover 
something of the Hegelian dialectic, in that it will too want to be a creative 
procedure that from a given opposition produces new meaning. Furthermore, 
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Ricœur too would operate conciliations and mediations, like Hegel. But these 
would ultimately be framed within the standpoint of Kant’s “philosophy of limits”, 
as he saw it. As such, the mediation only goes so far. But in between the standstill 
opposition of the antinomies, which Ricœur will never trespass, there will be a 
whole world of creative mediation and explanatory power, that parts three and 
four of this these will render explicit. But for now, and following the lead of this 
recuperation of dialectic in the domain of human praxis, let us turn to Marx. 
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1.4 – Marx on History and Class Warfare: Social Conflict 
 
This chapter will be shorter than the preceding ones, not only for lack of 
space, but also because Marx was no doubt less important for Ricœur’s work taken 
as a whole than Kant and Hegel were. Nevertheless, as in the case of Hegel, 
Ricœur’s relation to Marx was shifting and underwent a certain evolution. I 
decided to name it “social conflict” not because the social element was not present 
in Kant, Hegel, or before them. Indeed it was, and the preceding chapters have 
shown in a sufficient manner, I think, how the Greeks, Hobbes, Kant and Hegel 
accounted for social conflict. However, Marx and Marxist philosophy were the 
beginning of something new, because it was with Marx that the link between 
theory and praxis was more strongly emphasized. Indeed, it was with him that 
philosophy became not only political philosophy, but a certain strand of it, closer 
to actual political praxis, and this for both theoretical and practical reasons. As 
such, this chapter, dealing with Marx and with conflict as allegedly leading to 
social revolution, will also be the threshold to the next part, where I will deal with 
the contemporary reappraisal of conflict, mostly in social terms, and starting with 
a chapter on Critical Theory, which can rightfully be considered a Post-Marxist 
school with very strong Kantian and Hegelian influences. As such, this chapter, 
after summarizing Marx’s standpoint and the Ricoeurian reception of Marx, will 
also deal with the beginning of the sociological theory of conflict in the wake of 
Marx. I will mention Georg Simmel as one notorious example and present a rapid 
overview of the current situation. This will prepare the ground for the ulterior 
incursion in Critical Theory which, as is well known, is perhaps the most famous 
example of an interdisciplinary research tradition recurring to both philosophy and 
sociology. 
Of all the philosophers in world-history, Karl Marx is probably one of 
those that most heavily insisted on trying to influence society, politics and world-
history itself; at any rate, he probably is the one that has had a greater degree of 
success in doing so, in spite of all the failed attempts to fulfill his prophecies that 
plagued the 20th century and almost brought it to the brink of destruction. This is 
stated in powerful fashion in the concise formula of his very famous eleventh 
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thesis on Feuerbach: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various 
ways; the point, however, is to change it.”455 
I will leave aside the discussion, largely inspired by Louis Althusser’s 
analyzes456, concerning whether or not there is a “scientific” and a “pre-scientific” 
Marx, respectively before and after the writing of The Capital. Suffice it to say 
that I do not really believe in a “scientific Marx” or in the “scientific” possibilities 
of dialectical materialism any more than I believe in Hegel’s Absolute Knowing, 
and for reasons I share with Ricœur and Arendt. As such, and irrespective of the 
differences between an “early” and a “mature” Marx, I will downplay the role of 
the alleged “epistemological break” (coupure) and treat Marxist philosophy as if it 
were the steady development of a social philosophy with some common features 
that stand over and above the differences brought about by its development.457 It is 
in this context that I will provide a few comments on the twists and turns of 
dialectic and conflict in the works of Marx. 
If it is true that the dialectical development of world history in Hegel is 
full of tensions that eventually end up in full blown conflicts and political 
revolutions impregnated with violence, the same is true, and with even greater 
force, in Marx. This is even more so in that it is not very easy to determine the 
respective degrees of determinism and voluntarism attributed to human action in 
Marx’s theory of history; but insofar as a certain degree of freedom is attributed to 
social actors, then we can say that this conflictual process that almost necessarily 
entails violence in the form of class warfare ends up being encouraged. And this 
because the projected telos of the end of history and of a reconciled society is 
postponed. Hegel presupposes reconciliation. Marx projects it and, up to some 
extent, not counting on the Hegelian cunning of reason, makes social change 
depend on actual human agency. This is, of course, an anthropological reading of 
Marx but, again, and to reiterate what I also said about Hegel, it is the only way to 
meaningfully recover his philosophy in terms that can successfully be appropriated 
and made useful for contemporary social theory. 
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1.4.1 – Marx’s Social Philosophy: Estranged labor, Commodity Fetishism and 
Reification 
 
The early Marx is the one that provides us a more solid ground for this 
anthropological reading. Indeed, what we find in the Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts of 1844, and namely in “Estranged Labor”458 is a depiction of work 
as a fundamental social activity, one that properly makes us humans. In this 
Hegelian-inspired little text, we have both the account of what this activity should 
be like, its fundamental role of expressing our fundamental possibilities, and also 
the denunciation of the specific configuration that it assumes under the social 
forms of organization fostered by capitalist societies. 
The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 are a very peculiar 
text. As I already mentioned, they were only discovered in 1927, and originally 
published in Russian. They are fragmentary in nature and the fact that they were 
manuscripts comprised of writings which were very diverse (comments on 
readings, notes, brief attempts at conceptualization) makes any interpretation of 
them hazardous. But the fact remains that many commentators saw in it precisely 
the most tenable standpoint one can find in Marx, even if we reject dialectical 
materialism. 
The single, most-comprehensive study of the phenomenon of alienation 
in the early Marx is, to my knowledge, István Mészáros’s Marx’s Theory of 
Alienation459, first published in 1970. He mentions Feuerbach, Hegel, and English 
Political Economy as the most direct influences in the making of Marx’s theory of 
alienation460, but he in fact traces back elements of a history of alienation and 
liberation thereof in a wide range of cultural phenomena in European thought, and 
actually going as far back as the Bible, and the lament of being alienated from 
God, or having fallen from Grace that we can find in it.461 He also claims that the 
increasing extension of the market sphere led to a growing “saleability (the fact 
that we come to view material and immaterial things as objects that be bought or 
sold) which, in turn, created the conditions for alienation we find described by the 
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early Marx. And he pinpoints the genesis of alienation in Marx’s earlier 
reflections: his doctoral thesis on the philosophies of nature of Democritus and 
Epicurus, where Marx sees a stage of the “privatization of life” and of “isolated 
individuality”462; his writings on the Jewish Question – where he heavily criticizes 
“German backwardness” that rejected Jewish emancipation463 – and, of course, the 
Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right, which focuses on the need to 
criticize all forms of alienation, not only religion alienation, which had been given 
much attention by Feuerbach.  
Now, with this background in mind, let me recall that Marx pinpointed 
alienation as a structural malaise plaguing workers under the conditions imposed 
by capitalist societies. In Marx’s own words, “the worker sinks to the level of a 
commodity and becomes indeed the most wretched of commodities”.464 Marx’s 
analyzis postulated, already in this phase, the division of society in two main 
classes: the property owners and the propertyless workers, that is, as would 
become clearer in his mature theory, the owners of the means of production, and 
the productive forces, in the specific relation they assume under capitalist 
organization. 
He explicitly states that he wants to go beyond traditional political 
economists, who postulate (not unlike Hobbes) a fictitious primordial condition, 
and competition (led by avarice) as the main motivation of economic relations. 
Marx further wants to look at the separation of labor, capital and “landed 
property” and he asserts that what he is stating is an actual economic fact: he 
observed that “the worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the 
more his production increases in power and range”.465 
Why is this so? Because, according to Marx, labor in capitalist conditions 
does not only produce commodities. Indeed, it fashions its own nature, and the 
worker, as commodities themselves. This whole part of the manuscript is therefore 
dedicated to distinguishing four different aspects through which alienation 
manifests itself, namely, the separation of workers from their inner nature, from 
their own (working) activity, from humankind taken as such and, ultimately, from 
each other. Marx described in very powerful terms the consequences that this 
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system produces for those individuals who have nothing left to sell, except for 
their own workforce: they lose reality. “So much does labor’s realization appear as 
a loss of reality that the worker loses reality to the point of starving to death.”466 
This is described as a cumulative process, to the advantage of the owner 
of the means of production, and causing an inner rupture in the worker: “the 
poorer he himself – his inner world – becomes, the less belongs to him as his 
own”467, and this because the product of his labor comes to exist independently of 
him, and not for his fruition, but to be sold by the owner of the means of 
production. The result is that the worker becomes a slave of his object and of his 
own working conditions. In a decisive page,468 Marx speaks of production as 
active alienation and depicts the psychological conditions into which the worker is 
thrown. 
 
In his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content 
but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his 
body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in 
his work feels outside himself. He is at home when he is not working and when he is 
working he is not at home. His labor is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced 
labor. It is therefore not to the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs 
external to it. Its alien character emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or 
other compulsion exists, labor is shunned like the plague. External labor, labor in which 
man alienates himself, is a labor of self-sacrifice, of mortification.469 
 
This depiction has become famous not only due to the blunt terms with which it 
describes the psychological breakdown of alienated workers, but also because of 
the peculiar phenomenon which it successfully grasps: the appraisal of non-
working time as “free time” is indeed a sign of existing working conditions as 
those of a “slave labor”. Marx ends this section by appealing to emancipation but 
without, however, really specifying what it would be like, which he would 
eventually spell out in more detail in later works. 
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One has to grasp that Marx’s depiction of working relations partly 
reflected Hegel’s figure of unequal recognition in the master and slave 
relationship; his depiction of work as the expression of our being would also find a 
later resonance in Heidegger, because for Marx it is through work that we express 
our “most authentic possibilities”. There is, as Mészáros underlined, an alienation 
of human powers, because alienation appears as divorcing the individual from the 
social, the natural from the self-conscious.470 There is thus a potential reading of 
this early Marx as providing an ideal of expressivism, of seeing human beings as 
being fulfilled by the way in which, by working, they transform the world. This 
reading has been put forward by Charles Taylor471 and I think he is correct in 
depicting Marx’s early philosophy in this manner. 
Consequently, alienation can rightfully be considered as a social ill, a 
social pathology, to use the vocabulary of Critical Theory. As such, the criticisms 
of Marx can be understood against the backdrop of a critique that aims at 
transfiguring and transforming the social conditions that made this situation 
possible, so that this can no longer happen. But this was, in fact, only the 
beginning of Marx’s diagnoses of social pathologies. Indeed, Honneth continues to 
see Marx as denouncing social pathologies even after the alleged “epistemological 
break” and the publication of the Capital.  
In the fourth section of the first chapter of Capital (Book 1), entitled “The 
Fetishism of the Commodity and its secret”472, Marx unveils yet another 
perversion of the way we come to think about the product of our own labor in 
society. David Harvey points out that this section plays a significant role in the 
architectonic of the whole book, and indeed it does. Harvey describes its “rather 
literary style, evocative and metaphoric, imaginative, playful and emotive”473, 
contrasting with the preceding parts of the book, which are much more technical. 
Indeed, Marx starts by asserting that even though prima facie a commodity seems 
like a very simple, trivial thing, it abounds in “subtleties and theological 
niceties”.474 The fact that Marx is being ironic does not hide the significance of the 
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commodity; perhaps can we even argue that the ironic approach is only meant as a 
performative, namely, the dissolution of an illusion. 
Marx starts with the obvious: human beings transform nature in order to 
produce objects that might be useful. However, as soon as these transformed 
objects are turned into commodities they seem to acquire a life of their own, that 
is, they attain, to ordinary perception, a “mystical character”.475 And this not in 
virtue of their use-value but precisely because of their exchange-value, i.e., the 
fact that they can become part of a trade, or a sale, that might bring advantages to 
the one who puts them in the marketplace. But why is this mystical and what is the 
specific perversion entailed in this phantasy? 
Marx highlights a characteristic that, to him, had been totally forgotten in 
prior economic theory, namely, that all labor is in its essence a social activity: “as 
soon as men start to work for each other in any way, their labour also assumes a 
social form.”476 But he goes further in his description. It is not only that economic 
theory forgot the social nature of labor relations, or the properly human origin of 
commodities. It is that people themselves in their everyday relations tend to forget 
the human origin of these products, to forget that they have originated in the 
dynamism and features of people, features that have been transmitted to the 
product and that, eo ipso, seem to become characteristics of these things in 
themselves: 
 
The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists therefore simply in the fact that 
the commodity reflects the social characteristics of men’s own labour as objective 
characteristics of the products of labour themselves, as the socio-cultural properties of 
these things. (…) Through this substitution, the products of labour become commodities, 
sensuous things which are at the same time supra-sensible or social. (…) In order, 
therefore, to find an analogy we must take flight into the misty realm of religion. There 
the products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of 
their own, which enter into the relations with each other and the human race. So it is in the 
world of commodities with the products of men’s hands. I call this the fetishism which 
attaches itself to the products of labour as soon as they are produced a commodities, and is 
therefore inseparable from the production of commodities.477 
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Marx’s words in this very assertive passage of course bring to mind Feuerbach’s 
critique of religion. But their impact in fact reaches a dominion totally different 
from religion in the strict sense. That is, they point towards a very specific 
phenomenon of capitalist societies, namely, some sort of pantheism of objects, an 
adoration of those goods that are made for consumption. This passage was of 
course written in the 19th century, ca. 50 years before the advent of advertising, 
mass consumption and manipulation techniques associated with psychoanalysis, 
subliminal messages and the like. And yet that later turn of events only confirmed 
the extent to which Marx’s insight was prescient. The dawn of mass consumption 
and the cultural industry of course spurred Adorno to elaborate his own critique, 
very much inspired by Marx’s analyzes of commodity fetishism. And one can only 
wonder what would both of them think and write about the new, pervasive and 
inventive ways of advertising and the expansion of consumerism in our own day 
and age. 
But there is another side in this somewhat dialectical process. If, on the 
one hand, things come to reflect and appropriate what are essentially human 
characteristics and if, by hypostasis and comparison with the phenomenon of 
religion (in Marx’s eyes) they come to be considered as even more than human – 
in a process of transference that later undergoes a superlative transformation – that 
is, they come to be seen as Gods, venered, sought after and pursued… what 
happens to people, on this occasion? How will they come to be perceived? The 
answer does not come directly in Volume 1 of the Capital, at least not in the 
developed form it will assume elsewhere. What I am hinting at is of course the 
concept of reification. If things become Gods, persons become things. To be sure, 
Marx defines this in passing when he states: “There is an antithesis, immanent in 
the commodity, between use-value and value, between private labour which must 
simultaneously manifest itself as directly social labour, and a particular concrete 
kind of labour which simultaneously counts as merely abstract universal labour, 
between the conversion of things into persons and the conversion of persons into 
things.”478 Or, in other words, personification of things and reification of persons. 
The expression resurfaces again in one appendix to Capital, its planned “Results 
of the Immediate Process of Production”, which would be part seven of the first 
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volume; in that appendix, and when discussing the mystification of capital, Marx 
again asserts: “Capital employs labour. This in itself exhibits the relationship in its 
simple form and entails the personification of things and the reification of 
persons.”479 
What does the “reification of persons” mean? It means, at least in a 
simplified interpretation, that if the priority is given to, as we would put it our own 
contemporary terms, consumption and the veneration of objects in a logic of 
(simple) desire (not, in this case, desire of desire) then we come to treat other 
human beings, in Kantian terms, as simple instruments in our quest to attain our 
goals, namely, the consumption of these objects. Luckács, of course, would further 
develop this notion and make it the center of his social theory in History and Class 
Consciousness, as I alluded to before. In this view, persons come to be viewed as 
ossified, losing their inner dynamism, they cease to count as partners in interaction 
and thus fall victim to instrumental use. Adorno and Horkheimer would radicalize 
this critique and turn it into a whole critique of instrumental reason, as we shall see 
in the next chapter; and Honneth would propose to redefine once again the concept 
of reification, seeing in it a moral phenomenon deriving from lack of 
recognition.480 
This very rapid overview of three main loci of social pathologies in Marx 
is in tune with, and is in fact inspired by, Honneth’s own reconstruction of Marx’s 
social philosophy. In “Pathologies of the Social: The Past and Present of Social 
Philosophy” Honneth describes how Marx’s depiction of social ills operates 
against the backdrop of an ideal of good life expressed through work: “the 
possibility of freely and willingly experiencing their own labor as a process of 
self-realization forms the deciding precondition for a good life.”481 This 
necessarily entails an anthropologic and, as I see it, humanistic reading of Marx. 
And as Honneth claims, even in the transition to Capital and a systematic critique 
of political economy, the anthropologic viewpoint can be maintained. Honneth 
points out that when Marx criticizes reification he “is compelled to make some 
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strong assumptions about the structures of human self-realization in order to 
criticize the process of reification as being a hindrance to the good life.”482 
Ricœur, as we shall see in a moment, has a reading of Marx that is in tune 
with this reading of Honneth. Indeed, not only does he have an anthropological 
reading, he has a hermeneutic reading of Marx. This reading was, partly, a 
counterdiscourse on Marx and Marxism in his own time, which was marked very 
heavily by Althusser’s imprint. But today a whole new revival of Marxism as only 
one possible interpretation of the social, and one that is actually very important to 
understand the functioning of capitalism, its crises, and the structural effects it 
impinges on people is taking place, in terms very different from those of the past 
century. Indeed, authors like Emmanuel Renault483 and Stéphane Haber484 have 
contributed to the rekindling of Marxist social theory in a renewed fashion, with 
an emphasis on the experiences of social suffering and contemporary forms of 
alienation, and the many forms of non-scientific Marxism, from analytical 
Marxism to Critical Theory are nowadays once again flourishing.485 Now, Ricœur 
did not assume an orthodox Marxist standpoint – nor do I, for that matter – but he 
recognized the fertility of Marx’s standpoint and of some of his analyzes. In my 
opinion, Marxist social theory gains in insight if complemented by Ricœur’s 
reformulations, which we will see in a moment. 
Nevertheless, we still have to mention in a more detailed fashion how 
Marx envisaged social conflict and class struggle. This is also, obviously, crucial 
for his social theory and even the analyzes of capitalism. One of the other evident 
recoveries for our own time are his analyzes of the cyclical crises of capitalism – 
namely in the tendency of the rate profit to fall, as he presents it in the third 
volume of Capital – which, as later history demonstrated, not only did not cease 
after Marx’s demise, but in fact turned more severe, as the cases of 1929 and 
2007-2009 blatantly show. 
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1.4.2 – Marx on dialectic, class conflict and revolution 
 
In this short section, I will describe in a very succinct manner the way in 
which Marx thinks about social and historical evolution through a paradigm of 
conflict. I am alluding, of course, to his notion of class struggle or the struggle 
between those who possess the means of production and those who have nothing 
to sell but their own working force. This vision of historical evolution is inspired 
by Hegel and his own Aufhebung, with the difference being that Marx understands 
this process in more negative terms. In the Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, 
Ricœur emphasizes how Marx operates a simplification, which is at the same time 
a practical interpretation, of Hegel’s Aufhebung: 
 
From Hegel to Marx the meaning of Aufhebung is reduced to that of abolition, more 
specifically, practical abolition. In Marx the role of Aufhebung as preservation disappears, 
and it is replaced by an emphasis on Aufhebung as suppression alone.486 
 
This, in turn, is also accompanied by a diagnosis of world history that 
somewhat differs from that of Hegel, namely, in positing the end of history not in 
Marx’s actual historical time, not by postulating totality in the eternal present but 
rather in projecting it as the necessary telos of world history in the communist 
society, which would come naturally, as it were, through the capitalist society’s 
negation of itself in the revolution of the Proletariat. This would entail a final stage 
in which class war would cease and human beings would live in a natural state of 
cooperation. 
Ricœur does a good job of describing how Marx thinks the necessity of 
revolution and how this might be seen in terms of an overblown conflict, indeed a 
gigantomachia ruling world history. When commenting on a passage on 
revolution in the German Ideology, Ricœur states: 
 
A revolution is a historical force and not a conscious production. Any consciousness of 
the need for change is supported by a class. (…) Orthodox Marxism will develop this 
conflict between structures in terms of what Freud calls, in relation to the struggle 
between life and death described in Civilization and Its Discontents, a gigantomachy, a 
                                                
486 Ricœur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, p. 52. 
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conflict of giants. We may read and write history as the clash between capital and labor, a 
polemical relation between entities, a conflict of historical ghosts.487 
 
Of course that, in Marxist terms, this revolution is brought by the contradiction 
between modes of production and productive forces, i. e., when this contradiction 
reaches a breaking point. This conflict is, evidently, a socio-economic one. 
This amounts to Marx’s own version of dialectics, or what came to be 
known as “dialectical materialism” or “historical materialism”, even though it is 
somewhat disputed whether or not Marx exactly saw it in this way, since the later 
elaborations of materialist dialectics are mainly an originality of Engels and his 
Marxist successors. The places where Marx chooses to discuss dialectics are 
mainly the prefaces of postfaces to the several editions of Capital published during 
his life. As such, these can be understood as, maybe not simplifications, but sharp 
statements made with an eye to the larger public. His main assertion concerning 
the inversion of Hegelian dialectic and his materialist version of it can be found in 
the Postface to the second edition of Capital: 
 
My dialectical method is, in its foundations, not only different from the Hegelian, but 
exactly opposite to it. For Hegel, the process of thinking, which he even transforms into 
an independent subject, under the name of “the Idea”, is the creator of the real world, and 
the real world is only the external appearance of the idea. With me the reverse is true: the 
ideal is nothing but the material world reflected in the mind of man, and translated into 
forms of thought. (…) 
The mystification which the dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands by no means prevents him 
from being the first to present its general forms of motion in a comprehensive and 
conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be inverted, in order to 
discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.488 
 
Now, Marx’s own presentation of Hegel is of course sketchy and simplistic. But 
what interests me, and what constitutes a very important stage for our own concise 
history of conflict in philosophy, is the way he emphasizes that all social evolution 
is led by socio-economic infrastructural conflicts. Indeed, in the hands of Marx, 
conflict is given center stage, maybe even more so than in Hegel. For Hegel, in the 
                                                
487 Ricœur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, p. 92. 
488 Marx, Capital I, “Postface to the Second Edition”, pp. 102-103. 
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process of Aufhebung reconciliation is a constant part of the evolution whereas, for 
Marx, reconciliation is allegedly not metaphysical, only social, and only 
postulated in the future; reconciliation is not therefore, as present in Marx as it was 
in Hegel. But the same cannot be said about social conflict as history’s driving 
force. 
In what is perhaps the best biography of Marx, and also a very lucid 
commentary on his philosophy, the young Isaiah Berlin describes this process in 
stark kinetic terms: 
 
In fact progress is discontinuous, for the tension, when it reaches the critical point, 
precipitates a cataclysm; the increase in quantity of intensity becomes a change of quality; 
rival forces working below the surface grow and accumulate and burst into the open; the 
impact of their encounter transforms the medium in which it occurs; as Engels was later to 
say, ice becomes water and water steam; slaves become serfs and serfs free men; all 
evolution in nature and society alike ends in creative revolution. In nature these forces are 
physical, chemical, biological: in society they are specifically economic and social.489 
 
Obviously, the depiction in these terms reinforces Marx’s alleged 
scientific pretentions. But this was, as far as we can see, as Marx saw it: that is, 
history develops following a dialectic pattern and this, in turn, is a continual 
process of negations through clashes between different socio-economic classes. 
This is how we have evolved from slavery to feudalism, to capitalism and 
eventually, Marx believes, we will reach communism. 
What exactly the role for human agency is in this structural explanation, 
is a disputed interpretation. We might argue, for example, that crises of capitalism 
provide the agents with the opportunity to bring about revolution, but not 
necessarily lead them to do so, that is, that without Hegel’s cunning of reason, 
there is no motive to believe Marx has a 100% deterministic stance. But this is, of 
course, our own anthropologic reading of Marx, our own wish to see in this picture 
nothing more than social agents unfairly deprived of the means to live a fully 
human life, and therefore striving to overcome their dire conditions. Maybe Marx 
would not agree with this take, and argue that his was a properly scientific, i.e., 
deterministic approach, determining laws of social evolution and its outcome. But 
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we do find in Ricœur a confirmation of this approach, and this is a lead I want to 
follow. 
Today, Marxist thinkers in the English-speaking world are striving to 
renew his dialectic in contemporary terms, sometimes assuming the form of a 
critique of culture; of these Fredric Jameson’s effort is certainly the sharpest.490 
Most of these interpretations are of course a mix between Marx’s and other 
popular strands in our own day, namely Postmodernism. My own account of the 
fruitfulness of Marx’s insights brings them closer to Critical Theory and 
hermeneutics. I believe this is the same path chosen by Ricœur. So let us assess his 
relation to Marx throughout the years. 
 
1.4.3 – Ricœur’s latent Marxism: from early adhesion to mature moderation 
 
We have seen how, in the writings of Karl Marx, we can find a depiction 
of social conflict as class struggle and to what degree his philosophy provides us 
with several invaluable insights for social philosophy. In the next chapter, I will 
briefly venture into the works of social philosophers in the Frankfurt School 
tradition, showing how they incorporated a critical reception of Marx into their 
depictions of society and the analyzis of the phenomena of conflict and struggle 
within it. 
What I want to look into right now is an aspect of Ricœur’s early 
philosophical formation and social and political positioning that is usually 
overlooked or downplayed. This is the fact that during the years 1936 to 1938 
(when he was roughly 23 to 25 years old) and thus, before his imprisonment 
during WWII, he could actually be considered a Marxist, even though, obviously, 
not a dogmatic one. In fact, his relationship with Marx is a critical one, as is the 
case with Kant and Hegel. We can argue that ultimately the presence of Karl Marx 
in Ricœur’s philosophy is given less space than that which is allocated to Kant and 
Hegel, even though Marx is placed alongside Nietzsche and Freud as one of the 
three “masters of suspicion” during the 1960s period, and although the Lectures on 
Ideology and Utopia will further develop his critical usage of Marx. 
                                                
490 See Fredric Jameson, Valences of the Dialectic (London: Verso, 2009). 
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However, these early formative years saw Ricœur assuming a strong 
position of social engagement; at this time, he assumed he was, in what could be 
described as being an unconventional standpoint, a socialist, a Christian and a 
pacifist.491 I mean unconventional by our own standards, but certainly not to the 
social meaning of Christianism, at least as it was understood by Ricœur. In his 
Christian socialist standpoint, he was heavily influenced by the socialist protestant 
André Philip, who was an active member of the French resistance, and who played 
an important role in the French political scene, both before and after the war, as a 
member of the Front Populaire and, later, as a member of several post-WWII 
governments.  
Taken by this movement of social Christianity which, ultimately, aims at 
bringing about the word of Christ in the social domain (namely by tackling the 
most acute social plagues, such as misery) Ricœur thus turns to socialist solutions 
indeed, criticizing the obsession for profit (and thus the insistence in concurrence) 
and even preconizing a centralized planning of economy. During this period of 
1936-1938 Ricœur thus publishes articles in dissenting newspapers such as Terre 
Nouvelle and a small, almost secretive newspaper called Être. The main kernel of 
his standpoint is expressed in the formula which he used to define himself: 
socialiste parce que chrétien, he was a socialist because he was a Christian, that is, 
his social(ist) engagement stemmed directly from his Christian vocation. 
In the article “Socialisme et Christianisme”492, from 1937, he explains in 
further detail this mutual implication: a) the Christian vocation has an inbuilt 
social claim; b) this claim leads to a radical condemnation of capitalism, to the 
point that he can claim to be “revolutionary, because he is a Christian”; c) in order 
to overcome capitalism he has to mobilize historical, sociological and political 
judgments; d) combining these evaluations with the Christian social claim, he 
concludes that there is a need for concrete political action. He thus has to risk 
taking that action, and assuming it. 
Thus he turns to the most obvious expression of socialism with a 
philosophical background and a knack for political action through the positing of 
the union between theory and praxis: the thought of Karl Marx. As such, in a short 
                                                
491 On this interesting period of Ricœur’s life, see the chapter 4 of Dosse’s biography, pp. 47-63. 
492 Ricœur, “Socialisme et Christianisme”, in Être 1,4 (1936-1937): 3-4. 
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article significantly called “Nécessité de Karl Marx”493 [The need for Marx, or 
The necessity of Karl Marx] he significantly calls for the need to rightly 
appropriate the thought of Marx, draws a sharp distinction between what he calls a 
“dogmatic Marxism” and a “Critical Marxism” and concedes that Marx is right on 
many points, including the significance of class struggle, but he charges him with 
an oversimplification that we could label, in more contemporary terms, a kind of 
reductionism, due to the alleged scientific character of historical materialism. 
It is interesting to note that Ricœur writes this small text in 1937, at 
roughly the same time when Max Horkheimer, by that time already exiled in the 
U.S.A., writes “Traditional and Critical Theory”494, the programmatic text that 
would officially launch Critical Theory as a new research paradigm, and that 
would largely contribute, through the responses it spawned, to the real constitution 
of a “critical Marxism”. It is very likely that Ricœur ignored the existence of 
Horkheimer and Critical Theory at this point, but one cannot but note certain 
similarities in their projects. 
Ricœur’s main charge is that the economic emphasis on class struggle, 
and the status of almost a “dogma” that it assumes in historical materialism, with 
its emphasis in the infrastructure to the detriment of the superstructure, only 
captures a partial picture of the real motivations of human action, and human 
conflict, in society. 
 
[Marx] neglected the realm of the passions, of the irrational beliefs, of myths – a realm 
which is relatively autonomous from the economic one. (…) The start of the 20th century 
and namely the period after the World War, are almost incomprehensible if seen as a 
simple interplay of economic forces. It is equally explained by myths and interests (such 
as the economic nationalism, fascism, the division of the workers’ unit and also of the big 
international capitalism. The history of the world’s passions is relatively independent 
from its material history. Illusion and pride bear a blindness which resists economic 
interest. From this we can adduce a significant complication principle – by which I mean, 
a complication of history, but also of the judgment we bear on history.495 
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This interest in myths, and in the multiple motivations for human action, 
resonates strongly with the work Ricœur later undertook in the 1970s and 1980s. 
What he aims at in this article is the possibility of finding some humanist traits in 
Marx – as he does not mention the 1844 Manuscripts I ignore whether or not he 
knew them at the time when he wrote the article – and to put forth the value of the 
human person over against the hypostasis of History and its anonymous processes. 
In fact, he takes class struggle to be a fact, but he claims Marx is making a mistake 
when he reduces all forms of alienation to economic alienation:  
 
Marx made a description of what is. Class struggle is first and foremost a fact, before 
being a mean of action. And the real means of action is to become conscious of this fact. 
For me, Marx’s only mistake was not to have shown the historic role of class struggle, but 
to have excluded the other forms of man’s alienation, or to have forced them to be 
reduced to class struggle.496 
 
As Ricœur would elaborate two decades later in “The Political Paradox” 
there is a certain type of alienation that is not economic but specifically political, 
and which is as bad, if not worse, than political alienation (and that article marks 
the beginning of Ricœur’s official detachment from the communist societies, so 
often admired in the intellectual context of post-war France). 
Nonetheless, in 1937, in the name of social justice, he takes a voluntarist 
approach to Marxism and to Marx’s claim for the abolition of classes and the 
bringing about of the classless society. But he also maintains that if this social 
pathology of economic alienation is eliminated, still there will be other pathologies 
affecting the human being, which will not magically disappear even if the putative 
                                                                                                                                 
s’explique autant par des mythes que par des intérêts (tels le nationalisme économique, le fascisme, 
la rupture de l’unité ouvrière, et aussi du grand capitalisme international). L’histoire passionnelle 
du monde est relativement indépendante à l’égard de son histoire matérielle. L’illusion et l’orgueil 
ont un aveuglement imperméable à l’intérêt économique. Il y a là un principe de complication 
considérable – j’entends : de complication de l’histoire, mais aussi de complication de notre 
jugement sur l’histoire.”  Ricœur, “Nécessité de Karl Marx”, p. 8 [My translation]. 
496 “Marx a décrit ce qui est. La lutte de classes est d’abord un fait avant d’être un moyen d’action. 
Et le vrai moyen d’action c’est de prendre conscience de ce fait. Pour moi son seul tort n’est pas 
d’avoir montré le rôle historique de la lutte des classes, mais d’avoir exclu les autres formes 
d’aliénation de l’homme, ou de les avoir réduites de force à la lutte des classes.” Ibid., p. 9 [My 
translation]. 
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classless society becomes a reality. I will allow myself to quote a slightly longer 
passage, to show how clear and straightforward is Ricœur’s position at this time: 
 
Marx is right against those who want to leave things as they are, against those who want 
to reconcile classes instead of annulling them, by attacking their root: private property of 
the great means of production. 
But he is wrong in believing that at that point man will finally be human, work will be 
joyful, the heart will be contented. Yes, it is possible, by the technical means at our 
disposal, to feed everyone bread, and to found order and authority on function and 
competence. But still man will remain odious and adulterous; liar and proud; irrational 
and greedy, because there are more ways than one to be alienated. Marx is right: there will 
be no more exploitation of man by man in that specific way. But he is wrong when he 
says: there will be no exploitation of man by man at all. 
This argument still assumes that each human flaw is absolutely independent, as if man 
could be only partially healed. Rather his evils are tied to one another, his heart is made of 
one piece only. Marx gave us the recipe for one cure. I believe this is the right cure. But 
our expectations must be of a realization that will necessarily be inferior to what we 
dream of. Not only will man not be healthy because he has one less pathology, but he will 
not even be partially healthy. This pessimism does not reject hope, or action. We have to 
work not for success, but because the action is true. Men will ruin the work. But it is in 
this sense that we must act. We have to know how to translate the Marxist prophecies into 
demands. They will not truly BE; they MUST truly be.497 
 
                                                
497 “Marx a raison contre ceux qui veulent laisser les choses en état, contre ceux qui veulent 
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Mais il a tort quand il croit qu’enfin l’homme sera humain, le travail joyeux, le cœur satisfait. Oui, 
il est possible, dans l’état actuel de la technique, de donner du pain à tous, et de fonder l’ordre et 
l’autorité sur la fonction et la compétence. Et pourtant l’homme restera haineux et adultère; 
menteur et orgueilleux; irrationnel et cupide, parce qu’il a d’autres façons d’être aliéné. Marx a 
raison: l’homme n’exploitera plus l’homme de cette façon là. Marx a tort quand il dit : l’homme 
n’exploitera plus l’homme du tout. 
Encore raisonne-t-on comme si chaque tare de l’homme était absolument indépendante, comme si 
l’homme pouvait être guéri sur un point. Ses maux sont solidaires et le cœur de l’homme d’une 
seule pièce. Marx nous a donné la recette d’une cure. Je la crois bonne. Mais il faut s’attendre à 
une réalisation bien inférieure au rêve. Non seulement l’homme ne sera pas sain parce qu’il aura 
une maladie de moins, mais il ne sera pas partiellement sain. Ce pessimisme ne rejette ni en dehors 
de l’espérance ni en dehors de l’action. Il faut travailler non pour le succès, mais parce que l’action 
est vraie. Les hommes gâcheront l’ouvrage. C’est pourtant dans ce sens qu’il faut agir. Il faut 
savoir transcrire les prophéties marxistes en exigences. Elles ne SERONT pas vraiment; elles 
DOIVENT être vraiment.” Ibid., p. 9. 
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For those acquainted with Ricœur’s usual tone, it is interesting to note the 
pamphletary style, so distant from his mature production. This is obviously the 
adequate tone to the type of publication, and social juncture, that framed his 
specific situation at that point. Already we see a specific philosophic anthropology 
based on the multiplicity of passions, on the thumos that prevents any 
overemphasizing of our rational control, and still, a strong belief in the power of 
action or, as we could say in our own terms, in human capabilities. It is also 
noteworthy that he adopts the vocabulary of the diagnosis, addressing certain 
social pathologies, claiming that they are all tied together, and showing how the 
cure for the economic problems would leave the rest unsolved. 
Concerning the real possibilities brought about by the communist 
regimes, Ricœur later became, as so many others like him, disappointed with the 
way history actually turned out. I cannot trace all the details of the evolution of 
Ricœur’s political standpoint, but the fact of the matter is that he later became a 
foolproof democratic liberal, even though always retaining his social engagement 
and his left-leaning sympathies.  
Throughout his career, and faithful to his style of trying to think the 
political events of the present time – a feature that brings him close to Critical 
Theorists – Ricœur would display a continuing interest in Marx and Marxism, also 
to reflect upon the political landscape of his own time. This was particularly 
evident in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the Soviet Union was already 
showing its true, deceptive colors. As such, in this period, and always in an 
independent and critical fashion, Ricœur writes a series of texts reflecting upon the 
Marxist legacy and socialism. This is the case of “From Marxism to Contemporary 
Communism” (1959), of “Socialism Today” (1961), both published in English in 
the collection Political and Social Essays498 and of “La crise du socialisme” 
(1959). All three texts were published in Christianisme Social, the official journal 
of the protestant Association that had Ricœur as its president from 1957 
onwards499, and that sometimes served as a vehicle for some of Ricœur’s own 
political standpoints. In “La crise du socialisme” Ricœur notes and deplores that 
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industrialization was already producing a type of society allergic to politics, 
communitarianism and revolution and where man understood as a mere consumer 
was becoming ever more alienated from himself, from others, and from nature, 
thus echoing the early Marx’s analyzes of alienation. Over against this reality, he 
mobilizes the power of utopia, as he would do later. At this time, he still put 
forward a proposal of a regulated, “planned” economy, over against liberal market 
deregulation. 
As Bernard Dauenhauer rightfully notes, at this point in time, and 
actually for a long period, Ricœur was unsatisfied with liberal capitalism and its 
consumerist values, and he never displayed any enthusiasm towards Soviet 
Communism.500 In his early years he was inspired by Andre Philip and Karl Barth, 
seeking to unite socialist ideals with his Protestant faith; during the 1950s, as a 
member of Esprit and the Christianisme Social movement, he kept assessing world 
events, like the rise of Mao in China. But throughout this whole time he seemed 
unsatisfied with both these political forms and pleaded for a third way. 
Nonetheless, as Dauenhauer recalls, “The sort of socialism that would serve as a 
satisfactory third way, however, was not readily available. A crucial political task 
was to rethink what socialism ought to be. Ricœur took up this task in two ways. 
First, he offered a diagnosis of the obstacles that impeded the development of a 
genuine socialism. Then, he developed proposals for what this socialism should 
call for.”501 As such, we can see Ricœur’s fascination for Marx’s original insights 
which were, however, betrayed in real political practice in the Soviet countries.502 
This fascination increasingly led to a critical relationship; first, with Ricœur’s 
notion of the political paradox, and the distinction between economic and political 
alienation (a direct critique of the repression taking place in Soviet Countries), 
which we will see in more detail in part three of this thesis. Secondly, with the 
critique of the Marxist notion of ideology, such as we can find it in the Lectures on 
Ideology and Utopia, which date from 1975. 
In these lectures, Ricœur offers a glimpse at a very important 
phenomenon in social philosophy, namely the social imaginary and the creative 
paths it creates to meaningful action. I will only do justice to the lectures in part 
                                                
500 See Bernhard Dauenhauer, Paul Ricœur, The Promise and Risk of Politics (New York: Rowman 
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501 Dauenhauer, Ibid., p. 79. 
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five of this thesis, in the chapter on Ricœur’s social philosophy. But since in that 
book no less than five chapters are dedicated to Marx, and three more to Althusser, 
I will have to mention them now. In the Lectures, Marx is mobilized because of 
the phenomenon of ideology, not utopia (and this for obvious reasons, as the main 
use of the pejorative epithet “ideological” in political or social theory derives from 
Marx’s definition of ideology or some offshoot of it). 
What is interesting to mention is that Ricœur only tackles the early Marx, 
that is, the one from the 1844 Manuscripts and The German Ideology. He only 
mentions Capital in passing, in order to see what changes were there in Marx’s 
depiction of ideology after the German Ideology. The motive behind Ricœur’s 
lack of interest in the Capital (other than these are lectures we are talking about 
and, as such, given a restricted amount of time, and so Ricœur had to restrict 
himself to present only condensed versions of what he was teaching) lies perhaps 
in Ricœur’s rejection of dialectical Marxism as a science. 
In the first chapters, Ricœur follows the thread that runs through Marx’s 
early writings and that, influenced by Hegel and the left Hegelians, comes to 
identify reality and human praxis503 As he states, “The writings of the early Marx 
may be seen as a progressive reduction of the Hegelian “Spirit” through the 
Feuerbachian concept of species being to the properly Marxist concept of 
praxis.”504 By following this thread, he will eventually come to Marx’s early 
definition of ideology as being opposed and concealing this reality, that is, true 
human praxis. Ricœur dubs Marx’s standpoint at this point in time “an idealistic 
atheism”505 breeding the humanistic anthropology I mentioned before.  
When delving into the Manuscripts he chooses to emphasize “Estranged 
labor”, in order to recover its meaningful analyzes.506 He sees a connection 
between the notion of ideology and the framework of the Manuscripts, insofar as 
in this first book we catch a glimpse of the origin of the ideological phenomena 
that will be repudiated in the German Ideology. When commenting on Marx’s 
critical recovery of the political economists that preceded him, Ricœur offers a 
hint at a further possible way to recover Marx, namely, to consider his standpoint 
to be nothing more than a critical hermeneutics:  
                                                
503 Ricœur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, p. 21. 
504 Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
505 Ibid., p. 24. 
506 Ricœur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, chapter 3, pp. 35 ff. 
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We may say, very cautiously, that Marx’s analyzis here is a hermeneutics of political 
economy. It is a critical hermeneutics, since political economy conceals the alienation 
native to the labor process.507 
 
We might argue that in this and similar passages, Ricœur is identifying 
himself, to some extent, with Marx’s project (or at least with some sparse elements 
in it), because when reading Marx, Ricœur is interpreting Marx’s project in his 
own terms, using qualifications that he might use to describe his own project. 
Further proof of this interpretation comes when Ricœur considers that in the 
Manuscripts the notion of communism plays the role of a utopia. 
 
Could we not say, then, that we have another perspective on alienation: may we not look 
at alienation and judge it from this nowhere of utopia? Does not all judgment on ideology 
proceed from the nowhere of utopia?508 
 
Ricœur acknowledges that from the strictly Marxist standpoint, this interpretation 
is futile, inasmuch as for Marx a utopia is not needed to reflect upon ideology, i.e., 
contradiction proceeds from contradiction itself and in this dialectical movement 
ideology (and the capitalist conditions that foster it) will eventually negate itself 
and be canceled. 
But it goes without saying that Ricœur has never been interested in 
orthodox Marxism, and he was far from being Marxist stricto sensu. So these 
passages only reinforce my reading: Ricœur is highlighting certain passages in 
Marx and describing them in his own terms because he in fact wants to recover a 
part of the Marxist project for his own philosophy. Ricœur himself rams this point 
home a few pages later. First, recalling once again Marx’s critiques of political 
economy (and namely its alleged analytical approach), he starts depicting them by 
using the very powerful metaphor of the “closed book”: 
 
What is destroyed by this process of analyzis, says Marx, is the concept of society; 
humanity becomes a “closed book”. What is needed, therefore, is the unconcealment or 
unsealing of the closed book.509 
                                                
507 Ibid., p. 39. 
508 Ibid., p. 55. 
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However, and in a bold claim, Ricœur allows himself to complete the preceding 
statement with the following assertion: 
 
This concept of the closed book may be a source of the opposition, prevalent in orthodox 
Marxism, between ideology and science. Science becomes the reading of the closed text 
of industry. I would argue, however, that only when we view the text as open may we get 
out of the world of estrangement. Perhaps science needs to be supported by utopia in 
order to unseal the sealed book.510 
 
In a single move, Ricœur manages to reject the determinist assumptions of 
orthodox Marxism and claim that a critical hermeneutics, that is, his project – 
alongside the one put forward by the Habermas of his time – might be a useful 
way to open up the world of action and indeed free human action. He ends the 
chapter recalling Marx’s project of liberation, the category of anticipated totality 
of a free humanity and he asserts: “We may take this question as at least the 
content of a project.”511 He ultimately links Marx’s project of liberation through 
work with Kant’s depiction of autonomy.512 Ricœur would ultimately deny that we 
are fully autonomous, and this for Hegelian and anthropological reasons, tied to 
our fallibility, the intersubjective webs of interdependence in recognition, and so 
forth. But he would retain a project of liberation through hermeneutics as a 
practical project. I will come back to this project in part five, and to my own 
reactualization of it, in the last chapters of this thesis. 
One of Ricœur’s main rejections of Marx is seen in the following 
chapters of these lectures. For Marx, hermeneutics could never, as such, be 
critical, because it pertains to the superstructure and it ultimately is ideological.513 
Ricœur only sees in Marxism an anthropological interpretation with practical 
purposes, so he must disagree with Marx and, over against Marx, emphasize that 
the “superstructure” (that is, the world of representation and interpretation) will 
ultimately have to bear an influence in “infrastructures” and that these, in turn, 
cannot be so rigid as Marx thought they were. Ultimately, this comes down to a 
                                                                                                                                 
509 Ibid., p. 58. 
510 Ibid. 
511 Ibid., p. 65. 
512 Ibid., pp. 66-67. 
513 Ibid., p. 72. 
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certain influence of methodological individualism in Ricœur. Even if we are 
dependent on communities and intersubjective webs of relationships, Ricœur does 
not really believe in the sociological significance of the notion of “class” and so 
class struggle and the whole belief in the process of revolution being necessarily 
put forth through class struggle is for him very problematic. Ricœur sees in Marx, 
as I have emphasized earlier, a theory of human agency. He sees this at least in the 
German Ideology: “People’s assertion of themselves as individuals is fundamental 
for understanding the process of liberation, of abolition. Liberation is the claim of 
the individual against the collective entities.”514 He further asserts that even 
though workers suffer as members of a class, they react as individuals.515 Ricœur 
thus sees not only a competition between individuals and structures as a 
motivating force behind history in Marx’s German Ideology, but indeed the 
possibility of free agency in the Marxist early theory of history. In fact, he almost 
hints at what Axel Honneth calls the processes of solidarity and resistance of 
disenfranchised, disrespected individuals, each of which constructing a “semantic 
bridge” through a shared semantics rooted in common experiences. Ricœur 
comments: “even if in the labor process workers are only cogs and act as class 
individuals, when they meet their comrade in the union, it is as real individuals. 
They extract themselves from the class relationship when they enter into this other 
relation.”516 
With these last lines of Ricœur’s assessment of Marx drawn, I think the 
picture is now clear. Ricœur recovers a hermeneutic Marx as much as he rejects a 
scientific Marx. The following three chapters of the Lectures on Ideology and 
Utopia proceed to refute Althusser and later Marxism and their attempts to see in 
Marx’s corpus a paradigm of science. For the same reasons, Ricœur does not 
really go into the Capital. He sees in Marx the powerful depiction of conflict 
through revolution, but he denies that this revolution, or liberation itself can be 
brought about by a necessary unfolding of social structures and will instead argue 
that if indeed emancipation is a meaningful project, it can only be understood as a 
process led by the motivations of free agents, real individuals exerting their agent 
causation and liberating themselves from oppressing structures. Without knowing 
                                                
514 Ibid., p. 97. 
515 Ibid., p. 98. 
516 Ibid. 
 190
it, Ricœur was coming very close to what Honneth will later describe as the 
struggle for recognition. Likewise, Ricœur would keep a permanent interest in the 
social and political events of his time, and would not neglect to comment or 
intervene on them, as we will see in later chapters. 
 
1.4.4 – The affirmation of conflict in sociology: Simmel’s conflict theory 
 
Marx was thus the grandfather of conflict theory in the particular mix 
between philosophy and what later came to be known as sociological analyzes. 
However, if indeed Marx can be credited with bringing conflict to the forefront of 
sociological theory, we can not say that he was the only author to do so; in fact, 
the emphasis on conflict has had many offspring in sociology, so much so, that a 
whole theoretical field, significantly called “conflict theory”517 has been spawned, 
to the development of which authors such as Georg Simmel518 or more recently 
Ralf Dahrendorf519 and Lewis Coser520 have contributed, not to mention Jürgen 
Habermas and Axel Honneth, whose contributions we will mention more fully in 
the next chapters. While this is not the place to analyze in detail “conflict theory” 
in sociology, I would like to mention one of the most important classical 
contributions to this topic, namely Georg Simmel’s. 
In Conflict, Georg Simmel describes the sociological pertinence of 
conflict in its many forms, from conflict between individuals within a social group 
to widespread conflict among groups in society, and to war among nations. He 
analyzes social phenomena such as quarrels in the family, performance 
competition among individuals in capitalist societies, and tries to reflect upon the 
conditions that can provide solutions for these conflicts (either by victory, 
compromise or conciliation) as well as the cases where irreconcilability is 
inevitable. Simmel’s analyzes, while questionable in some points – Simmel 
sometimes cannot avoid trying to explain a multitude of phenomena in a few 
                                                
517 For an overview on the matter, see Randall Collins, Conflict Sociology: Toward an Explanatory 
Science (New York: Academic Press, 1975). See also Jeffrey C. Alexander, “The Centrality of The 
Classics” in Social Theory Today, edited by Anthony Giddens and Jonathan Turner (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1987), pp. 40-42. 
518 Georg Simmel, Conflict and The Web of Group-Affiliations, translated by Kurt H. Wolff (New 
York: The Free Press, 1964). 
519 Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1959). 
520 Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1956). 
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words, which can result in oversimplifications – are in fact full of psychological 
insight and sociological relevance. 
Simmel retains something of the Hegelian dialectic; in fact, he states that 
“conflict contains something positive. Its positive and negative aspects, however, 
are integrated; they can be separated conceptually, but not empirically”521 and 
goes on to argue, concerning our perception of unity and variety, that it “would 
perhaps be correct to posit neither as first but to assume an infinite rhythm where 
we cannot stop at any stage we have calculated but where we must always derive 
that stage from an earlier, opposite one.”522 However, differently from Marx, he 
does not focus exclusively on class warfare or even on economic conflict, nor is 
the organization of the means of production the decisive factor in his analyzis. 
Rather, for Simmel, conflict plays an essential role in the socialization 
[or, in his terms, sociation, Vergesellchaftung] of social actors. It can act to 
introduce actors in a group (thus producing the unity of a social group), as for 
instance when one group of people comes together to protest or oppose someone 
else, or to break down already existing unities (as when, for instance, a political 
party is divided in two opposing factions). Furthermore, when social groups are 
fueled by the dynamic of conflict (that is, when the cohesion of a certain group 
comes from its opposition towards another group, person, or policy) as when, for 
instance, minorities under repression come together to fight and resist, conflict can 
mitigate, in some sort, the social suffering of those who come together in that way: 
“opposition gives us inner satisfaction (…) [it] makes us feel that we are not 
completely victims of the circumstances.”523 This psychological satisfaction 
would, as we will see in next chapter, play a key role in providing the objective 
conditions for the mobilization of social movements of protest; Axel Honneth will 
speak about the “shared semantics” of disrespected social actors who share their 
experiences and find in group solidarity the force to struggle. According to 
Simmel large groups united by a common goal can be cohesive enough to endure 
even residual conflicts among its members without necessarily losing its 
characteristic of overall internal solidarity.524 
                                                
521 Simmel, Conflict, p. 14. 
522 Ibid., p.108. 
523 Ibid., p.19. 
524 Ibid., p. 66. 
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Ultimately, what I would like to emphasize is that Simmel stresses that in 
what comes down to social conflict, there is a specific dialectic between the states 
of conflict and the states of peace: “in historical reality, each of the two conditions 
uninterruptedly relates itself to the other”.525 He notes that peace is much more 
than a mere “tiredness of fighting”.526  It is rather a positive outcome, wanted and 
achieved by itself; however, we are never certain that its results are permanent. 
We have to make sure that the conditions that brought it about can be maintained. 
A conflict can end because one of the parties wins, or because there is a 
dissolution of the object at stake. Simmel even hints at the conflict of 
interpretations, speaking of the “theoretical controversy where the problem is 
unexpectedly solved by a higher intelligence and both conflicting positions are 
shown to have been wrong”527, in a way strongly resonating of Kant and that, up 
to a certain extent, anticipates Ricœur. From Simmel’s refined analyzes we can 
retain the pervasiveness and the multiplicity of the phenomena of conflict, the fact 
that they can be overcome and bring about positive results but also the fact that 
these results are fragile and provisional. 
Ultimately, if Marx had the merit of putting social conflict at the forefront 
and with that inspire the later sociological theories, these theories gained in insight 
with many other elements: Weber’s analyzes of social stratification and the 
exercise of power, his emphasis on going beyond the analyzis of social classes and 
attention to individuals, through his method of elective affinities (inspired by 
Goethe) and methodological individualism (later further developed by 
Schumpeter) all gave way to sociology’s attention to a multiplicity of conflicts 
taking place at the social level. Furthermore, the analyzis of power relations in the 
Poststructuralist movement – namely Foucault’s own emphasis on the modes of 
subjectification – served as a reinforcement for sociology’s conflict theory, and 
made sure conflict could not be ignored either by sociology or political 
philosophy. This confluence of interests was fundamental for social theory in the 
20th century, and I want to take a better look at Critical Theory as one the most 
fertile instantiations of conflict theory in this juncture. 
 
                                                
525 Ibid., p. 109. 
526 Ibid., p. 110. 
527 Ibid., p. 112. 
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Part Two 
 
The Contemporary Reappraisal of Conflict 
 
In part one I provided a brief historical account of the significance of 
conflict in philosophy, from the Greek source up until the main philosophical 
occurrences of the Kant-Hegel-Marx triad. I also mentioned, here and there, the 
contemporary recovery of these philosophies in their many forms, from the 
Hegelian and Marxist renaissance to the social philosophy of Arendt and, 
evidently, the way this was all taken up and assessed by Ricœur. 
This second part can be read as a continuation of the first, in that its 
method is somewhat similar. I am also interested in following the rule-governed 
polysemy of the philosophical occurrences of conflict, but the difference is now 
chronological. That is, if part one dealt with those authors which we sometimes 
like to call “classics”, part two will mostly analyze the contributions of 
philosophers who all made their contributions in the 20th or 21st century. Indeed, 
the overwhelming majority of philosophers whose works I will mention in this 
part are still actively putting forward new works and theoretical proposals. As 
such, any assessment of the significance of their overarching contributions to 
philosophy – or even to conflict theory – is riskier than was the case for the 
philosophers dealt with in part one; nevertheless, on the other hand, their 
contributions are at least as relevant, if not even more so, than those of the 
“classics” because they are all, in one way or another, taking up the questions 
which are our questions, the questions of our own day and age. 
As such, I will be drawing a very rapid cartography of the way in which 
conflict was discussed in philosophical terms in more recent decades. This will be, 
in a very humble way, an attempt at a quick history of the present time, that most 
paradoxical of tasks, and which nonetheless was pinpointed by both Foucault and 
Critical Theorists as being a fundamental one. My method here will be the same 
used in part one: first mention the contributions of the main authors themselves, 
and then, when there have been meaningful reactions from Ricœur, to see how he 
incorporated their contributions. 
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The main criteria will therefore be twofold: the relevance of these 
contributions to understand the inner workings of conflict, and also the impact that 
they had in the making of Ricœur’s own philosophy. I decided to divide this part 
in three different chapters. First we have an assessment of Critical Theory in its 
three different generations. Because this is, or at least meant to be at its inception, 
a “school” – the Frankfurt school, the other name that identifies their main 
theoretical orientations – I include a very brief historical reminder of its origin and 
aims, and recall some of the issues addressed in each of its three main stages. That 
is, I recall what were the theoretical ambitions of the main representatives of each 
of the three generations of Frankfurt School: Adorno and Horkheimer, Habermas, 
and Honneth. This is of course a very partial and “official” history, but it had to be 
done in this way for lack of space; I will neglect to mention, or only mention in 
passing, such important authors as Walter Benjamin, Herbert Marcuse or Albrecht 
Wellmer, but this is the price to pay for wanting to tackle such a complex and rich 
history in a small chapter. In the most substantive part of the chapter I will see 
how three authors differently emphasized conflict: Habermas and his take on 
communicative action and an ethics of discussion, Honneth and his insistence on 
the struggle for recognition and finally Mark Hunyadi and his apology of conflict 
as a notion with both theoretical and practical import, in what he calls the “virtue” 
of conflict. With these three authors, conflict will be given center stage in the 
contemporary discussion. 
If, in the first chapter, the particular mix between philosophy and 
sociology will be taken for granted, because all of these authors were some way or 
another influenced by these two theoretical domains, in the second the same 
collusion will take place but in a more artificial manner. In my defense, I can say 
that this mixture has been inspired by a certain Ricœur, the Ricœur of the mid 
1990s, and particularly the author of The Just. Its main characters will be John 
Rawls, Michael Walzer, Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot. As such, it is a 
debate simultaneously inspired by sociology and political philosophy. It could be 
labeled, at first glance, a classical debate between the liberal and the 
communitarian stances; but it even though it is indeed one such debate, it is also 
much more than that. It is, as Ricœur saw it, a conflict between the universal 
aspirations of justice and its plural instances and instantiations; a conflict that, 
furthermore, will mobilize an explanation of actions and justifications thereof 
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from the standpoint of the actors themselves, through the “sociology of critique” 
of Boltanski  / Thévenot. 
Lastly, I will dedicate the third and final chapter of this part to the figure 
whose work is probably closer, in its scope, breadth and framework, to Ricœur’s. 
In this chapter, I will look at Charles Taylor’s take on what he takes to be the 
conflicts of modernity. These will be not strictly historical conflicts, but 
fundamental conflicts in the shaping of our own identity. With Taylor, my brief 
overview of the contemporary reappraisal of conflict will be over; after that, we 
will enter the course of conflict in Ricœur’s own work. 
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2.1 – Habermas, Honneth and Hunyadi: Communicative Action, 
the Struggle for Recognition and the Virtue of Conflict 
 
The last chapter of part one was dedicated to Marx’s emphasis on social 
conflict, and to some of the sociological developments it has led to. The history 
and fate of Marxism in the 20th century is well known, as are the disastrous results 
it has led to in different parts of the world. My aim here will not be, in any way 
whatsoever, to draw the history of theoretical Marxism, and even less the history 
of the socialist movement from the first International to the constitution of 
communist parties, and all the political happenings that took place between 1917 
and 1989. 
Nonetheless, there is a particular strand of Marxism, which sometimes 
went by the name of Critical Marxism that I want to address – namely, Critical 
Theory. Critical Theory is a hugely important movement for conflict theory 
because not only does it take social conflict seriously, but it also provides a much 
more supple and non-deterministic background to it. This chapter will be 
dedicated to the main representatives of the second and third generations of 
Critical Theory, namely Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth, and I end it with 
Mark Hunyadi. However, a brief historical introduction to the whole movement 
will be provided, because it will also contain some elements that will offer an 
inspiration for the later parts of this thesis. 
The Institut für Sozialforschung was founded in 1923 in Germany and 
forced to move in 1933 to the U.S.A., when the political situation dramatically 
changed in Germany. From the start, it fostered an interdisciplinary research 
project halfway between philosophy and sociology, and with a strong 
psychoanalytical influence. Kant, Hegel, Marx and Freud provided the main 
theoretical framework, and the “school” allowed for contributions from thinkers so 
different in their scopes and styles as Horkheimer, Benjamin, Marcuse, Adorno 
and Fromm.528  
We can say, in a very schematic and cursory manner, that the particular 
mix of ideas which framed the movement contained simultaneously a belief in 
                                                
528 For a detailed account of the foundation of the Frankfurt school and its early years, see Martin 
Jay, The Dialectical Imagination. A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social 
Research, 1923-1950 (London: Heinemann, 1973). 
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progress and an emphasis on history partly borrowed from Hegel (although 
stripped down of its systematic pretentions), a methodology of immanent critique 
of reason borrowed from Kant (reason as a transhistorical instantiation in history) 
and a diagnosis of society as a locus of social conflicts and class struggles, 
evidently inspired by Marx.  
As Axel Honneth has shown, from its very beginning, Critical Theory 
could be seen as developing a kind of social philosophy529, one that tied a 
methodology of social critique to a belief in moral progress and a genealogical 
proviso530 aimed at assessing the origin and validity of social values. Not that there 
was a single methodology encompassing the production of all its members. But 
there was certainly the postulation of a connection between theory and praxis, and 
the establishment of a practical aim. And nowhere is this programmatic coherence 
stronger than in the early writings of Max Horkheimer. 
 
2.1.1 – The making of the Frankfurt School: Horkheimer and the task of critical 
theory 
 
 In his 1937 programmatic essay “Traditional and Critical Theory”531, 
Horkheimer described Critical Theory as an effort that would bridge the gap 
between theory and praxis. Critical theorists would produce a critique of the 
present time that would, in virtue of its own activity, contribute to bring about 
emancipation. In the words of Horkheimer, the own nature of the critical thinker’s 
activity “turns it towards a changing of history and the establishment of justice 
among men”.532  
For him this is, in fact, the difference between “traditional theory” and 
critical theory. Developing a critique that has some echoes in Heidegger’s (as well 
as Gadamer’s and Ricœur’s) critique of the Cartesian cogito, Horkheimer 
describes how in traditional theory, subject and object are placed “at a distance”. 
                                                
529 See “Pathologies of the Social: The Past and Present of Social Philosophy” in Disrespect. The 
normative foundations of Critical Theory, pp. 3-48. 
530 See “Reconstructive Social Criticism with a Genealogical Proviso: On the idea of ‘critique’ in 
the Frankfurt School” in Pathologies of Reason. On the Legacy of Critical Theory, translated by 
James Ingram (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 43-53. 
531 See Max Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory” in Critical Theory. Selected Essays 
(New York: Continuum, 1972), pp. 188-243. 
532 Ibid., pp. 242-243. 
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That is, how the conception of the object can bear no relation to the subject who 
produces it; this is, more or less, what Charles Taylor will call “disengaged 
reason”. If we want to use Aristotle’s categories, the production or consideration 
of even something as a “theoretical” object (or subject-matter) in traditional theory 
is seen by Horkheimer as the result of a pure techné, rather than the possibility of a 
praxis. However, according to him, science, knowledge and “intellectual” affairs 
are as much a result of the capitalist distribution of labor as anything else.  
As such, they are not, in themselves, “neutral”.533 They are, and the social 
sciences in particular might we add, the birthplace of what MacIntyre called 
“essentially contested concepts”.534 Over against the hypostatization of Logos535, 
Horkheimer wants to assert the agency of free individuals in the making of a 
critical theory. According to him, when the theoretician depicts societal 
contradictions, these not only express the result of a historical process, but also “a 
force within it to stimulate change”.536 
The result is that this theoretician is engaged in the struggle. And 
curiously enough, Horkheimer presents the positive prospect amid the experience 
of negativity (Honneth will assert the same thing, when depicting the struggle for 
recognition). Horkheimer claims that “the community of those engaged in the 
struggle experiences something of the freedom and spontaneity which will mark 
the future.”537 This, in fact, is the admission that the struggle has a very specific 
telos, namely, the emancipation from the conditions of domination. The role of 
theory is even in fact to intensify the struggle.538 This is, indeed, the reason why 
early Critical Theory remains fundamentally Marxist: the role of theory is to “lead 
to a heightening of those social tensions which in the present historical era lead in 
turn to wars and revolutions”.539 
However, it goes without saying that critical theorists were unorthodox 
Marxists. They kept themselves strictly apart from the Communist Party and did 
                                                
533 This is explicitly claimed: “There is likewise no theory of society, even that of the sociologists 
concerned with general laws, that does not contain political motivations, and the truth of these must be 
decided not in supposedly neutral reflection but in personal thought and action, in concrete historical 
activity.”  Ibid., p. 222. 
534 See Alasdair MacIntyre, “The Essential Contestability of Some Social Concepts” in Ethics 84,1 
(1973): 1-9. 
535 Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory”, p. 198. 
536 Ibid., p. 215. 
537 Ibid., p. 218. 
538 Ibid., p. 219. 
539 Ibid., p. 226. 
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not follow the indications of the International. This partly explains the different 
paths led by the theoretical enterprises of Adorno and Horkheimer on the one 
hand, and Luckács, on the other (notwithstanding the important role that Luckács 
played in inspiring critical theorists, mainly through the analyzes of reification that 
he undertook in History and Class Consciousness). As Honneth explains, part of 
their effort was to undertake more refined sociological analyzes than Marx. They 
wanted to understand why the Proletariat had failed to bring about the 
revolution.540 
Now, if the Proletariat is not the “universal class” as both Marx and 
Luckács believed541, what is there left to do? It seems that Horkheimer’s 
standpoint, at least in 1937, is radically voluntarist. Theory will help bring about 
the change that is needed. Here is his most forceful and engaged argument: 
 
A consciously critical attitude, however, is part of the development of society: the construing 
of the course of history as the necessary product of an economic mechanism 
simultaneously contains both a protest against this order of things, a protest generated 
by the order itself, and the idea of self-determination for the human race, that is the idea of 
a state of affairs in which man's actions no longer flow from a mechanism but from his 
own decision. The judgment passed on the necessity inherent in the previous course of 
events implies here a struggle to change it from a blind to a meaningful necessity. If we 
think of the object of the theory in separation from the theory, we falsify it and fall into 
quietism or conformism. Every part of the theory presupposes the critique of the existing 
order and the struggle against it along lines determined by the theory itself.542  
 
What Horkheimer wants to avoid is, therefore, quietism and conformism. In 1937, 
the programmatic affirmation of Critical Theory is therefore of the inextricable 
link between theory and praxis. However, this was about to suffer a major shift in 
the following years. 
 
 
                                                
540 See Gonçalo Marcelo, “Recognition and Critical Theory today: An interview with Axel 
Honneth, in Philosophy & Social Criticism 39, 2 (2013): 212. 
541 See Marx, “The Communist Manifesto” (published in The Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844, op. cit.), and Luckács, “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat” 
in History and Class Consciousness, pp. 83-222. 
542 Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory”, p. 229. 
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2.1.2 – The Pessimistic turn: Adorno, Horkheimer, and the critique of instrumental 
reason 
 
Historical events do not explain everything, and we are certainly not 
allowed to discern the meaning of a philosophical work in a “psychologist” way, 
by deducing the alleged psychological motives and intentions of their authors. 
However, I think it is safe to assume that WWII and the subsequent revelations of 
the Nazi horrors, especially the Holocaust, did much to alter the tone of the early 
critical theorists. Other events played a role as well. Martin Jay recalls some of 
these difficult circumstances, which led to their pessimistic phase in the late 
1940s: “Disillusioned with the Soviet Union, no longer even marginally sanguine 
about the working classes of the West, appalled by the integrative power of mass 
culture, the Frankfurt School traveled the last leg of its long march away from 
orthodox Marxism.”543 
In what became the greatest classic of the first generation of Critical 
Theory, Dialectic of Enlightenment544 (written in 1944), Adorno and Horkheimer 
in fact present us with a rather harsh diagnosis of reason and its use. The fact that 
they chose to name it “dialectic” and to qualify it by explaining that these were 
“philosophical fragments” is in itself a whole program. Indeed, the choice of the 
word “dialectic” suggests the process of evolution through contradiction, but the 
fragments indicate us that the book is at the same time a critique of the category of 
totality and totalitarianism. “Enlightenment”, on the other hand, is not taken to be 
a historical period – or if indeed it was, it is seen as just the peek of a movement 
that had been developing since Antiquity – but rather as being synonymous with 
reason in a very specific sense. Indeed, what Adorno and Horkheimer want to 
denunciate is the use of reason as instrumental. That is, they see the exercise of 
reason as being ultimately connected with violence, repression and domination of 
both inner and outer elements. In this, consequently, they are being more radical in 
their diagnosis than Marx himself. Consequently, they are not ignoring social 
conflict but they seem to be arguing that conflict is more pervasive than mere 
social conflict. In this, they are perhaps more Hegelian than Marxist, because their 
                                                
543 Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, p. 256. 
544 See Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical 
Fragments, edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr and translated by Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2002). 
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dialectic is more pervasive. Except that it is evidently a dialectic without 
Aufhebung. Jay emphasizes how radical this conflict is: “The clearest expression 
of this change was the Institut's replacement of class conflict, that foundation stone 
of any truly Marxist theory, with a new motor of history. The focus was now on 
the larger conflict between man and nature both without and within, a conflict 
whose origins went back to before capitalism and whose continuation, indeed 
intensification, appeared likely after capitalism would end.”545 
Reason thus comes to be identified with the effort to dominate both inner 
and outer nature. By exercising reason, we repress our instincts and become 
disciplined; pursuing that effort, we also come to dominate nature (eventually to 
the brink of destruction) and manipulate or even subjugate others; reason is 
therefore paradoxically tied to its other, that is, myth – “Myth is already 
enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology”546 is one of the main 
claims – and even to the possibility of utter destruction. Already in the preface, the 
picture that is drawn is very somber:  
 
The aporia which faced us in our work thus proved to be the first matter we had to 
investigate: the self-destruction of enlightenment. We have no doubt—and herein lies our 
petitio principii—that freedom in society is inseparable from enlightenment thinking. We 
believe we have perceived with equal clarity, however, that the very concept of that 
thinking, no less than the concrete historical forms, the institutions of society with which 
it is intertwined, already contains the germ of the regression which is taking place 
everywhere today.547 
 
To be sure, Adorno and Horkheimer’s claim is ambiguous. Even if they talk about 
regression and self-destruction, they affirm, as we can read in the passage above, 
that there is a way to reach freedom through the use of reason. It is in virtue of this 
belief that they still profess the need to exercise a critique of the present time, one 
that provides it with the reflexive conditions needed for the exercise of meaningful 
agency. But they are at the same time struck by Nazism, the rise of anti-Semitism 
and the widespread use of myth for mass manipulation. Furthermore, they are 
equally disillusioned by the structural conditions of late capitalism, and namely the 
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manipulation taking place within mass culture. All this leads them to conclude that 
manipulation, domination and alienation can assume many forms, not only the 
type of economic alienation presupposed by Marxism. Ricœur would come to a 
similar conclusion in the text “Political Paradox”. But whereas Ricœur emphasizes 
political alienation, Adorno and Horkheimer lambast cultural alienation, alongside 
these other forms the malaise can assume.   
What Adorno and Horkheimer ultimately do is to narrate the history of 
progress in an unorthodox manner. It is, we could say, an alternative, subversive 
narrative. In this story, reason has the tendency to self-destruct, as we can see in 
the ruthless, meticulous “rational” procedures of the Nazis and their campaigns of 
extermination. In this account, moreover, reason is in itself mythological, giving 
birth to myths: “But the myths which fell victim to the Enlightenment were 
themselves its products.”548 Throughout the whole book, they emphasize what 
they consider to be the main trait of reason: to command, to transform, to 
manipulate. 
 
Enlightenment stands in the same relationship to things as the dictator to human beings. 
He knows them to the extent that he can manipulate them. The man of science knows 
things to the extent that he can make them.549 
 
Consequently, if “Enlightenment” has perhaps the merit of liberating from the 
magic properties of ancient myths, reason, on the other hand, not only also 
becomes mythical, but by becoming repressive, by excluding and being dominant, 
it ends up enslaving human beings under its equalizing power. As they say, this 
power “amputates the incommensurable (…) human beings are forced into real 
conformity”.550 We are thus at the mercy of repressive equality, according to their 
depiction. Even the substitution of ancient myths, in their diversity of versions, for 
unified concepts is seen as a sign of command.551 
The division of labor and the reification of people into different social 
classes is of course seen as further proof of the violence of reason. In what has 
become a very famous analyzis, they depict the myth of Odysseus as being the 
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example of domination by the cunning of reason: he alone can enjoy the beautiful 
and alluring singing of the Sirens, whereas his fellow travelers are forced to work 
for him and be deprived of aesthetic contemplation. Odysseus, in a single move, 
dominates others and his own inner instincts. He can contemplate danger, but 
without falling victim to its charms; he does not lose control. 
Ultimately, they see reason as running the risk of becoming totalitarian, 
and they see myth reabsorbed and transformed in contemporary culture; likewise, 
they see forms of domination not only in barbarous political circumstances such as 
those of the Germany of their times, but also in the reification of persons in the 
marketplace. Mass culture is the ultimate proof of commodity fetishism. Cultural 
industry is seen as being akin to propaganda, where originality is lost and 
equalization is the rule, where culture is sold like objects and prepared to be 
revered for economic purposes. As such, mass culture is ideological (in the 
pejorative sense) and it must therefore be criticized. 
To be sure, Adorno and Horkheimer still seem to believe in the 
possibilities of emancipation. But like Nietzsche before them, they appear to suffer 
from the fact of not being able to say yes with the same force they say no. The 
Dialectic of Enlightenment is a beautiful, severe, insightful, essential book. But it 
is mainly a book made up of critiques and rejections: a critique of the process of 
reason, of progress, of pragmatism and instrumentality, over-unification, over-
conceptualization, capitalism, political voluntarism, the culture industry and so on. 
They seem to have difficulties conceiving of other uses of reason other than the 
strictly instrumental one, and are very pessimistic about the possibilities of 
reconciliation. Or, better put, they see a possibility for aesthetic redemption, but 
acknowledge the difficulties of a real political liberation through revolution – even 
if they long for it. All these traits would ultimately coalesce in Adorno’s later 
writings, such as Negative Dialectics. In the transition from the first to the second 
and third generations of Critical Theory, the theoretical landscape will be radically 
altered. If, on the one hand, there is something of the brilliance, cultural erudition 
and attention to aesthetics that is definitely lost, on the other hand, much is gained 
in theoretical insight, sociological relevance and interdisciplinarity. Furthermore, 
the take on reason and on the outcomes of the struggle and conflict resolution will 
be much more positive. From Adorno and Horkheimer we can retain the idea of a 
Critical Theory of the present time and the critique of the instrumental use of 
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reason as domination of inner instincts, outer nature, and other persons, as well as 
an incisive non-conformism over against equalization. From the standpoint of 
conflict, what we can find is a diagnosis of conflict as being completely pervasive: 
human beings are depicted as being essentially torn between instincts and their 
repression; as such, human history, and our relation with nature, is a conflictual 
struggle for domination. But with Habermas and Honneth we will find significant 
ethical and political applications, as well as a more nuanced take on these matters. 
 
2.1.3 – Habermas: from the discovery of the public sphere to communicative 
action and the ethics of discussion 
 
Habermas is now one of the most influential thinkers alive. Over the 
stretch of his long career, he never ceased to reflect and respond to the events of 
his own time, in different ways. This is still true today, with his critical take on the 
current events taking place in the European Union and the economic and social 
crisis of the Western world.552 His work is filled with meaningful insights that 
radically reshaped social theory and domains such as constitutional right, political 
theory, and even ethics. 
Curiously, perhaps his most influential book was the first he wrote, 
namely, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.553 In this book 
Habermas delves into the notion of Öffentlichkeit (literally, publicity, but in this 
context translated as “public sphere”) in order to see how it originated in the 
European bourgeois societies of the modern period, and how we can see in it an 
ideal-typical model of democratic practices of deliberation and discussion. The 
historical accuracy and empirical evidence of the book have been disputed and 
criticized throughout the years. It has been depicted as idealist and Eurocentric. 
However, setting aside for the moment being these criticisms, I think we would do 
well to see in it an ideal-typical reconstruction of a valuable practice, if not an 
entirely accurate historical depiction. Furthermore, I think that participation in the 
public sphere is an invaluable instrument in any mature democracy; as such, any 
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social philosophy must think about it at some point. In this, Habermas, alongside 
Arendt, offer us important resources for such a task. 
Habermas defines the bourgeois public sphere as “the sphere of private 
people come together as a public.”554 According to him, at a particular juncture in 
Europe – mainly in countries like England, France and Germany – after the late 
Middle Ages the conditions were met for a public to appear. This was largely 
made possible by the existence of shared cultural items, such as novels, which 
were scarce and all read by the few people who could call themselves a reading 
public. Later on, people started meeting in salons, and other places to discuss 
items of potential interest, among them literature and yes, politics. By the 18th 
century then, something very peculiar had been born. Namely, a sphere in which 
citizens – by which we understand, bourgeois – could come together and discuss 
freely, letting the outcome of their discussion be decided by the force of the better 
argument, and not by status and privilege. This means, Habermas claims, that it 
was a particular instantiation of civil society that was free from coercion and the 
exercise of power. No matter how rich or powerful my opponents in the discussion 
were; if, let me put it this way, reason (or persuasion…) was on my side, I would 
win the discussion. As such, the only a priori requirement for participating in the 
debate was the tacit agreement to let oneself be guided by the force of arguments 
alone. This, in the words of Habermas, constituted a radically democratic 
situation, a parity “on whose basis alone the authority of the better argument could 
assert itself”.555 
As I said, I see in this a powerful ideal-typical model; even a normative 
model. Of course that being ideal-typical, it might in itself be insufficient to 
address the complexity of actually existing social conditions. Habermas, like 
Adorno and Horkheimer before him, deplored the existence of mass culture when 
he wrote this first book. He eventually argued that at the time when he wrote the 
book, the public sphere had been degraded to such an extent that people were no 
longer autonomous. Publicity had become advertisement and manipulation. In our 
own day, this diagnosis has perhaps to be modulated and nuanced, after the rise of 
social protest and namely with the radically democratic possibilities opened up by 
the Internet. And actually he came back to think the issue of the public sphere 
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more than 30 years later, in Between Facts and Norms556 where he reshapes his 
take on the matter.  
In this later book, what Habermas is doing is a reactualization of his 
theory that actually responds to some of the criticisms that had been addressed to 
him by many readers. One of the main issues concerns the existence of weak 
publics and strong publics. Another one concerns the plurality of publics. Was 
there really only one, overarching public? Nancy Fraser and other feminists 
heavily criticized this take. Fraser emphasized557, supported by a vast bibliography 
of revisionist historiography, that Habermas’s reconstruction silenced the 
existence of feminine public spheres and the way in which the male-dominated 
bourgeois public sphere was constructed upon a number of significant 
exclusions.558 The formal exclusion of women from formal political participation 
notwithstanding, Mary Ryan, whose study Women in Public559 Fraser uses 
extensively to support her claims, has shown that women were able to contribute 
in various ways to American nineteenth-century political life and that they too 
constituted a political, albeit non-formal, political arena. 
Furthermore, Fraser also claims that what we need are strong publics. 
That is, we do not only want to discuss matters. We also want that our discussion 
of matters of public interest be taken into account in political decisions; that is, we 
want the outcome of the debate to be democratically decided. Habermas concedes 
that much in Between Facts and Norms, and part of his effort consists in a 
systematization of the ways in which this can happen, that is, the way those who 
are in the galleries can legitimately influence those who are in the arena of 
political decision. 
To reiterate, the theory of the public sphere and democratic decision-
making is, in my opinion, of the utmost importance. But it is, as such, a way of 
solving conflicts, not of taking them into account. So what was Habermas’s take 
on conflict? This is not entirely clear, and the matter has undergone a certain 
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evolution. We can say, in an oversimplified manner – that is, offering a depiction 
that is certainly not entirely true but that does indeed correspond to a general 
movement – that Habermas’s theoretical standpoint evolved from an early 
Marxism to a later Kantian transcendental standpoint. In the same manner, we can 
maybe claim that Honneth’s own development was partly a Hegelian backlash 
against this Kantian overarching influence in Habermas, Rawls and so many 
others. But setting aside these tags and coming to the more substantive point, the 
epithets “Marxist” or “Kantian” can also disclose something of the way in which 
Habermas understood theory, praxis and conflict. 
In the early works, such as Knowledge and Human Interests560 and 
Theory and Practice561 Habermas still admitted to a huge influence of Marx. 
Theory and Practice is a collection of Habermas’s early texts from the 1960s and 
its tone is indeed Marxist-Hegelian. It is in this book that he recovers the early 
Hegel’s Jena writings and reads them emphasizing the aspects of labor and 
interaction as I recalled in part one. It is also in this book that we find the 
denunciation of technique and science as being ideological, and also a first attempt 
to define what would be communicative action. This effort would be further 
elaborated in Knowledge and Human Interests, where we find Habermas’s first 
systematic grounding of this notion. Habermas’s standpoint needs to be grasped 
against the backdrop of Adorno and Horkheimer’s own denunciation of 
instrumental reason. 
In Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas distinguishes between 
what he names three “knowledge-constitutive” interests of reason itself. These are, 
respectively, the interest in technical control562, that is, an instrumental use of 
reason; a “practical interest”563 tied to the goal of comprehension or interpretation 
and which Habermas attributes to the “cultural sciences” and namely to 
hermeneutics; finally, an “emancipatory interest” that Habermas traces back to 
Fichte564 but which he wants to extract from idealism and, reinterpreting it in 
materialist terms565, make it the goal of critical social sciences.566 
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 Part of the importance of Habermas’s assessment resides in the way he 
significantly connects but also departs from Adorno and Horkheimer’s standpoint. 
That is, at this point in time, he recognizes and criticizes instrumental action – 
namely with his critique of work and his denunciation of scientism – but he 
refuses to deplete the significance of action, or reason, to their instrumental use. 
Instead, he chooses to emphasize the intersubjective processes of self-formation 
through work and interaction and his conclusion is that besides instrumental action 
there is also an alternative mode of interaction: namely communicative action. 
One of his strongest assertions is that communicative action is irreducible to the 
framework of instrumental action.567 This type of action is then defined as an 
“unconstrained consensus grounded on a type of “open intersubjectivity”.568 And 
if he still retains a Marxist standpoint, in that he clearly identifies emancipation as 
a practical goal, he criticizes Marx for having understood his own philosophy with 
the model of natural science.569 His model, in this early phase, consisted in a 
rejection of the positivistic tendencies of natural science and what he sees as the 
shortcomings of hermeneutics (one of the points with which Ricœur would most 
strongly disagree) and to see the critical social sciences as striving for 
emancipation at both a theoretical and a practical level; and this because they try 
to escape both dogmatism and domination through an effort of self-reflection. 
Adopting a stance that would find a significant echo in the Ricœur of the 1960s he 
uses Freudian psychoanalysis as an example of such emancipatory procedures, in 
that it aims to overcome a pathological situation of distorted communication and 
transform it into a situation where real communicative action can take place.570 
Consequently, and like Ricœur, he also sees in the psychoanalytical therapeutic 
relationship some sort of cure through mutual recognition. 
This was, of course, only an early attempt at grounding his fundamental 
notion of communicative action. His model would be refined in the following 
decades, leading up to the complex and encompassing proposal he puts forward in 
the 1980s in his Theory of Communicative Action.571 In the transition to this phase, 
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Habermas undertook what many have called a “linguistic turn”. In its broad scope, 
it is perhaps his most systematic take on action and rationality, while it is also an 
exercise of what he calls “postmetaphysical thinking” and an enquiry into the 
meaning of modernity, both topics to which he would dedicate separate books572 
in the aftermath of the Theory of Communicative Action. 
It should be noted that in the 1970s Habermas became interested in the 
potentialities of language and the analyzes thereof. Like many others, he was 
fascinated by ordinary language philosophy and namely speech act theory. The 
Theory of Communicative Action is an attempt to put forward a meaningful 
depiction of intersubjective social action as a theoretical alternative to systems 
theory, and also a take on rationality that aims at systematically unveiling its 
potentially positive traits. But in order to formally ground the possibility of 
communication, he had to delve into the communicative procedures needed to 
make sure the process is successful. As such, he developed a formal pragmatics so 
that he could capture the elements which, present in ordinary language and its 
everyday use, could lead to conventions and norms. As Lasse Thomassen makes 
clear, when Habermas looks at the illocutionary aspect of language he is aiming at 
unveiling those conventions that contain a normative force that lead us to 
emancipation, through the use of reason by linguistic means. Thus Thomassen: 
“That is, he wants to show that we cannot but orient ourselves towards mutual 
understanding when we communicate; or, by virtue of the very structure of 
language, we are aiming towards consensus.”573 
This means that Habermas’s theory at this point is universalist in its 
scope; indeed, at the forefront of his reflection stands the possibility of universal 
validity. A claim must be tied to reasons, and these reasons are criticizable. The 
claim can be attacked in what concerns its truth, sincerity or legitimacy.574 But 
whatever happens, validity claims cannot be rejected or accepted without reasons. 
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And because these reasons are intersubjectively grounded, they are seen as binding 
the partners in interaction and to gear them towards consensus and cooperation: 
 
So long as in their speech acts raise claims to the validity of what is being uttered, they are 
proceeding in the expectation that they can achieve a rationally motivated agreement and 
can coordinate their plans and actions on this basis-without having to influence the 
empirical motives of the others through force or the prospect of reward, as is the case with 
simple impositions and the threat of consequences.575 
 
Now, where is the prospect of conflict in all this? Habermas analyzes, on the one 
hand, what he calls the “lifeworld” of everyday interactions and, on the other 
hand, the rationalization or even potential colonization of the lifeworld by other 
modes of coordination such as money and power. The lifeworld provides the 
meaningful contexts that make a certain pre-understanding possible, especially 
through shared traditions and conventions. However, modernity processes and 
what Weber called the disenchantment of the world brought about post-
conventional societies where these shared pre-understandings are scarcer, even 
though the possibility of universal understanding is contained in language and the 
linguistification of the world itself. As such, the possibility of disagreement is 
indeed real and it evidently poses challenges to the mode of coordination 
understood as communicative action. This will lead us directly to what Habermas 
calls discussion (or argumentation, or discourse). It will be argumentation that will 
avoid, when disagreements or conflicts take place, the use of power or force to 
settle the dispute: 
 
Thus the rationality proper to the communicative practice of everyday life points to the 
practice of argumentation as a court of appeal that makes it possible to continue 
communicative action with other means when disagreements can no longer be repaired 
with everyday routines and yet are not to be settled by the direct or strategic use of 
force.576 
 
The point to emphasize is that, according to Habermas, agreement or disagreement 
are based on reasons that participants supposedly or actually have at their 
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disposal.577 I cannot help noting, and Habermas himself admitted it, that this is a 
somewhat idealized depiction. Indeed, it is an attempt at a rational reconstruction 
of a normative process which, in actual practice, we are not sure whether or not 
actually takes place. It is in this sense that Habermas speaks about an “ideal 
speech situation” which, nonetheless, is not tantamount to a concrete form of 
life.578 
Indeed, one of the peculiar developments in Habermas’s standpoint is his 
evolution towards an almost purely procedural approach. Since his standpoint is 
universalist he becomes increasingly concerned with the formal properties of 
principles and practices, because he needs these practices to be context-
transcending: “Only values that can be abstracted and generalized into principles, 
internalized largely as formal principles, and applied procedurally, have so 
intensive a power to orient action that they can cut across various particular 
situations and, in the extreme case, systematically penetrate all spheres of life.”579 
His is thus a procedural theory of rationality that stems from his own diagnosis 
asserting that all substantial (and monological) concepts of reason have been 
critically dissolved.580 
To sum up, this take is universalist, proceduralist, counter-factual, 
normative and regulative. As such, it runs the risk of losing some descriptive grasp 
in virtue of its own normative emphasis. But it can indeed be a suitable ethical 
standpoint. Allow me to very briefly mention the way the theory of 
communication action eventually leads to his discourse ethics, before turning to 
the critiques addressed to Habermas and the insufficiencies of his model to grasp 
some levels of conflict. 
With his Discourse Ethics581 of the 1990s Habermas takes the ultimate 
step towards proceduralism. In his preface, and assuming a position that is 
antithetical to Ricœur’s own standpoint in Oneself as Another, he asserts the 
primacy of the just over the good; that is, he assumes that his take is purely 
deontological.582 And why is this? Because he is basically refusing to ground 
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ethics on substantive notions. He puts forward a proposal of a postmetaphysical, 
postconventional morality (and a postconventional type of conscience too) where 
individuals are not guided by practices and customs stemming from tradition but 
rather strive to be autonomous and follow moral norms that must pass the test of 
generalization and be to adhered by everyone. At this stage, as we can easily 
understand, the Kantian inspiration is blatant. 
It is also at this point that Habermas tries to tackle in a more serious 
manner the problem of conflict. Against the backdrop of a discussion of the 
Aristotelian standpoint and the making of life plans and the qualification of actions 
as being good, he comes across the possibility of interpersonal conflict. And when 
he does, he sees this possibility as one where strategic action is deployed. As such, 
he argues that in order for this to be considered as a moral problem (and thus, 
ultimately solved by moral means) agents have to submit their maxims to the old 
Kantian universalization test: 
 
In strategic action, the participants assume that each decides egocentrically in accordance 
with his own interests. Given these premises, there exists from the beginning at least a 
latent conflict between adversaries. This can be played out or curbed and brought under 
control; it can also be resolved in the mutual interest of all concerned. But without a 
radical shift in perspective and attitude, an interpersonal conflict cannot be perceived by 
those involved as a moral problem. (…) Someone who raises the issue of its 
permissibility is posing (…) the moral question of whether we all could will that anyone 
in my situation should act in accordance with the same maxim.583  
 
The regulation of interpersonal conflicts of action is thus, for Habermas, a 
properly moral (not ethical in the Aristotelian sense) issue. One of the goals of this 
effort of practical reason will therefore be to grasp “the just resolution of a conflict 
in the realm of norm-regulated action”.584 In another formulation, he tells us that 
morality is concerned with the “norms according to which we want to live together 
and of how practical conflicts can be settled in the common interest of all”.585 
However, all this talk on conflict notwithstanding, does Habermas really 
take it into account in a sufficient manner? And even if he does, does his solution 
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really succeed at doing away with conflict? First of all, he attempts to resort to the 
“standpoint of impartial judgment”586 which is evidently problematic; it is not 
clear whether or not such an impartial judgment on human matters exists at all, let 
alone the possibility of assuming it for oneself. Secondly, his emphasis is more on 
consensus than on conflict as such. This would lead to many critiques. 
Indeed, Habermas sees society as a locus of cooperation and mutual 
understanding. In a way, he posits the existence of consensus both at the beginning 
and end of human interaction. At the beginning, because the lifeworld is based on 
processes of prior mutual understanding; at the end because, when people engage 
in a discussion and put forward claims that they wish the other recognize as valid, 
they also do so in the hope of reaching an agreement, provided that their 
motivations are not merely strategic. One of Habermas’s goals is to prove that 
rationalization is not intrinsically a totally negative process and, at the same time, 
that a society totally regulated by systems and strategic action would be untenable. 
But it should be asked if his ideal of fully eliminating them is not also, as such, 
untenable. Thus J. Donald Moon argued that a moral community fully founded on 
a proceduralist basis, one which would fully eliminate conflict, is impossible in 
societies characterized by value pluralism.587  
A second line of questioning could be an assessment of whether or not 
Habermas is sufficiently taking into account the actually existing conflicts in the 
societies he pretends to be analyzing. Many critics have indeed raised objections 
concerning the inadequacy of Habermas’s account to grasp conflicts, or indeed the 
capacity of his model to provide a just resolution of conflicts, which is something 
he allegedly tries to do. Moon, for instance, further claims that the agonistic 
dimension of our moral and political lives might be irreducible: “Without 
abandoning the demand for impartiality, we must also acknowledge that there may 
be deep conflicts of values which preclude agreement on norms that all could 
accept.”588 This claim would be present in a whole host of critics to both 
Habermas and Rawls, from the feminist critiques of Seyla Benhabib to the 
communitarian standpoint of Walzer. Furthermore, neo-Aristotelian emphases on 
the substantive good versus the procedural right, such as those put forward by 
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Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre and yes, Paul Ricœur, also attacked the 
possibility of a purely procedural theory of justice. This will only find a solution, 
in my opinion, in an ethics and politics of mutual recognition. At the end of this 
part we will see how Ricœur himself tries to provide a solution for this problem, in 
the context of the debate between universalism and contextualism.  
The occlusion of conflict and even a certain descriptive deficit in 
Habermas’s social theory has also been noted by some of the best readers of 
Habermas, such as Honneth and David Ingram. Commenting on Habermas’s ideal 
of argumentation and noting that it as question of “right, rather than might”, 
Ingram proposes to reverse the question: 
 
What – if anything – is realistic about that ideal? Critical theorists emphasize the 
importance of grounding their ideals in the understanding of real social agents. But how 
accurately do these ideals track these understandings?589 
 
Ingram argues that Habermas’s model runs up against the inherent context-
dependency of meaning; consequently, to devise an ideal model of argumentation 
and to expect that it hopefully can find some application in different contexts is 
partially misleading590 because it is a betrayal of the principle of letting these 
social contexts themselves inform us of the several ways in which they function. 
Moreover, he claims that we cannot neglect the role power plays in these different 
contexts. Ultimately, Ingram concludes that Habermas’s theory of argumentation 
is too optimistic in what comes down to both the possibility and even desirability 
of applying its ideal to all contexts of institutionalized research.591 He argues that 
in many contexts, in order to resolve conflict, a partial “strategic” compromise, 
rather than a full consensus, is perhaps the only way to solve or mitigate conflicts. 
Axel Honneth, for his part, adopted a critique of Habermas as an 
inspiration for his early theoretical endeavors. Indeed, his first book, The Critique 
of Power592, was an attempt to ground his own notion of a critical social theory in 
the idea of struggle that both sought inspiration but also heavily criticized 
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Foucault’s analyzes of power relations and Habermas’s take on communicative 
action. However, probably the most important article on his assessment of 
Habermas’s model is, as Jean-Philippe Deranty has duly noted593, the 1981 article 
“Moral Consciousness and Class Domination” republished in Disrespect.594 In this 
article, Honneth rejects the diagnosis according to which class struggle had been 
deactivated. He traces back this diagnosis from Adorno and Marcuse to Habermas. 
According to Honneth, they had all lost faith on a morality that might arise from 
socio structural conflicts.595  
Why did this happen, according to Honneth? Because, in his view, 
Adorno, Marcuse and Habermas all saw the interests of the wage-earning class to 
have diverted onto private consumption.596 At this point, he explicitly turns 
towards a critique of Habermas’s depiction of late capitalism. He claims that 
Habermas’s theory of society systematically ignores “all forms of existing social 
critique not recognized by the political-hegemonic public sphere”597 and that “a 
field of moral-practical conflicts may lie hidden behind the façade of late capitalist 
integration, in which old class conflicts continue to take place either in socially 
controlled or in highly individualized forms.”598 I am not sure whether or not 
Honneth’s claim was correct in 1981. But I am persuaded that this diagnosis from 
the 1980s is precise today, with the new struggles and protests taking place in the 
Western developed world in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 crisis.  
What is the problem with Habermas’s model? It consists in the following: 
by insisting that the procedural ethics of discourse only deals with normative 
claims, he risks overlooking all the “potentialities for moral action which have not 
reached the level of elaborated value judgments”.599 That is, we might add, 
Habermas overlooks all those embodied relevant moral events (of acceptance, 
rejection, suffering, and so forth) that do not reach the threshold of coherent 
discursive articulation and thus never become rational claims for normative 
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validity. Honneth’s move then is to look for “securely anchored feelings of 
injustice” that could be a complement to ethically grounded and discursively 
articulated goals. Honneth’s conclusion in this article is that a “critical analysis of 
society must see as its task today the identification of moral conflicts connected to 
the social class structure which are hidden behind late capitalism’s façade of 
integration”.600 This kind of “hidden morality” is to be found, according to 
Honneth, in the experiences of underground resistance. It is a “consciousness of 
injustice”601 which many times lies below the threshold of publicly recognized 
normative conflict but that is not, for that fact, non-existent. His self-professed 
goal at that point in time would therefore be to shed some light on the “socially 
repressed moral conflicts”602 without, however, being able to do so in the context 
of his short article. But this will be exactly what he would try to do in the two 
decades to follow. 
These criticisms by Honneth expose some of the fragilities of Habermas’s 
social model. Jean-Philippe Deranty, one of the best interpreters of Honneth’s 
social philosophy sees in Honneth’s early theoretical model a direct response to 
Habermas and an attempt to go beyond the linguistification of critical social theory 
and beyond the paradigm of communication.603 One of the earliest and probably 
the best collection of critical essays on Habermas’s Theory of Communicative 
Action has in fact been organized by Honneth, in collaboration with Hans Joas.604 I 
will take a better look at how he proposes an alternative to communicative action 
as a paradigm for social theory in the next section, which is dedicated to Honneth. 
Ricœur, for his part, also accompanied and sometimes incorporated and 
criticized Habermas’s writings, especially at the critical juncture of the 1970s, 
when he was himself particularly interested in the hermeneutics of action and in 
several matters pertaining to social philosophy, like the social imaginary. In the 
Lectures on Ideology and Utopia Ricœur dedicates two chapters to Habermas and 
namely to his Knowledge and Human Interests. These chapters are mainly 
dedicated to the topic of ideology in Habermas, because this is the core of 
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Ricœur’s book. He is particularly interested in seeing how this notion survives in 
unorthodox Post-Marxist theory, and namely in Critical Theory. It would be out of 
the scope of this chapter to delve into Ricœur’s analyzis of ideology in the theory 
of Habermas; however, he also includes, in passing, some comments on 
Habermas’s standpoint that are worth mentioning.  
Firstly, he mentions the similarities between Habermas’s standpoint and 
his own project in the 1960s, namely, the recovery of Freudian psychoanalysis in 
the context of a theory of interpretation and a refusal to oppose interpretation and 
explanation.605 However, he assumes a particular interest in the debate that took 
place between Gadamer and Habermas606, and this for obvious reasons. I 
mentioned how Habermas at this stage opposed the hermeneutical sciences and the 
critical social sciences. For him, indeed, only the critical social sciences could 
pursue the interest of reason in emancipation; this interest of reason would, in turn, 
partly be fulfilled through a critique of ideologies. At this point, he does not really 
credit the historic-hermeneutical sciences with the capacity to fulfill such a task. 
However, this a goal that Ricœur will set for himself. I will leave a more detailed 
account of Ricœur’s critical hermeneutics (and the connection of this with his 
social philosophy) for parts four and five of this thesis. But I will mention 
Ricœur’s main objection right now: 
 
First, I cannot conceive of a hermeneutics without a critical stage itself. This critical stage 
is exemplified in the development out of philology of modern structuralism and other 
objective approaches. Second, the critical sciences are themselves hermeneutical, in the 
sense that besides tending to enlarge communication they presuppose that the distortions 
of which they speak are not natural events but processes of desymbolization. The 
distortions belong to the sphere of communicative action.607 
 
Therefore, according to Ricœur, it will be up to action (guided by hermeneutics) to 
overcome these distinctions. But he downplays both Habermas’s distinction 
between the three types of sciences and his dispute with Gadamer. He sees their 
dispute as being a political one, and seems not to want this feud to spill over into 
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theory. What he does seem to take from Habermas is his own use of Freudianism 
and psychoanalysis as “depth hermeneutics”608 which is in tune with Ricœur’s 
own standpoint in Freud and Philosophy. However, he also offers a caution 
regarding the comparison between the critique of ideologies and the 
psychoanalytical relation. Indeed, he notes that psychoanalysis and the critique of 
ideologies have different criteria of success.609 Consequently, he claims that the 
parallelism can only go so far; namely, there is nothing in ideology critique 
compared to the relation between patient and physician610 except perhaps if we 
consider the critical theorist as some sort of doctor of society… but if we do, are 
we not forgetting the attention that must be directed towards actors themselves 
rather than to the alleged superior standpoint of the theorist? 
Ultimately, Ricœur is interested in putting forward his own notion of 
utopia over against ideology. And he will do this by using the social imaginary 
and a hermeneutic theory. In an article precisely called “Hermeneutics and the 
Critique of Ideology”, republished in both From Text to Action and Hermeneutics 
and the Human Sciences611 Ricœur develops his encompassing theoretical 
alternative that is supposed to go beyond Habermas’s positing of the strict 
alternative between these two theoretical endeavors. This is a fundamental article, 
to which I will come back when tackling Ricœur’s social philosophy. 
Later, in Oneself as Another Ricœur also comes back to assess 
Habermas’s ethics of discussion and takes it to be, alongside Rawls’s theory of 
justice, the greatest example of the universalist thesis.612 He then recaps the debate 
between universalism and contextualism and praises the effort to solve that debate 
with the help of an ethics of discussion and argumentation.613 Indeed, he sees in 
the application of an ethic of discussion a better solution than a purely procedural 
approach (that is, he reads the ethic of discussion as not being purely procedural, 
which is disputable…) but he criticizes the strategy of purification from 
conventions, which ultimately makes impossible the contextual mediation.614 He 
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further notes that in Habermas conventions come to take the place that inclinations 
had for Kant: they must be extirpated.615 He thus proposes to substitute the 
opposition between argumentation and convention for a dialectic between 
argumentation and conviction which will lead to his moral judgment in situation, 
some sort of reactualization of the Aristotelian phronesis. I will take a closer look 
at this in part five of this thesis. 
By now, I have reconstructed some of the main claims of Habermas’s 
critical theory and discourse theory, including the theory of communicative action. 
I did not mention his theory of deliberative democracy or his reflections on Europe 
and constitutional right, for lack of space and pertinence to this chapter. I also 
mentioned his take on conflict and its difficulties. These criticisms of Habermas’s 
take on conflict and the ultimate shortcomings of his theory notwithstanding, I still 
want to mention an important aspect of Habermas’s theory I haven’t mentioned 
yet. In the second volume of the Theory of Communicative Action he describes the 
interaction between “lifeworld” which is, for him, characterized by daily 
interactions tending towards mutual agreement, and what he calls “systems”. His 
examples of systems are mainly state and the market, which function through 
money and power. These systems bear an influence on people’s behavior that is 
ultimately independent of the efforts of communicative action; and Habermas’s 
diagnosis goes so far as to state the potential colonization of the lifeworld by these 
systems; this would entail a dire social pathology. In fact, this is Habermas’s own 
attempt at explaining reification in late capitalism; for him, reification comes 
about because of a process of abstraction brought by the media of money and 
power. 
 
This is even the model case for the colonization of the lifeworld that is behind reification 
phenomena in advanced capitalist societies. It sets in when the destruction of traditional 
forms of life can no longer be offset by more effectively fulfilling the functions of society 
as a whole. The functional ties of money and power media become noticeable only to the 
degree that elements of a private way of life and a cultural-political form of life get split 
off from the symbolic structures of the lifeworld through the monetary redefinition of 
goals, relations and services, lifespaces and life-times, and through the bureaucratization 
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of decisions, duties and rights, responsibilities and dependencies.616 
 
This can in turn lead, according to Habermas’s depiction, to a loss of meaning; 
there might be a “bureaucratic desiccation of the political public sphere” when the 
spheres of the lifeworld are totally invaded by functional imperatives of highly 
formalized domains.617 The bureaucratization and monetarization of everyday 
practices can thus have a destructive effect.618 Now, this caution indeed strikes me 
as being fundamental, and it would have a confirmation, as well as positive 
formulation, in the positing of the heterogeneity of social goods and the need to 
avoid both monopoly and dominance of one good over the others in Michael 
Walzer’s theory of justice, which I will mention in the next chapter. But let me 
now turn to the third generation of Critical Theory, and namely to Axel Honneth. 
With Honneth, whose influence in this thesis is everywhere patent, we find a 
model where conflict and struggle are granted a fundamental importance. 
 
2.1.4 – Honneth and the struggle for recognition 
 
I mention Axel Honneth and his core idea of the struggle for 
recognition619 many times in this thesis. We have already seen in part one how he 
systematically reconstructs Hegel’s tripartite model of intersubjective recognition 
of the Jena period, and in the last section I mentioned how he partially took the 
inspiration for his early theoretical endeavors from a critique of Habermas’s model 
of communication for social theory. Now I will dedicate a few pages to 
thematically analyzing his own theoretical proposals and their significance both 
for social theory and for conflict theory. I will end this section with a short 
excursus on how his social model might benefit from the intersection with other, 
                                                
616 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, p. 322. 
617 Ibid. 
618 Ibid., p. 325. 
619 Over the last few years I have presented the idea of Honneth’s struggle for recognition, mainly 
by comparing it with other similar projects on recognition, such as Taylor’s or Ricœur’s, in several 
articles. This section develops some of the ideas already contained in, for instance, Gonçalo 
Marcelo. “Consciência Moral e Reivindicação Social: em torno do paradigma do reconhecimento, 
in Actas das Primeiras Jornadas Internacionais de Jovens Investigadores de Filosofia (2009), 
available on-line at: http://www.krisis.uevora.pt/edicao/separatas_1JIJIF/Goncalo_MARCELO.pdf 
and Gonçalo Marcelo, “Paul Ricœur and the Utopia of Mutual Recognition” in Études 
Ricoeuriennes/Ricœur Studies 2,1 (2011): 110-133., available on-line at 
http://ricoeur.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/ricoeur/article/view/69.  
 221 
more strictly philosophical depictions of conflict, such as those put forward by 
Lyotard and Rancière. But first let me give a brief overview of how his social 
theory unfolded. 
In The Critique of Power, the book that stems from his doctoral thesis, 
Honneth aims at assessing the social models of both Habermas and Foucault. He 
starts off by analyzing the deficits of Adorno and Horkheimer’s take on social 
action, arguing that because they believed in a totalized model of the domination 
of nature, they were unable to grasp the specific dimension of intersubjective 
interaction.620 Accordingly, he sees in Habermas and Foucault two meaningful 
attempts to grasp the specifically social element of human interaction albeit from 
opposing standpoints: Foucault recovers the paradigm of struggle and domination 
from a system-theoretic viewpoint621, while Habermas explores the possibility of 
mutual understanding.622 From the analyzis and ultimately the critique of these 
two standpoints and their shortcomings, Honneth tries to put forward his own 
critique of power, which is both aimed at grasping the element of social 
domination and the critique thereof, but not from a systems-theoretic point of 
view. 
Deranty emphasizes how Honneth, in this book, considers that Habermas 
had lost sight of the problem of power and its maldistribution.623 Foucault, on the 
other hand, was considered as having had the merit of bringing back struggle as a 
key element for understanding the social world. He emphasizes how Foucault 
allows us to grasp the “twin dispositions of ‘power’ and ‘desire’ in which 
discourse, portrayed precisely as an omnipresent stream of linguistic events, is an 
object of strategic conflict.”624 He follows the thread of Foucault’s argument, from 
the pinpointing of the motivations of conflict to the depiction of social systems “as 
networks of social power in which knowledge formations assume the special 
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function of augmenting power”625 and from that to the ultimate diagnosis 
according to which the order of knowledge is transformed into an order of social 
power.626 What interests Honneth, however, is Foucault’s depiction of the 
diversity of power relations. The exercise of power is “an open-ended product of 
strategic conflicts between subjects” that leads to “a continuous struggle of social 
actors among themselves”.627 This is, somehow, a diagnosis of society as a locus 
of perpetual battle, reminiscent of Hobbes. One of the particularities of Foucault, 
however, is that he maintains that this happens in modern societies in a variety of 
different occasions, and not necessarily centralized by a state apparatus; this leads 
him to his project of a “microphysics of power”.628 Power, in turn, expresses itself 
in a variety of manners, from physical violence to ideological manipulation. 
Honneth ultimately concludes that Foucault falls back into a “fundamentally 
reductionistic idea of a one-sided rule of force”629 because he excludes the 
possibility of an overcoming of the situation of struggle.630 Indeed, social 
institutions come to appear as a means to exercise force. Accordingly, for 
Honneth, this will deprive social actors of the significance of their action among 
the plurality of conflict situations. Moreover, as would become clear in the 
Struggle for Recognition, Honneth argues that norms are not in themselves 
illegitimate uses of force and power (as Foucault seems to contend) and that the 
struggle is many times motivated by moral reasons. 
The topic of power and asymmetric power-relations will not be as 
important in the rest of Honneth’s work as it was in these early years. But there is 
indeed a possible complementarity between the theory of recognition (understood 
as the positive reciprocal acceptance or appreciation among social actors) and the 
analyzis of asymmetric power-relations and forms of subjectivation and 
subjectivity-formation inspired by Foucault. This lead has been followed, among 
others631, by Judith Butler. Misrecognition and power can in fact be closely tied 
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together, and a positive struggle for recognition needs to take that aspect into 
account. 
As Jean-Philippe Deranty contends, the Struggle for Recognition can be 
seen as the positive attempt to further develop some intuitions already formulated 
negatively in the Critique of Power, namely, the struggle for recognition is 
Honneth’s proposal of “what a new ‘philosophy of praxis’ maintaining the theory 
of class struggle should look like”.632 In the first book Honneth undertakes an 
immanent reconstruction of critique as it was understood in the Frankfurt School, 
showing how the “reflective stages” of prior critical theorists in a way lead to his 
own social model. Accordingly, the idea of a social theory that simultaneously 
recognizes the centrality of conflict in social life but grants actors the effective 
agency to liberate themselves from oppressing structures and damaged social 
relations, and grounds all of this in moral reasons, is precisely what Honneth 
would put forward in the most fundamental of his early books. 
I already mentioned the first chapters of the Struggle for Recognition in 
my chapter on Hegel in part one. What I want to briefly recap now is Honneth’s 
hugely influential reconstruction of the tripartite model of recognition in the 
particular mix of Hegel’s philosophy and George Herbert Mead’s social 
philosophy, and his proposal to grasp social evolution through the angle of the 
struggle for recognition. 
In a way, the idea to explain progress through the struggle for recognition 
is not new. As we have seen in the chapter on Hegel, Kojève undertook a similar 
effort. However, as we also mentioned in that chapter, Kojève’s take was 
ultimately individualistic, based in the Phenomenology of Spirit and its model of 
consciousness-formation and, even if it was constructed for political purposes and 
namely for the striving for emancipation, it was ultimately focused on 
asymmetrical relations of recognition and depicted recognition as an intrinsically 
violent and negative process, i.e., one that should be overcome. 
Honneth’s description is radically different from Kojève’s. Indeed, for 
him, recognition will be an essentially positive feature or, as Charles Taylor puts 
it, “a vital human need”.633 However, he also emphasizes the possibility of denial 
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of recognition (what he sometimes calls disrespect, but that can also assume the 
forms of social invisibility634 or reification635) but when he does he also 
systematically puts forward the possibility that social actors recover due 
recognition by exercising resistance and struggle. The result of this approach is a 
real social model of conflict, with both descriptive and normative content, and 
ultimately aiming at political goals. These goals are maybe not assumed by 
Honneth himself in the role of theoretician, but they have been forcefully put 
forward by some of his best interpreters, like Jean Philippe-Deranty and 
Emmanuel Renault636 and Honneth admits that as social theorists we have the duty 
to defend the best practices in terms of moral progress; if we do that, or so the 
claim implicitly goes, citizens can then use these goals in political terms.637 As 
such, in my opinion, Honneth’s social philosophy offers precisely what was 
missing in Habermas’s social theory: a powerful and encompassing model to grasp 
the significance of social conflict. 
In chapters four, five and six of The Struggle for Recognition Honneth 
puts forward his systematic renewal of the tripartite model of recognition. In order 
to do so in strictly postmetaphysical terms, he resorts to Mead’s social psychology. 
Mead allows him to develop an intersubjectivistic model of consciousness-
formation: “a subject can only acquire a consciousness of itself to the extent to 
which it learns to perceive its own action from the symbolically represented 
second-person perspective”.638 He follows this lead and connects it with Hegel’s 
notion of the development of a “practical relation to self” which is reflexively 
mediated, that is, dependent on the recognition of others. Mead’s distinction 
between the “I” and the “me” and between the “generalized other” and the 
“significant other” alongside Donald Winnicot’s theory of object relations and 
child development provide Honneth with a model to understand how one’s 
development and self-realization is intrinsically dependent on the meaningful 
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interaction with others and mainly with one’s “significant others”, that is, those 
that really count for us. 
As such, Honneth’s argumentation follows a double strategy, as his 
argument is put forward both in categorial and psychological / sociological terms. 
In the fifth chapter he therefore puts forward his systematic proposal of the 
patterns of intersubjective recognition, namely, love, rights and solidarity. Each of 
these spheres will be the locus of intersubjective relationships, each of which will 
garner the potentiality of developing one’s positive relation towards oneself. In 
love, rights and solidarity, the positive feelings of self-confidence, self-respect and 
self-esteem will thus develop; that is, if the relations of recognition are not 
systematically distorted or pathologically denied. This can in fact happen, and 
indeed thus do happen in many cases of what Honneth calls “disrespect”. If 
relationships of recognition unfold in primary relationships of love and friendship 
(love), legal relations (rights) and communities of value that grant esteem 
(solidarity), then the experiences of disrespect such as abuse, denial of rights, 
exclusion, or denigration and insult can compromise one’s physical or social 
integrity, or one’s dignity.639 In this matter, Honneth argues from a normative 
point of view. He claims that “every subject is free from being collectively 
denigrated, so that one is given the chance to experience oneself to be recognized, 
in light of one’s own accomplishments and abilities, as valuable for society.”640 
This means that everyone has a legitimate claim for recognition. If, in 
order to develop a healthy life, I need to be recognized at a personal level, and I 
need to have my rights and value recognized, if, in other terms, people do not go 
through life solipsistically ignoring others’ opinion and attitude towards them, 
then the consequences of the denial of recognition are dire. When faced with 
insult, humiliation, denial of rights and so forth human beings are exposed in their 
constitutive fragility. When the case is very serious (consider, for instance, 
physical rape) it can result in one’s feeling of loss of reality641 and even threaten to 
dissolve one’s own subjectivity. These types of degradations can be detected by 
the social theorist by interpreting symptoms such as “the sort of negative 
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emotional reactions expressed in feelings of social shame”.642 Now, of course, this 
can have several outcomes. If the pathology inflicted on social agents is too deep, 
people might never recover, or they cab even never be able to articulate their 
sorrows or claims for justice. However, 
 
Should actions guided by norms be repelled by situations because the norms taken to be 
valid are violated, this leads to “moral” conflicts in the social lifeworld.643 
 
Why is conflict the key to understand this process? Because victims of social 
abuse, like xenophobia, racism, denigration, bullying and so on might revolt 
against their oppressors and eventually resist. Of course that resistance might be 
individual but Honneth proposes to analyze societal development in terms of 
moral progress through collective conflict. When faced with disrespect, 
individuals can develop a feeling of indignation. But the conditions to resist will 
be improved if an individual becomes aware that his or her own situation might be 
typical for an entire group. If that happens, it just might be that the individual 
experiences of suffering and disrespect articulate and transmit themselves in such 
a way that they are understood by other people as also affecting them. Honneth 
thus speaks about a “semantic bridge between the impersonal aspirations of a 
social movement and their participants’ private experiences of injury, a bridge that 
is sturdy enough to enable the development of collective identity”.644 
As such, the violation of deeply rooted expectations regarding recognition 
can become the motivation for collective organization and resistance. In order for 
this to work, however, the conditions must be met for a shared semantics to 
encompass the members of the group: 
 
Hurt feelings of this sort can, however, become the motivational basis for collective 
resistance only if subjects are able to articulate them within an intersubjective framework 
of interpretation that they can show to be typical for an entire group. In this sense, the 
emergence of social movements hinges on the existence of a shared semantics that enables 
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personal experiences of disappointment to be interpreted as something affecting not just 
the individual himself or herself but also a circle of many other subjects.645 
 
This emphasis on shared semantics allows Honneth to partially recover 
Habermas’s insistence on communication, while at the same time arguing that it is 
conflict in society that will bring about a better situation. Whether or not this 
semantics is totally or only partially shared is not even an important point. What is 
needed is not an ideal speech situation, but rather a common agreement regarding 
the existence of an evil (insult, denigration, formal exclusion of rights, or whatever 
it is) that poses a common threat and which, therefore, needs to be removed. 
How to remove it is then a different problem but I will later argue that 
engaging in a conflict of interpretations – a process, after all, inspired by Ricœur – 
is an important way to try to overcome misrecognition. Honneth ends his book 
putting forward a “formal conception of ethical life”, that is, something more 
substantive than Kantian “thin” morality and the procedural theories that 
emphasize the deontological moment over and above the substantive good life. His 
whole theory can thus be seen as pointing out the necessary conditions for 
individual self-realization. And his whole take on the history of Western societies 
since the Enlightenment can be seen as a partial march towards a broadening of 
the spheres of recognition (for instance: social groups such as women increasingly 
saw their rights of democratic participation recognized). His standpoint is 
therefore a particular mix of optimism and realism. That is, he is confident that we 
tend, or at least can or should tend, towards the telos of a society whose members 
are duly recognized. But he does not ignore that in order for this to happen what is 
needed is a transformation of culture “so as to radically expand relations of 
solidarity”.646 He does not ignore that we might fail to attain such a goal. He does 
not have a systematic philosophy of history, such as Hegel’s, that would allow him 
to be certain of the desired outcome. And he is indeed “politically agnostic” in the 
Struggle for Recognition in that he refuses to determine what specific political 
shape such a future society could assume. But he is realistic in his 
acknowledgment of the importance of conflict in this process. Indeed, in the last 
sentence of his book, he qualifies this matter as “no longer a matter for theory but 
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rather for the future of social struggles”.647 That is, he does not expect societies to 
eventually reach an overarching consensus on these matters. Rather, he thinks it 
more likely that social groups defend their interests (for moral reasons) and that, 
through that social struggle, the desired outcome of a more just, solidary and non-
discriminatory society ensues. 
Consequently, what we find in Axel Honneth’s recognition-theoretical 
social model is a conflict theory with normative and moral grounding. In its grasp, 
it is almost as encompassing as Marx’s social theory but without, however, the 
deterministic consequences and also more geared to cultural and moral 
motivations than strictly economic ones. The impact of Honneth’s theory of 
recognition, alongside other recoveries of Hegelian recognition such as Charles 
Taylor’s or partially non-Hegelian appraisals of recognition such as Ricœur’s, has 
had a deep influence in both political philosophy and sociology in France, 
Germany and the United States. His emphasis on conflict has also been given 
much attention, even if some political philosophers such as Robin Celikates argue 
that Honneth could have been gone further in his analyzis of conflicts. In an early 
article Celikates claims that by putting the struggle for recognition under the 
banner of a possible reconciliation (even if just as a projected telos) Honneth loses 
sight of some important aspects of social conflict.648 In a more recent article, 
Celikates, together with Georg Bertram in a way go even further than Honneth in 
explicitly positing a fundamental connection between recognition and what they 
call “individuals’ capacity for conflict (Konfliktfähigkeit)”.649 Aiming to go 
beyond both what they call “positive” and “negative” conceptions of recognition 
(respectively, those that see recognition as liberating and those that see recognition 
as oppressing), they argue that any conception of recognition should be grounded 
in a generative notion of conflict. 
Moreover, Bertram and Celikates confirm my claim concerning the 
essential role of the conflict of interpretations. And they see in Honneth an 
insufficient place for this essential matter:  
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Honneth bars himself from being able to articulate his negative insight in a positive way. 
By contrast, a conflictual understanding of recognition must conceive precisely agents’ 
entering into conflicts as acts of recognition that can become the objects of further 
interpretations and novel negotiations in the course of these conflicts.650 
 
These authors go on to argue that conflict is the generative motor of recognitive 
relations in that in order for these to be established, social actors have to be able to 
negotiate them through conflict: 
 
Something central and essential becomes intelligible at this juncture: Relations of 
recognition are established and (con-)tested in and through conflicts. Conflicts cannot be 
conceived as what drives differentiation, nor merely as what initiates the reinterpretation 
of norms of recognition and thereby the extension of relations of recognition. Rather, 
conflicts are interactions between individuals or groups through which relations of 
recognition are actualized in the first place and must always be constituted anew time and 
again. Accordingly, relations of recognition are only realized when individuals or groups 
are capable of negotiating divergent normative claims.651 
 
This standpoint has the merit of showing a constitutive power of conflict. To be 
sure, it is not that recognition is a negative phenomenon, or that there cannot be 
recognition without strife. There certainly can be such a state, at least temporarily. 
Perhaps in a situation akin to what Ricœur calls the “clearings” of recognition, its 
“states of peace”. But Bertram and Celikates are right to pinpoint this much: the 
way recognition unfolds is many times through conflict. When someone puts 
forward certain claims, when he or she wants to be recognized, there is an inherent 
call for the recognition of the validity of those claims (as Habermas would put it). 
And the way this is played out is certainly in a conflictive manner. Argumentation 
entails contradiction, and contradiction, in turn, leads to a conflict of 
interpretations. 
The force of this reconstruction of relations of recognition through 
conflict is that even though conflict plays a role, it is not in itself necessarily a 
negative or pejorative role. These are not asymmetrical relations of recognition as 
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domination, as they were found in Kojève’s standpoint. Rather, there is here a 
certain “virtue of conflict” – to use Hunyadi’s formulation which I will turn to in a 
moment – because it is conflict that properly constitutes the relations of 
recognition themselves. 
There are other tensions, twists and turns in Honneth’s take on 
recognition, which I will only be able to mention very briefly, for lack of space. 
For instance, the fact that he makes of the striving for recognition the single, 
overarching motivation for social struggles might in itself be problematic. Nancy 
Fraser’s more nuanced approach, firstly presented under a dual aspect of cultural 
struggles for recognition and economic struggles for redistribution in her debate 
with Honneth652, and afterwards assuming the shape of a tripartite model where 
the topic of representation is added to those of recognition and redistribution653, 
seems best equipped to capture the plurality of motivations driving conflict and 
struggles among social actors. 
I will leave aside many very important aspects of Honneth’s theory of 
recognition, such as a more systematic exploration of the forms the negative 
deprivation of recognition assume within his theory, as for example the critique of 
social invisibility, reification, and the whole account of social pathologies. Instead, 
I will just mention in a very succinct manner the latest developments of his theory 
of recognition and namely the way in which the mature Honneth is now inspired 
by the mature Hegel, like the early Honneth was also inspired by the early Hegel. 
Indeed, roughly eight years after the publication of The Struggle for 
Recognition, Honneth began a systematic recovery of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. 
A first systematic attempt to recover it was put forward in Suffering from 
Indeterminacy654 and the more recent Das Recht der Freiheit, published in 2011, 
can be seen as an ambitious attempt to ground democratic ethical life in a recovery 
of Hegel’s philosophy of right. 
This last book is Honneth’s most important publication in twenty years, 
that is, the single most encompassing book since The Struggle of Recognition. It 
marks the transition from an intersubjective notion of recognition grounded on 
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social movements to an institutional idea of recognition leading up to the idea of 
democratic ethical life and revolving around the social realization of freedom. At 
the moment I am writing these lines the book is about to be published in English 
translation, with translations in several other languages to follow. As such, it is 
still too soon to grasp the significance of its reception worldwide, or the way in 
which it will meaningfully reshape recognition studies in philosophy and social 
theory. 
I will offer a few cursive remarks on the book. Honneth takes a 
distinction between three types of freedom as his point of departure: negative 
freedom655 (drawn from Hobbes), reflexive freedom656 (the model of Rousseau 
and Kant, close to procedural models) and social, substantive freedom657 (also 
called communicative freedom), inspired by Hegel. According to Honneth, each of 
these types of freedom develops a certain type of institution and leads to a certain 
type of justice. Negative freedom is individual freedom, that is, freedom from 
outside coercion over me. 
According to Honneth we understand the modern framework according to 
these three types of freedom. Negative freedom grounds individual rights; 
reflexive freedom, which entails self-consciousness, is tied to ideals of authenticity 
and of acting according to one own intentions – i.e., it proceeds according to the 
criteria of autonomous self-determination. In its version suitable for political 
philosophy, it leads to procedural attempts at defining collective will-formation. 
Social freedom, on the other hand, emphasizes the institutional forms that make 
the individual exercise of freedom itself possible. The fact that social freedom is 
intersubjective and can be institutionalized allows it to escape the specific type of 
social pathology which came to be known by Post-Hegelians as “atomism”. In 
fact, my own freedom can only be instantiated within a meaningful framework of 
interaction. 
One of Honneth’s goals is to assess the processes of democratic will-
formation658 in their many forms. In so doing he is “reconstructing” the normative 
ideals according to which these processes could function properly and thereby also 
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criticizing actually existing processes and practices when they do not correspond 
to these ideals. However, since this is an immanent critique he is wanting to put 
forward, these are not abstract ideals, the best set of possible ideals, procedurally 
established through a constructivist technique. Rather, his reconstructivist 
approach consists in taking up already-existing norms and ideals (which have a 
certain degree of normative consensus among us) and then to pit existing practices 
against these ideals, in order to be able to identify pathologies and distortions in 
these practices, when compared to the ideals we already accept. 
In his analyzis of social freedom and the conditions thereof we will once 
again find the spheres and patterns of recognition. Alongside friendship, family, 
and other forms that the pattern of love assumes, we find, for instance, the market, 
conceived, as it was in Hegel, as a system of needs. The main emphasis will be on 
personal relationships, economic interactions and ultimately the public sphere. 
Each sphere of mutual recognition will be a social form in which we can actualize 
freedom. Consequently, he is putting forward a somewhat thick, substantive 
conception of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). One of the main guiding threads of this last 
work is, accordingly, the determination of those conditions without which my own 
freedom is not possible at all. In this, he follows Hegel’s delimitation of objective 
spirit; that is, our own subjective freedom, framed by the intersubjective 
framework of the patterns of recognition, is in itself anchored in the institutional 
norms that grant it a somewhat objective existence. 
Louis Carré in a recent work has emphasized how we can find a 
continuity between Honneth’s early insistence on the struggle for recognition and 
his mature idea of the institutionalization of recognition and its inner ties with 
social freedom. This unity of his work is, according to Carré, to be found in a 
longstanding commitment to democratic ethical life.659 And this, in spite of the 
shift of emphasis, which he sums up in the following terms: “the interpersonal 
relations of recognition are now inscribed in a web of institutions. If, in The 
Struggle for Recognition he seemed to assume that the modes of recognition 
always go beyond their concrete modes of institutionalization, Honneth now takes 
                                                
659 See Louis Carré, Axel Honneth: Le droit de la reconnaissance (Paris: Michalon, 2013), p. 115. 
 233 
as his point of departure the assumption that the relations of recognition can only 
be grasped by the institutions of modern ethical life.”660 
Ultimately, Honneth does not believe that Modernity and its institutions 
were successful in embodying the perfect forms of freedom and recognition; he 
still wants to spell out a social critique, but these normative guidelines seem to 
provide him with the yardstick with which he can measure actually existing 
reality. And this not by comparing reality with an imaginary yardstick or invented 
norms but, to reiterate, by comparing already-accepted norms with actually 
existing practices. This means that he must implicitly accept the standpoint of the 
possibility of moral progress posited in The Struggle for Recognition. As Carré 
puts it “the ideal of a ‘democratic ethical life’ is not only behind us as something 
that we have inherited from Modernity but also and for the most part ahead of us, 
as a project to be sought after.”661 In this sense, both the task of Critical Theory as 
the fulfillment of a practical project of emancipation, and the hope that this can 
come from the agency of social actors themselves is something which in my 
opinion we can still find in Honneth’s mature theory. He reserves the more critical 
remarks of his book for the contemporary configurations of market-mediated 
interactions and democracy in the public sphere. In this, he actually comes closer 
to authors who, like Habermas as we have seen, were pessimistic concerning the 
threats of colonization of the lifeworld and those who, like Walzer as we shall see 
in the next chapter, assert the need for a heterogeneity of social goods in order to 
protect us from commodification and marked domination. 
The book is expected to provoke a meaningful reception in the years to 
come. But because no translation has been published until now, I can only mention 
in a few words the inception of this reception. As of this moment, and to my 
knowledge, the only dossier in English critically engaging it (and including a reply 
by Honneth) has been organized and recently published by Robin Celikates and 
Beate Rössler.662 From all the critical objections raised against Honneth (to his 
theoretical framework, different aspects of social freedom, his take on the 
economy and democratic will-formation) allow me to mention Joel Anderson’s 
interesting reading of the way in which Honneth puts forward his notion of social 
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freedom.663 Anderson underscores that in Honneth’s account social freedom is a 
fragile, vulnerable accomplishment; and this because its constitution is menaced 
by pathology-generating ideologies. Anderson reconstructs the claim as follows: 
“There are institutionalized understandings of freedom that function, as ideologies, 
to thwart attempts to realize (shared) self-understandings of our interdependence, 
thereby undermining the possibilities for realizing the forms of social freedom that 
these interdependencies call for. These ideologies involve the notion that social 
freedom is not necessary, not possible, and/or dangerous – dismissals that are 
reinforced by a wide array of cultural, social, and institutional forces.”664 
Accordingly, Honneth’s version of the critique of ideologies assumes the 
form of a critique of those systematic attempts to make us forget the intrinsically 
social and intersubjective nature of recognition and freedom. Anderson notes that 
the majority of examples Honneth provides of movements and developments that 
seem to counteract this tendency and to bring about a more concrete realization of 
justice are taken from the past: 20th century labor movements, the political 
communication of the early years of the press, and so on. But Anderson then asks: 
“where should social critics and social movements situate the emancipatory 
imaginary?”665 What he aims to disclose are the new sites through which social 
freedom can instantiate itself. Without this, Anderson claims, we risk falling back 
into a “sentimental mode of utopianism” that risks blocking out the “innovative 
potential of new developments”.666 He thus challenges Honneth’s account, arguing 
that we need new examples (if there are any) of this sort of instantiation of 
positive social freedom, as well as a sort of new compass to navigate the different 
types of freedom that Honneth’s book unveils. That is, he argues that, on some 
occasions, other types of freedom (for instance, negative freedom) can be the right 
type of freedom to exercise in particular circumstances of our life. Ultimately, he 
argues that what is missing from Honneth’s account is a description of the 
capacities that social agents need in order to be able to move between these 
different types of freedom. So that we can do that, we might need some sort of 
autonomous agency, one that would allows us to adapt the right kind of freedom to 
the meaningful context at hand. 
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In his response to the contributors to the dossier organized by Celikates 
and Rössler, and concerning the objections raised by Anderson, Honneth concedes 
that he “did not sufficiently focus on recent counter-movements and innovative 
projects in the spheres of the market and of democratic politics”667 and he 
mentions Erik Olin Wright’s Envisioning Real Utopias668 as providing meaningful 
examples of which he was not aware when writing his book. In my opinion, and 
even though I will not sufficiently ground this claim here, the contemporary uses 
of the internet, and the widespread rejection of the abuses of late capitalism and 
the colonization of the lifeworld by a financial stranglehold, apparent in the 
Occupy and the Indignados movements, could perhaps count as meaningful 
examples of what Anderson is looking for. And these “real utopian” efforts could 
indeed be something akin to the practical complement of a social imaginary 
which, since Castoriadis and Ricœur, has perhaps not been give due attention. 
Ultimately, as I think is now very clear, Honneth’s social model, in spite 
of the critiques that have been leveled against it, is perhaps the more 
encompassing and ambitious social model to account both for positive 
intersubjective interaction and the conflictual processes that lead up to it. From the 
struggle for recognition to the critique of ideology, Honneth does see conflict as a 
generative moment; besides, by spelling out his proposal in strictly post-
metaphysical and moral terms, he provides an account of action within a 
theoretical framework that we can accept in our day and age. He rejects the 
deterministic temptations of both Hegel and Marx, while retaining something of 
their social models and dynamics. In spite of the occasional insufficiencies of his 
theory, I must avow that as is now apparent, his model is the one, alongside that of 
Ricœur, from which I draw the most, in my reconstruction of contemporary social 
conflict. 
There are, of course, ways to deepen his take on conflict and carry it 
further. This can be done, for instance, by way of a meaningful connection with 
other accounts of conflict, mainly in contemporary French philosophy, and namely 
with Lyotard’s notion of differend (différend), and Rancière’s depiction of 
political disagreement (mésentente). Jean-François Lyotard and Jacques Rancière 
are not Critical Theorists stricto sensu. But insofar as their works brought 
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meaningful contributions to political philosophy, they can be of fertile use for the 
depiction of conflict and for possible different applications of critique. 
Lyotard in fact sees language itself as an inherently conflictual 
phenomenon. Taking Wittgenstein’s analyzes of language games669 as an 
inspiration, he disputes the emphasis on communication and the priority of 
consensus over conflict; indeed, he claims that conflict “results from phrases” and 
that at bottom there is not a language at peace with itself. What in fact exists are 
differends between genres of discourse and we do not usually acknowledge it 
because “in the matter of language, the revolution of relativity and of quantum 
theory remains to be made.”670 
The point to be emphasized however is not the relativism of Lyotard’s 
philosophy of language itself; rather it is his insistence on the irreducible character 
of the differend and the way it plays itself out when what is at stake are the tragic 
situations of those who are the most fragile. In the beginning of The Differend 
Lyotard invokes Auschwitz and the gas chambers. Speaking about the 
impossibility of the victims to communicate the wrong (tort) done to them, 
Lyotard explains: 
 
This is what a wrong [tort] would be: a damage [dommage] accompanied by the loss of 
the means to prove the damage. This is the case if the victim is deprived of life, or of all 
his or her liberties, or of the freedom to make his or her ideas or opinions public, or 
simply of the right to testify to the damage, or even more simply if the testifying phrase is 
itself deprived of authority. (…) In all of these cases, to the privation constituted by the 
damage there is added the impossibility of bringing it to the knowledge of others. And in 
particular to the knowledge of a tribunal.671 
 
What Lyotard stresses is thus the possibility of such dire social conditions, that 
those who suffer from them are thereby excluded from the possibility of 
articulating their experience in a discursive manner and cannot express them in a 
communicative fashion. Accordingly, what we have left is the possibility of 
testimony, as a means to respond to the differend. The differend, in practical 
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terms, takes place when “the plaintiff is divested of the means to argue and 
becomes for that reason a victim”.672 Usually, when there is a differend between 
parties, Lyotard argues, “regulation” of that conflict is done “in the idiom of one 
of the parties while the wrong suffered by the other is not signified in that 
idiom”.673 The traditional example, taken up by Lyotard, is that of the labor 
contract as seen by the Marxist standpoint: when regulating labor, the worker as 
the weaker part in the establishment of the contract, is forced to deal with his 
working capabilities as if they were a commodity, thereby adopting the terms of 
the employer. 
Therefore, when faced with a differend (in these practical terms), what 
can we do? Yves Cusset674 has forcefully shown that there is a similarity between 
Lyotard’s analyzes of the situation of the extreme victims of the differend and the 
profound loss of subjectivation which cripples those who suffer from extreme 
forms of disrespect, as they were identified by Honneth’s early philosophy. He 
thus proposes, following Honneth, that there is actually a normative backdrop 
against which to situate Lyotard’s notions of wrong and differend; if we take the 
extreme forms of wrong committed against the victims as an ethically 
unacceptable situation, then what is called for is an ethics of testimony, of those 
who can testify for the victims and, when possible, to reestablish the conditions of 
communication they were deprived of. According to Cusset, the task of such a 
project would be a radical struggle against disrespect; we would need to “invent a 
language open to the most radical experiences of human desubjectivation, where 
the demand for recognition no longer makes sense. Let us call such an idiom the 
language of testimony.”675 Such a project can be an ethical complement to the 
politics of recognition, and indeed we find ethical parallels to such a proposal in 
both Levinas and Ricœur. 
Jacques Rancière, for his part, puts forward his notion of mésentente, 
which is a term difficult to translate, but that is usually translated into English as 
(political) disagreement or, exploring another sense of the word, 
misunderstanding. Rancière’s standpoint is similar to Lyotard’s, but at the same 
                                                
672 Ibid., §12, p. 9. 
673 Ibid. 
674 See Yves Cusset, “Lutter pour la reconnaissance et/ou témoigner du différend: le mépris, entre 
tort et reconnaissance” in Où en est la théorie critique?, edited by Emmanuel Renault and Yves 
Sintomer (Paris: La Découverte, 2003), pp. 201-216. 
675 Ibid., p. 213 [My translation]. 
 238
time departs from it as both Jean-Louis Deotte676 and João Pedro Cachopo677 have 
shown. Unlike Lyotard, Rancière does not see differend as being the result of 
modernity’s explosion of small-scale narratives. Rather, he sees disagreement as 
being constitutive of politics, as what separates it from juridical and commercial 
exchange.678 He explicitly assumes the standpoint of political philosophy and even 
argues that there might be an occlusion of the specific political element by the 
social. He argues that there might be “an evacuation of the political by its official 
representatives”.679 For him, philosophy is precisely defined by a “mark of a 
specific paradox, conflict, aporia”680; he also considers that philosophy becomes 
political when it embraces the aporia. According to him, politics is the exercise of 
equality (or the search thereof) but the principle of equality is in turn dependent on 
a system of community shares: “when is there and when is there not equality in 
things between who and who else?”681 
And this is for him a typical matter for disagreement. He claims that 
“disagreement bears on what it means to be a being that uses words to argue”682; it 
thus points towards a situation in which the object of discussion itself and the 
capacity of those who enter the discussion is in dispute. He therefore calls for a 
“rationality of disagreement”683 that will in fact grant to the political agents a 
stronger degree of agency than Lyotard allowed for. In fact, as we have seen, 
sometimes people cannot articulate discursively their situation, which might in 
fact consist in a situation of suffering. Rancière recovers Aristotle’s distinction 
between discourse and voice (phoné). While speech expresses (and thus 
distinguishes good from evil), voice merely indicates.684 But what it indicates 
inarticulately, can very well be expressions of feelings (even of those such as 
indignation, or suffering). Accordingly, a radical misunderstanding takes place 
when, following the specific partition of the perceptible that guides each situation, 
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one person cannot understand the other because, according to the judgment of the 
first person, what the other utters is not meaningful discourse, but rather only 
inarticulate voice. As Cachopo explains in a footnote, the Mésentente can 
therefore describe the situation when we do not hear or understand what the other 
is saying, that is, when we “talk past each other”.685 
The conclusions are obvious. As Deotte puts it: “if slaves, paupers and 
the disenfranchised are unintelligible, if what they express arises more from a cry 
than from an argumentative speech, then the outcome will nearly always be a 
foregone conclusion.”686 The problem occurs because the social distribution has 
already determined those who count and those who do not. Thus Rancière concurs 
with Honneth’s diagnosis of social invisibility of the disenfranchised. However, 
the specific intervention that Rancière allows for is precisely one of a 
redistribution of the perceptible or, more literally, the sensible (his famous notion 
of the partage du sensible) which also calls for a redefinition of what and who 
counts or does not count in the political sphere. 
This brings us to his definition of political intervention. Rancière 
proposes to call to the distribution of places and roles in society, and to the 
legitimation of that established order, police.687 This is what Ricœur would call 
ideology. Over against the emphasis on consensus, Rancière chooses to define 
politics as the alteration of those places and roles, in such a way that the 
disenfranchised come to count: “Politics does not exist because men, through the 
privilege of speech, place their interests in common. Politics exists because those 
who have no right to be counted as speaking beings make themselves of some 
account.”688 This is probably akin to what Ricœur would consider a shattering of 
ideology through initiative, inspired by utopia. Politics, for Rancière, is whatever 
breaks with that pre-established unjust configuration.689 For him, however, the 
goal of politics seems to be always more or less the same: that is, to (re)establish 
equality. 
One of the main differences between Lyotard and Rancière, resides in the 
fact that Lyotard insists, more than Rancière, in the fact that conflict (in this case, 
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his version of the differend) ultimately resides in an opposition of genres of 
discourse, whereas Rancière traces back the origin of conflict (as mésentente) to 
what counts or does not count as legitimate speech and, as I just mentioned, what 
that tells us about the role each person occupies in society. As a result the, let us 
say, “solutions” to both these forms of conflict will be different. Whereas Lyotard 
proposed only that we bear witness, or testimony, to the differends, Rancière 
seems to offer a more optimistic solution, in that he sees politics as precisely a 
way to change society and gear it towards greater equality. As Cachopo puts it, 
“the question is how and to what extent those concepts enable us not only to 
account for certain situations of political conflict (in which “language” and 
“power” seem to merge into each other), but also to influence those taking part in 
such situations by means of changing the way in which one understands the 
situation and imagines its very changeability (or “treatability”).”690 
Anticipating a small part of the course of conflict we will see with 
Ricœur in the next three parts of this dissertation, we could almost say that for 
Lyotard the main source of conflict is always language, and thus his diagnosis is 
of an almost perpetual conflict of interpretations; and when it happens that social 
actors are afflicted by a crushing loss of subjectivity, what we can do is at most 
bear witness to their situation. As for Rancière, the conflict of interpretations will 
certainly be grounded in a prior practical conflict – and an unjust apportionment of 
roles in society – and will as such be given a possible practical (in his case, 
political) solution. Deotte therefore summarizes the difference between Lyotard’s 
and Rancière’s approach as follows: “Thus, in contrast to Lyotard, Rancière 
assumes that every voice is potentially articulable, and thus that the wrong that 
exists because of the difference between voice and speech can be transformed into 
litigation.”691 This litigation, in turn, through politics and political discourse, can 
ultimately tend to transform society and the social order. Cachopo concludes that 
Rancière’s “analysis of politics culminates in the disclosure of the pure 
contingency of any social order”.692 Ricœur reached the same conclusion in 1975 
in the Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, and his remarks on basic metaphoricity in 
                                                
690 Cachopo, “Disagreeing before acting”, p. 69. 
691 Deotte, op. cit., p. 80. 
692 Cachopo, p. 171. 
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The Rule of Metaphor actually provide an insight into the way any given (social or 
otherwise) order might indeed be only metaphoric and thus open to revision. 
Coming back to Honneth, the way in which his recognition-theoretical 
model can meaningfully intersect with Rancière’s depiction of politics and 
disagreement has been put forward by Jean-Philippe Deranty in an early article. In 
“Mésentente et lutte pour la reconnaissance”693 Deranty, like Celikates, 
emphasizes how in certain aspects, Honneth’s model is closer to reconciliation 
than to conflict. In other articles, as I mentioned, he pleads for a political use of 
Honneth’s theory. In this particular article, Deranty argues that Honneth should 
pay more attention to “the tragic, the non-reconciled, the non-resolved alienation 
that everywhere threats each of the intersubjective recognition and reconciliation 
forms in Hegel.”694 He also perceives a danger of reification of social hierarchies 
in the struggle for recognition because, as he sees it, Honneth sometimes seems to 
take identities as stable and already constituted. He therefore thinks that a greater 
degree of questioning of these identities is needed, in order for emancipation to be 
attained. As he puts it: “in order for the quest for recognition to produce political 
effects, that is, effects that are really egalitarian, we need for social identities to be 
blurred, forgotten or negated.”695 He thus seems to want the social order not to be 
too tightly scripted, even in terms of the constitution of social identities. And 
while he allows that Honneth’s model is the best, most encompassing framework 
for the struggle for recognition, he wants to see it corrected by Rancière’s 
insistence on equality and the different partition of the sensible needed to attain 
real emancipation. He also sees in Rancière a good description of the relation 
between the individual and the social elements, and an emphasis on the political 
intervention needed to bring about change. 
Ultimately, we can say that Honneth balances between conflict and 
conciliation. The same can be said, as we shall see later, about Ricœur. In 
Honneth’s case, conflict in the shape of the struggle for recognition is evidently 
the motor that brings, or at least creates the potential to bring about, moral and 
social progress. He also gives an account of the situations of disrespect and the 
potential destruction they foster. But each step ultimately points towards possible 
                                                
693 See Jean-Philippe Deranty, “Mésentente et lutte pour la reconnaissance: Honneth face à 
Rancière” in Où en est la théorie critique, op. cit., pp. 185-199. 
694 Ibid., p. 191 [My translation]. 
695 Ibid., p. 195. 
 242
reconciliations through recognition and communicative freedom, either through 
meaningful intersubjective relations, or the institutionalization of recognition. As 
we saw, his social model can be complemented by approaches such as those of 
Lyotard and Rancière, which allow us to grasp what happens when the conflict 
and the lack of communication is so dire that the disenfranchised cannot be 
understood. Personally, I also interpret his proposal for social change in positive 
terms, and I emphasize the agency put on social actors that might eventually allow 
them to overcome their sometimes dire situation. As such, I agree with Deranty’s 
and Renault’s proposal to politicize his model of recognition. But in the same 
manner he has been criticized, on one side, for allegedly not making enough space 
for conflict, he was also criticized, on the other side, by supposedly not making 
enough room for conciliation and peace. 
This was, curiously enough, Ricœur’s critique to Honneth, and I will 
mention it only in passing now, because I will develop it more substantively in 
part five of this thesis. In The Course of Recognition, and after accepting 
Honneth’s reconstruction of Hegel’s philosophy of the Jena period, Ricœur comes 
to grips with the model of the struggle for recognition. After depicting and lauding 
its merits, Ricœur will, as so often in his work when analyzing the contributions of 
other authors, also try to find a limit for it. Consequently, he proposes a reading 
which is somehow resonant of Jean Wahl’s reading of the unhappy consciousness 
in Hegel. In his own words: 
 
Does not the claim for affective, juridical, and social recognition, through its militant, 
conflictual style, end up as an indefinite demand, a kind of "bad infinity"? This question 
has to do not only with the negative feelings that go with a lack of recognition, but also 
with the acquired abilities, thereby handed over to an insatiable quest. The temptation here 
is a new form of the "unhappy consciousness," as either an incurable sense of 
victimization or the indefatigable postulation of unattainable ideals.696 
 
This does not mean, of course, that Ricœur does not sufficiently take conflict into 
account in the Course of Recognition, or that he eventually rejects Honneth’s 
model. But he would ultimately propose that the collaboration involved in the 
                                                
696 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, p. 218. 
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conciliatory states of recognition be more granted than demanded, more voluntary 
than obligatory. This will be his proposal concerning the “states of peace”. 
I will come back to this later. For now, allow me to summarize what we 
have seen with Honneth in this section. We have seen how Honneth starts his 
career with an attempt to go beyond Habermas’s insistence on the paradigm of 
communication for social theory. In his early theory, he does this by insisting on 
the importance of analyzes of power (with the help of Foucault) and by putting the 
model of struggle as the meaningful motor of social evolution and even moral 
progress. This is done by insisting that the single, most encompassing framework 
for understanding the motivation of social actors and the possibility of resistance 
to socially degrading circumstances is the framework of the struggle for 
recognition unfolding in several different spheres. Ultimately, his model evolves 
towards the idea of institutions of recognition stemming around the idea of the 
social realization of freedom. His standpoint is always intersubjectivistic and if he 
ultimately comes to recover the importance of communication (mostly through the 
notion of communicative freedom) and of social integration through recognition, 
conflict does not cease to play a role in the way the patterns of recognition and 
interaction keep changing and evolving. So conflict plays an essential role in his 
theory, from the analyzes of power to the transformation of the spheres of 
recognition. And if I tried to resort to many different interpreters to complement 
and partially correct his own positions, I do see his model as essential for today’s 
social theory and conflict theory. 
Ultimately, we could describe what I am doing in this thesis by resorting 
to the vocabulary of the next author whose contribution I shall analyze in the next 
few pages. What I am doing is depicting a certain “virtue” of conflict, that is, a 
certain positive function to it, in its many forms. Because he was also marked by 
the Critical Theory tradition I will end my chapter on Critical Theory with a brief 
analyzis of Mark Hunyadi’s contribution.  
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2.1.5 – Hunyadi and the virtue of conflict 
 
Mark Hunyadi’s first book, stemming from his doctoral thesis and 
published in 1995 under the title La vertu du conflit697 provides a fresh and 
original take on the relevance of conflict for practical philosophy. As such, and 
because the application of conflict that is put forward in this book is both fertile 
and different from all the other standpoints we have seen up until now, it makes 
sense to mention it in our concise cartography of the uses of conflict in 
contemporary philosophy. 
In the brief foreword to the book, Hunyadi sums up in a few words his 
standpoint. He wants to put forward a moral point of view whose origin is strictly 
human – even immanent and post-metaphysical, we could say – but universalist 
and attentive to the context of application of human practices.698 Hunyadi’s 
emphasis lies in the normativity of rules, that is, their legitimacy and validity. His 
starting point and in fact the backdrop of the whole book is a tacit discussion with 
Wittgenstein, one in which conflict plays a fundamental role. 
In the famous §217 of his Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein 
argued for a pragmatic take on rules and rule following. He stated that when I 
answer the question “How I am able to follow a rule” what I am doing is justifying 
the particular way I act; and “once I have exhausted the justifications, I have 
reached bedrock, and my spade is turned”; his conclusion is that in that moment I 
must acknowledge that “This is simply what I do”.699 This is of course a 
conclusion stemming from (if not a mere variation of) Wittgenstein’s claim 
according to which “meaning is use”. It is an application of that principle to the 
practical domain. The corollary to this could be that we should not strive to find 
justifications because, as the popular adage says, “it is what it is”. This is, in fact, a 
version of Nietzsche’s amor fati; but the tragic consequences of this claim for the 
domain of human action is their quietist attitude. To know that I follow a rule just 
because I act in a certain way still does not tell me anything about whether or not I 
should follow that rule. 
                                                
697 Mark Hunyadi, La vertu du conflit. Pour une morale de la médiation (Paris: Cerf, 1995). 
698 “L’hypothèse qui guide le présent travail vise à établir que l’on peut, sans recourir à aucun 
élément extérieur aux pratiques humaines elles-mêmes, établir un point de vue moral qui soit à la 
foi universel et respectueux de l’infinie diffraction qui caractérise ces pratiques.” Hunyadi, La 
vertu du conflit, p. 7. 
699 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §217, p. 91. 
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With this is mind, Hunyadi sets out to find a way to pinpoint the 
normativity of rules. He agrees with Wittgenstein concerning the intersubjective 
nature of rules: a rule cannot be followed by one man alone, it demands a plurality 
of users. But the descriptive take on the rule only confirms what it is that I do, or 
that the rule prescribes. Nonetheless, in order to see whether or not the rule is 
correct, to unveil its hidden normativity – or even to assess whether or not its 
claim to be normative is legitimate – Hunyadi argues that we need to dispute its 
validity.700 As such, the task will be, at least in a first approach, to attack the 
positive content of the norm. Hunyadi thus subverts Wittgenstein’s metaphor: 
what is needed is not to look at this positivity like an unbreakable bedrock, but 
actually see what happens when it (i.e., the positive content of the rule) indeed 
breaks.701 
For the purposes of our cartography of conflict, the most interesting 
chapter of Hunyadi’s book is the first one702, which assumes the status of a 
conceptual clarification. He decides to name it “the illuminating force of conflict” 
and from the title alone we can grasp its programmatic character. He compares 
Wittgenstein’s take on the positivity of rule-following with Pierre Bourdieu’s 
notion of habitus. He follows Bourdieu’s assertion that, for the most part, 
institutions and norms operate under the mode of facticity.703 But to take a rule at 
face value evidently does not tell us anything about its validity. Hunyadi’s bold 
move, and which in fact sums up, in a nutshell, the main argument of the book is 
that conflict, by imposing a distanciation between the rule and its factual 
existence, unveils its normativity: 
 
It is precisely at this moment that the heuristic force of dissensus comes into play. This 
force, which goes from simple differend to war reveals – almost in the photographic sense 
of this term – a hidden aspect of rule-governed intersubjective mediations. By 
highlighting differences in points of view, opinions, interpretations, interests, utilities, 
                                                
700 “lorsqu’on conteste une règle, on ne conteste pas forcément sa signification ; au contraire, on la 
suppose connue, sans quoi on ne pourrait pas la contester. On la conteste donc dans une autre 
dimension, qui est celle de sa validité. Or, c’est le conflit qui sert de révélateur à cette dimension de 
validité ou de normativité que Wittgenstein n’a pas considérée ; c’est le conflit qui, révélant un 
désaccord au sujet de la règle telle qu’elle vaut factuellement (sa positivité), met en évidence sa 
normativité.” Hunyadi, La vertu du conflit, p. 8. 
701 Ibid. 
702 Hunyadi, “La force éclairante du conflit” in La vertu du conflit, pp. 9-31. 
703 Ibid., p. 15. 
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convictions, intuitions, dissensus sheds the factual evidence of what is valid because it is 
the case. In that, it activates the normative dimension which is inherent to rules.704 
 
There is thus, according to Hunyadi, a disclosing function in conflict. To be sure, 
Hunyadi is not telling us that a rule is not valid because it happens to exist. But 
what he is saying is that it is not sufficient for a rule to exist in order for it to be 
legitimate. Its contestation, i.e., putting it to the test by forcing it to undergo – let 
us use the Ricoeurian formula – a conflict of interpretations is in fact, for Hunyadi, 
the only way to assert its validity. I strongly agree with this claim and it is 
apparent that Hunyadi is here close to Ricœur’s notion of the conflict of 
interpretations, even though he does not explicitly mention it. 
As we shall see when I directly address the notion of social philosophy in 
the last chapters of this thesis, the conflict of interpretations can be put to a use 
which is similar to the function Hunyadi attributes to conflict in La vertu du 
conflit. According to him, once there is a transition from the factual to the 
normative standpoint, it undergoes a transformation.705 Conflict transforms rules. 
Even though a consensus might be reached (after the conflictual process of 
disputing the rule), the rule will have been transformed because it will cease to be 
merely factual and it will have become grounded in a normative manner. 
Consequently, we can even speak about a generative power of conflict. 
This does not mean that a consensus or a mediation does not need to be 
reached. Indeed, for Hunyadi (as for Habermas), it does. In chapter two Hunyadi 
therefore puts forward a “pragmatics of mediation”706 in which he distinguishes 
different types of rules (constitutive, practical, technical, prescriptive and 
categorial rules) and their different relations towards practices. Thus constitutive 
rules, for instance, are those that create the practices they rule; without those rules, 
the practices governed by them would not exist. However, all rules are, to an 
extent, both constitutive and prescriptive, even though they can be ranged in 
several ideal types, and this is something Hunyadi strives to do.707 Each type of 
rule sends us back to a different type of practice and to a different type of 
                                                
704 Ibid., p. 16 [my translation] 
705 Ibid., p. 17. 
706 Hunyadi, “Pragmatique de la médiation” in La vertu du conflit, pp. 33-83. 
707 See the table in page 47 for a brief outlook of the several types of rules and their respective 
constitutive and prescriptive dimensions. 
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intersubjective relation grounding that practice. Hunyadi explicitly claims that the 
normativity of rules sprouts from the concrete intersubjectivity which forms a 
specific type of community.708 And it is always within that same community that a 
solution for the conflict can be sought after. 
As such, if rules and conflicts originate in an intersubjective community 
of practices and values, and if indeed conflict is both necessary and eventually 
needs to be overcome, we thus need a solution for it. And this is what Hunyadi, 
following a long tradition, calls mediation. His move is, however, to emphasize 
the importance of mediation in practical philosophy: at this point in time, he calls 
for the establishment of a “morality of mediation”. Thus in the third and final 
chapter of this book, entitled “Le principe de la médiation”709 Hunyadi explicitly 
defines morality as an effort to deal with conflicts and solve them: 
 
Morality is not so much connected to specific objects (the just, the good) as it is tied to the 
solution of conflicts in general. Insofar as the normativity of the rule is activated by 
conflict and the heuristic force of the latter resides in its capacity to manifest the level of 
concrete intersubjectivity in which is rooted the agreement that validates rule, it is conflict 
– insofar as it manifests diverging aspirations – that becomes the core of morality as 
such.710 
 
This leads him to conclude that a moral conflict is not necessarily a conflict 
dealing with such and such a specific object (what is good or just, etc.) but that, on 
the other hand, every conflict has a moral dimension since, to reiterate, it awakens 
the normativity of rules because it highlights the “recognition claims of diverging 
aspirations”.711 
Accordingly, Mark Hunyadi posits a pragmatics of conflict mediation as 
the main task that addresses morality. And he is indeed focusing on recognition 
when he defines such a task for morality.712 In this case, what is at stake is not 
                                                
708 Ibid., p. 83. 
709 Hunyadi, “Le principe de la médiation”, in La vertu du conflit pp. 85-112. 
710 Ibid., p. 85: “la morale n’est pas tant liée à tel ou tel objet (le juste, le bien) qu’à la résolution 
des conflits en général. Dès lors que la normativité de la règle est activée par le conflit, que la force 
heuristique de celui-ci réside donc dans sa capacité à manifester le niveau de l’intersubjectivité  
concrète où s’enracine l’accord qui les valide, c’est le conflit en tant qu’il manifeste des aspirations 
divergentes qui devient l’enjeu par excellence de la morale.” [My translation] 
711 Ibid. 
712 Ibid., p. 86. 
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directly the recognition of social actors or collective groups as it was in Honneth. 
But it is so in an indirect manner, inasmuch as when what we are dealing with is 
the validity of claims concerning rules that are put forward by those social actors, 
the debate concerning the normativity of the rule also entails that when we discuss 
the rule what we are also discussing are the identities of those affected by it, and 
Hunyadi explicitly acknowledges this.713 Allow me to provide an example. If what 
is at stake is a rule that will determine the rights of a certain group of people (will, 
for instance, immigrants be granted rights of political participation or not) the 
outcome of the conflict of interpretations concerning that rule – maybe the 
already-existing rule is unjust and needs to be reformulated – will also be decisive 
for the identity of those who will be directly concerned by it. Accordingly, in the 
example given, for a group of immigrants in a given country, the fact that they are 
granted some political rights of participation will be decisive in the determination 
of their own identity, insofar as the objective attribution of rights (and the fact 
these are legal rights does not occlude the fact the issue is also a moral one) will 
also determine their moral standing, and as such also a significant part of their 
identity, towards society in general. 
So, to sum up Hunyadi’s proposal, we come to the conclusion that for 
him in this early book, every conflict of rules is implicitly a moral conflict and 
therefore what morality must try to do, to employ one expression used before, is to 
look for a treatability of those conflicts and, by mediating them, attempt to solve 
them. The rest of Hunyadi’s book tries to establish what he calls a “moral point of 
view”. He wants to conceptually determine what “validity” means and he 
voluntary adopts a deflationary standpoint on morality. He steers away from a 
substantive definition of morality and limits the task of morality to the 
determination of the moral point of view: “the moral point of view is limited to 
determining the perspective according to which a litigious rule could be said to be 
legitimate.”714 Hunyadi tries to provide what we could call a “horizontal” solution 
for the conflicts of rules. That is, he acknowledges that there are different types of 
rules each of which producing different types of normativity. But he posits that 
every litigation concerning a rule must be solved in the level of the rule which is 
                                                
713 Ibid. 
714 Ibid., p. 88: “le point de vue moral se limite à déterminer la perspective à partir de laquelle une 
règle litigieuse pourrait être dite légitime.” [My translation] 
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imposed by the nature of that same rule.715 This means that he does not try to 
establish a lexical order among rules like Rawls did with his principles of justice, 
or even less speak about “hypergoods” and hierarchies of goods, which would be 
the path followed by Charles Taylor. We will see these solutions in the next two 
chapters. 
Hunyadi in fact adopts what we could call a procedural solution. And he 
admits the influence of Habermas in his own standpoint. He admits to having a 
Habermasian, “post-metaphysical” standpoint.716 His proposal is thus of a “post-
traditional” morality, in the sense we have seen above, when analyzing 
Habermas’s ethics of discussion. Accordingly, Hunyadi’s solution will be 
pluralistic. Arguing that for his moral point of view there is never such a task as to 
impose an ethical worldview, he claims that “the task is, on the other hand, in an 
age of a pluralization of pretentions claiming recognition, of finding a point of 
view that could make their coexistence feasible.”717  
Now, in my own standpoint, in the leads I am following from several 
authors, from Ricœur to Honneth and Taylor, I will often argue for a more 
substantive standpoint, more angled towards the good than to a procedural 
standpoint. However, I am deeply sympathetic with Hunyadi’s early appraisal of 
conflict and its virtues. Sometimes, Honneth speaks about a certain type of 
critique, which he dubs disclosing critique (erschließende Kritik)718. Now I think 
that what Hunyadi is doing is to pinpoint, in this early book, a disclosing power of 
conflict, that is, in his case, a disclosing of the normativity of conflictual rules. 
Now, Ricœur himself would speak about the conflict of rules (or the conflict of 
duties) in Oneself as Another. As I mentioned before, he aimed to go beyond the 
deontological moment and in so doing he departs from the standpoint that Kant, 
Rawls, Habermas an in a certain sense also Hunyadi share. But his overall strategy 
of conflict is grounded, or so I will argue, in a somewhat constructivist perspective 
that leads to an enlarged standpoint. As such, and as I will contend later, one of 
the features of Ricœur’s use of conflict is that he grants conflict a disclosing power 
too. Not, in his case, a power of disclosing the normativity of rules, but of 
                                                
715 Ibid., p. 89. 
716 Ibid. 
717 Ibid., p. 89. 
718 See Honneth, “The Possibility of a Disclosing Critique of Society: The Dialectic of 
Enlightenment in Light of Current Debates in Social Criticism” in Disrespect, pp. 49-62. 
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disclosing the whole picture of a given problem and also of finding theoretical 
alternatives or practical solutions to it. As such, I believe that in an indirect 
manner, what Hunyadi tells us about the conflict of rules helps us to partially 
grasp what is at stake in Ricœur’s general use of the category of conflict in his 
philosophy. This will become apparent in the next parts of this thesis. 
Ultimately, Hunyadi in this first book tends to point towards a possible 
agreement concerning the coexistence of a plurality of values and rules.719 In this, 
he is not very far from Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice, even if in a later book 
Hunyadi heavily criticizes Walzer’s communitarian standpoint.720 He concentrates 
on the quality of the rules that guide the attribution of respect. According to him, 
there are no “moral facts” in themselves, only rules that elevate facts to the dignity 
of moral facts.721 Accordingly, and as Habermas, he underscores the procedure of 
just solution of conflicts between persons with divergent aspirations.722 Towards 
the end of his book, he argues for context sensitive solutions that establish, on a 
case-by-case scenario and in an intersubjective manner, how the mediation is 
going to unfold.723 This is a very interesting turn of his argument, and it brings 
him to the neighborhood of the Ricœur of Oneself as Another who himself argued 
for an “invention of the rule” adapted to each case in what he called “practical 
wisdom”. Hunyadi’s ultimate insistence on a “just mediation”724 is also not a 
stranger to Ricœur’s standpoint taken as whole.  
In later books, Mark Hunyadi decided to further develop this context 
sensitivity of moral action; as such, his mature books put forward a contextualist 
approach to morality725 which, to reiterate, finds echoes in Ricœur’s practical 
wisdom. He puts forward a notion of objective moral context726 that aims at 
simultaneously going beyond a minimalist ethics (only focused on the topic of 
justice) and provide a better epistemological and practical grounding to the notion 
of context. He is still interested in the notion of a moral point of view and of 
                                                
719 Hunyadi, La vertu du conflit, pp. 94-95. 
720 See Mark Hunyadi, L’art de l’exclusion. Une critique de Michael Walzer (Paris: Éditions du 
Cerf, 2000). 
721 Hunyadi, La vertu du conflit, p. 98. 
722 Ibid., p. 99. 
723 Ibid., p. 101. 
724 Ibid., p. 106. 
725 See Mark Hunyadi, Morale Contextuelle (Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval, 2008) and 
Mark Hunyadi, L’Homme en contexte (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2012). 
726 See Hunyadi, Morale Contextuelle, p. 9. 
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validity, but now under the banner of the moral context. Thus for instance he now 
states that conflict reactivates not only the normativity of the rule, but also the 
normativity of the objective moral context in which the rule is inscribed.727 And he 
wants to put forward a type of morality that goes beyond the opposition between 
the just and the good and tackles fundamental questions for our own desire to live 
together, as Ricœur would put it. As such, his standpoint is perhaps today less 
proceduralist, which allows him to provide a “thicker” response to these 
fundamental questions – such as, do we want a world in which all 
commodification is possible, or human clones are allowed, and so on.728 
Interesting as his new proposal is, I cannot delve in detail in it here, 
because I need to assess the other meaningful contributions of conflict in 
contemporaneity. In this chapter, we have seen how conflict is tackled in some of 
the main works produced by critical theorists of the first three generations of 
Critical Theory. We have seen how in different contexts conflict is given center 
stage, either in the depiction of man’s inner conflict (repression of instincts) and 
the fundamental conflict against nature in Adorno and Horkheimer; the way 
conflict is located by Habermas against the backdrop of communicative reason 
and then an ethics of discussion by Habermas; Honneth’s insistence on conflict in 
the form of the struggle for recognition as the motor for social change, as well as 
its possible social and political intersection with the works of Lyotard and 
Rancière; finally, we have seen Hunyadi’s appraisal of the virtue of conflict as a 
disclosing of normativity, and I hinted at how this appraisal of conflict could 
reveal us something about the way conflict functions in the works of Ricœur. 
All the way through this chapter dedicated to Critical Theory, the 
sociological standpoint has been mixed with the properly philosophical standpoint. 
That is, ethics and political philosophy have been always in the background of 
these assessments. In the next chapter, I will start with an account that is more 
purely connected to normative political philosophy, namely, the theory of justice 
of John Rawls. Then I will mention the more pluralist, thicker objections to Rawls, 
especially in the form they assume in Michael Walzer. Finally, taking the plurality 
of the instances of justice as my guiding thread, I will mention the pragmatic 
sociology of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot. This final stage will provide me 
                                                
727 Ibid., p. 28. 
728 Ibid., p. 73. 
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with a chance to reconnect with the topic of social critique which was one of the 
guiding threads of the chapter that I am now closing. 
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2.2 – Rawls, Walzer and Boltanski-Thévenot: The Conflict 
Between Universalism and the Plurality of Justice 
 
In the second chapter of this cartography of the contemporary reappraisal 
of conflict, I will turn to what at first glance might seem like a less substantive 
account of conflicts. We have already seen in the previous chapter a procedural 
ethical standpoint, with Habermas’s ethics of discussion. Now I turn to the 
contemporary theories of justice. I will evidently not provide a full account of 
them, because this field has had such a wide array of contributions in the last 
century, that it would be impossible to do so in a few pages. I will leave out such 
important contributions as those of Amartya Sen, and only mention in a very brief 
and cursory manner the theories of justice of Nozick and Sandel. I will have to 
start with Rawls’s procedural theory of justice, because his was the seminal work 
that spawned all the later discussion. When coming back to Walzer (and, in the 
next chapter, to Taylor) as my privileged counterweights to Rawls, I hope to flesh 
out the substantive alternatives to Rawls’s thin theory of justice.  
In the second half of the 20th century, perhaps partly because of the 
horrors witnessed during the two preceding World Wars, not only the practical 
affirmation of human rights, but also the urge to theoretically ground a theory of 
justice became one of the leading concerns. This was particularly true in the 
Anglo-Saxon world; and perhaps, in the context of analytical political philosophy, 
no book was so influential as John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice.729 His procedural, 
deontological approach, renewing with the social contract theory that had been 
somewhat forgotten since the 18th century, and at the same time rekindling a Post-
Kantian universalistic approach transposed from moral philosophy to political 
theory, was simultaneously inspiring and controversial, fueling the most 
participated debate in political philosophy in the last 50 years. 
Rawls was met with fierce criticism by people like Nozick, on the one 
hand, and by communitarians such as Walzer, Taylor and Sandel (all of whom 
sometimes feel uncomfortable with the label), on the other. It would be out of the 
scope of this brief chapter to discuss all the main stakes of these debates. 
However, I would like to take a cursory look at the debate taking place between 
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Rawls and Walzer, namely on the nature of social goods, and on the ways to 
apportion and distribute those social goods, not only because this is a vital 
question that any theory of justice needs to address, but also because Ricœur 
himself commented on this topic. As will become apparent, the distribution, or 
redistribution of social goods, will be one of the main sources of conflict in this 
particular arena. 
 
2.2.1 – Rawls: society as a consensual-conflictual phenomenon730 
 
From the very first chapter of A Theory of Justice, Rawls defines justice 
as pertaining to social institutions. According to him, “Justice is the first virtue of 
social institutions.”731 At first glance, conflict plays a big role in his theory. Rawls 
asks us to assume that people let themselves be guided by systems of rules and 
that these exist because societies are a system of cooperation. But he immediately 
adds that cooperation is not in itself evident: 
 
Then, although a society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, it is typically 
marked by a conflict as well as by an identity of interests. There is an identity of interests 
since social cooperation makes possible a better life for all than any would have if each 
were to live solely by his own efforts. There is a conflict of interests since persons are not 
indifferent as to how the greater benefits produced by their collaboration are distributed, 
for in order to pursue their ends they each prefer a larger to a lesser share.732 
 
Thus the conflict is, for Rawls, an integral part of the way in which we live in 
society. The risk is, for him, that conflict overcomes the identity of interests and 
that cooperation ceases to be possible. Ricœur captured well the essence of this 
constitutive dialectic in Rawls’s theory: 
 
Inasmuch as society presents itself as a system of distribution, every division into shares 
is problematic and open to equally reasonable alternatives. Since there are several 
plausible manners of dividing up advantages and disadvantages, society is through and 
                                                
730 In this section, other than to Ricœur, I am especially indebted to Pedro Viegas Santos, Consenso 
e Conflito no Pensamento de John Rawls. A Perversa Ingenuidade do Liberalismo. (Lisboa: 
Colibri, 2004). 
731 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 3. 
732 Ibid., p. 4. 
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through a consensual-conflictual phenomenon. On the one hand, every allocation of 
shares can be challenged – especially in the context of unequal distribution. On the other 
hand, to be stable, distribution requires a consensus about the procedures for arbitrating 
among competing demands.733  
 
This is, in a nutshell, the core of Rawls’s need to find a procedural theory of 
justice. Since every apportionment is potentially conflictual, there must be a way, 
he thinks, to find a set of rules sufficiently capable of arbitrating among these 
conflicts and arriving at a suitable solution. 
Rawls’s solution is to postulate an original position where people, under a 
veil of ignorance, would establish the principles of justice binding the society to 
come. This is the basis for his version of the social contract. The veil of ignorance 
makes sure that the participants choosing the principles of justice “do not know 
how the various alternatives will affect their own particular case”.734 Moreover, 
they will not know their place in society, class position or social status, not even 
their conceptions of the good or their natural abilities. Rawls keeps them blind to 
the particular socio-economic and cultural situation of their future society too. 
Their knowledge is kept to a strict minimum, they only know what is needed to 
fulfill the procedural criteria needed for the choice. This is why, Rawls explains, 
he defines justice as “fairness”: the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial 
situation that is fair.735 By all accounts, this is a thought experiment and so the 
question might be raised – as it was indeed raised by Walzer, Ricœur, and others – 
as to what efficacy a postulated, ahistorical pact might have in what are always 
already-existing societies, with their prevailing traditions and practices, which are 
more often than not the result of processes of evolution and sedimentation. 
In fact, Rawls places the emphasis on the process of deliberation, in part 
guided by the assumptions on human agency that are described in the theory of 
rational choice. Rawls’s specific approach, however, is to consider that in this 
process agents are both rational and mutually disinterested (partly because what 
the veil hides forces them to be so).  
Certainly, Rawls does more than describing the procedural criteria 
through which a choice of the principles of justice might take place. He also puts 
                                                
733 Ricœur, Oneself as Another, pp. 233-234. 
734 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 118. 
735 Ibid., p. 11. 
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forward an argument for what principles should in fact be adopted. These will 
together form what he calls the “basic structure” of society, that is, the 
“arrangement of social institutions into one scheme of cooperation”.736 Now, these 
basic social principles of justice are in fact two, for Rawls. He offers several 
definitions of these, first in chapter 11 in a tentative form, than in chapter 13, and 
finally a “definitive” formulation in chapter 46. The justification of why these are 
the two principles, the discussion of their respective meanings, and the 
justification of why there is a priority of one of them over the other, occupies a 
substantial part of the book, and it has also been a source of contention ever since 
the Theory of Justice was published. 
The definitive formulation of these two principles states: 
 
FIRST PRINCIPLE 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic 
liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 
 
SECOND PRINCIPLE 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: 
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings 
principle, and 
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity.737 
 
The first might be called the principle of equal liberty, whereas the second can be 
broken down into a) the difference principle and b) the equality of opportunity 
principle. 
According to Rawls, there is a lexical priority which establishes that the 
order of importance of the principles is as follows: 1) equal liberty; 2) equality of 
opportunity and 3) the difference principle. Now, this procedure is there for a 
reason: Rawls knows that in practice there will be situations where these principles 
might conflict. To reiterate, his procedural criteria are established in order to deal 
with conflict and to mitigate or even deal away with it, if possible. 
His insistence on the priority of the first principle makes clear that his is a 
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liberal standpoint, as against, for instance, an egalitarian standpoint; throughout 
the whole process, Rawls presupposes the application of what he calls the 
“maximin rule” or “the maximin criterion” (that applies to the difference 
principle). It entails that the difference principle is inferior to the equality 
principle, but that this has some exceptions: 
 
All social values – liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the social bases of 
self-respect – are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of 
these values is to everyone’s advantage.738  
 
The maximin rule is a rule of choice under uncertainty used in economic theory. It 
tells us, according to Rawls’s concise formulation “to rank alternatives by their 
best possible outcomes: we are to adopt the alternatives the worst outcome of 
which is superior to the worst outcomes of the others.”739 Translated in terms of 
the principles of justice, social and economic inequalities are only acceptable if 
they are “to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged”. 
To be sure, Rawls’s approach is not entirely procedural. In fact, he wants 
to see if his description of the original position matches what he calls our 
“considered convictions” of justice or “extends them” in an acceptable way.740 He 
thus displays a certain trust in a pre-theoretical or, if we may put it this way, pre-
procedural layer of experience. Our considered convictions are something akin to 
our moral intuitions. He gives the example of racial discrimination, or religious 
intolerance. We naturally intuit that they are unjust. Therefore, the principles are 
to be tested, to make sure whether or not they are able to accommodate our 
“firmest convictions”.741 
He also, of course, takes into consideration the possibility that there 
might be a discrepancy between our convictions, and the principles we arrive at. In 
that case, he argues, either we modify the account of the initial situation, or we 
revise our judgments. In this, he remains radically Kantian in that he believes in 
the possibility of radically revising even our firmest beliefs. But this 
accommodation, he argues, is not automatic or straightforward, it is something 
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akin to a “back and forth” movement, which he dubs a “reflective equilibrium”: 
 
By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual 
circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments and conforming them to principle, I 
assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that both 
expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered 
judgments duly pruned and adjusted. This state of affairs I refer to as reflective 
equilibrium. It is an equilibrium because at last our principles and judgments coincide; and 
it is reflective since we know to what principles our judgments conform and the premises 
of their derivation. At the moment everything is in order. But this equilibrium is not 
necessarily stable. It is liable to be upset by further examination of the conditions which 
should be imposed on the contractual situation and by particular cases which may lead us 
to revise our judgments.742 
 
The reflective equilibrium is, we must acknowledge, the closest that Rawls can get 
– at least in A Theory of Justice – to a substantive conception of the good. The will 
to take into account our “firmest convictions” is a proof of that effort. Ricœur will 
take up that lead and propose that we take seriously our “considered convictions”. 
However, for Rawls the reflective equilibrium, even though it might sound 
dialectical, remains strictly procedural. 
This is perhaps the reason why there will be a slight shift in Rawls’s 
standpoint. Rawls’s mature thought is expressed in his later book Political 
Liberalism743, where he more clearly adopts the standpoint of political philosophy. 
One of the main problems he will try to tackle is precisely the fact of political 
pluralism, that is, of a variety of “comprehensive doctrines” and “conceptions of 
the good” that makes up existing societies. Hence, he postulates a difference 
between what he dubs “comprehensive doctrines” and his political conception of 
justice, which is supposed to be more attuned to the need to reach a consensus 
between existing conceptions of justice. As such, his insistence is not so much on 
the method of the veil of ignorance anymore, even though he still posits a 
constructivist approach and in fact a very thin theory of justice (precisely in that he 
wants to avoid it becoming a “comprehensive doctrine”). 
I will focus mainly on what he dubs “overlapping consensus”, which is a 
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different way of solving disagreements. This expression is briefly mentioned in A 
Theory of Justice744, but it is only developed in the article called “The idea of an 
overlapping consensus”. This article was originally published in 1987, and later 
republished and reframed as a part of Rawls’s Political Liberalism.745 
Rawls sets the framework for his new take on the problem of justice in 
the very first page of his article, in the following terms: “how is it possible that 
there can be a stable and just society whose free and equal citizens are deeply 
divided by conflicting and even incommensurable religious, philosophical, and 
moral doctrines?”746 It is to this question that political liberalism is supposed to 
provide an answer. According to Rawls, conceptions of justice are divided 
according to whether or not they accept political pluralism. There are “those that 
allow for a plurality of reasonable though opposing comprehensive doctrines each 
with its own conception of the good”747 and those that do not. He claims that under 
enduring political institutions we can accept the coexistence of those plural views 
of the good.748 Consequently, or so the claim goes, no comprehensive doctrine is 
appropriate as a political conception for a constitutional regime.749 To be sure, 
Rawls does not say we cannot hold comprehensive doctrines. However, what he 
does claim is that we cannot draw a liberal theory of justice from them and, 
furthermore, that we cannot use political power to impose our own comprehensive 
doctrines (or conceptions of the good) onto others.750 This means that political 
values, and namely the principles upheld by political liberalism, should override 
all the other values, when what is at stake is a political decision. We can therefore 
uphold our comprehensive doctrines as being reasonable and even true, without 
however using political power to enforce them. 
                                                
744 In the Theory of Justice Rawls mentions the overlapping consensus in the context of finding the 
conditions to ensure the existence and maintenance of a common sense of justice. He 
acknowledges that society is a locus of individual and group egoism and that there will be 
difficulties in making sure this agreement is maintained. And he then arrives at the conclusion that 
it will probably not be so difficult as it sound, because a strict consensus is not needed, only an 
overlapping one: “Although those who acknowledge the principles of justice should always be 
guided by them, in a fragmented society as well as in one moved by group egoisms, the conditions 
for civil disobedience do not exist. Still, it is not necessary to have strict consensus, for often a 
degree of overlapping consensus allows the reciprocity condition to be fulfilled.” See Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice, p. 340. 
745 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 133-172. 
746 Ibid., p. 133.  
747 Ibid., p. 134. 
748 Ibid., p. 135. 
749 Ibid. 
750 Ibid., p. 139. 
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Rawls is looking for a consensus with a certain degree of stability, one 
that can properly frame the political structure of a given society. He insists that an 
overlapping consensus is to be distinguished from a mere modus vivendi751, that 
is, it is more than a strategic agreement whose parts are willing to pursue their 
interests at the expense of the other, regardless of the agreement.752 Thus this is an 
agreement to be founded not on interests, not as “the outcome of political 
bargaining”,753 and that must not be indifferent or skeptical.754 This means that we 
need not be hostile to truth, only to violence, irrationality and abuse of power. We 
need not be relativistic either. What we need is to find some common ground on 
which to agree, while inserting this common ground in our own comprehensive 
religious, philosophical or moral view to which we can adhere. That is, Rawls 
does not reject our “considered convictions”. But he insists that political 
conceptions need not be comprehensive.755 Accordingly, the basic structure of 
society, upon which the overlapping consensus will be built, will decide what are 
the conflicts that can or cannot be politically solved. 
Rawls therefore explicitly claims that “we must frame the institutions of 
the basic structure so that intractable conflicts are unlikely to arise”.756 Following 
his deflationist approach he asserts that “a political conception is at best but a 
guiding framework of deliberation and reflection which helps us reach political 
agreement”.757 But with these last assertions it becomes very clear how Rawls 
ultimately assesses conflicts. In the last analyzis, conflict is something to be as 
much as possible avoided. Nowhere is this clearer than when Rawls assumes that: 
 
Faced with the fact of reasonable pluralism, a liberal view removes from the political 
agenda the most divisive issues, serious contention about which must undermine the bases 
of social cooperation.758 
 
Conflict is thus seen as a threat, not a generative and creative power. Rawls 
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therefore admits that public reason is a work of reconciliation759 and that the idea 
of overlapping consensus is itself a utopian idea.760 As such, all he can do is to 
provide the indication of certain “steps” which would in principle brings us closer 
to a “constitutional consensus” or an “overlapping consensus”. A constitutional 
consensus is taken to be a mere consensus on principles;761 it only includes the 
political procedures of democratic government.762 An overlapping consensus, by 
contrast, will be the shared public conception that overlaps in several reasonable 
standpoints and is thus secured by a common agreement. The constitutional 
consensus ensures the existence of political basic rights and liberties. But it is 
supposed to suffuse citizens with “the virtue of reasonableness and a sense of 
fairness, a spirit of compromise and a readiness to meet others halfway”.763 This 
last passage speaks volumes about the public virtues that Rawls chooses to 
emphasize. 
Ultimately, Rawls concedes that a full overlapping consensus is “never 
achieved but at best only approximated”.764 But he does want more than a “purely 
political and procedural constitutional consensus”765 because that would be too 
narrow. He thus calls for a consensus on substantive freedoms such as liberty of 
conscience, freedom of thought, association and movement, as well as measures to 
assure the basic needs of all citizens so that they can take part in political and 
social life,766 even though he clarifies that the need to satisfy basic needs is not 
tantamount to a push for greater equality or economic redistribution. The result is 
that his ideas remain somewhat vague; that is, they are mere principles. He 
reasserts his idea of justice as fairness as entailing a “fair system of cooperation” 
axed on democratic ideals of persons as being “free and equal”.767 But he 
ultimately remains too closely tied to ideal theory. Not surprisingly, he seems to 
condemn conflict as a merely negative phenomenon, that is, something to be 
avoided and to which we must always find a solution. 
This is evidently a very cursory presentation of Rawls’s method. 
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However, we can ask, how seriously does it really take social conflict? In the 
previous chapter we have seen, with Honneth, Celikates, Hunyadi, among others, 
that there might be a “virtue” to conflict, in that it can have a generative power, a 
capacity for generating social integration and formulate rules. None of that is 
present in Rawls. To be sure, his theory is not completely procedural and 
constructivist, but it is mainly procedural and almost always constructivist. In that, 
it is deontological and essentially ideal. It is true that he does his best to provide us 
with a finely nuanced and rational model. And it is also true that he came a long 
way since the publication of the Theory of Justice. That is, his initial model of the 
veil of ignorance was merely a thought experiment and completely unrealistic, 
probably totally unfit for already-existing societies. His attempt to devise a 
reflective equilibrium and  – to an even greater extent – the overlapping consensus 
are attempts to bring his theory closer to reality but one can always ask what 
descriptive power they have. 
Rawls presents no serious attempt to tackle the problem of unequal power 
relations in society. He seems to almost overlook the problem of domination in 
societies and he does not tell us enough on how to overcome situations of already-
constituted injustice. His focus on a procedural theory of justice risks leaving out 
meaningful conceptions of the good upon which our shared identities hinge. Many 
have seen in Rawls’s early theory a host of disembodied individuals. Feminists, 
for instance, have pressed this point, as well as the seeming absence of notions of 
care, emotion and relationship in his work.768 Communitarians, on the other hand, 
have pointed to the insufficient way Rawls takes communities into account, and 
decried the way his liberal depiction almost seems to look at individuals as 
isolated beings, ignoring their previous insertion into meaningful intersubjective 
relationships, traditions and so forth. As Michael Sandel puts it in a critical tone, 
for Rawls “We are distinct individuals first, and then we form relationships and 
engage in co-operative arrangements with others”.769 Likewise, his notion of 
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overlapping consensus has also been under attack. For instance, Marcel Becker in 
a recent article has argued that Rawls’s strict separation between comprehensive 
doctrines and his own political conception of “justice as fairness” is more 
problematic than at first glance appears. Becker asserts that even though Rawls 
rejects a substantive espousal of the good in a theory of justice, he is indeed 
putting forward a description of the “good citizen” that ultimately brings him 
closer to a substantive ethics of virtues than he would have admitted.770 This 
reading is confirmed by Rawls’s emphasis on the “virtue of reasonableness” to 
which I alluded before. Becker concludes that there is an ambiguity in Rawls’s 
overlapping consensus and that therefore his strict distinction between private 
moralities and public morality can be challenged. He argues that the only way for 
the overlapping consensus to have any practical effect (even as a motivation for 
actors in the public sphere) is to let its frontiers with comprehensive doctrines be 
less strict than Rawls allowed for.771 According to him, only comprehensive 
doctrines are the sources of political values and thus provide the “moral energy” 
that drives people to participate in the political public sphere. To ignore that this is 
so is tantamount to incurring a descriptive deficit and thus not being able to come 
down from ideal theory to empirical reality. 
Ricœur, for his part, had a positive but critical assessment of Rawls. 
Dosse emphasizes how the appropriation of the Anglo-Saxon debates on the 
theory of justice was very important for Ricœur in the 1990s, when he started 
thinking about the institutional forms of conflict in society, judicial practices and 
the judiciary system.772 He also underscores that in these debates Rawls played for 
Ricœur an essential role. Even if in many aspects Ricœur was closer to the 
“communitarians” and to a substantive version of the good, he saw in Rawls’s 
Theory of Justice and its later developments the point of departure for all later 
debates. 
There is a good amount of scholarship analyzing the relation between 
Ricœur and Rawls.773 Trying not to anticipate too much Ricœur’s treatment of 
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conflict in the judicial domain, a more extensive discussion of which I will leave 
for part five, I will try to condensate in a provisional manner the core of Ricœur’s 
appraisals and rejections of Rawls, at least in the articles that he explicitly 
dedicates to Rawls’s theory of justice. I will mention four main articles. The first 
two articles are from 1988-90 and, to my knowledge, they have not been translated 
into English, but they have been republished in French in Lectures 1: “John Rawls: 
de l’autonomie morale à la fiction du contrat social”774 and “Le cercle de la 
démonstration”.775 The second pair of articles is more or less from the same period 
and they have been republished in The Just. One of them has been originally 
published in English: “Is a Purely Procedural Theory of Justice Possible? John 
Rawls’s Theory of Justice”776 (written in 1990) and the other, “After Rawls’s 
Theory of Justice”777 which was written in 1995, focuses on the developments 
taken by Rawls’s theory after his 1971 seminal book. 
Throughout these articles, the tone is always more or less the same, and 
some topics and passages are repeated. The fact that they were written in a 7-year 
period accounts for some stability in Ricœur’s position concerning Rawls. In all of 
them, Ricœur praises Rawls’s deontological approach and its normative moment. 
However, he also reproaches its occlusion of the substantive good. Let us recall 
that in the meantime Ricœur published Oneself as Another. A large part of these 
articles is merely introductory to Rawls’s thought. Ricœur, in fact, did much to 
introduce the Rawlsian theory of justice in France, much like he had done for so 
many other authors and strands before. I will skip those parts, because the main 
traits of this theory have already been briefly recalled in the preceding pages. As 
such, I will concentrate on the objections. 
Three of these articles deal with The Theory of Justice. In “De 
l’autonomie morale à la fiction du contrat social” Ricœur reproaches Rawls for 
having a “very limited” notion of what a teleological standpoint can be.778 Indeed, 
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he thinks that Rawls’s argument is only directed against a particular teleological 
version of justice, namely, the utilitarian view, and he considers that there might 
be a way to reconcile a teleological strive for the good with Rawls’s deontological 
point of view. He considers that Rawls’s whole book can be taken as a 
contractualist reactualization of the Kantian principle of autonomy, aiming to 
adapt it to an institutional level.779 Ricœur’s main objection consists in noting that 
Rawls’s procedural method is a fiction and that at most, what it can do is to 
formalize a “sense of justice which is always presupposed.”780 That is, there is 
always a pre-comprehension of justice put forward by social actors, which the veil 
of ignorance cannot hide. He thus considers the Rawlsian reflective equilibrium as 
being more realistic than the original position, which is to be discarded. His 
conclusion is that if, on the one hand, moral autonomy can be considered, within 
the Kantian framework, a fact of reason781, the social contract is nothing but a 
fiction. As such, he argues, a suitable social theory needs to be grounded in the 
“desire to live together”, and not in a fictional pact. Ricœur does not ignore the 
situations of asymmetric power and domination in society. They stem, he argues, 
from a possible forgetting of this “desire to live together”; as such, in order to 
overcome domination, that is, to retransform power-over in power-in-common, 
what we need is a rekindling of that desire to live together. 
This diagnosis bearing on Rawls’s early method leads Ricœur to conclude 
that there is a circle in Rawls’s presentation of his argument in the Theory of 
Justice. Thus in “Le cercle de la démonstration” Ricœur proceeds to show how 
Rawls’s principles of justice have no independence and validity in themselves and 
that they derive mainly from our “considered convictions”. Ricœur notes that it is 
puzzling that Rawls chooses to define justice as a virtue of social institutions 
instead of starting from intersubjective relations.782 He challenges Rawls’s method 
of lexical ordering of his principles of justice.783 To reiterate, he argues that what 
matters are our “considered convictions” and not the original situation.784 
Ultimately, and even though he sees a usefulness in Rawls’s universalization 
principles, he argues that the way to test those convictions, to, let us say, “consider 
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them” might be done through a recourse to argumentation and discourse, as we see 
in the proposals of Habermas and Apel.785 Ultimately, refusing the strict 
formalization put forward by Rawls, he proposes that his principles, and for 
instance the maximin, be interpreted in prudential terms, and he provides the 
example of the golden rule. Hence, the maximin is something recommended by 
our own intuitive sense of justice, and not by detached rules.786 In the conclusion 
to this article, Ricœur argues that moral theory does not “institute anything ex 
nihilo”787; rather, it only justifies our common moral convictions. With this last 
remark, we can anticipate how close Ricœur will be to Walzer’s own standpoint, 
which we will follow in more detail in the next section. 
In “Is a Purely Procedural Theory of Justice Possible?” Ricœur reasserts 
the dependence of the deontological rule upon the non-formalized prudential 
golden rule. To reiterate, his thesis is “that a procedural conception of justice at 
best provides a rationalization of a sense of justice that is always presupposed.”788 
In “After Rawls’s Theory of Justice” Ricœur emphasizes the communitarian 
critique concerning the a-historical status of Rawls’s fictional pact, and the fact 
that it cannot bind historical societies.789 But he chooses to emphasize the 
connection between the reflective equilibrium and the overlapping consensus. He 
notes that “A Theory of Justice does not say what considered convictions satisfied 
the conditions for reflective equilibrium.”790 Ricœur asks from where does the 
motivation from the moral capacity come from, and he states that without the 
overlapping consensus, all Rawls’s theory has to offer is “a strategy of avoiding 
controversies”.791 He argues that we have to take “professed beliefs” that is, in 
Rawls’s vocabulary, “comprehensive doctrines” as more than mere prejudices or 
survivals from the past.792 Ricœur thinks that the overlapping consensus is Rawls’s 
best solution for the political problem. But he does emphasize, much more than 
Rawls, the role of beliefs, convictions and “comprehensive theories”. He also 
insists, much more than Rawls, that we need to take the problem of domination 
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and even State coercion into account. And, as I stated before, he grounds Rawls’s 
deontological moment in the teleological moment and formalized rules in 
prudential, pre-deontological rules. 
As we can see, in his critiques of Rawls, Ricœur borrows many of the 
objections made by those who adopt a communitarian viewpoint (whether or not 
they assume it for themselves). In the following section and in the next chapter I 
will turn to authors, like Walzer and Taylor, who provided thicker accounts of the 
good. Ultimately, they do not ignore pluralism, or maybe even give a more 
substantive description of what is at stake in the pluralistic landscape of a wide 
range of diverging positions, all with different conceptions and thick identity 
claims. As will ultimately be apparent, Ricœur will be somewhere between the 
two positions. But let me first briefly mention the contributions of Walzer and 
Boltanski / Thévenot, in which Ricœur saw a description of the plurality of 
instances of justice that ultimately provided a counterweight to Rawls’s unified 
account of justice, before mentioning the ultimate configuration this all assumes 
for Ricœur. 
 
2.2.2 – Walzer: complex equality and the irreducible plurality of goods 
 
Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice793 is probably the best account of 
pluralism that we can find in contemporary political philosophy. As I will argue 
later, Walzer’s insights are also valuable for the construction of a critical social 
philosophy, in that he takes the defense of democracy and the plurality of goods 
over against the possibilities of dominance or monopoly of one good over the 
others, as it seems to be many times the case in contemporary societies. 
Walzer argues for what he calls complex equality in chapter one of his 
book. In a way, only the first and the last chapters794 are somewhat systematic, 
spelling out the way only complex equality is, in his view, able to sufficiently 
ground the criteria able to safeguard the existence of a truly democratic society. 
What all the other eleven chapters do is to engage in substantive and sometimes 
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historical discussions of everything that can be considered as social goods795 and 
the way in which complex equality in the distribution of these goods might (or 
might not) be envisioned. 
To be clear, Walzer is a fierce defender of equality. But he also 
understands that one has to be careful when defining it, in order to avoid its perils. 
In fact, he opens up the book in a somewhat polemic manner, asserting that 
“equality literally understood is an ideal ripe for betrayal.”796 Why betrayal? 
Because inequality is natural in terms of talents and capacities, and different 
people come to fill different roles; fully trying to make people equal on all 
accounts, even in terms of the roles they fulfill, would probably result in tyranny. 
However, he argues that there must be a way to bring about equality in a 
democratic way. 
Walzer therefore chooses to concentrate on social goods, much like 
Rawls. He asserts that “we have to understand and control social goods; we do not 
have to stretch or shrink human beings.”797 This, in turn, entails the main thesis of 
the book: that no social good, natural or acquired, provided by nature, nurture, or 
sheer work or force of will, can serve as a means of domination. He thus wants to 
put forward an egalitarianism that is consistent with liberty798, and the way he 
finds to do it is by developing an “art of differentiation”799 which, adopting a 
purely historical and particularistic standpoint, describes the plurality of goods we 
come to recognize in our societies. The standpoint is particularistic because it is 
grounded in our own contingent values, those that have come about in a historical 
way in our particular societies. Differently from Rawls, Walzer has no interest in 
trying to provide a tendentially universalistic model. Even if Rawls admits that his 
own model applies mainly, or even exclusively, to liberal societies, there is always 
the tendency to try to export his proceduralist approach elsewhere; we find no 
such tendency in Walzer. 
That said, I do not think we can speak of a purely relativist approach 
either; I am more inclined to detect a certain perspectivism in it, whereby we adopt 
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a certain value and defend it as being appropriate to us – “us” having the 
possibility of encompassing the society in which we live, in this case – without 
necessarily positing its universal validity or possibility of application elsewhere. 
As such, the “art of differentiation” will be accompanied by a strict positing of the 
frontiers of the social goods in question, and even their inconvertibility. This is, in 
Walzer, the key to maintain an equilibrium between democracy and equality. But 
let us follow the argument more closely. 
One important aspect to note is that Walzer considers the meanings 
attached to social goods as being an integral part of them; this means that social 
“goods” are not really “good” in themselves, but because of the meaning we attach 
to them. They are relative, as we shall see in the next section, to what we can call a 
certain “standing”. This is very easy to understand and acknowledge; social goods 
like hard work, free time, or even education can be more or less appreciated in 
different societies, and in different points in time. He puts forward some strong 
claims in this matter: that there is no single set of primary or basic goods 
conceivable across all moral and material worlds800 and that social meanings 
change over time.801 The consequence is that Walzer chooses interpretation, and 
not “discovery” or “invention” as the main tool of social analyzis; he spells out 
this claim clearly in Interpretation and Social Criticism.802 
Walzer’s conclusion is therefore radically pluralist: 
 
When meanings are distinct, distributions must be autonomous. Every social good or set 
of goods constitutes, at it were, a distributive sphere within which only certain criteria and 
arrangements are appropriate.803 
 
But this autonomy is obviously always at risk of being infringed upon in the daily 
functioning of our societies. In fact, states Walzer, the violations are systematic. 
He distinguishes between two types of violations: 1) Dominance: that is, the use of 
a good to command a wide range of other goods; or, even worse, 2) Monopoly: 
owning or controlling social goods in order to exploit their dominance. For 
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instance, if goods are scarce, dominance will, eo ipso, entail monopoly. However, 
often things are murkier. 
Usually, the phenomena of dominance are more frequent than those of 
monopoly. Monopoly situations, when they happen, are blatant. Dominance, by 
contrast, can work in the shadows. Walzer cites land ownership, religious or 
political office, capital and technical knowledge as examples, among others, of 
social goods that in a certain period were considered as being the valuable social 
good. The consequence of possessing such a social good in those occasions is 
explained in a very clear manner by Walzer; if one has it, “then all good things 
come to those who have the one best thing. Possess that one, and the other come in 
train.”804 
It goes without saying that for Walzer both dominance and monopoly are 
unjust. Like Rawls, he also stresses that what justice deals with are social goods, 
and also like him, he stresses that distribution is what social conflict is all about. 
However, some conflicts are more blatant than others. Dominance, in particular, is 
a shady business, sometimes hard to detect. Walzer is certainly right to point out 
that in our day and age, and particularly in our Western societies, money (or 
wealth, or capital, however you might want to put it) tends to become the most 
valuable good. And so he is also right to point out that finding a way to curb its 
monopoly is probably the way to control the autonomous distribution of social 
goods. He actually points out that “in practice, breaking the monopoly of money 
neutralizes its dominance”.805  
But the overall strategy proposed by Walzer is one of reducing 
dominance because, ultimately, it is dominance that leads to monopoly; he thus 
aims at reshaping actually existing institutions. The first step is to assert that no 
particular good is generally convertible, and his ultimate hope is that this “would 
open the way for more diffused and particularized forms of social conflict”.806 
He takes up a Pascalian argument to claim that personal qualities and 
social goods have their own spheres of operation and that in order to avoid 
tyranny, the standing of an individual in a particular sphere cannot be transferred 
to any other. To be sure, Walzer’s argument is not directed against inequality per 
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se; he puts forward the following counterfactual argument: suppose that 
dominance is eliminated and the autonomy of the spheres established. What if it 
came to happen that it would be the same people that would conquer a good 
standing in each individual sphere, “piling up goods without the need for 
illegitimate conversions?”807 This would certainly prove, according to him, that 
society is and would be inegalitarian; and of course that this success would not be, 
in itself, illegitimate. But Walzer argues that such an outcome is by and large 
unlikely and that even if it happened, so long as we do not allow for illegitimate 
conversion, we will not not fear that a caste of individuals will come and rule the 
rest of us, because those who will succeed probably change over time. 
As such, complex equality would come through what he calls an open-
ended distributive principle: 
 
No social good x should be distributed to men and women who possess some other good y 
merely because they possess y and without regard to the meaning of x.808 
 
But this distributive principle actually turns out to be itself plural, as Walzer 
recognizes three legitimate but incomplete distributive principles, which must be 
combined in order to bring about complex equality: free exchange, desert and 
need. 
Free exchange is, of course, the principle guiding the market. Walzer 
recalls that it is obviously “open-ended” in that it “creates a market within which 
all goods are convertible into all other goods through the neutral medium of 
money”.809 In it, at least in principle, there are no dominant goods and no 
monopolies. Since the value of the goods is intrinsically dependent on social 
evaluations, it should avoid these situations. However, this is obviously an ideal 
account of the way in which the market works. How does exchange really take 
place, according to Walzer? 
 
Money, supposedly the neutral medium, is in practice a dominant good, and it is 
monopolized by people who possess a special talent for bargaining and trading.810 
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The result, then, is a concentration that leaves some unsatisfied and who might call 
for a redistributive principle; but this is in turn problematic because the former 
will never want to return to a situation of simple equality. 
Walzer’s conclusion is that we need to set limits to what can be 
exchanged for what. He gives the example of political power. If political power is 
allowed to be bought and sold, the ensuing result is tyranny. And this from the 
lowest to the highest form. If you want my hat, and I can do without my hat, and 
if, on the other hand, I value the power of vote more than you, nothing under the 
principle of free exchange prevents me from trading my hat for the possibility of 
having two votes instead of one. Walzer concedes that setting up these limits is 
difficult, because “money seeps across all boundaries”811 but precisely because of 
its pervasiveness, the setting up of limits is all the more necessary. 
As for desert, it seems as open-ended and pluralistic as free exchange. 
But how are we to determine who deserves what and in under what 
circumstances? If I am a charming man, maybe I deserve to be loved. But by 
whom, and to what extent? Or person x is an interesting and stimulating person; 
maybe she deserves to be influential. But who is to decide what kind of role she 
will play? Ultimately, Walzer argues, “only God would be able to make the 
necessary distributions” of goods such as love, influence, offices, and so on, 
according to a principle of desert.812 Even if we were capable of putting in place 
such a system, Walzer contends, it would probably be seized by a group of 
aristocrats claiming to be the sole possessors of the criteria of excellence, and the 
principle would cease to be pluralistic and open-ended anyway. 
The third criterion is the one of need. Walzer invokes Marx’s maxim: to 
each according to his needs. This might seem an obvious criterion when what we 
are talking about are physical needs, or the means of subsistence. But the principle 
is less clear, Walzer claims, when it is applied to other social goods.813 Do we 
“need” a certain job, or political office, as badly as we need food, shelter, and so 
on? Maybe we need recognition, but when it comes in the form of honor, do we 
need it as badly as we need, for instance, love and approbation? This means that 
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each of these spheres is a particular sphere, separate from al the others. As Walzer 
states: “Needed goods distributed to needy people in proportion to their neediness 
are obviously not dominated by any other goods”.814  However, it will be precisely 
this fact of the heterogeneity of goods that will lead Walzer to his radically 
pluralistic account of social goods: 
 
But we can now see, I think, that every criterion that has any force at all meets the general 
rule within its own sphere, and not elsewhere. This is the effect of the rule: different 
goods to different companies of men and women for different reasons and in accordance 
with different procedures. And to get all this right, or to get it roughly right, is to map out 
the entire social world.815 
 
Evidently, Michael Walzer is not capable of mapping out the entire social world. 
However, we can now understand what he means by complex equality. According 
to his definition:  
 
In formal terms, complex equality means that no citizen’s standing in one sphere or with 
regard to one social good can be undercut by his standing in some other sphere, with 
regard to some other good.816 
 
This means that even if I have money, that possession should not entail that I 
necessarily deserve political clout, or vice-versa. Having education is not 
tantamount to acquiring recognition, and so on. 
In the rest of the book, what Walzer attempts to do is therefore to 
describe in an isolated manner, with no particular order, the different highly 
regarded social goods and the spheres they form. He concedes that his approach is 
phenomenological in character. That is, it is descriptive and even though he tries 
to reconstruct the normative functioning of each particular sphere, he does not 
follow a system of priorities like the lexical order assumed by Rawls. As such, in 
the conflict about the distribution or redistribution of social goods, he takes a 
radically pluralistic stance. His analyzes ultimately aim at defining the shape of 
our societies and the way different goods should or should not be distributed 
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within it. I will not delve in the details of each particular sphere described by 
Walzer. 
Instead I will only mention a few of the main general traits that his theory 
ultimately assumes. These are provided in the last chapter of Spheres of Justice. 
Eventually, Walzer gives a substantive account of societies; hence, his 
phenomenological and historical descriptions.  According to him, the adjective 
“just” does not determine the lives of societies; at most, it can modify them. This 
is a position akin to the one defended by Ricœur. For Walzer,  “A given society is 
just if its substantive life is lived in a certain way – that is, in a way faithful to the 
shared understandings of the members.”817 And this is crucial because, to reiterate, 
since the value of goods is attributed in a social manner, it is precisely the shared 
understanding of members of society that will grant value upon things and roles. 
One very important aspect to highlight, and which brings Walzer to the 
neighborhood of Ricœur, is that his conception of social justice is hermeneutic. 
That much is apparent already in The Spheres of Justice: “We are (all of us) 
culture-producing creatures; we make and inhabit meaningful worlds.”818 In 
Interpretation and Social Criticism, he makes even more explicit how his model 
of social analyzis is hermeneutical, and how it departs from other possible 
methods for social criticism.819 For Walzer, there are three main “paths in moral 
philosophy”:  discovery, invention and interpretation. Discovery refers to the 
social and critical approaches that appeal to an experience of religious or cognitive 
clarity in order to advance a socially closed realm of generally binding values. 
This is, in short, a kind of Platonism. Invention is the type of approach that starts 
by looking for a generally valid procedure and then tries to apply these norms to 
already existing societies. Finally, interpretation is to be understood as the 
hermeneutic dimension of the creative disclosure of existing cultural values and 
ideals. 
Walzer illustrates this alternative by means of an analogy: Discovery 
resembles the work of the executive: to find, proclaim and then enforce the law. 
Invention is legislative: it is the work of “representative men and women, who 
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stand for us all because they could be any one of us.”820 Finally, interpretation is to 
be understood as a judgment, the work of the judicial branch of government. 
Walzer’s description of these three alternative paths does not intend to be 
exhaustive. In a way, he is only sketching ideal-types, useful to roughly 
understand the most important characteristics of what he takes to be the more 
common approaches of social criticism. Nonetheless, far from limiting himself to 
a merely descriptive approach, he forcefully makes the case for the choice of one 
these criticisms. For Walzer, “the claim of interpretation is simply this: that neither 
discovery nor invention is necessary because we already possess what they 
pretend to provide.”821 
According to Walzer, the moralities we discover or invent actually turn 
out to be remarkably close to those we already have. Usually, what we do when 
we engage in a discussion on morality is to use already-existing moral concepts 
and intuitions. Accordingly, social criticism is more likely to draw a thick 
description of moral norms and social realities, rather than discovering them 
somewhere or inventing them altogether. What constitutes the moral life of a 
given society or group within it? Its historic ideals, public rhetoric, foundational 
texts, ceremonies and rituals. Walzer states that “it’s not only what people do but 
how they explain and justify what they do, the stories they tell, the principles they 
invoke, that constitute a moral culture.”822 And what is striking is that these are not 
mere facts that could be rendered by a purely descriptivist or positivistic approach. 
This is not to say that the best morality is the one that already exists, or that the 
social critic should be equated with a policeman of morality or a moral 
conservative. Rather, these “moral facts”, adds Walzer, have to be “read, rendered, 
construed, glossed, elucidated, and not merely described.”823 Thus, such a “moral 
fact” can be justified or not according to what we make of it, to the interpretation 
we offer of it. The social critic will sometimes confirm and sometimes challenge 
received opinion. Moral life is, we could say in Ricoeurian terms, subject to a 
“conflict of interpretations.”824 Later, he will refine his examples and provide 
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more arguments to defend his “thick” ethical theory.825 
In The Spheres of Justice he insists that a theory of justice must be alert to 
differences and sensitive to boundaries.826 This does not necessarily entail the 
appearance of more just societies. But in those societies, Walzer argues, justice 
will have more scope: 
 
It doesn’t follow from the theory, however, that societies are more just if they are more 
differentiated. Justice simply has more scope in such societies, because there are more 
distinct goods, more distributive principles, more agents, more procedures. And the more 
scope justice has, the more certain it is that complex equality will be the form that justice 
takes.827 
 
This is, for Walzer, the core of a democratic society, and the exact opposite of 
tyranny. When spheres are autonomous (which is not the case, for instance, in a 
caste society) the exercise of tyranny entails intrigue and violence, and is thus 
more easily detectable and hopefully curtailed. Walzer defines tyranny as “a 
continual grabbing of things that don’t come naturally, an unrelenting struggle to 
rule outside one’s own company”.828 According to Walzer, “contemporary tyrants 
are endlessly busy”829 because the differentiation makes the reach of their power 
harder to penetrate in all the spheres, whether it is courts, bureaucracy, citizens 
associations, and so forth. This, Walzer hopes, serves as a deterrent to tyrannical 
exercise of power. As for the phenomenon of totalitarianism, he asserts that it 
corresponds to some sort of “perfection of injustice”. There, the tyranny is 
unmistakable but there is nothing for the theory of justice to do, except to 
repudiate it. For Walzer, complex equality is the exact opposite of 
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totalitarianism.830 
Accordingly, for him, totalitarianism as the extreme form of tyranny and 
consequently as also the extreme form of coordination, is the worse of political 
evils. However, more pervasive and widespread is the dominance of money, and 
the power it procures: 
 
Contemporary forms of egalitarian politics have their origin in the struggle against 
capitalism and the particular tyranny of money. And surely in the United States today it is 
the tyranny of money that most clearly invites resistance: property/power rather than 
power itself.831 
 
Hence, and because what Walzer is striving for is, after all, (complex) equality, he 
does not stop short from suggesting that there is something we might do about 
this. He is, actually, a connected critic, such as those he calls for in Interpretation 
and Social Criticism. Evoking John Kenneth Galbraith, he calls for the 
mobilization of “countervailing powers”. That is, if his theory is a theory of limits, 
of boundaries strictly separating social goods, and “since armies of ambitions men 
and women push forward from one side of the boundary, what we require are 
similar armies pushing forward from the other side.”832 Now, this is social 
criticism with a practical intent, if there ever was one.  
Walzer’s aim, as is easy to grasp, is for this movement to reinstate the 
real autonomy of distributive spheres. In a formulation that would be unacceptable 
if it applied to people and their movements, but which makes sense when applied 
to his spheres of justice, he states: “Good fences make just societies”.833 He thus 
proposes that we undertake a work of vigilance. But this, however, without a 
guarantee of results: “Eternal vigilance is no guarantee of eternity”.834 
Ultimately, and over against Rawls’s overcautious ideal standpoint, 
Walzer does not refrain from putting forward his own model of political 
organization and concrete arrangements. According to him: 
 
The appropriate arrangements in our own society are those, I think, of a decentralized 
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democratic socialism; a strong welfare state run, in part at least, by local and amateur 
officials; a constrained market; an open and demystified civil service; independent public 
schools; the sharing of hard work and free time; the protection of religious and familial 
life; a system of public honoring and dishonoring free from all considerations of rank and 
class; workers’ control of companies and factories; a politics of parties, movements, 
meetings, and public debate.835 
 
We can of course agree or disagree with this set of particular arrangements. We 
can put forward arguments defending or attacking some of these arrangements, or 
all of them. I will not pursue such a debate here. But at least Walzer has the merit 
of putting forward a thick description, not an ultimately vague and disconnected 
model, such as Rawls’s.  
Allow me to subscribe to Walzer’s assertion concerning the risk of 
plutocracy and the dominance of money. At the time Walzer was thinking and 
writing the book (roughly the 1970s and early 1980s) inequality, money 
dominance and market deregulation were arguably still at very low levels if we 
compare it with what happened afterwards and is still happening today. In fact, the 
effects of systemic deregulation and the growth of the financial sector out of 
proportions were a movement partly motivated by political measures taken by 
Thatcher and Reagan whose overblown effect was only felt in 2007 with the 
eruption of the latest financial crisis. 
Likewise, the invasion of the economic sphere unto the political sphere, 
with its particular mix of private interests and decisions with public consequences, 
is arguably greater today than at the time of Walzer’s writing, and no lesser in 
Europe than in the United States. As such, and if we agree with his vision of the 
connected critic and the thick theory of justice – I happen to agree with it – than 
the duty of critical vigilance and reflection on these matters is today even more 
urgent than it was when The Spheres of Justice was published. Following a similar 
lead, Michael Sandel recently undertook a forceful critique of the 
commodification in our everyday lives in his What Money Can’t Buy.836 I do think 
that this is one of today’s critical tasks, and I will come back to it in part eighth of 
this thesis. 
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As for Ricœur, he proposes to read Walzer’s theory of justice as a 
privileged example of intrastate differentiation of generative instances of right, or 
justice. As such, Ricœur finds in it a good complement and counterweight to 
Rawls’s abstract and procedural theory. However, in an important article 
republished in The Just and that I will follow as a guiding thread, he proposes to 
read it in connection with Luc Boltanski’s and Laurent Thévenot’s On 
Justification. Consequently, I will postpone Ricœur’s assessment of Walzer to the 
end of next section, where it will come by way of a comparative analyzis between 
his theory of justice, and Boltanski and Thévenot’s sociology of critique. 
 
2.2.3 – Boltanski and Thévenot: the multiple orders of worth, strategies of 
justification, and the exercise of critique 
 
The publication in 1991 of On Justification: Economies of Worth837 
assumed the status of a true event, in the strong sense of this term, in French 
sociology. Sociology plays an enormous theoretical role in France, perhaps an 
even more important role than it does in Germany. For a very long time, the main 
developments in this field were coalesced around the imposing figure of Pierre 
Bourdieu. Bourdieu, of course, played a crucial part in the development of the 
social sciences, and of sociology in particular, and introduced such important 
notions as those of habitus, or symbolic violence. He was particularly interested in 
the analyzis of power relations, and in the conditions of domination and 
emancipation thereof. 
His standpoint has sometimes been described as one of “critical 
sociology” or a “sociology of emancipation”, in that the social theorist is 
somewhat disconnected from the standpoint assumed by social actors. That is, by 
adopting a “scientific” point of view he is supposed to somehow see beyond what 
ordinary people experience in their daily lives; to go beyond the distortion that 
somehow afflicts ordinary consciousness and to lead the way, through critique, to 
a possible liberation from those conditions. 
                                                
837 See Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, On Justification: Economies of Worth, translated by 
Catherine Porter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).  
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This project has some affinities with Critical Theory838 but it is actually 
more ambitious (perhaps overambitious?) in what comes down to the role played 
by the social critic; indeed, it is not without reminding us of Althusser and his 
“epistemological break”. Over against this emphasis, and partly as a movement 
cutting its ties with Bourdieu’s towering influence, Boltanski and Thévenot’s 
book, which had been preceded by some earlier articles, inaugurated a fresh and 
original way of doing sociology. Their movement, sometimes described as 
“pragmatic sociology” or a “sociology of critique” (to mark its distinction from 
Bourdieu’s “critical sociology”) adopted a somewhat more modest standpoint in 
what concerned the role of the social scientist. Indeed, they chose to concentrate 
on the standpoint of actors themselves, and to analyze their vocabulary, their 
actions, their ways of exerting critique, create meaning or justifying their actions. 
In this, we might perhaps say that their movement gave some voice to precisely 
those social actors themselves, not assuming some sort of doubling of 
consciousness in which the theoretician would necessarily see further and point 
the way to social actors. 
Their research coalesced around a group called the Groupe de Sociologie 
Politique et Morale (GSPM), whose headquarters was at the École des Hautes 
Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS). It is hard to say up until what point we 
could call this movement a “school” because it allowed for many different 
methodologies, styles and empirical researches within it. However, for around 
twenty years, it saw the development of such important works as Luc Boltanski’s 
                                                
838 See Robin Celikates, “Systematic misrecognition and the practice of critique: Bourdieu, 
Boltanski and the role of critical theory” in Recognition Theory and Contemporary French Moral 
and Political Philosophy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), pp. 160-172. Recent 
Critical Theory, on the other hand, has sometimes been described as being somewhere in between 
the standpoint of Bourdieu, and that of pragmatic sociologists. Axel Honneth, for his part, even if 
he is close to Boltanski and his analyzes of the “new spirit of capitalism” (see for instance his 
interview with me, “Recognition and Critical Theory Today”, op. cit., p. 212) has published a harsh 
critique of On Justification. Honneth argues that if Bourdieu exaggerated on the role of the social 
theoretician, and saw agents as opaque to themselves, Boltanski and Thévenot in their book 
commit the opposite exaggeration. That is, Honneth argues that they strip the role of the social 
critic to such a point in their insistence on the plurality of the orders of justification that “we are 
presented with an image of a normatively and completely unstructured society”. Therefore, the 
claim goes, “The tendency toward the dissolution of the moral structures of the social is the danger 
that the study encounters on nearly every page.” See Honneth, “Dissolutions of the Social: On the 
Social Theory of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot” in Constellations vol. 17, number 3 (2010): 
388. I do not think that this critique is entirely fair. But I subscribe, in its main traits, to the 
standpoint adopted by Critical Theory. 
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L’amour et la justice comme compétences839 and On Critique840, Luc Boltanski’s 
and Ève Chiapello’s The New Spirit of Capitalism841, Laurent Thévenot’s L’action 
au pluriel842, and Cyril Lemieux’s Le devoir et la grâce843, to mention only a few 
of the most important monographs published in this period.844 
At the moment when I am writing these lines, the research programs of 
Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot have parted ways, as Boltanski seems to have 
taken a step back and, since his On Critique, partially returned to a “critical 
sociology”; or, better put, he seems to want to go beyond the alleged rift between 
“critical sociology”845 and the “sociology of critique”. In his new research 
program, he wants to find a new mixture between overarching critiques (those he 
calls “critical theories”, and by this he understands the theories of Marx, Bourdieu 
or those coming from the Frankfurt School) and pragmatic, pluralistic critiques, 
like those that had been put forward by members of the GSPM in the two 
preceding decades. Laurent Thévenot, on the other hand, developed a more 
systematic approach on what he calls the “regimes of engagement” of familiarity, 
regular planning and justification, which develop his earlier notion of “suitable 
action” (l’action qui convient). 
Boltanski’s On Critique was met with fierce criticism by some within the 
movement and both the coherence of his standpoint from a diachronic point of 
view (that is, the relation of his many works) and the feasibility of his proposed 
program in this book have been disputed.846 While I understand and praise the 
                                                
839 Luc Boltanski, L’amour et la justice comme compétences. Trois essais de sociologie de l’action 
(Paris: Métailié, 1990). 
840 Luc Boltanski, On Critique: A Sociology of Emancipation, translated by Gregory Elliott 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011). 
841 Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism, translated by Gregory Elliott 
(London: Verso, 2007). 
842 Laurent Thévenot, L’action au pluriel. Sociologie des régimes d’engagement (Paris: La 
Découverte, 2006). 
843 Cyril Lemieux, Le devoir et la grâce (Paris: Economica, 2009). 
844 For a provisional summing up of the main developments and theoretical discussions of this 
movement, see Compétences critiques et sens de la justice, edited by Marc Breviglieri, Claudette 
Lafaye and Danny Trom (Paris: Economica, 2009). 
845 “Critical sociology” is of course a problematic designation and it needs to go through a 
conceptual clarification if it is to be properly understood. For a critical assessment of this notion, 
see Jean de Munck, “Les trois dimensions de la sociologie critique” in SociologieS, available on-
line at http://sociologies.revues.org/3576 
846 For a very harsh criticism of Boltanski’s book, see Joan Stavo-Debauge, “De la critique, une 
critique. Sur le geste “radical” de Luc Boltanski, in EspacesTemps.net, Travaux, 07-03-2011. 
Available on-line at http://www.espacestemps.net/articles/de-la-critique-une-critique-sur-le-geste-
radical-de-luc-boltanski/ For a brief overview of the main developments of the pragmatic sociology 
movement, including a more sympathetic account of Boltanski’s On Critique, and a somewhat 
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pertinence of this movement and their fine and detailed analyzes of action, 
justification, critique and many other topics, I do not have a particular desire to 
enter this debate in a polemic manner, nor do I have a particular tendency to see 
their respective standpoints as being irreconcilable. In what comes down to 
Boltanski’s On Critique, I praise the gesture of trying to reconcile in a creative 
manner “critical sociologies” and namely “critical theories” with the pragmatic 
analyzes of action, while I also recognize a certain descriptive deficit and 
obviously a contradiction with previous works, two problems identified by Stavo-
Debauge. 
One important aspect to mention, also so that it can be understood why I 
am including a discussion of these developments in this thesis, is that this was a 
movement that from the start was heavily influenced by Ricœur, and which also, 
in turn, influenced Ricœur. There was thus an interesting reciprocal interaction 
and fertile discussion whose steps I will not analyze in detail, but which deserves 
to be mentioned. In The Just, Ricœur included an important analyzis of On 
Justification and in The Course of Recognition Ricœur again drew on their 
analyzes, as well as on Boltanski’s L’amour et la justice comme compétences 
when preparing his discussion of agape and the states of peace which provide him 
with an alternative model for recognition, different from the Honnethian model of 
the struggle for recognition. 
Boltanski and Thévenot, for their part, explicitly recognize the influence 
of Ricœur in the theoretical framework of pragmatic sociology.847 Thévenot 
mentions the mark of Ricœur in topics like the interpretation of action and texts 
(important for their depiction of the pragmatic regimes848), the analyzis of persons, 
agency and identities849 and the fertility Ricœur’s works had for a whole group of 
researchers, from Marc Breviglieri’s analyzis of inhabiting, to Stavo-Debauge’s 
take on hospitality and belonging, not forgetting Luca Pattaroni’s analyzis of 
                                                                                                                                 
ironic (or at least humorous) take on the whole polemic turn this has taken, see also Philippe 
Corcuff, “Style de théorie, statut de la critique et approche des institutions” Working paper CrIDIS 
n.º 28 (Mai 2011), available on-line at http://www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/cr-
cridis/documents/_WP_28_Philippe_Corcuff.pdf  
847 See “L’effet Ricœur dans les sciences humaines. Table ronde avec Luc Boltanski, François 
Dosse, Michaël Foessel, François Hartog, Patrick Pharo, Louis Quéré, Laurent Thévenot” in Esprit 
“La pensée Ricœur” n.º 323 (mars-avril 2006): 43-67. 
848 Ibid., p. 47. 
849 Ibid., p. 48. 
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responsibility.850 Boltanski, for his part, emphasizes how the reading of Ricœur’s 
works from the early 1980s onwards helped him to transpose an hermeneutic 
model to sociology, a model of reconstruction of meaning which allowed for an 
alternative to the hermeneutics of suspicion.851 Ultimately, as of today, a part of 
these researchers is still actively looking at Ricœur’s works for inspiration, 
transposing and further developing some of his intuitions to social theory.852 
As for me, to reiterate, my own standpoint is one of a political and social 
philosophy simultaneously inspired by Critical Theory and by Ricœur’s 
philosophy, and namely his ethical insights and hermeneutic methodology. Since I 
am not a sociologist myself, I am in no position to evaluate the methodologies put 
forward by pragmatic sociologists themselves. However, their fine analyzes of 
action, critiques, justification and so forth provide me with a descriptive content 
which is useful for my own standpoint. I will refrain from analyzing all the 
meaningful debates taking place within this movement, for lack of space. I will 
thus restrain myself to mentioning the main theses of the founding book, On 
Justification, and then mention some of the very interesting analyzes that we can 
find in Boltanski and Chiapello’s New Spirit of Capitalism, because they provide a 
glimpse at how a critique of some of the procedures of late capitalism might be put 
forward, which is an important task to which I will come back in part eight of this 
thesis. The analyzis of On Justification will provide a glimpse on the topic of 
conflict and compromise that was emphasized by Ricœur, as well as a 
continuation of the conflict between Rawls’s universalistic standpoint and the 
plurality of instantiations of justice. 
On Justification is a book that revolves around the competences of social 
actors. The authors decide to analyze the “operations of qualification” among 
social actors, that is, how people do things such as compare and establish 
hierarchies. In order to do that, they directed their attention towards several 
“orders of generality”, each of which with a particular kind of “worth” and 
                                                
850 Ibid. 
851 Ibid., p. 51. 
852 Allow me to mention Thévenot’s and Breviglieri’s contributions to a recent number of Études 
Ricoeuriennes / Ricœur Studies on social analyzis, organized by Anna Borisenkova. See Laurent 
Thévenot, “Des Institutions en Personne. Une sociologie pragmatique en dialogue avec Paul 
Ricœur” in Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricœur Studies vol. 3, n.º 1 (2012): 11-33 and Marc Breviglieri, 
“L’espace habité que réclame l’assurance intime de pouvoir. Un essai d’approfondissement 
sociologique de l’anthropologie capacitaire de Paul Ricœur” in Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricœur 
Studies vol. 3, n.º 1 (2012): 34-52. 
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conferring upon social actors a certain “standing”. Describing their methodology, 
they emphasize that they had to be attentive to their descriptive language in order 
to avoid transforming observation into critique.853 That is, the type of critical 
exercises, arguments, justifications and so forth that will appear in the book are 
those that social actors use. As they put it, theirs is a “way of constructing 
generality – and thus of supporting justifications and critiques – that is not 
unfamiliar to the actors themselves.”854 This data, in turn, is organized according 
to a certain typology. But this typology is nothing more than a collection of ideal-
types, that is, sets of normative models that they put forward, following an 
inspiration from classical works of political philosophy. 
These models will thus be found in the classical political philosophies 
that attempted to describe the common good by placing different goods at the top 
of their hierarchy. Hence, in chapter four of the second part of their book855 they 
list the main forms of “polities”, each of which assuming a different type of worth. 
Their initial list comprises the inspired polity (based on Augustine), whose 
members derive their worth from acceptance of God’s grace; the market polity, 
based on Adam Smith, praising market value and free exchange; the domestic 
polity (based on Bossuet, worth depending upon a hierarchy in a chain of personal 
dependencies); the polity of fame (based on Hobbes’s depiction of honor, worth 
depending on “fame”; the civic polity (worth deriving from an impersonal 
sovereign made up by the convergence of human wills, that is, a model stemming 
from Rousseau’s social contract theory); and the industrial polity, inspired by 
Saint-Simon, and where what counts is production and efficacy. 
All these polities, in turn, lead them to model six different “worlds” 
(cités), where the values put forward by the polities organize a specific way of 
living together. These will thus be the inspired world, the domestic world, the 
world of fame, the civic world, the market world and the industrial world. In 1999, 
Boltanski and Chiapello would add a seventh world, namely, the “projective 
world” (where what matters is organization in projects). We can ask whether or 
not there is a certain degree of arbitrariness in this coupling of ordinary action, and 
hierarchization with these specific notions in classical political philosophy. Why 
                                                
853 Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, On Justification, p. 10. 
854 Ibid., p. 11. 
855 Ibid., pp. 83-123. 
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these “worlds” and not a number of any others? Why these authors and notions, 
and why not others? Why draw on Hobbes, for instance, when dealing with a 
notion close to recognition, and not Hegel? However, this is not, in itself, an 
objection. It goes without saying that the authors found the normative models that 
best suited the modes of hierarchization and organization they had found in 
everyday, ordinary interaction. They explain their method as follows: 
 
 We treat the works we have selected as grammatical enterprises intended to clarify and 
fix rules for reaching agreement, that is, both as polity and as models of the shared 
competence required of persons in order for agreement to be possible. We use these works 
to develop a model of legitimate order – termed the polity model – that spells out the 
requirement a higher common principle must satisfy in order to sustain justifications.856 
 
This passage contains, in a nutshell, the core methodology of the book. They in 
fact assume that actors possess these competences and that they implicitly resort to 
these models when discussing and trying to reach common agreement. 
Now, this is an important part of the book. In a way, what Boltanski and 
Thévenot want to put forward is a radically plural account of the way in which 
“fitness or rightness is expressed” (fitness here being suitability). This is why there 
are in the book different forms of generality, each of which can justify an action. 
By spelling out these different ways to specify the common good they are close to 
Michael Walzer, which is an influence they explicitly acknowledge.857 But they do 
not simply acknowledge this plurality. In fact, a central claim of the book resides 
in their belief that social actors can navigate throughout these different worlds and 
appeal to different forms of justification according to the situation in which they 
happen to be. And the radical consequence of that plurality (in the triple sense of 
the plurality of worlds, the plurality of situations faced by social actors, and their 
capacity to appeal to the different forms of generality and hierarchization which 
leads to a plurality of forms of agreement) is that there might be an intrinsic 
conflict between these principles in the justifications of action  put forward in each 
case. 
One of the reasons why these authors and particularly this book is very 
                                                
856 Ibid., p. 66. 
857 Ibid., p. 14. 
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important for this thesis is that these authors want to take into account both 
conflict and agreement (or consensus, or, in a modified form, compromise). In 
this, they can, albeit in a superficial manner merely tied to nomenclature, be 
compared with Rawls and his conflictual-consensual approach to society. 
However, their means are radically different, not only because they are more 
pluralistic and offer thicker accounts than Rawls does (so they are closer to 
Walzer) but also because their method has sociological pertinence. 
But this interaction between conflict and consensus is programmatically 
asserted; they explicitly claim:  
 
There is no reason to maintain a radical opposition between sociologies of consensus and 
sociologies of conflict, although they derive from quite different traditions. 
(…) 
We seek to embrace the various constructs within a more general model, and to show how 
each one integrates, in its own way, the relation between moments of agreement reaching 
and moments of critical questioning.858 
 
In what aims to be a very integrative approach, they also seek to go beyond strictly 
“individual” or “collective” explanations of action.859 Their emphasis will be on 
conventions, that is, something which is social in its core but that is only validated 
if and when the individual social actors resort to it. 
This is indeed a complex model. But it only is so, it can be argued, 
because it aims to reflect the structure of what are in themselves complex 
societies.860 There is conflict because if people need to justify their actions against 
a normative backdrop and if there are a plurality of principles among which they 
can move, when there is juxtaposition of models and when different people are 
trying to find the right way to justify themselves, these different principles can 
clash. Accordingly, Boltanski and Thévenot are attentive to different types of 
conflicts that can appear in everyday interaction: personal interactions, tensions 
between the public and the private spheres, conflicts in economic relations.861 
                                                
858 Ibid., p. 25. 
859 Ibid., p. 27. 
860 Ibid., p. 40. 
861 Ibid., p. 71. 
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Conflict arises because each of these principles tends to be overarching.862 Each of 
the polities entails not only a principle of worth but also a needed sacrifice for the 
common good.863 In this way, and this is something Axel Honneth has noted, the 
polities seem to be all organized by a principle of desert. To be sure, not all 
principles are valid. Boltanski and Thévenot identify the eugenic order as a 
possible order, but one which is based on an illegitimate value; however, 
illegitimate values cannot be established in full generality.864 
Nevertheless, those that can establish such a generality must be tested. In 
a move that is highly similar to that of Ricœur in Oneself as Another, they thus 
call for a “situated judgment”. As they tell us, “political philosophies remain at the 
level of principles; they tell us nothing about the conditions under which an actual 
agreement is reached.”865 Polities extend and encompass common worlds insofar 
as actors situate themselves in those worlds by claiming that in certain 
circumstances, the adequate action, the action that is just, is the one a certain 
normative principle calls for. But the specific principle to be called for is only 
decided by such a situated judgment. 
How then to decide who’s right, when justifications and normative 
principles clash? Boltanski and Thévenot argue that people look for a confirmation 
of their value through “objects”; people “objectify themselves by bringing objects 
into play and valorizing them, that is, endowing them with value”.866 This is what 
attributes a certain consistency to worlds and makes them transcend a pure 
intersubjective situation. Therefore, when there is disagreement, it is not only the 
normative principle that will be tested, but in fact the whole stability of the world 
and “the equitability of the way worths have been distributed in the situation at 
hand”.867 Moreover, each actor will be more or less attached to a specific world 
(the authors speak here about engagement) according to the position he or she will 
take, and depending on the hierarchical order promoted by that specific world. 
And this because each world will value different traits. The inspired world will 
value inspiration and imagination, people who are passionate, artists, geniuses, and 
so forth; the domestic world will value family, hierarchy, fidelity; bosses or other 
                                                
862 Ibid., p. 72. 
863 Ibid., p. 72. 
864 Ibid., p. 80. 
865 Ibid., p. 127. 
866 Ibid., p. 131. 
867 Ibid., p. 133. 
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traditional figures will rule. In the world of fame reputation will be the 
overarching value. Success, “fashion”, soft skills of communication and self-
promoting will be the key virtues. In the civic world, what will be valued above all 
are democratic values, solidarity, and so on. People chosen by the democratic 
processes of will formation are therefore prone to be valued the most. In the 
market world what counts is competition and marketability; its heroes will be the 
businessman, salespeople, the entrepreneur, etc.; as for the industrial world, people 
who are productive, performative, reliable (in a word, experts) will be the high 
achievers; finally, in the projective world as it will be defined later, autonomy, 
creation of webs of interaction where projects will unfold, and so forth will be the 
key features. As such, the people most likely to succeed are people with the right 
soft skills, or those who can teach them. Now, each of these capacities has 
particular tests that validate or invalidate the people who claim to possess these 
skills. For instance, in the inspired world people will have to demonstrate that they 
can create, in the market world they will have to prove they can conduct 
businesses and make sales, in the projective world the worker needs to multitask, 
find new projects, and so on. 
Finally, people can succeed or fail in tests. Boltanski and Thévenot 
mention the possibility of deficiencies.868 For instance, in the industrial world, a 
worker might point out to a colleague that he does not know how to properly 
fulfill such and such a task. According to the world in which this conflict takes 
place, a typology of conflicts is possible. In the domestic world there will be 
quarrels, breakdowns in the industrial world, social conflicts in the civic world… 
Ultimately, people are subjected to these tests in a regular basis, and they can 
either pass or fail them. 
Ultimately, we can always ask whether or not Boltanski and Thévenot are 
a little too optimistic concerning people’s capacity to navigate the common 
worlds. They explicitly acknowledge that they “assume that all persons are 
inherently endowed with the equipment they need to adapt to situations in each of 
the worlds we have identified.”869 They call this the “arts of living in different 
worlds” and claim that “normal” people can do it. Those who cannot do it are 
                                                
868 Ibid., p. 134. 
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deemed “psychologically abnormal”.870 Hence, they implicitly assume people’s 
adaptability. If the first parts of the book define the polities, common worlds and 
the competences of social actors, from part four onwards the argument will make a 
further move. Besides from tests that evaluate a given actor’s competence in 
acquiring worth in each world, they assess the possibility of having two or more 
worlds colliding. In chapter seven, called “worlds in conflict, judgments in 
question”871 they consider the many forms this can assume. Usually, this process 
appears when a test is contested: false worth conceals deficiency; this, in turn, 
leads to critique, which calls for a different justification.872 Faced with this 
situation, actors can either avoid it (what the authors call “tactics of 
disengagement, such as irony, hyperbole, understatement, etc.”873) or try to reach 
agreement through compromise. 
The need for compromise appears because  balance needs to be reached: 
 
On the one hand, a constantly repeated critique results in a vain flight into alternative 
worlds; on the other hand, an excessive identification with the series of objects in the 
world at hand results in a petrified attachment to a specific worth.874 
 
Boltanski and Thévenot thus call for an “opening of our eyes” to plurality. In what 
they define as prudence (again, and to reiterate, very close to Ricœur) they 
presuppose that in virtue of our own free will we have the capacity to both go in 
and out of situations: 
 
A multiworld justice thus presupposes free will on the part of persons who are capable in 
turn of closing their eyes (in order to attend fully to what they are doing in the situations 
in which they are involved, to resist distractions and engage themselves in the tests that 
the situations have in store for them) and of opening their eyes (in order to challenge the 
validity of a test and, by breaking free from the grip of the situation, to distinguish beings 
deriving from other worlds).875 
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872 Ibid., p. 224. 
873 Ibid., p. 225. 
874 Ibid., p. 232. 
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For these authors there is also, so to speak, a disclosing power of critique. To 
continue using their metaphor, it is critique that opens our eyes. It is because one 
world is criticized that we detach ourselves from a given situation and are 
therefore made to recognize that there are other worlds, other possibilities to rank 
priorities and justify what we are doing. It is critique that leads to justification.876 
Hence, the eighth chapter877 of the book is dedicated to the critiques a 
standpoint based in each of the worlds addresses to the other worlds; more 
importantly, however, is the authors’ assertion that conflicts, critiques and disputes 
are not unsolvable. Rather, in chapter nine and ten878, they display a wide array of 
forms that compromise for the common good can assume. They call them 
“compromise formulas”. Significantly, they do not posit that a full consensus 
might be reached. These are “composite arrangements”. 
 
In a compromise, people agree to come to terms, that is, to suspend a clash – a dispute 
involving more than one world – without settling it through recourse to a test in just one 
of the worlds. The situation remains composite, but a clash is averted. Beings that matter 
in different worlds are maintained in presence, but their identification does not provoke a 
dispute.879 
 
Significantly, they acknowledge that a compromise can be tacit. That is, an 
overarching principle ruling the agreement might not be identified. People are 
“favorably disposed toward the notion of a common good without actively seeking 
one”.880 This thus stems from the acceptance of plurality, and the will to cease a 
dispute. It aims at including both of the goods in dispute (and so it is also more 
than an overlapping consensus, in the Rawlsian definition881). The authors provide 
the example of “techniques of creativity”, which draws both on the inspired and 
the industrial worlds. And they emphasize that compromises are fragile. This is 
important and brings them back to Ricœur once again, because Ricœur always 
says that mediations are “fragile” and “provisional”. The rest of their book is 
therefore dedicated to the mixed polities that can be reached in states of 
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compromise. Some of these compromises will be more suitable than others. Some 
will have a greater degree of relative stability than others. But it is the principle 
that is interesting. 
Ultimately, Boltanski and Thévenot point towards the possibility of 
circumstantial agreements. These can evidently fail. There might be a 
denunciation of the compromise, or a flight from justification. They also mention 
the possibility of relativization882, that is, the attempt to argue that nothing matters, 
and thus to avoid both justification and agreement. Ultimately, even if theirs is a 
somewhat radically pluralistic account, it is not a relativistic one, because 
justification matters. Later, taking up the same vein of pragmatic account, Cyril 
Lemieux will push further the anti-relativistic stance and try to recover a 
universalistic stance through a grammatical analyzis of action inspired by 
Wittgenstein and aimed at finding constants in human action that can be properly 
identified by the social sciences.883 
This is, in a condensed manner, Boltanski and Thévenot’s early model, 
which prompted so many fertile, even if sometimes divergent later developments. 
Allow me now to come back to Ricœur and his assessment of the plural instances 
of justice. 
In The Just, and after presenting Rawls’s unified, systematic and 
procedural account of justice, Ricœur includes an article called “The plurality of 
instances of justice”.884 In this important article Ricœur sees in Walzer and 
Boltanski / Thévenot examples of the limitation of a unified form of juridical 
power and a plea for a differentiation of instances of right. He thus takes up 
spheres and cities (the French concept is cités, translated as worlds in the English 
translation of On Justification) as two important projects of pluralization. 
Ultimately, he thinks they are closely tied together:  
 
There is a kinship between these two projects of pluralizing the idea of justice that brings 
them close together. We can show this by the implicit borrowings each makes from the 
other. For example, the notion of social goods develops an internal logic heavily freighted 
with a prescriptive load (for example, what one does or does not have the right to 
purchase). In this sense, the notion of a shared understanding links up with that of 
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justification. In an opposite sense, we can say that scales of standing give rise to 
distributions just like that of social goods. Justification too then has to do with distributive 
justice. What is more, in both cases it is power, and therefore also satisfaction and 
enjoyment, that gets distributed. It is true, however, that the gap remains between a 
project aimed at equality, that is, at the limitation of domination, and one aimed at 
justification, that is, at a reasonable treatment of opposing claims.885 
 
He also sees both these theories as providing practical solutions to specific 
problems. Walzer aims at curbing dominance and tyranny, whereas Boltanski and 
Thévenot strive to solve conflicts without resorting to violence. 
He recognizes that there are many differences in their respective 
methodologies too. But he also states that both these works are faced with a 
similar perplexity: how encompassing can radically pluralistic accounts be? As he 
puts it, concerning Walzer: “Can a theory exclusively concerned to differentiate 
spheres avoid the question of integration of these same spheres into a single 
political body?”886 According to Ricœur, there is a fundamental “political 
paradox” here, that of treating the State in terms of distributive justice.887 Ricœur 
seems to think that insofar as it is political power that allows for the distribution of 
many other goods, what we should strive to think is rather its self-constitution. 
Allow me to recall, in passing, that Walzer considers political power as merely 
one sphere, alongside all the others. This is, for Ricœur, paradoxical. 
Turning to Boltanski and Thévenot, he praises their depiction of conflict 
between different worlds. But, more importantly, he sees in the figures of 
compromise the overall significance of their work.888 However, he asks whether 
we really can reach some sort of “supercompromise” (what Boltanski and 
Thévenot call a “compromise for the common good”) precisely because if these 
theories cannot be overarching, compromises will always remain, as Boltanski and 
Thévenot admit, fragile. This fragility is very important for Ricœur: 
 
In reading the part of this book devoted to compromise, one gets the impression that 
compromises are always weaker than the internal bonds of the different cities. The result 
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is that if some higher common good is affected by the compromise, as a general figure of 
interaction, it is just as indeterminate as the bond set up by the compromise is fragile. 
Outside the Utopia of Eden there is only the possibility of dealing with disagreements in 
terms of compromises always threatened by turning into a compromising of principles, on 
a slippery slope that recalls the perverse effect denounced by Walzer under the heading of 
conversion.889  
 
Now, I want to argue that by insisting in this manner in the fragile constitution of 
compromises, and also by alerting to the danger of turning fragile compromises on 
“compromising of principles” Ricœur is actually implicitly making a claim that 
has far reaching implications for his own philosophy. Without anticipating too 
much, I can say that Ricœur always sought mediations in his philosophy. To 
reiterate, he always said that these were “fragile and provisional mediations”890, 
and he was always afraid that these turn into “compromises” in the pejorative 
sense of the word, that is, false shortcuts which would betray the principles at 
stake in each of the theories he was mediating.891 
In this article, Ricœur concludes that this paradox of treating the state as 
whole and a part, a container and something contained brings with it the 
complexity of a multitude of generating centers of rights, as well as a paradox of 
sovereignty being divided between states and supranational entities. Ultimately, 
we can see this article as a critical appraisal of this pluralization. At the same time, 
Ricœur’s coupling of these two books allows us to better grasp the similarities 
between the notions of conflict to which we have dedicated this chapter. 
With Walzer, what we have is a depiction of the conflict in the 
apportionment of social goods. The same could be said for Rawls. As for Rawls, 
for Boltanski and Thévenot societies can also be seen as consensual-conflictual 
phenomena, even if the sources of conflict and their respective solutions are 
different in each case. Rawls is more preoccupied with providing an ideal theory 
and an ordering of the principles of justice. When trying to deal with actually 
existing societies he proposes the solution of a minimalist overlapping consensus 
without however specifying how it would work and what exactly to include in it. 
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Boltanski and Thévenot plead for compromises in the orders of justification. 
Ultimately, both Rawls and Boltanski / Thévenot seek pacification. Walzer does 
not deal directly with this problem in the Spheres of Justice, but from all these 
authors, he is the one to put forward a thicker model of political organization and 
apportionment of social goods. 
Therefore, we have seen in this chapter conflicts of norms, conflicts on 
the apportionment of social goods, conflicts in the way each normative principle 
(or polity, in the case of pragmatic sociology) might eventually invade into one 
another; the same problem was posed by Walzer concerning social goods. With 
Walzer we had the solution of a theory of justice based on limits and vigilance; 
with Boltanski and Thévenot we saw a plead for compromise, with Ricœur 
doubting that an overarching compromise might be reached, but arguing that 
fragile compromises and overlapping consensuses are very important. 
Ultimately, from all these intersections with Ricœur’s thought, the one 
with pragmatic sociology has been the more fertile, and more systematically 
developed. Alain Loute, for example, has explored pragmatic sociology from a 
Ricoeurian standpoint. In his thesis on the social creation of norms892, he argued 
that the Ricoeurian philosophy of action allows us to really grasp normative 
creativity and to go beyond the mere reproduction of conventions. In my 
conclusion I will talk about “Ricoeurian philosophy after Ricœur”, which entails a 
creative renewal of some of the leads spelled out by Ricœur. It goes without 
saying that pragmatic sociologists are one of the main movements undertaking 
such a renewal. 
Before ending this chapter allow me to mention the critical analyzis of 
capitalism such as we can find it in The New Spirit of Capitalism. This book, 
written in the second half of the 1990s takes a pessimistic look at the state of 
critique, amid a profound mutation and even a reinforcement of capitalism. The 
book was translated into English in 2005 and has had a significant impact on all 
those still interested in understanding capitalism as a system of social integration 
and coordination of social practices. Writing in the late nineties, Boltanski and 
Chiapello found that the relation between capitalism and the exercise of critique 
was inverted if compared to what they had witnessed in the late 1960s and early 
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1970s.893 In that period, productivity and profitability were down, there was an 
increase in real wages and yet social critique was at its height, namely with the 
student protests of which May 1968 in France was the privileged example. In 
contrast, they claim, in spite of the fact that from the beginning of the 1980s 
onwards inequalities began to rise, capitalism was able to modify itself and to 
regain the trust of social actors to the point of ensuring their peaceful 
collaboration. In other words, even if capitalism was at its height in the 1990s and 
if the majority of workers did not have better living or working conditions if 
compared with the situation they had in the late 1960s and early 1970s, critique 
had been silenced. 
And why? Because capitalism can be seen as a system of justification and 
persuasion, leading social actors to accept its conditions and peacefully collaborate 
with it. The pessimistic result, according to Boltanski and Chiapello, is “a sense of 
impotence” and a practical “closing down [of] the field of possibilities”.894 Now, it 
is not hard to see that these descriptions come very close to what in the 
philosophical tradition, from Marx onwards, is denounced as being ideological 
phenomena. Critique had allegedly been silenced, precisely because people had 
more or less bought the ideology. The closing down of the field of possibilities, on 
the other hand, is precisely what Ricœur wanted to counteract with his notion of 
utopia. Boltanski and Chiapello mention the possibility of utopia but at the time of 
their writing they only see utopias in the form of returns to an idealized past, and 
hence with little practical effect in the world. Critique was thus at a standstill at 
that time, they argue. 
Summing up their analyzes in just a few sentences, I will say that they see 
capitalism as a system of perpetual mutation and which evolves by absorbing the 
critiques that are addressed to it. In that way, it is as resistant as it is pervasive. In 
a minimal definition, it is “an imperative to unlimited accumulation of capital by 
formally peaceful means.”895 Nevertheless, as they argue, the detachment of 
capital from material forms of wealth gives it an abstract character. That is, inbuilt 
in the definition of capitalism there is a tendency to develop an insatiable 
character. There is no reason why the individual capitalist should stop the process 
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of accumulation at any given point. Evidently, in the long run, this can tend to 
produce inequalities. Inequalities can lead to dissatisfaction. But in order for the 
capitalist system to pursue its goals, some degree of social peace and collaboration 
from social actors is of course needed. As such, and by means of a reactualization 
of a concept originally taken from Max Weber896, Boltanski and Chiapello spell 
out what they call the “spirit of capitalism”, that is, the evolving body of beliefs, 
values and justifications that on every occasion capitalism puts forward in order to 
guarantee the collaboration of social actors. And why is this needed? Because, 
according to these authors,  
 
In many respects, capitalism is an absurd system: in it, wage-earners have lost ownership 
of the fruits of their labour and the possibility of pursuing a working life free of 
subordination. As for capitalists, they find themselves yoked to an interminable, insatiable 
process, which is utterly abstract and dissociated from the satisfaction of consumption 
needs, even of a luxury kind. For two such protagonists, integration into the capitalist 
process is singularly lacking in justifications.897 
 
However, and in spite of its latent irrationality in terms of social integration, the 
system demands the collaboration of a large number of people whose prospects of 
profit are low. And precisely the body of justifications, or ideologies, that are put 
forward, convinces these people. The conclusion is simple: besides its dimensions 
of coordination of social interaction, economic regulation and so forth, capitalism 
also is, or at least entails, a certain type of morality. It puts forward values, which 
in turn are embodied in practices that present themselves as the best possible 
practices, those that allow for no alternative course. Sometimes, these are even 
naturalized. 
But since, from time to time, things go awry, and the system comes to be 
criticized, people mobilize themselves, social movements of protest are formed 
and the public image of things as they stand becomes negative, what does it do? It 
mutates, absorbing new characteristics that better suit what seems to be demanded 
                                                
896 See Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated by Talcott 
Parsons (New York: Dover Publications, 2003). Weber, of course, saw the “spirit” of capitalism 
and the development of capitalistic practices as an unintended consequence of the protestant ethic, 
whereas Boltanski and Thévenot use this term as a much more systematic manner, and they do not 
see its development as purely accidental.  
897 Boltanski and Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism, p. 7. 
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by precisely those critiques that targeted it. If we accept this diagnosis, than we 
must accept that in a paradoxical way, and as Boltanski and Chiapello argue, 
capitalism needs its critics. Without them, it would petrify and eventually, who 
knows, perish. But because the system itself is elastic, its survival and thriving 
have been made easier by the absorption of critiques and transformation of 
practices leading to the possibility of new justifications. 
Following this thread, Boltanski and Chiapello thus propose a brief 
history of capitalism, following its different phases, the guiding ideals of each of 
them, the critiques that have been addressed to capitalism in each of these phases, 
and how capitalism evolved by incorporating them. These phases go from the 
ideal of the bourgeois self-made man, to the contemporary heroic figure of the 
manager, and the appearance of the cadres, a category to which pragmatic 
sociologists paid much attention. I will not follow all these developments. Suffice 
it to say that the latest metamorphosis of capitalism detected by Boltanski and 
Chiapello at the time they were writing the book was intrinsically connected with 
the managerial revolution. By analyzing a wide array of management literature, 
they spelled out a new normative polity, the “projective city”. In this new world 
order, they argue, managers embodied some of the ideals of the “artistic critique” 
that developed in the 1960s. Two types of critique, they argue, developed in the 
19th century: the “artistic critique”, which strives for authenticity and liberation, 
and a social critique, aiming at denouncing poverty and exploitation.898 These 
types of critique evidently underwent evolution in the 20th century, but by the 
1960s and 1970s capitalism was under fire by these two types of critiques, one 
stemming more from students, the other from workers, labor movements, and so 
on. Nevertheless, their claim is that the managerial revolution that started in the 
early 1980s was able to transform capitalism to such an extent that its dominant 
morality was able to absorb the artistic critiques while at the same time 
downplaying social critiques. At the time of big centralized corporations, people 
complained from lack of freedom, lack of control of their time, monotonous tasks, 
alienation and so forth. Now, with the emphasis being put on projects, 
multitasking, and capabilities connected with communication skills, the emphasis 
is more on networking than on hierarchy. Workers are supposed to be creative and 
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inventive, display enthusiasm and team spirit.899 These developments and changes 
in the structure of corporations and of the way work has radically transformed in 
the last decades, including the consequences of globalization and changes in 
bureaucracy have also been highlighted by Richard Sennett.900 Ultimately, if we 
follow the claim of Boltanski and Chiapello, it is as if the demands for liberation 
called for by the artistic critique were heard and partially satisfied. It is as if 
capitalism succeeded in fashioning its image as the best of possible worlds. 
Boltanski and Chiapello, of course, do not think that there has been an 
utter elimination of alienation and work exploitation. But they do think the 
managerial revolution did a good job of making them less apparent. Consequently, 
their diagnosis is of a disarming of critique in recent decades. In their postscript, 
they plead for a sociology “contra fatalism”. They claim they hope having 
contributed to “revive critique”901 and its liberating force, but do not know what 
the future holds. All in all, their diagnosis is pessimistic. They see the rise in 
individualism as leading to skeptical indifference, and the alternative of total 
commitment as being discredited and accused of dogmatism. In other words, they 
see their contemporary society as partially submerged in anomie.902 
These sociological analyzes are not without consequences for our own 
proposal. On the one hand, the type of work put forward by Boltanski and 
Chiapello is already an implicit critique of capitalism, and can thus be 
meaningfully connected with the types of “critical theories” Boltanski mentions 
ten years later in On Critique. On the other hand, if we accept these conclusions as 
good, not only is the conflict about the apportionment of social goods and 
economic redistribution shown to be more evident (even if, as it were, concealed 
by the façade of peaceful integration of late capitalism) but the conditions of 
vigilance and prevention from conversion called for by Walzer are made more 
difficult and problematic. If capitalism generates inequality but if people tend to 
accept it and thus implicitly legitimate those who do succeed, the invasion of the 
market sphere into the other domains is facilitated. So the challenge is greater. 
If we fast-forward fifteen years to the present time, the socio-economic 
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landscape of the North Atlantic has once again changed. With the dawn of yet 
another crisis, inequalities have risen once again: real wages are lower, and the 
concentration of capital in a few hands is higher. However, since the abuses of the 
pre-crisis years have burst out in the open, so have social movements and a 
renewal and reinforcement of critique. What the results will be remains yet to be 
seen. On the one hand, there seems to be a greater level of civic vigilance. On the 
other hand, in the real decision making arenas, what we have seen up until now 
was a tightening of the financial stranglehold in ailing societies, especially in 
Europe’s peripheries. 
What this all entails is, in a way, a betrayal of our desire to live together 
under a meaningful horizon of cooperation, as Ricœur would have put it. Maybe 
what is called for is a new critique of reason. But I will only address this in part 
eight. As for now, I will move to the last stop of my overview of the contemporary 
reappraisal of conflict, namely, the one that resurfaces in the works of Charles 
Taylor. Over and again, I have talked about substantive accounts, thick 
descriptions and an emphasis on the good, when speaking about Ricœur, and to 
distinguish him from the proceduralist standpoints. The time has now come to 
mention the author which, asides from Ricœur, spelled out a more forceful account 
of a substantive ethical standpoint taking into account a meaningful notion of the 
good. 
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2.3 – Charles Taylor: Hypergoods and the Conflict in the Making 
of the Modern Identity 
 
In the context of the late 20th century and early 21st century philosophy, 
Charles Taylor’s work is perhaps the one whose main orientations most strongly 
resonate with those of Ricœur. Like Ricœur, Taylor insists on the pertinence of the 
category of personal identity, over against Hume’s and Parfit’s objections. He also 
influenced what is sometimes called the “narrative turn” in philosophy and the 
social sciences, alongside Alasdair MacIntyre and Ricœur. In fact, for them, not 
only are narratives important, they are also one of the main features through which 
we come to make sense of our lives. Taylor’s enquiry into the modern identity is 
also depicted as an essay in “retrieval”, that is, a reconstruction of sources, which 
is very similar to one of the versions of Ricœur’s hermeneutics. Finally, as I 
already mentioned before, both Ricœur’s and Taylor’s ethical standpoints put an 
emphasis in the predicate “good” as being decisive for the orientation of our lives. 
This is to say that their framework is ultimately neo-Aristotelian, and placed in 
stark contrast with strictly deontological or procedural theories of morality or 
justice, such as Kant’s, Habermas’s and Rawls’s. This latter point is even clearer 
in Taylor than it is in Ricœur, because Ricœur’s own standpoint encompasses so 
many of the others. The two men knew each other and read each other and it is 
safe to assume that their respective philosophies exerted some reciprocal influence 
upon each other. 
 
2.3.1 – Hypergoods, moral sources and inescapable frameworks 
 
In Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity903, which was 
published around a year before Ricœur’s Oneself as Another, what is at stake is 
therefore what we can call “goods”. However, these goods are here taken as more 
than an economic good (something like a commodity) or even a social good to be 
apportioned, as we have seen in the theories of justice of Rawls and Walzer. Like 
Walzer, Taylor can be considered a communitarian (even if he rejects the tag), 
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having decisively contributed to what came to be known as multiculturalism.904 As 
such, he understands the importance of social goods and also like Walzer, defends 
and upholds the plurality of such goods. 
However, Taylor puts forward a category that none of the above authors 
speaks about: that of the “hypergoods”. These also entail more than what 
Boltanski and Thévenot call polities, insofar as these are taken as being strictly 
social in character. However, there is a certain similarity between Taylor’s 
hypergoods and the generalizing principle of polities, insofar as what is at stake is 
a principle of hierarchization. In fact, Taylor defines hypergoods as “goods which 
not only are incomparably more important than others but provide the standpoint 
from which these must be weighed, judged, decided about”.905 The great 
difference here is that in polities what is always at stake is the “common good”, 
that is, the hierarchization always entails the creation of a social order; Taylor’s 
hypergoods, however, can be strictly personal (in that I might value one good 
above any others and come to decide my life because of that) even if this 
hypergood might come to count in my life only through my insertion in 
intersubjective communities of value. But this hypergood is seen by Taylor as 
having, if I may use this formulation, an existential gravitas that is not easily 
ignored (as opposed to the strategies of detachment from certain worlds of which 
Boltanski and Thévenot spoke about). If something is my hypergood, there is no 
ignoring it. If I am, for instance, an artist or a poet and adopt an expressivist 
stance, the meaning of artistic creation assumes for me a decisive character. 
The peculiarity of Taylor’s approach is that he decides to undertake an 
historical analyzis of the way in which the goods that can be considered as 
“hypergoods” came about and imposed themselves; this is, for him, a striking 
feature of the modern identity. Through the identification with certain hypergoods, 
this identity becomes the product of a peculiar evolution. But what is more 
interesting for our own problematic is that the identification of hypergoods, Taylor 
argues, is also a source of conflict: 
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Hypergoods are generally a source of conflict. The most important ones, those which are 
most widely adhered to in our civilization, have arisen through a historical supersession of 
earlier, less adequate views. (…) Hypergoods are understood by those who espouse them 
as a step to a higher moral consciousness.906 
 
Why is this taken to be a higher moral consciousness? The first thing to 
understand is that for Taylor, even though the origin of what we can call “goods” 
or “hypergoods” might be “social” and “historical” (in that they might arise from 
unarticulated ideas that were spread in certain communities and are transmitted by 
a historical process) but its mains significance in our lives is “moral” (or what 
Ricœur would call “ethical”). Our position towards the good determines our 
orientation in “moral space”, which is the topic of Taylor’s second chapter.907 By 
spelling out his claim in these terms, Taylor is renewing with the ancient notion of 
moral orientation as a kind of “cybernetics” which, in Plato, is tied up with the art 
of self-governance, understood through the metaphor of steersmanship. We 
navigate our way through life, and this orientation is, in a way, a direction towards 
(what we consider as being) the good, with all its resonances of the Socratic 
depiction of the life that is worth living. 
In fact, for Taylor, the “good” or “the goods” determine what he calls 
“inescapable frameworks”908 and this is the reason why, right at the outset, he 
asserts that selfhood and the good (as well as morality) are inextricably 
intertwined.909 The framework can be seen as being the product of a discovery, in 
the sense of an order that pre-exists us and resonates in us – either we take this 
order in a naturalistic or in a theistic sense – or of an invention, as we can see in 
most of the expressivist notions of identity that have sprouted from the Romantic 
period onwards.  
Each hypergood thus involves the possibility of creating a framework. 
And if we can indeed “create” hypergoods, this must be akin, as Taylor himself 
admits, to a “transvaluation of values” in the Nietzschean sense.910. What used to 
be considered “good” ceases to be so, and what turns out to be good in the new 
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“order” is either the contrary, or else something simply different, from what was 
considered good in the “old” order. 
Taylor goes so far as to explicitly claim that living without such 
frameworks is impossible, because it is impossible to live without strong 
qualitative discriminations.911 It is not true that in our lives “anything goes”. In 
stating this, he seems to be once again returning to Plato’s metaphor of the 
navigation to which I alluded above: 
 
The claim is that living within such strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human 
agency, that stepping outside these limits would be tantamount to stepping outside what 
we would recognize as integral, that is, undamaged human personhood. 
(…) 
People may see their identity as defined partly by some moral or spiritual commitment, 
says as a Catholic, or an anarchist. Or they may define it in part by the nation or tradition 
they belong to, as an Armenian, say, or a Québécois. What they are saying by this is not 
just that they are strongly attached to this spiritual view or background; rather, it is that 
this provides the frame within which they can determine where they stand on questions of 
what is good, or worthwhile, or admirable, or of value. Put counterfactually, they are 
saying that were they to lose this commitment or identification, they would be at sea, as it 
were; they wouldn’t know anymore, for an important range of questions, what the 
significance of things was for them.912 
 
Thus, to be able to answer for oneself is to know where one stands, what one 
wants to answer.913 Ultimately, Taylor asserts that this phenomenological account 
of identity states the “transcendental conditions” of what is conceivable in human 
life, it explores its limits.914 Thus a totally detached, carefree individual who 
would not put forward any values or let him or herself be guided by these values, 
is beyond (or below) what we consider to be human. This is a view shared by 
many, including Bernard Williams and his famous description of the 
“amoralist”.915 
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What Taylor aims is at providing thick descriptions of our moral lives; he 
admits explicitly “to move to a language of “thick description”, in the sense of this 
term that Clifford Geertz has made famous, that is, a language which is “a lot 
richer and culturally bound, because it articulates the significance and point that 
the actions of feelings have within a certain culture.”916 But let us note in passing 
that this is not the mainstream method of social or moral theory. Taylor’s efforts 
therefore are put forth in a somewhat polemical manner, because he is basically 
struggling against the overwhelmingly dominant strand of reductionist and/or 
naturalist and/or proceduralist depictions of the world order in general and of 
moral life in particular. Over against Taylor’s thick descriptions, mainstream 
proceduralist theories actually sometimes appear as unbearably thin.  
What I want to focus on is the way in which Taylor describes hypergoods 
as being inherently conflictual: 
 
An ethical outlook organized around a hypergood in this way is thus inherently conflictual 
and in tension. The highest good is not only ranked above the other recognized goods of 
the society; it can in some cases challenge and reject them, as the principle of equal 
respect has been doing to the goods and virtues connected with traditional family life, as 
Judaism and Christianity did to the cults of pagan religions, and as the author of the 
Republic did to the goods and virtues of agonistic citizen life.917 
 
This depiction brings us back to the transvaluation of values that takes place 
whenever a new hypergood imposes itself; as Taylor admits, following Nietzsche, 
“a transvaluation is not necessarily a once-for-all affair. The older condemned 
goods remain; they resist; some seem ineradicable from the human heart. So that 
the struggle and tension continues.”918  
This last depiction is very important. It contains, in a nutshell, the 
justification for a state of affairs where a plurality of different values coexist at the 
same time. Indeed, and if we want to borrow the terms from linguistic analyzis, 
even if the different values – and their eventual rise to the status of hypergoods 
around which meaningful frameworks are formed – have different origins in time 
and can be assessed through genealogy or diachronic analyzis, the fact is that 
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many of them can coexist synchronically. And they do coexist, sometimes in 
different places in the world, other times in the same places but shared by different 
people and even, one might argue, in the same people, who are sometimes divided 
by their respective loyalty to different values and orient their action according to 
different goods, whether or not they are aware of it. Because the “old” values are 
seldom or even not at all eliminated, because they tend to resist, the possibility of 
conflict is inescapable. 
This evidently poses a threat, one that must be considered in all its 
seriousness; the threat of skepticism: 
 
And this actual struggle and disagreement, the seemingly ineradicable absence of 
unanimity about these hypergoods, has always been a potent source of moral 
skepticism.919 
 
Why the threat of skepticism is posed is rather self-evident. If there are no 
hypergoods that impose themselves in light of their own objectivity, their own 
force of appeal, how do we avoid falling back into full-blown relativism? Taylor 
himself concedes that what is properly transcendental is the necessity to let 
ourselves be guided by a hypergood, but not what that hypergood is itself. So the 
need to be guided still does not help us in “choosing”, so to speak, the hypergood 
through which we should orient ourselves (assuming that this is a matter of choice, 
and not of overwhelming imposition, conversion, which might sometimes be the 
case). 
In my view, only a different epistemological standpoint, one that makes 
fully explicit the inescapability of the conflict of interpretations in the Ricoeurian 
sense, is able to radically ground value pluralism, without falling back upon full-
blown relativism or skepticism. But this discussion will only take place in part 
four below. 
As I hinted at above, Taylor’s work in Sources of the Self is largely an 
effort of retrieval, that is, in his own words, of “articulating what has remained 
implicit”920, of spelling out what he calls the “moral sources” from which the 
orientation towards the hypergoods stems. In a way, this puts the social theorist in 
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a position of having to “invent” language, not because it is not available, but 
because a new term might bring to light some aspects of experience that have not 
been fully disclosed before. He remains faithful to his method, when he states that 
“the path to articulacy has to be a historical one.”921 
But how exactly do these conflicts between hypergoods unfold? Taylor 
gives some examples that are tied up with the way in which the particular history 
of the West developed. 
 
A cluster of these turn in modern culture on the tension or even conflict between our 
commitment to certain hypergoods, in particular the demands of universal and equal 
respect and of modern self-determining freedom, on one hand, and our sense of the value 
of what must apparently be sacrificed in their name, on the other. There are a number of 
different conflicts of this kind. In some cases, what seems threatened is the good of 
community; in others friendship, or else our traditional identity, seems in danger. In still 
other situations of conflict, the goods of sensuality and sexual fulfillment are in tension 
with our higher goals.922 
 
Thus conflict seems exacerbated because sometimes we are forced to choose. And 
in choosing we must sacrifice, someway or another, other goods that also count as 
valuable for us. This is what Ricœur will call, in the little ethics of Oneself as 
Another, the choice between the bad and the worse. 
Sometimes, Taylor is radical enough to affirm that we cannot help being 
on both sides of the problem: we need to espouse hypergoods and still we feel 
compelled to defend the goods that are sacrificed in their name.923 In these 
passages, he comes close to what we can call an existential conflict, implicitly 
admitting a philosophical anthropology akin to the one Ricœur sketches in Fallible 
Man. 
However, he too seems to hesitate between this diagnostic of inevitable 
conflict and the possibility of reconciliation. In a very significant manner, he 
places articulacy of our moral sources as the possible path to reconciliation:  
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The moral conflicts of modern culture rage within each of us. Unless, that is, our greater 
lucidity can help us to see our way to a reconciliation. If I may give expression to an even 
farther-out hunch, I will say that I see this as the potential goal and fruit of articulacy.924  
 
But he also admits that this is a risky bet, because “if reconciliation is impossible, 
then articulacy will buy us much greater inner conflict.”925 Why this must be so is 
easy to understand. If we follow Taylor’s argument, we see that according to him 
many of the values and goods with which we identify ourselves operate in us in a 
way that is not fully transparent. We are not 100% clear about our motivations and 
reasons for action, even though we need to be situated within the inescapable 
frameworks. This is the reason why we sometimes act in contradictory ways. He 
also thinks that the predominant conception of disengaged reason, self-sufficient 
humanism and naturalism, which are major developments of the modern era, fail 
to grasp something of our moral predicament and the way in which we live our 
lives, because they are too “thin” and have blind spots that they can cannot solve 
by themselves. Thus he thinks that espousing these conceptions entails a kind of 
reductionism that ultimately mutilates important and integral parts of our moral 
life. Part of his effort of articulacy will therefore aim at self-understanding; it is a 
sort of “hermeneutics of the self” in the sense Ricœur will give to it, and that will 
be dealt with in parts four and five of this dissertation. An hermeneutics not only 
of individual selves, but also of the publicly available moral sources that have 
come about in the historical process and that happen to be available to us, in our 
time. The move is therefore from a macro to a micro level: by understanding what 
sources and hypergoods are available to us, we understand how our moral life 
works and why we act the way we do. But if this hermeneutics, this articulacy, 
discovers that we cannot but live in a conflicted way, the price to pay is an 
exacerbation of conflict (let us say that we will have less excuses for distraction or 
dismissal of this fact); nonetheless, to reiterate, his hope is that a better articulacy, 
a fully developed hermeneutics, will bring about reconciliation. 
In this, as is easy to see, Taylor is obviously post-Hegelian, he who 
contributed so much to Hegel studies in the 20th century. However, this is clearly 
just a wager, a hope, which brings him once again very close to Ricœur’s own 
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standpoint. The rest of the book, the details of which can not be dealt with here, 
delve into the different moral sources of what can be considered good, be it 
inwardness (part two), ordinary life (part three), nature (part four), up until 
Modernism and Post-modernism itself (part five). 
 
2.3.2 – The conflicts of modernity, our conflicts 
 
Nonetheless, his conclusion926 is interesting, because after embarking in 
the long historical genealogy of all these sources, he undertakes a more synchronic 
analyzis of these in our day and age, and concludes that the conflicts of modernity 
are still, in a way, our own conflicts. In explaining his method, he uses an 
excellent metaphor, that of the strata of a rock: “understanding our society requires 
that we take a cut through time – as one takes a cut through rock to find that some 
strata are older than others. Views coexist with those which have arisen later in 
reaction to them. This is to oversimplify, of course, because these rival outlooks 
go on influencing and shaping each other.”927 
In the conclusion, he distributes the three main moral sources exerting 
influence in our own self-understanding and moral orientation in a schematic map. 
According to him, these moral sources are: a) the original theistic grounding; b) 
the naturalism of disengaged reason which in our day takes scientistic forms; c) 
the multiple forms of expressivism, either those stemming from the Romantic 
period, or its Modernist successors.928 He also acknowledges the influence of d) 
“Post-Modern” strands of thought, but these too are criticized. 
Taylor realizes that many types of conflict, some of which we could call 
conflicts of interpretation, can take place between these multiple influences. The 
last pages of the book are dedicated to unpacking what he ultimately takes to be 
the three main types of conflict taking place nowadays: 1) conflicts about sources; 
2) the issue of instrumentalism; and 3) the issue about morality itself (which 
largely stems from the attacks of Post-Modern thinkers). 
He chooses to start by tackling issue 2, the one concerning the 
disengaged, instrumental mode of life, because he takes it to be the dominant 
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standpoint in our epoch, and this since the Enlightenment: Locke, Hume and what 
he calls the “punctual self”.929 Following this line of reasoning, he claims that the 
society that has imposed itself since the 18th century has been dominated by “a 
utilitarian value outlook entrenched in the institutions of a commercial, capitalist, 
and finally a bureaucratic mode of existence [that] tends to empty life of its 
richness, depth or meaning.”930 This claim seems to me to be entirely fair, and 
Taylor recalls the several critiques addressed to this society by Tocqueville (there 
is no more room for heroism or aristocratic virtues), Kierkegaard (loss of passion), 
Nietzsche (his depiction of the “last men” and their “pitiable comfort”) and Marx 
(critique of capitalism) / Weber (the “iron cage” of bureaucracy).931 
Moreover, he mentions the expressivist critiques, those that insist that the 
dominant view on human reason as being instrumental and the organization of 
society it entails structurally impede expressive fulfillment. However, he also sees 
dangers in the narrowly subjectivist stance. Indeed, this latter standpoint runs the 
risk of shallowness: “A total and fully consistent subjectivism would tend towards 
emptiness: nothing would count as a fulfillment in a world in which literally 
nothing was important but self-fulfillment.”932 However, part of the problem, as he 
sees it, is that the only alternative to subjectivism that contemporaneity has come 
up with is precisely a thin theory of procedural fairness that falls back into the 
instrumentalist outlook.933 But what these leave out, according to Taylor, is the 
possibility of finding moral sources that originate outside the subject and 
nonetheless resonate within him or herself; as he puts it, the possibility of “the 
grasping of an order which is inseparably indexed to a personal vision”.934 
  As is easy to see, Taylor takes a critical stance towards the instrumental 
way of conceiving reason and the self, as well as towards the way of organizing 
society that these visions tend to promote. His two main charges, however, are 
those of 1) what he persistently calls atomism (the individual is taken out of 
community life and enters into a series of partial roles designed for highly specific 
ends) and its inherent selfish individualism and 2) the lack of space for a credible 
“thick” theory of our moral predicament, one which promotes the recognition of 
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goods that affect us from “the outside”. Taylor sees these overindividualistic 
societies as also posing other kinds of threats, even to the environment: 
individualism, taken to its extreme, can lead to ecological irresponsibility. 
To be sure, Taylor has nothing against self-governance; but he thinks the 
way it has been described is misguided. He draws on Tocqueville to assert that 
self-governing individuals need a sense of identification with their public 
institutions and political way of life.935  
Ultimately, what he wants to develop is an “exploration of order through 
personal resonance”.936 According to him, we have not been paying attention to 
these phenomena in our culture, at least not as much as we should. In passing, he 
drops an excellent metaphor about the relations between artists, thinkers and 
philosophers, and the way he envisages the connection with these meaningful 
outside sources. It is worth quoting a longer passage, because this seems to be the 
place where Taylor is more straightforward about his own option and views: 
 
This is a major gap. It is not just the epiphanic art of the last two centuries which fails to 
get its due by this dismissal. We are now in an age in which a publicly accessible cosmic 
order of meaning is an impossibility. The only way we can explore the order in which we 
are set with an aim to defining moral sources is through this part of personal resonance. 
This is true not only of epiphanic art but of other efforts, in philosophy, in criticism, 
which attempt the same search. This work, though it obviously fails of any epiphanic 
quality, falls into the same category. I have throughout sought language to clarify the 
issues, and I have found this in images of profound personal resonance like ‘epiphany’, 
‘moral sources’, ‘disengagement’, ‘empowering’, and others. These are the images which 
enable me to see more clearly than I did before. They could, I believe, be the animating 
ideas of an epiphanic work, but that would require another kind of capacity. The great 
epiphanic work actually can put in contact with the sources it taps. It can realize the 
contact. The philosopher or critic tinkers around and shapes images through which he or 
another might one day do so. The artist is like the race car driver, and we are the 
mechanics in the pit; except that in this case, the mechanics usually have four thumbs, and 
they have only a lazy grasp of the wiring, much less than the drivers have. The point of 
this analogy is that we delude ourselves if we think that philosophical or critical language 
for these matters is somehow more hard-edged and more free from personal index than 
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that of poets or novelists. The subject doesn’t permit language which escapes personal 
resonance.937 
 
This very long and engaging quotation has a lot to unpack. Taylor admits that 
were he capable of achieving it, he would have granted his book an “epiphanic 
quality”. We see him simultaneously avowing the shortcomings of philosophical 
language and method, and admitting that there is nothing else he could do. He also 
thinks that a work like his book could hopefully arouse an epiphanic work. The 
assumption here is that articulacy, clarification, by bringing about greater clarity in 
self-knowledge and in the knowledge of our culture would or could result in an 
experience of a sort of conversion. Because we are supposed to see the importance 
of this kind of moral sources, we are free to engage in a search for them and 
hopefully, if we are the artists or novelists with the capacity to produce epiphanies, 
this self-clarification will motivate us to do so. But perhaps the most important 
part is the ontological claim that hides beneath the colorful analogy of the four 
thumbed philosophers, versus the stunning race-car artists. The claim is that the 
language that artists and novelists can put forward can realize the contact with the 
source; in other words, that there is some sort of ontological power of poetry, art, 
and so on. Taylor does not say that poetic language or art create this reality, but he 
does imply that they make us, in a way, discover it. And this in fact comes very 
close to what Ricœur calls ontological vehemence, and that he develops, in 
connection with his studies on metaphor in the 1970s. 
Having said this, Taylor’s own position in this conflict is well defined. 
Ultimately, he does not restrict himself to a diagnosis of conflicts; rather, he also 
takes place within them, much like Marx, or the Critical Theorists had done before 
him. For proponents of disengaged reason, there are no sources of this sort. For 
him, there are. According to him, one of the side effects of the assumption of the 
existence of these sources is coming to live in a “deeply resonant human 
environment and, even more, to have affiliations with some depth in time and 
commitment.”938 So, in a way, this is a kind of attitude he is proposing. One of 
care towards the world and others, of attention, of “respect for what is there”. 
Ultimately, he aims at the good of family, polis and ecology. These concerns are, 
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he thinks, integral parts of our moral predicament. This is his position concerning 
point 2 above (instrumentalism). 
But it also discloses his position concerning points 1 (conflicts on 
sources) and 3 (the existence of morality itself). For him, “high standards need 
strong sources.”939 If we strive for benevolence and justice, like many utilitarians 
tended to do, we need, according to Taylor, something like agape, where doing 
good basically entails an appreciation of the intrinsic goodness of the creature. If 
not, according to him, we risk falling back in Dostoyevsky’s or Nietzsche’s 
critiques of the acts of beneficence as mere expressions of guilt that risk turning 
into contempt, or even hatred, because they can demand an unbearable cost in self 
love and self-fulfillment.940 So we can see what type of sources Taylor chooses: 
those that are substantive, ontological, and that demand thick descriptions. In a 
word, strong sources. But this in fact entails his belief, which almost goes without 
saying, in morality itself. In a way, he has to address this issue, because of the 
attack on this notion brought about by Postmodernism. 
The charge that high ideals might be interwoven with domination and 
exclusion is well known. In fact, the accusation that moral conscience itself might 
be an expression of false conscience, and hence an illusion, is as old as Nietzsche. 
This is one of the claims spelled out by the “masters of suspicion” with which 
Ricœur grapples in the 1960s, and which will be further analyzed in chapter 4.1 
below. Taylor does not deny that at some points, hypergoods might constitute 
crushing burdens on us. But he does deny that a good must be invalidated just 
because it might hypothetically and in some situations lead to suffering or 
destruction.941 This is, in fact, some sort of logical fallacy because it consists in a 
form of argument from consequences and, what is more, from consequences that 
are only alleged. There is not even a prudential argument that could be used here: 
should we stop striving for justice, or arguing for benevolence, because in some 
cases this “instinct” might turn against itself and lead to violence?  
Ultimately, Charles Taylor wants us to recognize the existence and 
pertinence of these strong sources and substantive hypergoods. His choice is clear. 
But part of his preliminary task is to make clear that these goods exist, and that 
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given the conflict between them within us and in society at large, we have to 
choose, or to conciliate them as best as we can. What he wants to avoid is the 
“mutilation” that denies their own existence and viability as moral sources and 
hypergoods. And he actually sees this task as being inscribed in the good tradition 
of Critical Theory – albeit in a very peculiar way, we must say – because he 
claims this is a task of liberation: 
 
Does something have to be denied? Do we have to choose between various kinds of 
spiritual lobotomy and self-inflicted wounds? Perhaps. Certainly most of the outlooks 
which promise us that we will be spared these choices are based on selective blindness. 
This is perhaps the major point elaborated in this book. 
But I didn’t undertake it in this downbeat a spirit. The kind of study I have embarked on 
here can be a work, we might say, of liberation. The intuition which inspired it, which I 
have recurred to, is simply that we tend in our culture to stifle the spirit. (…) 
We have read so many goods out of our official story, we have buried their power so deep 
beneath layers of philosophical rationale, that they are in danger of stifling. Or rather, 
since they are our goods, human goods, we are stifling. 
The intention of this work was one of retrieval, an attempt to uncover buried goods 
through rearticulation – and thereby to make these sources again empower, to bring the air 
back into the half-collapsed lungs of the spirit.942 
 
This is as powerful a passage as we can find in contemporary philosophy, and we 
cannot deny its broad appeal. We could even say, half seriously, that Hegel 
breathes again. Taylor recognizes the danger involved in this proposal, precisely 
insofar as the highest spiritual aspiration might lead to mutilation or destruction. 
But he does assert “the dilemma of mutilation” is “our greatest spiritual challenge, 
not an iron fate.”943 And so the final words of Sources of the Self, this masterpiece, 
are words of hope. Hope, in his case, of “a divine affirmation of the human” and 
also, to be clear, that a retrieval of these hypergoods does not lead to hatred and 
destruction, that we can overcome mutilation and bring out the good. 
In a way, this a very untraditional academic book, and Taylor himself 
acknowledges that much of what he says might be accused of inconsistency and 
that some of his claims are unsupported, which is, we could say, tantamount to 
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assuming that they are born out of a wager. Ultimately, these turn out to be the 
propositions of a believer, and the fact that Taylor assumes them as such only 
testifies to his bold Redlichkeit. In fact, what his later work does is to explore the 
meaning of secularism in our culture; namely, in the specific sense “secularism” 
assumes in his work, “a move from a society where belief in God is unchallenged 
and indeed, unproblematic, to one in which it is understood to be one option 
among others, and frequently not the easiest to embrace.”944 In this later work, 
Taylor willfully adopts the language of “fullness” (something like what we feel 
when we are in direct contact with the source) and “tacit framework” (i.e., the 
context provided for all beliefs in a certain age, which makes some options more 
“credible” than others, and which provides the assumptions for all ulterior 
questioning). Part of his investigation thus concerns the question of why this 
fullness comes to be, in the West, considered almost exclusively in immanent 
terms, and why this framework has come about (in stark contrast with the 
framework in which virtually all of our ancestors were, up until the dawn of 
Modernity). In his own words, “a secular age is one in which the eclipse of all 
goals beyond human flourishing becomes conceivable”.945 Thus his polemic is, in 
this book, even more sharply than in the preceding one, against self-sufficient 
humanism. We have lost naiveté, our framework is plural, but it seems to favor 
self-sufficient humanism, and against this, Taylor wants to reaffirm the possibility 
of the transcendent sources. I will not delve into the details of this recent work, 
because it extrapolates the subject of this part of the thesis, on the contemporary 
reappraisal of conflict. But his insights into the way our modern identity has 
unfolded and is now in inner turmoil are invaluable. In a word, his diagnosis of 
some of the conflicts affecting us, and of their respective historical sources, is 
illuminating, whether or not we share his particular option and position in the 
conflict. I will try to spell out this claim more clearly. 
I think we could say that Taylor’s treatment of the conflict concerning 
hypergoods and the conflicts in the making of the modern identity have both a 
theoretical and a practical import. They have a theoretical relevance in that, by 
forcing us to acknowledge conflict in our modern predicament, and in moral 
sources (including those that “resonate” in us from without) they broaden our 
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perspective over the whole moral phenomenon. They force us to see things that we 
could not acknowledge before, and to recognize that they exist or, at the very least, 
that it is possible, conceivable that they do. Because this is our moral life we are 
talking about, the practical import consists in allowing us to grasp alternative 
courses of action (or the same courses of action we took before, but with a 
different grounding). Because of this, I think that what he is doing comes very 
close to Ricœur’s own use of conflict, but this will only be discussed in the three 
parts of this dissertation to follow. 
The question that must be asked though is whether or not these strong 
moral sources, and Taylor’s own choices, are only at the disposal of believers. 
That is, assuming that we recognize the conceivability of these sources, do we 
need to make the same wager as he does in order to act upon it? Do we need to 
believe in the goodness of all there is (people, the world) or even in God, to live 
up to our own moral ideals? The risk of answering yes to this question is that of 
excluding a whole bunch of people who are not, for a reason or another, willing to 
make that wager. 
Perhaps the issue is addressed in a more potentially inclusive manner if 
we accept, as does Arto Laitinen946, strong, thick evaluations and descriptions, but 
envisage the possibility of making such evaluations without necessarily recurring 
to moral sources in the strong sense; without, as it were, having the need of 
something which imposes itself from without and resonates in us. 
 
2.3.3 – The fundamental and the historical (Ricœur’s reading of Sources of the 
Self) 
 
Ricœur, as always, plays a part in this debate, in the context of the “legal 
turn” in his late philosophy. We have already seen his analyzes of Rawls, Walzer 
and Boltanski / Thévenot in The Just. In the second book dedicated to the topic of 
justice, Reflections on the Just (Le Juste II), which is somewhat less systematic 
than the first one, consisting in three different parts – “studies”, “readings” and 
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“exercises” – Sources of the Self is given much attention. Ricœur dedicates two 
pieces to one of the problems raised by Taylor’s book, a “reading” (something 
very close to a critical book review) and an “exercise”, that is, an autonomous 
approach of a problem, from the standpoint of the conditions of application of the 
moral judgment in situation stemming from his little ethics. This last article deals 
with much more than the “reading”, and in fact does not discuss Taylor in a 
thematic way as the first does, but their closeness is disclosed in the very title they 
each have: the reading is called “The Fundamental and the Historical”947, while 
the study bears the title “The Universal and the Historical”.948 Fundamental and 
historical are not, of course, interchangeable concepts, but they both seem to 
assume, in the way Ricœur uses them, a Kantian, transcendental tone. 
In the first of these two pieces Ricœur identifies what he takes to be the 
fundamental difficulty of the book: an “epistemological hiatus” between the first 
part of Sources of the Self, namely the transcendental character of the inescapable 
frameworks and the apparently historical contingent way in which moral ipseity 
turned out to be formed in the process of Modernity. Ricœur asks if we can speak, 
concerning inescapable frameworks and strong evaluations, of a “concrete 
universal” (in the Hegelian sense) that can be dealt with in an ahistorical or 
transhistorical way.949 
Ricœur seems to accept the fertility of the metaphor of “moral space” and 
our orientation within it; he further suggests that this is not to be mistaken with 
Euclidean geometrical space. In fact, he argues that in the same way idem 
temporality and ipse temporality are different – in that ipse temporality avoids 
reification – so does our orientation within this moral space, because it is dynamic. 
Wandering, departure (Abraham) or the return home (Ulysses) thus assume a 
properly moral significance.950 Who I am and where I stand in the moral space do 
become correlative questions, as Taylor suggests.  
But what Ricœur sees as problematic is precisely the mixture between a 
synchronic and a diachronic approach that we have alluded to above. He argues 
that in the historical parts of the book, Taylor uses a mixed strategy of 
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retrospection and anticipation. Ultimately, the difficulty is precisely one of 
combining the historical character of moral conceptions and the transhistorical 
character of ethical universals.951 Ricœur goes so far as to see in this dialectic a 
new application for his distinction between sameness and ipseity. In fact, in our 
moral orientation, we can renew with, so to speak, “old” moral sources but when 
we do, we are always interpreting them anew; this is an application of what he 
calls the dialectic between sedimentation and innovation, which we will see in part 
four. 
 
In the moral order, the past leaves not only inert traces, or residues, but also dormant 
energies, unexplored sources which we might assimilate to something like unkept 
promises, those which ground memory, as Paul Valéry put it, in speaking about the future 
of the past. This dormant character of as-yet-unfolded potentialities is what allows for 
resumptions, rebirths, reawakenings, through which the new gets connected with the 
old.952 
 
Ricœur ultimately concludes that conflict is a constitutive part of the 
fundamental, that is, of inescapable frameworks themselves.953 He argues that 
these “transcendental” structures are not ahistorical, but transhistorical, which 
means that even though they are inescapable, they admit change in their core. But 
for this very reason, they cannot escape conflict: 
 
Strong evaluations claim to be shared; therefore, they require a communicability in 
principle. But, for this very reason, they are also contestable. Their discrimination, which 
we saw was inevitable, opens the way to controversy. To put this, rather than that, “higher 
up” requires giving reasons. The question “How ought we to live” opens a field of conflict 
as soon as our choices call for justification.954 
 
As we can see, Ricœur here proposes a reading of the conflict of the hypergoods 
somewhat inspired by a Habermasian ethics of discussion, and the problem of 
justification posed by Boltanski and Thévenot. By claiming that adhesion to moral 
sources, and to hypergoods, is not just the matter of a personal choice that could 
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be taken, as it were, in a purely detached fashion from the opinions of others, by 
emphasizing its public character and the need to justify this particular ranking and 
not other, he is not only emphasizing that placing a hierarchy in what are plural 
and incommensurable goods poses a problem and calls for a justification. He is 
also tying, in an even deeper manner than Taylor’s, inescapable frameworks to 
conflictuality. It seems as if, for Ricœur, even though we are somewhat forced to 
choose our own way in life, thereby implicitly or explicitly assuming that for us 
one good or another is superior to all others, we cannot simply just make that 
choice and carry on living our life in peace and quiet. Rather, we are called upon 
to provide reasons (logon didonai) for that choice. On this account, living life 
ethically, without Socratic examination (not only self-examination, but even 
public debate) seems inescapable, as does the possibility – or even more, the 
likelihood – that our choice will be attacked and faced with the many other 
alternatives ways of life. In a nutshell: these crossed diagnoses, Taylor’s and 
Ricœur’s, almost force us to admit that plurality – of goods, moral sources, and so 
on – which for us, with our democratic temper, itself assumes the value of an 
invaluable good, involves at the same time a high price: the loss of unity, certainty 
and the constant need to fend for ourselves in a somewhat complicated world. 
“The Universal and the Historical”, the concluding chapter of Reflections 
on the Just, is a very dense article that in a way sums up some of the problems 
discussed in this part of my thesis (at least those directly discussed by Ricœur, 
comprising mainly the theories of Rawls, Habermas, Walzer, Taylor, and 
Boltanski / Thévenot). In the introduction to this book, Ricœur assumes that the 
dialectic between the universal and the historical is something that interests him 
very much, and that this is the reason why he decided to analyze this tension in 
Sources of the Self. However, in this last chapter, what he undertakes is to reaffirm 
once again the basic structure of his little ethics – basic ethic, moral obligation, 
practical wisdom and the regional ethics – while, on the other hand, arbitrating 
once again between the universalistic Kantian character of the theories of 
Habermas, Apel, and Rawls, and the contextual claims of Walzer and Taylor, 
while at the same time placing the context of application under the banner of 
conflict, the tragic of action. Ricœur formulates this problematic in the following 
manner: 
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What is at stake in all these arguments is whether we can formulate on the ethical, 
juridical, political, and social planes universal principles that are valid independently of 
persons, communities, and cultures which are able to apply them, without any limitation 
having to do with the particular circumstances of their application, especially in light of 
the novel cases that have appeared in the modern era.955 
 
Ricœur argues that there are indeed limitations imposed by the particular 
circumstances of the application of moral rules; but his first step is to approximate 
Rawls’s and Habermas’s approaches to the universal rule. He contends that the 
choice of the principles of justice taking place in the original position postulated 
by Rawls presupposes a process that can be assimilated to the ethics of discussion. 
He also thinks that such an ethics of discussion will always have conflicts in the 
apportionment and distribution of goods as one of its main topics, because both 
Rawls and Habermas accept pluralism as a fact; one of the virtues of both these 
approaches, according to Ricœur, is the transfer of conflictuality to the domain of 
language. It is through rational discussion that violence is avoided.956 
However, one of Ricœur’s contentions with Habermas is that discussion 
in itself does not deplete ethics; he calls our attention to the existence of “hard 
cases” which bring to the fore the problem of the application of the allegedly 
universal rule to particular situations, much more than the strict problem of the 
justification of the principle. And this is why we need to return to cultural and 
historical traditions: in order to mediate the process of application, this being one 
of the communitarian’s objections to Rawls.957 
The conclusion is that we need both: the normative background and the 
knowledge of historical tradition and of the plurality and heterogeneity of goods. 
This also presupposes, in a way, that respect is due to persons, as much as it is to 
laws. Consensus in an ethics of discussion is thus posed as a regulative idea; if 
consensus is impossible, then Ricœur argues that at least there should be an 
agreement on the need to avoid violence, “an agreement to disagree”.958 
Ricœur’s definitive position in this complicated and many-sided matter is 
given in the conclusion to this article (and the book). As is easy to guess, it is a 
                                                
955 Ricœur, “The Universal and the Historical”, p. 232. 
956 Ibid., pp. 239-240. 
957 Ibid., p. 244. 
958 Ibid., p. 247. 
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very nuanced, dialectical position. He claims that universalism and contextualism 
are not opposed to each other on the same plane, but rather belong to two different 
levels (respectively, the plane of moral obligation and that of practical application) 
that are both needed in order for an ethical theory to be successful. He further 
claims that 1) universalism must be taken as a regulative idea that allows us to 
“recognize heterogeneous attitudes capable of being recognized as cofoundational 
of the common space unfolded by the will to live together”959; 2) this regulative 
idea only has the force of an “inchoative universal” that is supposed to act as a 
concrete universal – i.e., this alleged universal seeks intersubjective recognition in 
order to be approved as such and this recognition is obviously contextual and 
historical; and 3) historical and contextual identities are in turn protected from 
intolerance and violence precisely by a “mutual labor of understanding” that is 
presupposed by the universalistic attitude. And at this point Ricœur proposes the 
model of linguistic translation as a possibility for this labor of mutual 
understanding. 
As we can see, Ricœur is thus divided between the two positions. I would 
say, but this is a personal interpretation, that he is ultimately closer to a 
contextualist and culturalist standpoint, because he admits that the universals are 
only “alleged” or “inchoative” and that they need to be transformed (as much as 
possible) in a concrete universal through a process of mutual understanding and 
recognition. This is, in fact, a somewhat Hegelian standpoint, but rather stripped 
down from its ahistorical pretentions. When Ricœur speaks about the 
transhistorical, what he seems to be assuming is that values have very precise 
origins in time. So they are contingent, and even though some of them might tend 
to claim universal validity, this validity is always dependent on their factual and 
historical recognition. So he does seem to assume the possibility of evolution in 
the domain of values, as he does in the domain of ipseity. Actually, what seems to 
be universal is only the need for mutual understanding, and the recognition of the 
community as the expression of the will to live together. The decision concerning 
what rules, values and norms will better accommodate that fundamental desire will 
be, or so I think Ricœur would argue, in each case taken by the particular 
community. There is no a priori decision in this matter because power and its 
                                                
959 Ibid. 
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justification must be prevented from becoming ideologically reified. Amid all of 
this, conflict indeed plays an essential role: in disclosing the limits of the 
universalistic approach, in showing the need of the recognition of traditions and 
the value of each particular situation, and so forth. Conflict, as I have been 
arguing, and as will become more apparent in the next parts of this thesis, has a 
generating and disclosing power. 
 
* 
 
With this chapter on Charles Taylor’s depiction of strong evaluations, 
hypergoods and the conflict in the making of modern identity, I conclude my brief 
overview of the contemporary reappraisal of conflict in philosophy, Critical 
Theory and pragmatic sociology. Ricœur was evidently always in the backdrop, 
and I mentioned his direct assessments of all these contributions, whenever they 
existed. This methodology entailed sometimes direct, other times indirect 
comparisons between Ricœur’s standpoint and those of other contemporary 
figures, such as Habermas, Honneth, Rancière, Lyotard, Hunyadi, Rawls, Walzer, 
Boltanski, Thévenot, Taylor and others authors I mentioned in passing. Like in 
part one, even though Ricœur was always lurking in the shadows and almost 
always appeared at the end of each of my assessments, I did not necessarily follow 
his footsteps. Rather, I tried to spell out in each occasion how I looked at the 
assessment of conflict in these authors myself, and detected the similarities and 
differences with Ricœur’s project. Since these authors many times dealt with 
topics also examined by Ricœur, I mentioned a lot of issues to which I will need to 
come back in the next three parts of this thesis, in a slightly different manner. My 
reconstruction of the contemporary reappraisal of conflict has by no means been 
exhaustive. An exhaustive reading is beyond my capacities. And there were surely 
many other relevant  and more or less contemporary figures, many of them very 
relevant for political and social philosophy, like Derrida or Deleuze (whom I 
neglected to analyze completely) or Bourdieu, Foucault or Castoriadis, which I 
mentioned but not seriously discussed, that could have been mobilized in a 
thorough manner in this cartography. I did not include them, first of all, because I 
could not turn this section in a book-long discussion. And ultimately because I 
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think that the work Johann Michel already did with these authors left me with not 
that much to add.960 
The next parts of this thesis will be written from a different perspective. If 
part one was a history of conflict and part two a contemporary cartography of 
conflict, the next parts will be the course of conflict in Ricœur’s work. As such, 
they will assume a much more diachronic standpoint. As such, I will refrain from 
putting forward many of my own assessments. That is, I will conduct my own 
interpretations of Ricœur, but these will not be critical in character. I will be more 
interested in following the evolution of conflict and spelling out Ricœur’s 
philosophy in its main traits, than in critically assessing it. Another shift in 
perspective will occur in parts six, seven and eight, after my diachronic 
presentation of the course of conflict.  
Without anticipating too much, I would say that even though we saw 
conflict in many forms in the two preceding parts, from Marxist social conflict to 
Rawlsian conflict in the apportionment of social goods, not forgetting the struggle 
for recognition and so forth, it is difficult to find an author with a use of conflict so 
diverse and widespread as Ricœur. Ultimately, conflict is tied up with more 
overambitious claims in Heraclitus, Hegel or Marx. It is perhaps more overarching 
in Honneth or tied up with more extreme consequences in Lyotard, than in 
Ricœur. But Ricœur has so many different uses for conflict in his philosophy, and 
this is all encompassed by such informed and supple readings within his ultimately 
hermeneutic framework, that I will venture to say that conflict theory, in a broad 
sense, has much to learn from Ricœur. The course of conflict, to reiterate, will be 
broken down in three main stages: existential, hermeneutical and practical conflict. 
But each of these will have many different theoretical claims and practical 
applications, as well as some twists and turns. Let us thus now start following its 
path. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
960 See Johann Michel, Ricœur et ses contemporains, op. cit. 
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Part Three 
 
The Existential Conflict 
 
In parts one and two I summarized some of the most important 
philosophical and sociological descriptions of conflict and negation in Antiquity, 
Modernity and in more recent times. Part three will now begin following the 
thread of the “course of conflict” in Ricœur’s own work, a course that we will 
follow in parts three, four and five of this dissertation. In this part, which roughly 
corresponds to Ricœur’s very first writings of the 1930s and 1940s, up until the 
late 1950s, in addition to laying down the coordinates of what can roughly be 
encompassed under the description of “existential conflict”, I also want to stress 
some of the overall main intuitions and early developments of Ricœur’s theoretical 
efforts, some of which have largely been overlooked in Ricoeurian scholarship. 
In fact, Ricœur often described his intellectual work as being the result of 
a “path”, a “way” or a “course”, one that lets itself be guided by the unexpected 
detours that a person can find alongside it. Thus he claimed to stop writing or 
talking about a subject after he had wrote a book on that topic, so that he could 
“move along”: “When I have written a book on a topic, I don't speak about it after 
that, as though my duty has been done in its regard, leaving me free to continue on 
my way. (…) it is often in the remainders from an earlier subject that I have seen 
the urgency of another theme.”961 However, a close and attentive reading of his 
writings finds that often the same topics are recurrent, even if sometimes they are 
only alluded to. It seems as if some of the main intuitions of his work were there 
from the very beginning in the form of convictions, in some sort of first naivety 
that he recurrently submitted to the test of critique and perpetual reinterpretation. 
Let me mention, just to provide a small example of the way in which the topic of 
conflict seems omnipresent in Ricœur, that in a very early and somewhat 
polemical article, “Le Risque”, from 1936-1937962, Ricœur, who was starting to 
                                                
961 Ricœur, Critique and Conviction, p. 76. 
962 As mentioned before, the period stemming from 1936 to 1938 is marked by a certain Marxist 
tone in Ricœur’s writings. In the article “Le Risque” in Être 1-2 (1936-37): 9-11, the tone is 
somewhat Marxist and Nietzschean, which only attests a certain boldness and courage of Ricœur’s 
thought in what were some very troubled times in Europe. This article has been put under heavy 
scrutiny because it served as an alleged evidence to charge Ricœur of supporting Pétain during his 
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become interested in the topic of the will – and this topic would become the 
subject of his doctoral thesis thirteen years later –  already mentions the problem 
of the “conflict of duties” that would later become a centerpiece of his 
philosophical anthropology and ethics, both in Fallible Man and Oneself as 
Another. In fact, in this very short and very sharp article, written when Ricœur was 
only 23 years old, he criticizes what he calls the “rationalist” approach to human 
action, which would lead us to believe that by taking a “scientific” approach we 
could decide our course of action with the same degree of certainty with which a 
mathematician solves an equation. He opposes this approach to the virtue of 
having the courage to take risks and show resolve by acting, in the face of 
uncertainty.963 
What seems interesting to me is that even in this very early text Ricœur 
attempts to sketch a typology of conflict, showing how conflict is an inevitable 
part of human life and how we can discern among the phenomena of conflict many 
different dimensions, from social conflict to existential conflict, not forgetting 
moral conflict. I will allow myself to quote a long quote of this short text, so that 
we can measure the degree to which the intuitions that were to inspire many 
significant developments in the decades to come were already, in a simplified, 
amalgamated but acute manner in it: 
 
Life has taken care of dismantling our rationalist pretentions, otherwise than by its 
complexity, to summon us to courage and to risk: by facing us with opposing demands; 
this is what is sometimes called cases of conscience or conflicts of duties. Conflict and 
contradiction are the normal environment of risk. As soon as the conflicts of duties are 
                                                                                                                                 
POW years at Gross-Born, in what came to be known as the alleged “Passade pétainiste de 
Ricœur”. This happened because the article was reprinted, alongside other texts and without 
Ricœur’s consent, in 1941 (at a time when he was imprisoned at the camp) in a journal officially 
supporting Pétain, under the heading “Paroles de Prisonniers” [words of prisoners], that is, 
supposed testimonies of prisoners of the Oflag where Ricœur was, allegedly supporting Pétain. As 
is widely stated, during the pre-WWII years Ricœur was a pacifist attached to the Christian left; in 
the years after the war, even though his relationship towards Marx became more and more 
moderate, and he embraced political liberalism as his definitive political stance, his leaning was 
always to the left. As such, even though during the imprisonment years he was certainly subject to 
political propaganda and a lack of information, it does not seem very likely that Ricœur ever 
supported Pétain. We can read Ricœur’s response to these accusations, translated by Charles 
Reagan, at the website of the Fonds Ricœur, 
http://www.fondsricoeur.fr/photo/Prisonner%20of%20war%20camp%281%29.pdf. We can also 
read Olivier Abel’s explanation of the matter in that site. For a fuller account of the whole episode, 
see chapter 8 of Dosse’s biography, “Du cercle Pétain à la résistance”, pp. 94-101. This whole 
polemic notwithstanding, I will mention this text only for its substantial content. 
963 Ricœur, “Le Risque”, p. 9. 
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felt as an inner tearing apart [tiraillement intérieur], conscience is awaken from its 
dogmatic slumber or simply from the confortable indolence of collective conscience, that 
is, of the conscience of Mr-everybody [Monsieur-tout-le-monde]. 
Many conflicts are born out of exterior, social situations. Society is not homogeneous, it is 
divided against itself. (…) [there are] multiple social circles that overlap into one another 
and dispute our concern, consume us: professional, cultural, sports, artistic and religious 
groups, each of these circles of influence displays its own demands, which often oppose 
one another. It is up to each person to uphold and even to create his or her own unity, 
independence, originality, to risk assuming his or her own lifestyle. This contradiction, 
this conflict that is inherent to society, is a call for one to perpetually invent oneself. (…) 
Other cases of conscience, other calls to risk have more of an inner source, which is more 
personal. I am thinking about the conflicts between ends and means (…) 
[And] conflicts become more intimate and more subtle in that region of the soul where are 
pitted against one another the intransigency of our principles and that tact, that sweetness, 
that delicate tenderness that we owe to those we love. (…) Oh, these hearts divided 
between the rigidity of justice and the tender frailty of forgiveness. 
This is the conflict between the person and the rule. (…) these are the subtle tearing apart, 
the fine split [déchirure] upon which sometimes the certainty of a friendship or the 
harmony of a home depend. Because we do not take the risk, or because we do it wrong, 
because we cannot discern the best compromise or the best option, those that better suit 
the conflict, we end up sowing offenses and hatred.964 
                                                
964 “La vie s’est chargée d’une autre façon que par sa complexité, de désarçonner nos prétentions 
rationalistes, et de nous inviter au courage et au risque: en nous jetant en face d’exigences 
contraires; il s’agit ici de ce qu’on appelle quelquefois cas de conscience ou conflits de devoirs. Le 
conflit et la contradiction sont le climat normal du risque. Lorsque les conflits de devoirs sont 
sentis comme un tiraillement intérieur, la conscience est réveillée de son sommeil dogmatique ou 
simplement de la confortable torpeur de la conscience collective, je veux dire de la conscience de 
Monsieur-tout-le-monde. 
Bien des conflits naissent des situations extérieures, sociales. La société n’est pas un milieu 
homogène, mais disjoint et divisé contre lui-même. (…) [il y a] multiples cercles sociaux qui 
chevauchent les uns sur les autres, nous accaparent et se disputent nos soucis : groupements 
professionnels, culturels, sportifs, artistiques, religieux ; chacun de ces cercles d’influence a ses 
exigences propres et souvent rivales. Il appartient à la personne de défendre et même de créer son 
unité, son indépendance, son originalité, de risquer son style vie. Cette contradiction, ce conflit 
inhérent à la société, est un perpétuel appel à l’invention de la personne par soi-même. (…) 
D’autres cas de conscience, d’autres appels au risque ont une source plus intérieure, plus 
personnelle. Je songe d’abord aux conflits de fins et de moyens (…) 
Les conflits se font plus intimes et plus subtils dans cette région de l’âme où s’affrontent 
l’intransigeance de nos principes et ce tact, cette douceur, cette tendresse délicate que nous devons 
à ceux que nous aimons. (…) Ah ! Ces cœurs partagés entre la raideur de la justice et la tendre 
faiblesse du pardon ! 
C’est le conflit de la personne et de la règle (…) il s’agit de ces subtils tiraillements de ces fines 
déchirures, d’où dépendent parfois la sûreté d’une amitié, ou l’harmonie d’un foyer. Pour n’avoir 
pas su risquer, ou pour avoir mal risqué, mal discerné le compromis, ou l’option, exactement 
proportionnés au conflit, nous semons blessures et haines.”  Ricœur, “Le Risque”, pp. 9-10. 
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This passage places us at the confluence of problems dealing with history, 
society, and the emergence of subjectivity. In fact, even though Ricœur does not 
use this category at this point in time, it is already the question concerning the 
conditions of possibility guiding the formation of the self that moves him. We can 
discern in this praise of courage and risk a somewhat Nietzschean (or, if we really 
want to be anachronic, Foucauldian) tone, in that Ricœur seems to be calling for a 
self-fashioning through the adoption of one’s own style, which reminds us of 
Foucault’s techniques of subjectivation. More important for our own topic, we 
find here already both a typology of conflict (including the tension between the 
objectivity of justice, and the love, solicitude or forgiveness towards the fragile 
person) and a tentative first response to the way we should deal with it, at least at a 
practical level: by daring to decide, that is, by neither hesitating nor waiting for a 
perfect answer, just acting. 
Significantly, Ricœur goes on to argue in the same article that “there are 
no universal rules to decide a conflict of rules” and that what is called for is a 
“personal tact” “an equilibrium that must in each case be original”;965 as such, he 
is actually anticipating the much more substantive argument on practical wisdom 
that he would present in the ninth chapter of Oneself as Another, 53 years later. 
This is an ongoing characteristic of Ricœur’s thought: he provides diagnoses of 
conflicts but often tries to answer, to the best of his abilities, to those conflicts, 
attempting to provide solutions for them. I will now turn to those “intimate” 
conflicts, the inner, existential conflicts that come to the fore in these early works, 
underlining the lasting influence these first explorations will assume within his 
theoretical framework. 
Indeed, it is likely that the first decisive influence in Ricœur’s 
philosophy, namely, existentialism, especially in the form it assumed in the works 
of Gabriel Marcel and Karl Jaspers, played a more important role than it is usually 
given credit to, in the context of his philosophy. From a biographical standpoint, 
Marcel’s influence was the more decisive966 because Ricœur developed a close 
relationship with him, so much that during the 1930s, starting from 1934-35, 
                                                
965 Ibid., p. 10. 
966 For a more detailed account of these years, and of Marcel’s influence in the early Ricœur, both 
from a personal and philosophical standpoint, see Dosse, Chapter 2 “Le cercle de Gabriel Marcel et 
la filiation réflexive”, pp. 28-37. 
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Ricœur visited frequently with him, attended the Friday meetings at his house 
where a host of guests discussed philosophical problems and, forbidden to quote 
authors and texts, were enticed to “think by themselves”. Furthermore, they were 
encouraged to let their “personal experience” be their guiding thread; this can be 
considered some sort of application of Marcel’s “concrete philosophy” which we 
will see in more detail in this part of the thesis. In fact, at this point Ricœur 
discovers and reads attentively Marcel’s Metaphysical Journal967 and Being and 
Having.968 Marcel, who was a Christian philosopher, known for his “Christian 
existentialism” (even though he rejected himself the tag) was probably the first 
philosopher to write, even before Merleau-Ponty, about the importance of taking a 
subjectivist approach to the body, considering it as an incarnate “personal body” 
(corps propre) and thereby foreshadowing some of the radical conclusions that 
both Merleau-Ponty and Ricœur would draw from that insight, and that would 
significantly change, in the works of these two authors, the phenomenological 
approach. 
As Ricœur emphasized many times, he always “walked on two legs”969 
which means that he always drew both on his convictions and on critique; 
moreover, it also means that a fundamental part of those convictions were his 
religious beliefs. It is true that he often tried not to mix the genres, even claiming 
to be “philosophically” agnostic in his late works, but we cannot deny that he took 
religion to be one of philosophy’s “others”, alongside poetry, mythology and the 
Greek tragedy, and argued that philosophy could sometimes seek inspiration in 
these others. That said, the degree to which Ricœur allowed his philosophical 
efforts to be inspired by religion also underwent evolution. As we will see in the 
next chapter, at the beginning of his career, Ricœur, probably influenced by 
Marcel, was much closer to a “Christian” or “peri-Christian” philosophy than he 
was in his late works. In fact, Marcel often spoke of the “peri-Christian zones of 
existence” such as those that are experienced in fidelity, love and hope, and which 
are capable of inspiring, according to him, a philosophy of what he called 
“mystery”. I would argue that all these phenomena – fidelity, hope and love – 
remained crucial for Ricœur’s philosophy throughout his whole career and that 
                                                
967 Gabriel Marcel, Metaphysical Journal, translated by Wall Bernard (London: Rockliff, 1952). 
968 Marcel, Being and Having, translated by Katherine Farrer (London: Dacre Press, 1949). 
969 Ricœur, Critique and Conviction, p. 139. 
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even though they lost their umbilical connection to the “secretly reconciled 
ontology” that Ricœur postulated in his early works, their practical value was kept 
in Ricœur’s later philosophy of action. 
 It was also through Marcel that Ricœur discovered Jaspers and his 
compelling notion of Liebender Kampf, which we will analyze in more detail 
below. In fact, if Ricœur was probably closer to Marcel than to Jaspers, in that the 
substantive content of his philosophy was very much inspired by Marcel, I would 
say that from a methodological viewpoint he was closer to Jaspers, namely in this 
notion of “loving struggle” which is ultimately one of the most existential, 
engaging notions of conflict that we can find. Jaspers’s notion of paradox also 
plays a key role in Ricœur’s methodology and expresses, or so I will argue, a 
certain style and substantive content that we will find in a more refined manner 
later, in Ricœur’s analyzis of metaphor. However, from a methodological 
standpoint, the single, most important discovery for Ricœur at this point in time 
was Husserl’s phenomenology. In this period, that stretches from the mid-1930s to 
the early 1950s we can say, in a nutshell, that the conflict unfolds between the 
existential thick concepts of incarnation, engagement, dialogue, invocation, and 
the methodological constraint of phenomenology with its rigorous analyzes. It is 
also from 1934-35 that Ricœur reads Husserl’s Ideen, in English translation, for 
the first time, the same book that he would translate into French while imprisoned 
during the Second World War. Ricœur thanks his friend and colleague Maxime 
Chastaing both from having introduced him to Marcel and for having presented 
Husserl’s work to him. 
However, we can argue that the existential traits of Ricœur’s early 
philosophical standpoint are only vestiges of a more encompassing choice. To 
state the claim in a rather simple and straightforward manner, I would say that for 
him, persons always come first. This is to say that his philosophy ultimately is, as 
we shall see in part five, a philosophy of human action. The value that Ricœur 
grants to human beings, and his wish to put persons over and above everything 
else, leads him to develop a philosophical anthropology, whose first formulation, 
the one we can find in the post-Kantian essay Fallible Man, we will discuss in the 
third chapter of this section. This anthropology ultimately revolves around the 
notion of the subject, whose value and limits Ricœur would discuss up until his 
very last works; and ultimately this means that there is an inherent reflective, post-
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Cartesian and post-Kantian aspect of his philosophy, which he will never let go, 
even though this feature will be calibrated by the conflict with the masters of 
suspicion that we will see in the next part.  
It is important to see how these aspects ultimately form a web of 
interconnected notions: humanity, person, subject, existence, self, subjectivity, 
these are all notions whose slightly different Sinne all point towards very similar 
Bedeutungen, whether it is me, you, a third, or the web of connections that forms 
the “we” of intersubjectivity we are talking about. As such, the Ricoeurian 
emphasis on human action that we will find in his last books is, in a way, only a 
return, a “second reflection”, a coming back to the possibilities and existence of 
concrete human beings, after the long detour of language, hermeneutics, and the 
human sciences undertaken in the middle period of the 1970s and 1980s. This 
second coming of the reflection on human beings provides Ricœur with more tools 
to delve in detail into the great possibilities and inner workings of human action. 
However, to reiterate, some of the main intuitions have been with him from the 
beginning. As we shall see, conflict is pervasive throughout the whole course. 
Existential conflict expresses itself in my position in the world, the way I look at 
my body and live with it, within it, am it; in the conflict between the voluntary and 
the involuntary, the finite and the infinite, the tension between the search for truth, 
the rooting in being, and the rigorous methodological procedures, alongside the 
meticulous positing of limits. This section will deal with all these forms of conflict 
and will leave us at the threshold of one of Ricœur’s longstanding contributions to 
the history of philosophy: his radical reshaping of the hermeneutic tradition. 
The first of these tensions that we will look into, that between the 
existential standpoint and the phenomenological method, both encompassed by a 
reflective philosophy, will become apparent in the first volume of his philosophy 
of the will: Freedom and Nature. However, if we are to understand the lasting 
impression of the existential topics in Ricœur, we will have to start from his very 
first books on Jaspers and Marcel. 
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3.1 – Existentialism and Phenomenology 
 
In a way, Ricœur’s theoretical influences in this period reflected, as was 
often the case, the spirit of his time. It is no wonder that the American 
philosophical society dedicated to Continental philosophy and founded in 1962 is 
called Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, precisely because 
these were the two main philosophical movements, in Europe, in the first half of 
the 20th century. 
My goal in this chapter is to show the main existential topics that were 
fundamental for Ricœur’s early philosophy, and to proceed to demonstrate how 
they were integrated in a reflective philosophy, how they interacted with the 
philosophical inspiration of Mounier’s “Personalism” and how, ultimately, there 
was a locus of tension between these existential topics and the phenomenological 
method. It will become apparent, both in this chapter and in the next ones, that the 
existential standpoint reveals a wide array of different conflicts, playing at many 
levels. Nevertheless, it will become clear that Ricœur treats them very differently 
and also that he attempts to mediate and conciliate many of them. I will start by 
showing the significance of Jasper’s philosophy, and proceed with Marcel.  
 
3.1.1 – Jaspers and the loving struggle 
 
Ricœur wrote two books on the philosophy of Karl Jaspers, one of them 
with his friend Mikel Dufrenne, who shared his captivity time in Gross-Born with 
Ricœur, when they were both Prisoners of War during World War II. Both these 
books were published in 1947, and the first one to be published, Karl Jaspers et la 
philosophie de l’existence970, was certainly prepared, at least in part, during the 
captivity time in Gross-Born. It is difficult to discern which parts were mainly 
written by Ricœur, and which by Dufrenne, but I will treat the book as a single 
whole and assume that Ricœur wholly subscribed to all that was written in it. 
If we had to choose one single overarching notion in Jaspers’s philosophy 
that would become fundamental for Ricœur, it can easily be argued that loving 
struggle (Liebender Kampf) fits that description. As is widely stated, Jaspersian 
                                                
970 Mikel Dufrenne et Paul Ricœur, Karl Jaspers et la philosophie de l’existence, préface de Karl 
Jaspers (Paris: Seuil, 1947). 
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philosophy revolves around what he calls the “boundary situations” such as death, 
suffering, struggle and guilt. In these, Jaspers argues, existence is revealed to us, 
as we move beyond a merely empirical comprehension of our lives and understand 
that we are both finite and placed against a pole of Transcendence, whose 
“cyphers” we are called upon to “decipher”, to interpret; between these poles of 
existence and Transcendence, our freedom unfolds and our possibilities in the 
world are revealed. Rejecting all overarching principles and encompassing 
philosophical systems, Jaspers wants to grasp the radical depth of the existential 
experiences of those he calls the “exceptions” (individuals such as Kierkegaard 
and Nietzsche) and, being aware that he is not himself the exception, but not 
wanting to renounce to the philosophical claim for conceptual clarity, he 
ultimately aims to rationally reconstruct the significance of these experiences; as 
Ricœur and Dufrenne put it: 
 
The ambition of existential philosophy is to unite reason and existence, reason being the 
search for conceptual precision, systematic concatenation and clarity, as it has been 
defined by the Western philosophical tradition, and existence being the sense of intimacy, 
drama and depth that stems from the cardinal experiences of individuals.971 
 
Philosophy will thus be defined as an “Illumination of Existence” 
(Existenzerhellung), insofar as we can say, to continue using this metaphor, that it 
is supposed to “shed some light”, to “give reasons”, to “give an account” (logon 
didonai, in the primordial Greek sense) to these deep existential experiences. I will 
not delve in detail into the specific aspects of all the boundary situations and 
concepts but I want to emphasize the one he calls “loving struggle” because it 
contains, in a nutshell, a significant account of intersubjectivity. In fact, Jaspers’s 
account of intersubjectivity, his “social philosophy”, we could say, is not very far 
from a “consensual-conflictual” analyzis that, much like Habermas (or Eric Weil, 
for that matter), acknowledges the omnipresence of conflicts in social life but 
stresses the importance of overcoming these conflicts by a process of 
                                                
971 “La philosophie de l’existence a pour ambition d’unir la raison et l’existence, en entendant par 
raison la recherche de la précision conceptuelle, de l’enchaînement systématique et de la clarté telle 
que l’a formée la tradition philosophique de l’Occident, et par existence le sens de l’intimité, du 
drame et de la profondeur tel qu’il procède des expériences cardinales de l’individu.” Ibid., pp. 25-
26. 
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communication and dialogue. In this, Jaspers’s originality consists in claiming that 
the whole process of communication is conflictual through and through, that 
conflict always plays a role in individuating and forming subjectivity: Dasein 
kommt nur im Kampfe.972 
This pervasiveness of conflict also has radical consequences, namely the 
fragility of every intersubjective connection, and of the process of communication 
itself; dialogue can always fall back upon violence and if that radical possibility 
comes about, as Eric Weil claims, we will leave the realm of philosophy. Dufrenne 
and Ricœur capture well this pervasiveness of conflict in Jaspersian philosophy: 
 
The fabric of history is woven by conflicts and wars. It is also true that if social relations 
unfold under the banner of struggle, this is because every person affirms him or herself at 
the expense of others. But, and this is the point, I cannot be myself anywhere else than in 
the struggle, and I must struggle in the empirical order, so that I can elevate myself to 
existence afterwards. Egoism and struggle are inevitable. But far from impeding 
communication, we will find them in there, even though transformed: egoism will be self-
affirmation, struggle will be loving struggle; the problems they pose to social life will be 
posed to existence too and this is why communication will only be achieved in a 
paradoxical manner, at the price of a perpetual effort and always retaining a precarious 
status.973 
 
Ultimately, Ricœur would not follow Jaspers all the way in this account. 
Specifically, he never affirmed the ethical importance of egoism, choosing to 
emphasize the value of hospitality; however, Jaspers’s hint about the conflictual 
process of dialogue and communication is invaluable. On the one hand, the 
dialogue of existences is said to be a “reciprocal creation through 
confrontation”974. On the other hand, this “confrontation of existences” will have 
direct consequences even in the plane of non-direct communication, or what we 
                                                
972 Jaspers, Philosophie, II, p. 371, quoted by Ricœur and Dufrenne, p. 159. 
973 “La trame de l’histoire est tissée de conflits et de guerres. Et il est vrai encore que si les 
rapports sociaux se déploient sous le signe de la lutte, c’est que chacun s’y affirme aux dépens des 
autres. Mais précisément je ne puis être moi que dans le combat et je dois lutter dans l’ordre 
empirique pour me hausser ensuite à l’existence. L’égoïsme et la lutte sont inévitables. Loin qu’ils 
fassent obstacle à la communication, nous les y retrouverons, transfigurés : l’égoïsme sera 
affirmation de soi, le combat, combat amoureux ; les problèmes qu’ils posent sur le plan de la vie 
sociale se poseront de nouveau à l’existence, et c’est pourquoi la communication ne se réalisera 
que d’une façon paradoxale, au prix d’un effort constant, et avec un statut toujours précaire.” 
Ricœur et Dufrenne, Ibid., p. 159. 
974 Ibid., p. 61. 
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could call an indirect dialogue mediated by tradition, or by the act of reading. In a 
nutshell, the loving struggle would come to define for Ricœur the search for truth 
that marks a specific way of doing philosophy, the so-called “philosophizing-in-
common” (Symphilosophieren). It is very likely that Ricœur retained from Jaspers 
this philosophical style, whereby the truth is sought after with the help of others, in 
dialogue and in conflict with them; in a word, the loving struggle is a reciprocal 
learning process. This process is unilateral when we are confronted with a written 
text, and not in the face-to-face everyday interaction, but it is not vain either. In 
fact, as I will show in more detail in part four of this thesis, Ricoeurian 
hermeneutics will develop the specific tools to stress the value of the written text 
and its plurivocity of meaning opened up by the processes of reception. At this 
point in time these conceptual tools had not yet been acquired by Ricœur, but let 
me say that the intention was there, insofar as we can assume that he and Dufrenne 
are subscribing to the description of Symphilosophieren they are making: 
 
Dialogue is not added to existence, rather it is constitutive of existence. The truth of the 
other is not only left outside me, it is that truth that creates me in the struggle. Philosophy 
is philosophizing-in-common, Symphilosophieren. It is a vast exchange between the best, 
its truth is “communicative” (…) he or she who has not listened, commented, loved the 
great philosophers, has not yet become him or herself. 975 
 
I will come back to the search for truth in the early Ricœur in the fourth 
chapter of this part. Suffice it to say, for now, that at this point truth is the fruit of a 
tension, a conflict, intersubjectively constructed by struggle and dialogue. I would 
like to add two substantial points to this claim, both of which stemming from 
Jaspers, and that will both be fundamental for Ricœur: the philosophy of limits 
that stems from a certain type of perspectivism (even though there are important 
differences between perspectivism and hermeneutics that we should address) and 
the fact that, given the radical condition of finitude, historicity and fragility of the 
human being, this “truth” is always “in the making”, incomplete. To put it very 
simply, that it expresses itself paradoxically, dialectically, in an ever-changing 
                                                
975 “le dialogue ne s’ajoute pas à l’existence mais la constitue. La vérité de l’autre n’est pas 
seulement laissée hors de moi, mais m’engendre dans le combat; la philosophie est philosophie en 
commun, symphilosophieren. C’est un vaste échange entre les meilleurs, sa vérité est 
‘communicative’. (…) qui n’a pas écouté, commenté, aimé les grands philosophes n’est pas encore 
lui-même.” Ibid., p. 204. 
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manner. Thus we will see how, via Jaspers, Ricœur comes to the same conclusions 
to which he also arrived by reading Kant, Kierkegaard and Jean Wahl’s 
interpretation of Hegel. 
Indeed, Dufrenne and Ricœur describe Jaspersian philosophy as being a 
“non-resolved dialectics”, that is, a “dialectics without a final synthesis”.976 As a 
consequence, they describe existential philosophy as being precisely defined by 
the existence of paradoxes, which, in their definition, are “living and non-resolved 
contradictions, without Aufhebung”.977 Therefore, they place existential 
philosophy as a philosophy of finitude, in stark contrast with Hegelian thought: 
 
We believe that what is brilliant in existential philosophy is that it leads the way towards 
an ontology of the torn apart being [être déchiré], of limits and leaps, towards an ontology 
that excludes the possibility of a system, but that allows for a systematic, coherent and 
organized thought.978 
 
It is thus in Jaspers’s approach of historicity that Ricœur finds one of the 
first alternatives to Hegel. Seen from this perspective, humanity is both finite and 
a result of historical developments. All philosophy that wishes to escape German 
idealism as a form of inner delusion has to embrace the condition of finitude and 
to proceed from it. It is interesting to see how Ricœur uses many times the 
adjectives brisé, fragmenté or déchiré in his works, to express the fact that the 
quest for unity in philosophy, language, or even in one’s own self is problematic, 
if not, sometimes, impossible. He thus stresses, in 1947, the importance of 
acknowledging that being is torn apart. However, he does think, in this phase, that 
such a philosophy is ultimately unable to hold its ground. He thus pairs the 
approach of paradox (with its grounding in conflict) with an approach of mystery. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
976 “C’est une dialectique non-résolue, c’est-à-dire sans synthèse finale ; la philosophie existentielle 
confirme sa vocation en face du système hégélien.” Ibid., p. 284. 
977 “une contradiction vivante non résolue, sans Aufhebung” Ibid., p. 285. 
978 “nous croyons que le génie de la philosophie existentielle est de frayer la voie à une ontologie 
de l’être déchiré, des limites et des bonds, à une ontologie qui exclut le système et permet une 
systématique ordonnée et cohérente.” Ibid., p. 374. 
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3.1.2 – Marcel, mystery and concrete philosophy 
 
Consequently, in his second published book, this one written alone and 
not with Dufrenne, Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers: philosophie du mystère et 
philosophie du paradoxe979, Ricœur engages in a comparative approach of what he 
dubs a “philosophy of paradox” and a “philosophy of mystery”. In comparison 
with Jaspers, who is decisively a thinker related to conflict, Marcel will be more a 
philosopher related with the procedures of mediation and conciliation.980 
Marcel wants to concentrate on what he calls the “concrete”, existential 
experiences of everyday life. In that, he wants to avoid what he calls “primary 
reflection”, which is a sort of intellectual abstraction that he associates with 
traditional philosophy. This is the kind of reflection that deals with concepts and 
that aims at producing a system, no matter how detached from reality it might be. 
Thus he aims at developing another kind of reflection, which he dubs “secondary 
reflection” and that revolves around mysteries, which are problems that implicate 
human beings in an existential way. I can be indifferent towards a particular 
problem or paradox; however, Marcel’s depiction of mystery makes it a 
phenomenon from which I cannot abstract because, ultimately, the mystery 
concerns my own being. As Patrick L. Bourgeois explains: “I cannot abstract 
myself from the mystery of my own being. Thus, the dimension of mystery cannot 
be considered merely to be a problem which cannot be solved. Rather, I am 
precisely what (who) is being reflected upon. On this level there is an ontological 
exigency at the heart of human existence which should prevent me from closing 
myself off into the problematic and the objective.”981 
Boyd Blundell sees in this “secondary reflection” the main link between 
the thoughts of Marcel and Ricœur. He stresses that secondary reflection is “a 
doubling back, a re-collection of the original situation in which the problem 
arose.”982  If, on the one hand, philosophical problems (or paradoxes) pertain to 
                                                
979 Paul Ricœur, Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers. Philosophie du mystère et philosophie du 
paradoxe (Paris: Temps Présent, 1947). 
980 “Telle est l’intention d’une philosophie du mystère plus que du paradoxe, c’est-à-dire d’une 
philosophie de la médiation et de la conciliation intérieure plus que de la déchirure” Ibid., p. 43. 
981 Patrick L. Bourgeois, “Ricœur and Marcel: An Alternative to Postmodern Deconstruction” in 
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy, vol. 7 no 1-2 (1995), pp. 168-169. 
982 Boyd Blundell, “Creative Fidelity: Gabriel Marcel’s influence on Paul Ricœur” in Between 
Suspicion and Sympathy. Ricœur’s unstable equilibrium (ed. André Wiercinski) (Toronto: The 
Hermeneutic Press, 2003), p. 91. 
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the domain of “having” (I have a problem, but I do not participate in it), mysteries, 
on the other hand, belong to the domain of being and as such cannot be escaped. It 
is the mystery that sends me on a quest to its solution, the solution to the mystery 
of my own existence, as an incarnate being. Thus the philosopher enters into a 
mode of exploration, and Blundell sees in this Marcellian topic a decisive 
influence on Ricœur’s own philosophical style of “detour” and “return”. It is true 
that he would develop a hermeneutic based on the “long route” and that 
“hermeneutics as a recollection of meaning” would be one of his main emphases 
in the 1960s. But we should probably add Plato’s influence to this movement of 
coming back, as Plato describes the movement of “second sailing” or “second 
voyage” in the beautiful metaphor of the Phaedo 99d.983 
The consequences of this “secondary reflection” are also decisive for the 
domain of practical philosophy. Ricœur many times reflected upon the particular 
mixture of autonomy and heteronomy that makes up human beings. Not wanting 
to abdicate from the necessary affirmation of autonomy, he nevertheless often 
spoke about the constitutive heteronomy that constitutes autonomy, in what he 
called a “loving obedience”.984 This means that there are limits to one’s freedom, 
and that this freedom has certain conditions of possibility. We will explore this 
further in the next chapter. However, some of the roots of this conception stem 
directly from secondary reflection: “Secondary reflection reveals that freedom is 
not autonomy or, better put, that it transcends the opposition between dependence 
and independence – of autonomy and heteronomy – as well as the opposition 
between activity and passivity.”985 In fact, Ricœur sees Marcel as being mainly 
preoccupied with the relaxation of man in the presence of Being.986 
Thus the key of Marcel’s concrete philosophy is also in its posture 
towards Transcendence, which he understands in a radically different manner from 
Jaspers’s way of seeing it. For Marcel, philosophy should entertain a privileged 
                                                
983 Plato, Phaedo in Complete Works, 99d, p. 86. The translation reads “second best” as in, the 
“second best” solution to enquire on the cause; but the expression “deuteros plous” literally means 
“second sailing”. 
984 Ricœur, “‘Thou Shalt Not Kill’: A Loving Obedience” in André LaCocque and Paul Ricœur, 
Thinking Biblically. Exegetical and Hermeneutical Studies, translated by David Pellauer (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 111-138. 
985 “La réflexion seconde dévoile que la liberté est non-autonomie, ou plus exactement transcende 
l’opposition de la dépendance et de l’indépendance – de l’hétéronomie et de l’autonomie –, comme 
celle de l’activité et de la passivité.” Ricœur, Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers, p. 227 
986 Ibid., p. 244. 
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relationship with Christianism and it is in the Peri-Christian zones that Existence 
reveals itself. As for Jaspers, his understanding of Transcendence forbids him to 
provide a name for it. God does not show itself, Transcendence is “hidden 
divinity”.987 For Jaspers, ultimately, the world is broken, divided between the two 
poles of freedom and Transcendence. For Marcel, the access to Transcendence is 
ultimately more direct and fundamental than for Jaspers. 
 
3.1.3 – The secret conciliation 
 
For Ricœur, the relationship between faith and philosophy, existence and 
Transcendence is more complicated. However, it is important to note that in these 
early books, even though he insists on the omnipresence of conflict and its 
extreme importance, he does choose to underline the other side, i.e., the doctrine 
that even though conflict is pervasive, a “radically torn apart philosophy is 
impossible.”988 This is his main objection to Jaspers. In fact, this conciliation, as 
defined by Ricœur and Dufrenne in 1947, posits the insufficiency of thought to 
grasp the whole of human existence and being: 
 
What for thought is separated, is it not in a certain way reconciled? And is it not 
necessary for Being to be in a certain manner unified in order for the leap to still be a 
passage? Now, the reader of Jaspers is taken by a supreme hesitation: in many aspects, 
this philosophy is secretly reconciled; what he calls “historicity” unites existence with the 
world and the diverse attitudes that existence can have towards Transcendence unite 
existence with Transcendence (…) maybe a philosophy that is definitively torn apart is 
impossible, and maybe paradox always has a union and a participation as background, 
pertaining to action or feeling.989 
 
This passage seems to indicate a certain a priori incapacity of theory to grasp what 
                                                
987 Ibid., p. 278 
988 Dufrenne and Ricœur, Karl Jaspers, p. 385. 
989 “Ce qui pour la pensée est séparé n’est-il pas d’une certaine façon réconcilié ? Et ne faut-il pas 
que l’être soit en quelque façon unifié pour que le bond soit encore un passage ? Or, une suprême 
hésitation arrête le lecteur de Jaspers: par bien des aspects, cette philosophie est secrètement 
réconciliée ; ce qu’il appelle ‘l’historicité’ joint l’existence au monde, et les diverses attitudes de 
l’existence à l’égard de la Transcendance joignent l’existence à la Transcendance. (…) 
peut-être qu’une philosophie définitivement déchirée est impossible et que le paradoxe a toujours 
pour toile de fond une union et une participation, de l’ordre de l’action ou de l’ordre du sentiment;” 
Dufrenne et Ricœur, Karl Jaspers, p. 379. 
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is more fundamental. In fact, the fundamental does not even seem to be the object 
of an intuition, or, for that matter, any objet whatsoever. It seems as if conflicts, 
and even the “loving struggle” are only the superficial layer of an inner, overall 
unity that only action and feeling can grasp. This is certainly not a Hegelian unity 
of Reason with itself. But Ricœur does state the priority of conciliations over 
conflicts: 
 
If the tearing apart [déchirure] grants this philosophy its seriousness, on the other hand, its 
condition of possibility rests on the conciliations that underpin the conflicts themselves, 
and that make themselves recognizable in specific actions or feelings. Something passes 
from one mode of being to another. The tension between freedom and nature has as its 
background a unity that is simultaneously felt and wanted.990  
 
Ultimately, this means precisely that Ricœur is more drawn to Marcel’s 
depiction of existence than to Jaspers’s. In fact, it is to mystery, and not to 
paradox, that he pledges allegiance: 
 
Every philosophy, whether it is in the form of a system or that of a paradoxical 
systematics, is formed from a first kernel of experience which constitutes its living source 
and that ensures that its parts are connected, but that is not itself logical. Namely, the 
paradox that introduces ruptures in the movement of thought, states in disjoined terms 
that which is united in an ineffable manner (…) Rather, it is from a unity that is divined, 
foretold, recognized by the “heart” that reason tries to express through a systematics of 
paradox what we can state about it and that we can not characterize. Paradox is the 
intellectual cover of mystery. A radically torn apart philosophy is impossible.991   
 
What Ricœur has to say about the heart, the thumos, would be 
                                                
990 “Si la déchirure donne son sérieux à cette philosophie, elle tire sa possibilité des conciliations 
qui sous-tendent les conflits eux-mêmes, et qui se font reconnaître dans des sentiments ou dans des 
actions spécifiques. Quelque chose passe d’un mode d’être à l’autre. La tension entre la liberté et la 
nature a pour toile de fond une unité sentie et voulue tout à la fois.” Ibid., p. 382. 
991 “toute philosophie, qu’elle soit en forme de système ou en forme de systématique paradoxale, se 
constitue à partir d’un premier noyau d’expérience qui en est la source vivante et assure la liaison 
de ses parties, mais qui n’est pas d’ordre logique. En particulier, le paradoxe qui introduit des 
ruptures dans le mouvement de la pensée, énonce en termes disjoints ce qui est unifié d’une façon 
indicible (…) Mais c’est à partir d’une unité devinée, pressentie, reconnue par le ‘cœur’, que la 
raison tente d’exprimer par une systématique du paradoxe ce qui en peut être dit et qui reste 
incaractérisable. Le paradoxe est l’enveloppe intellectuelle du mystère. Une philosophie 
radicalement déchirée est impossible.” Ibid., p. 385. 
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significantly complicated and developed in Fallible Man. However, this 
precedence of conciliation over conflict in the early works is not without 
significance. Ricœur will progressively tone down his ontological claims and 
expectations of reconciliation as his career moves forward, which results in the 
“postponed ontology” of Oneself as Another. However, this wish of conciliation  
(if not of total, Hegelian reconciliation) is a marked characteristic of Ricoeurian 
thought, which we will address in part six of this thesis. Nonetheless, this 
characteristic will not prevent Ricœur from diagnosing the multiple loci of 
conflict, the thread of which we are now following. 
 
3.1.4 – The lasting influence of Jaspers and Marcel in Ricœur’s philosophy 
 
Besides these two books dedicated to Jaspers and Marcel, it is very likely 
that many sparse elements of these two philosophies remained decisive for 
Ricœur’s later philosophy, often operating in silence. For example, Jaspers’s limit 
situations (Grenzsituationen) of suffering, death, fault and struggle992 resurfaced 
every once in a while, and marked the tone of his philosophy. Suffering was a 
fundamental characteristic that Ricœur recognized in human beings, a 
characteristic that reveals our inner core of passivity and attests the presence of 
evil in the world. This was evident both in Fallible Man and in Oneself as Another 
so we can argue that it is a permanent feature of his philosophical anthropology. 
Death also remains something with which he thinks philosophy must grapple, even 
though he forcefully contends that the main merit is to affirm our conatus, our 
effort to persevere in existence and affirming life’s value up until death, and not 
anticipating it as an existential experience.993 Fault would be a cornerstone of the 
philosophical anthropology of the 1960s, both in Fallible Man and in the 
Symbolism of Evil. In fact, the experience of faute, which we can translate as fault, 
guilt, and error is another attestation of the existence of evil. However, what is 
interesting is that Ricœur would later complement this approach of fault with an 
approach of forgiveness (human beings can fail, they can be guilty, but they can 
also be forgiven because, in some way, they can be considered as being superior, 
                                                
992 Explained in detail at page 337 of Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers, op. cit. 
993 Ricœur, Living up to Death, translated by David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2009). 
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more valuable, than the sum of their perpetrated acts) namely in Memory, History, 
Forgetting.994 And already in 1947 Ricœur reproaches Jaspers with not 
complementing fault with forgiveness.995 Struggle, as we have already mentioned, 
would remain decisive for the whole of Ricoeurian philosophy, in the form of 
conflict. 
In the same way, the Marcellian topics of fidelity, love, calling [appel] 
and hope were fundamental for Ricœur. As we have already seen in our discussion 
of Post-Hegelian Kantianism, hope is all that is left for ourselves as soon as the 
system is gone. In Oneself as Another, when explaining the difference between 
idem-identity and ipse-identity, Ricœur makes fidelity (or the capacity to keep 
promises) one of the main traits of the capacity to maintain an ethical continuity of 
the self through time. The difference of love and justice – love being able to go 
beyond justice and its insistence on reciprocity – is thematized both in Amour et 
Justice996 and in Ricœur’s biblical writings. And the notion of calling (or 
summons), even if applied only to the other in the context of an intersubjective 
relationship, would also be the model of a specific act of non-constrained 
relationship building, one that would be particularly important for Ricœur’s model 
of recognition. And we can argue that this too is an influence stemming from 
Marcel.  
In 1968 Ricœur conducted a series of six interviews with Marcel. These 
were also a way of paying homage to his longtime friend. In the last interview, 
Marcel suddenly evokes inter-subjectivity as a process of opening to the other, of 
generosity under the auspices of agape. Ricœur pursues that line of thought, 
adding: “It is the problem of intersubjectivity, of the other, that incessantly brings 
you back to the inexhaustible concrete: it is the act of recognizing the other that 
incessantly brings you to experience and transforms it into a proof.”997 In his 
answer, Marcel provides us with this interesting hint: “Yes, I think you are right in 
using that word, recognizing (…) we can also think about recognition – I would 
                                                
994 Ricœur, Memory, History, Forgetting, translated by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
995 Ricœur, Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers, p. 289. 
996 Ricœur, Amour et Justice (Paris: Seuil, 2008). 
997“c’est le problème de l’inter-subjectivité, d’autrui, qui sans cesse vous ramène vers un 
inépuisable concret: c’est l’acte de reconnaître autrui qui sans cesse ramène à l’expérience et fait 
de celle-ci une épreuve.” See Paul Ricœur, Entretiens Paul Ricœur – Gabriel Marcel (Présence et 
Pensée) (Paris: Aubier, 1968), p. 124. 
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say, even about the military meaning of that word – and about recognition as 
gratitude.”998 And Ricœur concludes by saying “It is also in that act of recognition 
that we should seek the true meaning of hope, not to oppose it to experience, but in 
order to discern it in the thickness of experience.”999 This excerpt of the interview 
is interesting because it seems to contain, in a nutshell, some of the ideas that 
Ricœur would develop in the Course of Recognition, namely, the importance of 
recognition as gratitude, the connection with agape and also the way in which 
hope is to be connected with everyday experience. 
 
3.1.5 – The methodological significance of phenomenology 
 
As mentioned before, Ricœur discovers Husserl’s Ideen in 1934 and 
publishes his translation of that book1000, with a long introduction and invaluable 
footnotes providing comment, in 1950, at the same time he publishes Freedom and 
Nature.1001 That introduction, which is, alongside Levinas’s work, one of the first 
texts on Husserl in French, has been translated into English, with and introduction 
by Pol Vandevelde, and published in A Key to Edmund Husserl’s Ideas.1002 In this 
thesis, I will not delve in detail in Ricœur’s approach to phenomenology. 
However, it must be said that the rigorous discipline of eidetic analyzes was 
formative for his philosophy and that even though he goes beyond phenomenology 
in many aspects, he will not refrain from engaging in phenomenological analyzes 
at least up until Memory, History, Forgetting. Thus his approach to freedom, 
memory, and the body (just to mention a few topics) is largely explored in a 
phenomenological way. The main articles, some of them using very technical 
terminology, that Ricœur has written over the decades, have been reprinted in 
                                                
998 “Oui, je pense que vous avez raison d’employer ce terme reconnaître. (…) On peut tout aussi 
bien penser à la reconnaissance – je dirais même au sens militaire du mot – qu’à la reconnaissance 
comme gratitude.”, Ibid. 
999 “C’est aussi du côté de cet acte de reconnaître qu’il nous faudrait rechercher le sens véritable de 
l’espérance, non point précisément pour l’opposer à l’expérience, mais pour la discerner dans 
l’épaisseur de l’expérience.” Ibid., pp. 124-125. 
1000 Edmund Husserl, Idées Directrices pour une phénoménologie, avec introduction, traduction et 
notes de Paul Ricœur (Paris: Gallimard, 1950). 
1001 Ricœur, Freedom and Nature. The Voluntary and the Involuntary, translated by Erazim V. 
Kohák (Evanston, Il.: Northwestern University Press, 2007). 
1002 See Paul Ricœur, A Key to Husserl’s Ideas I, translated by Bond Harris and Jacqueline 
Bouchard Spurlock, edited and with an introduction by Pol Vandevelde (Milwaukee: Marquette 
University Press, 1996). 
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French in À l’école de la phénoménologie.1003 Moreover, some key concepts of 
Ricoeurian anthropology, such as recognition, gain in insight if proven 
phenomenologically.1004 
Many Ricœur scholars, and Ricœur himself, dubbed his method 
“Hermeneutic Phenomenology”. This is true up to a point, even though matters are 
far more complicated. It is true that he was one of the initiators of the “interpretive 
turn in phenomenology”1005 and that through his hermeneutic method he was able 
to deal differently with many problems in classical phenomenology. Pol 
Vandevelde, for example, has argued that the Ricoeurian notion of narrative 
extends the bounds of phenomenology by reformulating two crucial and technical 
points in Husserl’s phenomenology: the passive synthesis and fulfillment.1006 
Arguing that “Ricœur’s genius is to introduce a pragmatic slant into 
phenomenology”1007, he thus sees Ricoeurian hermeneutic as encompassing both 
methods and showing how the intentional anticipates its pragmatic fulfillment. 
The text of action is thus the conglomerate of intentional acts.1008 
In 1950, Ricœur’s intention was to develop in the practical domain, 
something equivalent to what Merleau-Ponty had accomplished in the theoretical 
domain with his Phenomenology of Perception.1009 Ricœur himself in Critique and 
Conviction assumes this.1010 Concerning Ricœur’s early method, Don Ihde 
curiously speaks about a “dialectic of the diagnostic”; this is interesting, because a 
diagnostic seems precisely to be what Ricœur is doing at a first, descriptive level. 
Thus in the opening pages of Freedom and Nature he asserts that it “is in some 
ways an eidetic of the voluntary and the involuntary (…) providing we consider 
them simply as meanings or principles of intelligibility of the broad voluntary and 
involuntary functions. (…) A schematic understanding of these key functions 
precedes any empirical, inductive study undertaken according to experimental 
                                                
1003 Paul Ricœur, À l’école de la phénoménologie (Paris: Vrin, 1986). 
1004 See David-Le-Duc-Tiaha, “Genèse phénoménologique de la reconnaissance. La chair, l’autre et 
le corps propre”, in Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricœur Studies vol. 2, no. 2 (2011): 146-170. 
1005 See Gary B. Madison, “The Interpretive Turn in Phenomenology: A Philosophical History” in 
Between Description and Interpretation, edited by Andrzej Wiercinski (Toronto: The Hermeneutic 
Press, 2005), pp. 3-51. 
1006 See Vandevelde’s introduction to Paul Ricœur, A Key to Husserl’s Ideas I. 
1007 Ibid., p. 21. 
1008 Ibid. 
1009 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, translated by Colin Smith (London: 
Routledge, 2005), 
1010 See Ricœur, Critique and Conviction, p. 26. 
 343 
methods borrowed from natural sciences. Such an immediate understanding of the 
voluntary and the involuntary is what we have sought to elaborate first of all”.1011 
In fact, in the descriptive phase of his method, Ricœur uses both the 
eidetic approach and the empirical approach, engaging with the sciences of his 
time. Thus we can say that this is his theoretical approach to the practical domain 
of human action and willing, in the 1950s. It is not that the existential problematic 
is not more fundamental; but Paul Ricœur believes that only the phenomenological 
method is able to shed light, to rationalize, so to speak, the phenomenon of human 
will. This can be interpreted as a first move of distanciation, a movement that 
would later become fundamental for his hermeneutics. The next chapter will give 
the conflict between the voluntary and the involuntary its proper space. However, I 
want to argue that even in these early years, it seems that something like the 
subject, or the self, is already at the back of Ricœur’s mind, in that both 
existentialism and phenomenology are encompassed by the early development of a 
reflective philosophy. 
 
3.1.6 – Personalism and Reflexive Philosophy 
 
In the year 1934, decisive because of Ricœur’s acquaintance with Marcel 
and with Husserl’s writings, which we already mentioned, he also defends his 
Diplôme d’études supérieures thesis, dedicated to the topic of God in the 
philosophies of Jules Lachelier and Jules Lagneau [Le problème de Dieu chez 
Lachelier et Lagneau]. As he states: 
 
In fact, the true benefit of this passage by Lachelier and Lagneau was elsewhere. Trough 
them, I found myself initiated and in fact incorporated in the tradition of French reflexive 
philosophy, akin to German Neo-Kantianism.1012 
 
Ricœur lists Émile Boutroux, Felix Ravaisson, Maine de Biran, Jean 
Nabert, Bergson and Léon Brunschvicg as the main representatives of this 
                                                
1011 Ricœur, Freedom and Nature, p. 4. 
1012 See Ricœur, “Le jugement et la méthode réflexive selon Jules Lagneau, in Bulletin de la société 
française de philosophie (1994): 122. Quoted and translated by  Eric Crump in “Between 
Conviction and Critique. Reflexive Philosophy, Testimony and Pneumatology” in Ricœur as 
Another. The ethics of subjectivity, ed. Richard Cohen and James Marsch (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 2002), p. 171. 
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tradition of French reflexive philosophy. Eric Crump adds Pierre Thévenaz as a 
main direct influence of the style of reflexive philosophy for Ricœur.1013 A 
philosophy “without absolute”, which becomes a defining trait of post-Hegelian 
philosophy is also a reflexive philosophy. This, in Thévenaz’s terms, is also a 
statement of philosophic humility that will be incorporated, mutatis mutandis, in 
Ricoeurian philosophy. I certainly cannot sum up what is meant by “reflexive 
philosophy” in all these authors; however, the way it is understood and 
incorporated by Ricœur is in fact as being a heritage of Post-Cartesian philosophy 
in that it maintains that the self is a very specific kind of entity, one that exists 
(and which we can attest and vouch for). This self, this ipse is to be understood in 
a different manner from that in which we grasp common objects in the world. 
Thus, to be a reflexive philosopher, Ricœur states, is also to “resist objectification, 
naturalism”.1014 This would lead to Ricœur’s later distinction between idem-
identity and ipse-identity. 
Therefore, and to sum up the way in which these different aspects 
intersect with one another at this point, philosophy’s effort to describe the world 
(mainly phenomenologically) and to enlighten one’s personal situation 
(existentially) is encompassed by a reflexive method that stresses that this all takes 
place inside one’s consciousness and that all these acts pertain to one’s personal 
identity. These elements will become clearer as soon as Ricoeurian philosophy 
explicitly becomes hermeneutic. 
Probably the single most influential representative of reflexive 
philosophy for Ricœur was Jean Nabert, for whose republished works 
L’expérience intérieure de la liberté1015 and Éléments pour une éthique1016 he 
wrote prefaces. In fact, as Maria Luísa Portocarrero has shown, it is in Nabert that 
he would find a philosophy that simultaneously stresses the importance of the self 
but refuses to make it a starting point, a first principle (like Descartes’s), choosing 
instead to follow a path to the self that goes through its acts and their 
symbolism.1017 Portocarrero emphasizes that for Nabert the reflexive movement is 
                                                
1013 Eric Crump, “Between conviction and critique”, in Ricœur as Another, pp. 161-186. 
1014 Ricœur, Critique and Conviction, p. 90 
1015 Jean Nabert, L’expérience intérieure de la liberté (Paris: P.U.F., 1994) (originally published in 
1924). 
1016 Nabert, Éléments pour une éthique (Paris: Aubier, 1962) (originally published in 1943). 
1017 See Maria Luísa Portocarrero, “Afirmação originária e sabedoria prática na reflexão ética de 
Paul Ricœur” in Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricœur Studies vol 2, no. 2 (2011): p. 77. 
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rooted in the fundamental desire to be (and in this there is a fundamental Spinozist 
tone) and that this primary affirmation is destined to be expressed in symbolism 
and testimony1018 
This would have decisive consequences in The Symbolism of Evil, which 
is dedicated to Nabert, because it introduced the hypothesis that signs mediate the 
cogito, that is, self-knowledge, and that concrete reflection will have to make the 
long detour of the hermeneutic of the world. As Ricœur succinctly puts it in 
“Nabert on Act and Sign”: “reflection, because it is not an intuition of the self by 
the self, can be, and must be, a hermeneutics.”1019 This is already his refashioning 
of Nabert’s reflexive philosophy in hermeneutic terms, an effort that Nabert 
himself did not undertake. But ultimately, as Eric Crump states, “reflexion is the 
bond between the comprehension of signs and that of oneself.”1020 
The style of this reflexive philosophy animated by hermeneutics would 
also undergo its metamorphoses, as the object of hermeneutics gradually expanded 
from signs and symbols to texts and actions.  
However, it seems as if in this first phase of the 1950s, the specific 
framing of the self was something very close to the notion of “person” as it 
appeared in Emmanuel Mounier’s strand of “personalism”.1021 Mounier was the 
founder of the magazine Esprit1022 in 1932, which remains to this day one of the 
most influential and read intellectual publications in France, among whose writers 
we find very good Ricœur scholars such as Olivier Mongin and Michaël Foessel. 
As François Dosse contends, we have to understand Esprit, and the personalist 
movement, in the nonconformist context of the 1930s. Mounier aims at edifying a 
new community and ultimately even bears the hope of bringing about a different 
type of civilization, one that is embedded in the Christian values of spirituality. As 
Dosse shows, Mounier wants to avoid two reified positions: one of a purely inner 
spirituality, detached from reality, and the other of a pure materiality of the world, 
the domain of having (which echoes Marcel). His concern is with the domain of 
human praxis; personalism is thus geared towards a revolution – not directly a 
political revolution, but a revolution in the domain of human existence. He thus 
                                                
1018 Ibid. 
1019 Ricœur, “Nabert on act and sign” in The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 222. 
1020 Crump, op. cit., p. 179. 
1021 On Mounier, personalism and its influence on Ricœur, see chapter 3 of Dosse. 
1022 On the history of Esprit, see Michel Winok, Histoire politique de la revue esprit 1930-1950 
(Paris: Seuil, 1975). 
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aims at developing a non-universitary form of knowledge and intervention, 
therefore anticipating, in his own peculiar style, a rejection of academic 
philosophy that would, decades later, find echoes in the positions assumed by 
Sartre, Deleuze, Derrida, among others. In fact, thought as civic engagement, as 
ethical and political standpoint, is key for Mounier. 
 As for Jaspers and Marcel – and echoing Buber – the key process is here 
communication, dialogue. The personalist standpoint entails a movement towards 
the other, the you, that requires a certain decentering of the subject. We could 
argue that this is in agreement with with Ricœur’s reflexive standpoint, that finds 
the subject not in inner consciousness as a certainty, but takes it as another. With 
the difference that Mounier explicitly assumes for himself the role of the educator 
– more than the revolutionary – which was never the case for Ricœur. And even 
though Mounier distances himself from Marxism (in spite of also assuming its 
influence) the truth is that his alleged position as an educator is in some aspects 
close to the position of Luckács, in that the theoretician is also, in some sort, the 
political organizer. What Mounier has in mind though is some sort of recovery of 
the values of the Renaissance, over against the materialism and the 
dehumanization of the following centuries. He argued for a return to community 
life, and, in a way, the community he set up for himself and for the members of 
Esprit at Châtenay-Malabry (the place known as Les Murs Blancs), and where 
Ricœur himself lived with his family for most of his life, was a partial fulfilling of 
that dream. 
In 1950, shortly after Mounier’s premature death, Ricœur wrote an article 
dedicated to him and to his philosophy: “Emmanuel Mounier: A Personalist 
Philosopher”, republished in History and Truth.1023 In this article, he distinguishes 
roughly two main phases in Mounier’s intellectual production: the pre-war years 
and the postwar years. He stresses that in the beginning (years 1932-1934) 
personalism was directly geared towards the goal of bringing about a more 
communitarian lifestyle: “Personalism: in the beginning a pedagogy concerning 
communal life linked to an awakening of the person.”1024 But he also mentions 
that Mounier’s last productions transform personalism into a philosophy which is 
                                                
1023 See Ricœur, “Emmanuel Mounier, a Personalist Philosopher” in History and Truth, pp. 122-
161. 
1024 Ibid., p. 136. 
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much closer to the philosophies of existence. The difference with Marxism is that 
Mounier charges Marxism of being less than an awakening and less than a 
pedagogy. He sees Marxists as waging that the future society will be brought 
about by the economic and political changes; however, he thinks, they do not 
stress with enough force the attraction exercised here and now by the 
revolutionary values preached by the pedagogue. Ricœur sums up this debate as 
follows: “Here is the core of the debate: the conviction of personalism is that one 
does not progress toward the person if the person is not in the beginning what 
demands, what presses on in the midst of the revolt of the famished and 
afflicted.”1025 
One of the most interesting aspects is to see how, ultimately, “person” 
and “existence” are two different but similar notions operating within Ricœurian 
philosophy at this point. At the end of this article, he sums up these two 
approaches: 
 
First, person and existence refer primarily to two orders of preoccupation which are not 
exactly co-extensive: on the one hand, there is an ethico-politico concern, a “pedagogical” 
intention in touch with a crisis of civilization; on the other hand, there is a critical and 
ontological reflection in contact with classical “philosophical” tradition. 
Second, the word person is a way of designating one of the interpretations of existence, 
once one is situated in the strictly critical and ontological level of the philosophies of 
existence.1026  
 
Ultimately, what remains important for Ricœur is the notion of “person”, 
to which he would come back many times, in his discussions of Kantian practical 
philosophy and phenomenology. Indeed, reassessing Personalism three decades 
later, in an article called “Meurt le personnalisme, revient la personne…”1027 
(originally pronounced in a symposium to celebrate the fiftieth birthday of Esprit) 
Ricœur shows how the demise of “Personalism” as a philosophical movement, 
well confirmed by that time, does not entail the disappearance of the importance of 
the notion of person. Ricœur acknowledges, in that article, that Personalism did 
not have enough theoretical consistency to affirm itself in the way other “isms”, 
                                                
1025 Ibid., p. 144. 
1026 Ibid., p. 160. 
1027 Ricœur, “Meurt le personnalisme, revient la personne...” in Esprit 50,1 (1983), pp. 113-119. 
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such as Marxism or Existentialism managed to do; however, he also emphasizes 
that at that time, the importance of the person as the support for a specific 
perspective and aspiration remained valid. In an indirect manner, the development 
of bioethics in the following decades ultimately proved him right, as the 
discussions taking place around the status of the embryo and its rights pushed for a 
redefinition of the status of the person itself. 
However, what I want to underscore, to reiterate, is that notions such as 
existence, identity, self, person, ipse, reflexion, subjectivity, are very closely 
related, and that they ultimately form a semantic web in the context of Ricoeurian 
philosophy. They are the core of his philosophical anthropology, which we will 
discuss in more detail in this and the following parts of this thesis. However, if we 
are to sketch the portrait of Ricœur’s depiction of human kind, we might as well 
begin by his discussion of our fundamental attributes. Freedom is one of them. 
And thus the next shape conflict will assume is that of the tension between the 
voluntary and the involuntary. 
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3.2 – The Conflict Between Voluntary and Involuntary 
 
In Freedom and Nature1028 Ricœur undertakes phenomenological 
analyzes of the acts of willing in their many forms.1029 The major, most significant 
inner conflict that is shown by this eidetic approach is that between what is 
voluntarily willed and the elements of irreducible involuntary in us. This approach  
lays the ground for the first developed form of philosophical anthropology that we 
will see in detail in the next chapter.  
The Philosophy of the Will, at least in its two first volumes, remains in a 
post-Kantian framework. The English translation of Le volontaire et 
l’involontaire, which emphasizes that the debate is largely between the possibility 
of freedom amid the necessity imposed by nature, reveals, better than the French 
original, this framework. Indeed, we could argue that like Kant, Ricœur is trying 
to uphold the existence and specificity of human freedom – not understood as a 
Reich der Zwecke as in Kant – and to reconcile it with the objective laws of 
physical and human nature. This is the reason why, alongside phenomenology, 
Ricœur also draws on psychology and the natural sciences. He is not, in any way 
whatsoever, stepping away from the empirical data on human beings provided by 
science. But he is in fact refusing to accept that these results deplete what can be 
meaningfully be said about us, because he is indeed repudiating objectivism, 
avoiding that we be reduced to a mere object, and that the first-person perspective 
be completely swallowed by the objective description. Don Ihde has an interesting 
way of assessing this method: “In its first appearance Ricœur’s dialectic is double-
focused, suggesting the use of a geometrical metaphor. From two fixed points at 
least two figures are possible. The first is a set of partly overlapping circles; the 
                                                
1028 In this chapter I am following the translation of Erazim V. Kohák; however, I am also 
comparing it with the French original and sometimes emphasizing the subtleties of the French text. 
1029 Freedom and Nature is the most comprehensive and exhaustive take of Ricœur on the 
phenomenology of the will, but the same topic is dealt with in several other smaller texts. See also 
the collection of these texts, republished in Paul Ricœur, Écrits et Conférences 3: Anthropologie 
Philosophique edited by Johann Michel et Jérôme Porée (Paris: Seuil, 2013), and namely “L’unité 
du volontaire et de l’involontaire comme idée-limite”, pp. 95-122; “Le problème de la volonté et le 
discours philosophique”, pp. 123-146; and “Phénoménologie du vouloir et approche par le langage 
ordinaire”, pp. 147-171. This last text, originally written in 1971 is interesting because it sums up 
the way in which Ricœur’s attention to ordinary language philosophy, which we will see in more 
detail in the next part of this thesis, comes to be an interesting complement to the 
phenomenological analyzis of action. On this first phase of Ricœur’s philosophy, see also David 
M. Rasmussen, Mythic-Symbolic Language and Philosophical Anthropology. A Constructive 
Interpretation of the Thought of Paul Ricœur (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971). 
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second is an ellipse. In the case of Freedom and Nature one point or focus is 
clearly weighted centrally as an eidetic phenomenology. But against this focus are 
played a series of counterfoci all of which have in common a type of objectivism 
(empirical psychology, psychoanalysis, and biology among them).”1030 
 
3.2.1 – The overarching role of conflict and its alleged inner (re)conciliation in 
Transcendence 
 
The conflict at the heart of human freedom is one which must be dealt 
with and explicated, because its result decides what are the proper limits to human 
action and what we can, or cannot, legitimately expect to accomplish. And conflict 
is here at stake at both an ontological and a methodological level. Ontologically, 
as we have seen, it is the torn, broken status of existence itself: 
 
Existence tends to break itself up. In effect the advent of consciousness is always to some 
degree the disruption of an intimate harmony.1031  
 
This disruption, according to Ricœur, will be reflected in the many levels 
in which our free will is mixed with involuntary elements that determine us in 
some sort. In fact, conflict will have an exploratory and even revelatory power 
because it will help explore and draw the limits of our will. Because our freedom 
will often crash into the resistance offered by the involuntary in its many forms. 
Thus Ricœur explicitly declares that 
 
bit by bit the relations of the involuntary to the voluntary reveal themselves in a 
perspective of conflict. [de proche en proche les rapports de l’involontaire au volontaire se 
révèlent sous le signe du conflit.]1032  
 
In this passage, “se révèlent sous le signe du conflit” also means: are revealed by 
conflict. Because human freedom is not absolute freedom, the resistance offered to 
the human will, and the effort to overcome that resistance, shows us exactly the 
                                                
1030 Don Ihde, Hermeneutic Phenomenology. The Philosophy of Paul Ricœur (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 16. 
1031 Ricœur, Freedom and Nature, p. 17. 
1032 Ibid., p. 18. 
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specificity and the extent of our possibilities. 
Nevertheless, we are far from being able to say that conflict has the last 
word in the Philosophy of the Will. We have seen in the previous chapter that 
Ricœur and Dufrenne reproached Jaspers for emphasizing the role of conflict and 
ultimately producing an utterly broken philosophy; they also affirmed the “secret” 
inner reconciliation of that philosophy. In 1950, in Freedom and Nature, Ricœur 
remains within the same framework: 
 
The act of Cogito is not a pure act of self-positing: it lives on what it receives and in a 
dialogue with the conditions in which it is itself rooted. The act of myself is at the same 
time participation. 
Thus the intention of this book is to understand the mystery of reconciliation, that is, as 
restoration, even on the clearest level of consciousness, of the original concord of vague 
consciousness with its body and its world. In this sense the theory of the voluntary and 
involuntary not only describes and understands, but also restores. 
From the point of view of method, this final deepening of our quest opens the way for a 
consideration of the paradox. Consciousness is always in some degree both a disruption 
and a bond. This is why the structures which connect the voluntary and the involuntary 
are structures of rupture as well as of union. Behind these structures lies the paradox 
which culminates in the paradox of freedom and nature. (…) 
But then what prevents the paradox from being destructive?  How can freedom help being 
annulled by its very excess if it does not succeed in recovering its connection with a 
situation which would in some sense sustain it? A paradoxical ontology is possible only if 
it is covertly reconciled. (…) 
Thus this study of the voluntary and the involuntary is only a limited contribution to a far 
broader schema which would be the reconciliation of a paradoxical ontology in a 
reconciled ontology [Ainsi cette étude du volontaire et de l’involontaire est une 
contribution limitée à un dessein plus vaste qui serait l’apaisement d’une ontologie 
paradoxale dans une ontologie réconciliée.]1033 
 
This somewhat long passage has the merit of summing up the context in 
which Ricœur is placing his project of a philosophy of the will. On the one hand, 
there is an implicit mentioning of his indirect reflexive philosophy: the affirmation 
of the cogito stems from its participation in something other than itself. On the 
                                                
1033 Ibid., pp. 18-19. [Modified translation. Kohák translates “the reconciliation of a paradoxical 
and a reconciled ontology”.] 
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other hand, philosophy is a paradox wrapped in a mystery, that is, a theory that 
presents itself paradoxically but which is secretly reconciled in a union with Being 
itself.  
However, we must say that this ontological vehemence notwithstanding, 
Freedom and Nature does not really take a definitive step towards this “reconciled 
ontology”, whatever is meant by that somewhat vague expression. And this 
because, as Ricœur announces shortly after this passage, this book refrains from 
analyzing fault [faute] and Transcendence as such: 
 
The fault remains an alien body in the essential structure of man. There is no principle of 
intelligibility of such disruption, analogous to the mutual intelligibility of involuntary and 
voluntary functions, in the sense that their essences complete each other within the human 
unity. The fault is absurd.1034  
 
We cannot suspend the fault without suspending Transcendence.1035  
 
Transcendence will appear to us later as an absolute positing of a presence which 
constantly precedes my own power of self-affirmation, even when the latter always seems 
to be on the verge of engulfing it. This is why the connection of Transcendence and 
freedom inevitably appears paradoxical. It will be the task of the third volume of this 
Philosophy of the Will to bring the difficulties of that paradox into full light. (…) But the 
paradox of freedom and Transcendence can be sustained only as a mystery which it is the 
task of poetics to discern.1036  
 
Throughout his whole career, Ricœur always affirmed that fault is not 
primordial. The Kantian claim that even though evil is radical, it is not originary, 
resonates strongly with him. Thus he believes in human being’s original innocence 
and he wagers the reconciliation in that innocence. However, if it is true that he 
thoroughly analyzed fault in the second volume of the Philosophy of the Will, 
namely in the Symbolism of Evil, the truth is that the projected third volume was 
never written. Thus the “poetics of the will” and the volume that would explicitly 
define Transcendence and show its intrinsic connection with human existence and 
                                                
1034 Ibid., p. 24. 
1035 Ibid., p. 29. 
1036 Ibid., pp. 32-33. 
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freedom was never more than a project. This means that Ricœur was unable – or, 
more probably, that he chose not – to philosophically ground this reconciled 
ontology. 
Some have argued, and they are probably right, that even though this 
volume never saw the light of day, we can consider the hermeneutic works of 
Ricœur as the replacement of that book, in that they explicitly deal with the 
“poetic” function of language and also radically redefine the understanding and 
explanation of human action. These aspects are well depicted, but I would also 
emphasize that the difference between these works, which we will see in the next 
part, and the projected third volume of the Philosophy of the Will is that the former 
do not (explicitly or implicitly) place themselves in the standpoint of 
Transcendence. In fact, what this means is that Ricœur progressively tones down 
his ontological claims. It also means that conflict and (re)conciliation are probably 
omnipresent in Ricoeurian philosophy but that their balance of forces changes 
with time. If, roughly until 1960, we can say that in Ricœur’s philosophy there is 
this presupposition of a reconciled ontology that does not necessarily express itself 
in thought but that might as well do it, it seems that the same conditions do not 
apply from that point on. And because in fact Transcendence is not explicitly 
defined nor explored as such, what we are left with, in Freedom and Nature and 
the subsequent books, is a thorough exploration of philosophy and its limits, its 
others, under the banner of the multiform phenomena of conflict. 
Freedom and Nature is a good example of the abovementioned claim. 
The book has three parts: 1) Decision: Choice and its Motives; 2) Voluntary 
Motion and Human Capabilities; and 3) Consenting: Consent and Necessity. And 
this because, according to Ricœur, “to want” fundamentally means three different 
things: 1) I decide [something]; 2) I move my body and 3) I consent [to 
something]. Decision is, according to this analyzis, the first moment of the 
voluntary act, the one which forms a project – defined as “that which is to be 
done”.1037 But decisions are not taken abstractly. Decision is complemented by 
action; finally, there might be an active decision that does not create an alternative 
to the existing state of affairs but that nonetheless is a decision: that of consenting 
to it. 
                                                
1037 Ibid., p. 42. 
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The reciprocity between voluntary and involuntary is shown by the fact 
that at each stage the voluntary will find that it has what is involuntary as its 
background and even as its condition of possibility. So motivation will be the 
involuntary aspect of decision: the body has involuntary organs and muscles 
which function without the intervention of my will; finally, the third part will deal 
with character, the unconscious and life itself, all three being aspects which I can 
not choose myself (I can not choose the fact of being born here and at this time, 
who my parents are, the way my body is and functions) and to whose necessity I 
must ultimately consent.  
Concerning this reciprocity between the voluntary and the involuntary, 
and more specifically the diagnostic of the involuntary that Ricœur is making with 
the help of phenomenology and the natural sciences, Ihde speaks about a “latent 
hermeneutics”, that is, already a detour and some sort of “conflict of 
interpretations”. According to Ihde: “The door is opened to a dialectic between 
phenomenological and objective universes of discourse, and in the conflict of 
these separate theories the latent hermeneutics of Freedom and Nature 
emerges.”1038 Why is it latent, how does it operate? According to Ihde, Ricœur 
takes objective characteristics as signs for obscure or border experiences 
pertaining to the involuntary.1039 In this way, he diagnoses the involuntary. 
However, he also shows that the diagnostic is not vague and imprecise, precisely 
since it is replaced within the totality of human experience, and because the 
objective sciences will also help determine its borders: “But since the dialectic 
involved in the diagnostic occurs at the borders of experience, in the vague and 
obscure, a second process involves the locating and mapping of these borders.”1040 
It was the task of the books from the 1960s to make hermeneutic explicit. But let 
us first take a closer look at the multiple forms of conflict which are here at stake. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1038 Don Ihde, Hermeneutic Phenomenology, p. 29. 
1039 Ibid., p. 30. 
1040 Ibid., p. 31. 
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3.2.2 – The conflict of values and modes of life 
 
Part one of this book1041 deals with the relation between decision – and it 
undertakes its eidetic description –, motivation and what is called the “corporeal 
involuntary”. Ricœur claims that every decision has a motivation. However, he 
also stresses the distinction between motives and causes, a topic in which he 
would delve in more detail as soon as he started reading and discussing post-
Wittgensteinian analytic philosophy. However, motivation does not have to be 
voluntary. So Ricœur takes the example of the corporeal needs like hunger. 
Hunger makes me want to eat, but does not force me to do so. I can choose not to. 
Thus the whole chapter two1042 of part one deals with the utter complexity of 
motivation and the way it can reflect itself on values. Ultimately, the difficult path 
of one’s freedom will be made of the persisting conflicts between different values 
(embodying different motivations) and which can eventually lead to different 
lifestyles. 
When Ricœur starts discussing motives and values on the “organic 
level”1043 he asserts that “on the human level, organic life is undoubtedly a cluster 
of heterogeneous demands, revealing discordant values.” Therefore, there is a 
complexity of values on the organic level. For instance, even though pleasure is 
usually considered good, and pain bad, there are moments in which one can 
choose to be courageous, to endure pain and suffering, for the sake of a different 
value. As Ricœur states: “it seems that bodily existence reveals other values than 
those of pleasure and pain”.1044 For example, what is easy is usually considered to 
be good, because it is interpreted as “the absence, or, better, the cessation of an 
obstacle or an impediment.”1045 Nonetheless, Ricœur stresses the viability of the 
opposing possibility, that of taking the difficult as the embodiment of the good. 
This possibility is more rare than the preceding, opposing one. However, 
it is not without a certain tradition and even a certain poetic quality: it might be the 
way of the hero. Thus Ricœur recalls the quality of struggle, a struggle which can 
be more than the Hegelian struggle for recognition, it can assume the Nietzschean 
                                                
1041 Ricœur, Freedom and Nature, pp. 35-197. 
1042 Ibid., pp. 85-134. 
1043 Ibid., p. 104 ff. 
1044 Ibid., p. 110. 
1045 Ibid., p. 112. 
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quality of the struggle for power in the context of the affirmation of the will to 
power. It is worthy to quote the beautiful passage in which Ricœur depicts this 
possibility: 
 
Not having suffering in any form as its opposite pole, the pleasure in an obstacle never 
reaches the form of plenitude, of elimination of pain, of liberation from hindrances, in a 
word, of repose. It is the genuine pleasure of movement which alone reveals the authentic 
tensions of life beyond the twin avarice of desire and fear. It alone testifies to the heroic 
dimension, the Don Quixotic dimension of life contrasted to a Sancho Panza who is 
guided solely by the pleasures of possession, freedom from suffering, and ease. (…) 
In effect the taste for obstacles is a tendency towards choosing suffering itself and 
sacrificing the pleasure of possession to the pure pleasure of conquest. This pleasure then 
adds to the more elementary values of food and the complementing sex, the values of 
struggle, which are still vital and spontaneous but also, in a way, uninterested and utopian. 
[ce plaisir ajouterait donc aux valeurs plus élémentaires de l’aliment et du sexe 
complémentaire, les valeurs encore vitales et spontanées, mais en quelque sorte 
désintéressées et utopiques de la lutte.]1046 
 
Ricœur concludes this section by affirming that “there is no organic 
order”1047, but rather a multiplicity that must be clarified and unified by a de-
cision, a choice. Thus choice becomes a moral problem, because in virtue of the 
specific content of the value we choose, we are also choosing our own lifestyle. 
Do we want to be Don Quixote or Sancho Panza? 
In the following pages Ricœur asserts the value of intersubjectivity: “In 
the last analyzis, it is the other who counts”1048, because the subject is not 
solipsistic. However, what this reveals is that “organic” values are not the only 
ones that we have to bear in mind. Ricœur therefore asserts that in the multiplicity 
of the organic values they are not only in conflict with one another, but also in 
conflict with social values.1049 Other people, taken as fellow citizens, bearers of 
rights, are not only measured against the value of my life, but also against the 
backdrop of society as a whole, taken as a value. This, according to Ricœur, forces 
the need for a choice, of our own values, in our own life. 
                                                
1046 Ibid., pp. 119-120 [Modified translation]. 
1047 Ibid., p. 121. 
1048 Ibid., p. 128. 
1049 Ibid., p. 129. 
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3.2.3 – The conflict of duties and the value of happiness 
 
This move, from organic to social values, and the emphasis on the 
conflict among them, forces Ricœur to enter in a Kantian framework, as would 
later be the case in the little ethics of Oneself as Another. We have already 
mentioned how in 1936-1937 he hinted at the conflict of duties. Now, in 1950, we 
see his second coming to the topic, delving into it in more detail. On the one hand, 
Ricœur acknowledges the presence of a conflict between happiness and duty.1050 
On the other hand, he also argues that Kant has overemphasized the formal value 
of the universalization of our maxims and claims that the Kantian ethic must be 
encompassed by “a phenomenology which goes beyond the opposition of reason 
and sensibility.”1051 This because sensibility must be able be recognized by reason 
as being a motive, and also because reason must, in turn, be able to move us in 
some sort (which is what the feeling of respect for the law does in the context of 
Kantian practical philosophy). 
But duty itself is splintered in many conflicting imperatives.  The third 
chapter1052 of part one focuses on hesitation and choice. Ultimately, he describes 
the transition from hesitation to choice by developing a phenomenology of 
attention.1053 However, the interesting aspect for the topic with which we are 
dealing here is the description of the conflicts of duties that cause us to hesitate. 
Hesitation stems from an impossibility to establish an absolute hierarchy between 
values. In this, an interesting aspect of Ricœur’s perspectivism is revealed: 
 
If we now observe that all value is relative, that every “good” is a “better” we can sense 
that the difficulties concerning the idea of a totality arise once more in the notion of a 
hierarchy: the comparison of two or more values is always moving and incomplete, new 
points of view can always be considered, the evident hierarchy depends in part on 
knowing what “horizons” will be determined, that is, what values left in the shadows will 
be carried to the center of consciousness. The incompleteness of the totality makes the 
                                                
1050 Ibid., p. 130. 
1051 Ibid., p. 131. 
1052 Ibid., pp. 135-197. 
1053 See also Ricœur’s early phenomenological study of attention: Ricœur, “L’attention” in Écrits et 
Conférences 3: Anthropologie Philosophique), op. cit., pp. 51-93. 
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hierarchy precarious. The search for a hierarchy always remains an indefinite process.1054 
 
This means that at least to some extent, the rejection of totality at the 
theoretical level (exemplified by the rejection of Hegelian Absolute Knowing) also 
bears at the practical level. As new points of view can be considered at a 
theoretical level – and this is decisive for Ricoeurian hermeneutics – also new 
points of view concerning values can shift the horizons in which we evaluate. And 
therefore, we can change our mind. And when we have not chosen yet, 
phenomenologically, we hesitate. 
This does not mean that we do not choose. We do. But every choice is 
personal, and this is why we can speak about “moral creativity” 1055 in Ricœur: 
 
We must constantly invent some original progression in order to embody a principle in an 
action which is in some respects without precedent, and this invention retains an 
irreducible character of inexactness.1056  
 
This invention is made amid what he describes as a “chaos of values”1057  
because we also have in ourselves, or so he claims, the whole history of socially 
conflicting values that made up our societies. Thus we are influenced by a “feudal 
conscience gravitating around honor and knightly heroism, a Christian conscience 
centered on love and forgiveness, a bourgeois conscience whose tone is set by 
ideas of liberty and toleration, a modern conscience enamored of justice and 
equality”.1058 In sum: “all the ages of mankind are thus represented within our 
consciousness.”1059  
Since it is not productive to assume the standpoint of the D. Juan who 
courts every type of consciousness and gravitates around several of them without 
really choosing, we have to navigate among them and choose our values as best as 
we can. This bears testimony to the fact that “society is not a homogeneous milieu, 
but is disjointed and divided against itself (…) social topography projects itself in 
                                                
1054 Ibid., p. 146. 
1055 On this topic, see John Wall, Moral Creativity. Paul Ricœur and the Poetics of Possibility 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
1056 Ricœur, Freedom and Nature, p. 147. 
1057 Ibid., p. 148. 
1058 Ibid. 
1059 Ibid. 
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contradictory affective signs and painful alternatives.”1060 The individual thus 
appears as being torn apart by professional, cultural, sports, artistic and religious 
groups (among others) and forced to “dare his own style of life”. As Ricœur 
claims: “The person arises from his distortion among the conflicts of duties.”1061  
The rest of this page repeats some formulations that Ricœur had 
published thirteen years before in the article “Le risque” that I mentioned before. 
Ultimately, this comes down to the conflict between the person and the rule, love 
and justice. All these topics would later resonate strongly in Ricoeurian practical 
philosophy. In fact, these small passages from pages 147-149 of Freedom and 
Nature contain some intuitions that would be further developed in whole books 
some 40 or 50 years later. What is interesting to note is that at this point, Ricœur 
grants social conflict a sort of epigenetic function: the person arises from the 
conflict of duties. The fact that we are forced to choose, to give a personal imprint 
to our life’s path and the values it assumes, is in fact the positive outcome of the 
process of conflict. It is, therefore, a dialectical beginning: personality stems from 
history and from an act of decision. 
Ricœur proceeds by phenomenologically describing the way out of 
confusion of the “chaos of values” by the phenomenon of attention and the event 
of choice, which stops attention and makes the irruption of a project possible. 
Ricœur reiterates that conflict “awakens” conscience; he also claims that the 
“conflict of duties” is the normal situation of conscience, not its limit-case.1062 
However, differently from the solution that he would find in his later philosophical 
anthropology, the characteristic that now provides a solution and leads to choice, 
is actually a virtue: generosity. 
 
These conflicts allow of no solution other than choice. An extended rationalization 
hardens them into rigid alternatives, personal meditation consecrates them into impasses. 
There is a point at which there exist no rules for resolving the conflict of rules. Such 
conflict has at least the virtue of awakening socialized consciousness to itself and saving it 
from rational automatism. It calls for personal initiative and invention capable of 
constituting at most a limited jurisprudence, a provisional morality which always remains 
revocable. Generosity, in Descartes’ sense, means not only loving the good, but also 
                                                
1060 Ibid. 
1061 Ibid. 
1062 Ibid., p. 174. 
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deciding amid confusion and conflict what is better, here and now, for me.1063  
 
Descartes’s “provisional morality” is certainly a problematic notion and in this, 
Ricœur distances himself a lot from Kantian morality. However, it is this lack of 
absolute certainty that provides existence with a certain interest. Freedom entails 
risk. My hierarchy of values, and my decisions, are only that: mine. In choosing 
something, I choose myself. Moreover: choice, and hesitation, are a sign of 
finitude; since my understanding is limited and finite1064 and therefore I cannot 
entirely deduct the results of my decision, and given the fact that I am many times 
under the constraint of urgency, I am forced to choose. So we can see that a more-
or-less Cartesian provisional morality is, at this point of Ricœur’s philosophy, 
deduced from the diagnosis of human finitude stemming from Kant, from 
phenomenology and from existential philosophy. 
Ultimately, Ricœur characterizes this way out of the confusion of values 
and duties by the appearance of a preference in the web of conflicting motives1065 
and its realization in what he calls a reconciliation in the act.1066 By acting I open 
up the way for my life to go on and cease hesitation. However, nothing prevents 
the process from taking place all over again, because if the choice is my choice, it 
can nevertheless still change. 
 
3.2.4 – The conflict between passion and law 
 
Part two of Freedom and Nature1067 explores the meaning of acting, 
moving the body and all the involuntary aspects attached to it, such as the 
“preformed skills” [savoir-faire préformés] (that is, reflexes), contains dense and 
beautiful, almost poetic analyzes of emotions (surprise, joy, sadness, desire, shock, 
passion) and detailed descriptions of habit. However, it is in chapter three, 
“Moving and Effort”1068 that we find what Ricœur dubs the “fundamental 
conflict”: that between passions and the law. 
This analyzis is prepared by an analyzis of resistance. The resistance of 
                                                
1063 Ibid., p. 173. 
1064 Ibid., p. 175. 
1065 Ibid., p. 180. 
1066 Ibid., p. 181. 
1067 Ibid., pp. 199-337. 
1068 Ibid., pp. 308-337. 
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the body to my own will is, according to Ricœur, a “crisis of the unity of the self 
with itself.”1069 And what causes this crisis, this lack of unity, are precisely the 
passions: “It is due to passions that conflict appears as the ultimate verdict on 
man”.1070 Stepping up a notch in this description, he states that it is the conflict 
between law and passion that “gives resonance to every dramatic description of 
man.”1071  
Passions show me that I am not the master of myself, in myself. This is 
what is shown to us, with an incredible poetic force, by Greek tragedy. Passions 
and emotion appear as impediments: “the principle of passion is bondage I impose 
on myself, the principle of emotion is wonder to which I submit”.1072 And when 
confronted by resistance, the human being’s response can be none other than 
effort. Both passion and emotion tend to prevent me from freely exercising my 
will but Ricœur claims that we are able to regain a certain mastery over ourselves, 
either by playing one passion against another, or through habit: 
 
Descartes showed admirably that the art of living lies in part in playing one “passion” 
against another; thus the will acts against the emotion it resists in its very visceral 
stronghold by giving itself indirectly to the involuntary spontaneity of an allied docile 
emotion. 
But this aid of one emotion against another emotion constituted as an obstacle is itself 
exceptional. Bare effort would be ineffective without the mediation of the pacificatory 
function par excellence – habit.1073  
 
However, the fact that there might be a solution to these conflicts does not 
diminish the dramatic effect that they bear. Françoise Dastur emphasizes that 
when the involuntary assumes the form of necessity and the untamable nature, 
conflict is in fact turned into drama.1074 
 
                                                
1069 Ibid., p. 310. 
1070 Ibid. 
1071 Ibid. 
1072 Ibid., p. 312. 
1073 Ibid., p. 314. 
1074 “Lorsque l'involontaire prend la forme de la nécessité et de l'immaîtrisable nature et apparaît 
alors sous la figure d'une puissance hostile, le conflit se transforme en drame.” See Françoise 
Dastur, “Volonté et liberté selon Paul Ricœur” Cahiers de L’Herne, Paul Ricœur (Paris: Éditions 
de l’Herne, 2004), p. 185. 
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3.2.5 – Unconscious conflicts 
 
There is another conflict to which Ricœur alludes briefly in this book, a 
conflict that runs even deeper than passions and emotions: the conflict in psychic 
life. In part three of Freedom and Nature he is dealing with the problematic of 
consenting to necessity. He traverses all the problems posed by life itself and by 
the individual constitution of the particular human being that I am, with my 
specific character and inner life, and he confronts himself with the methodology of 
the natural sciences and with psychology. Eventually, he reaches the problem of 
the unconscious and for a moment already hints at the hermeneutic hypothesis, by 
briefly mentioning that “Nietzsche (…) had the vivid feeling that consciousness is 
a surcharged text, that self-knowledge is an infinite reflexion which in its ferocity 
never ceases to strike down masks, to wipe off make-up.”1075 However, he does 
not pursue, at this point in time, this line of thought to its last consequences. But 
he does take one important consequence: the affirmation that consciousness is not 
transparent to itself and, therefore, that we need a detour to understand it. 
And Ricœur delves, for the first time in a systematic manner, in the 
unconscious and in Freudianism. And so, he is forced to consider the possibility of 
taking unconscious life itself as the ultimate seat of conflicts: 
 
A new type of intelligibility suggests itself if instead of taking the viewpoint of the 
subject’s intentions we now deal with these phenomena as objects and approach them 
from a causal viewpoint. In this way it is possible to see in them signs or effects which 
reveal certain hidden affective tendencies. The psychoanalytic method thus consists of 
gathering indications whose convergence leads us to the hidden cause. Once we adopt this 
perspective it is possible to consider the psyche as a locus of conflict, that is, of mutually 
opposing and inhibiting forces. Repression is the most remarkable case of this 
fundamental phenomenon of intersection of psychic forces.1076  
 
At this point, in 1950, Ricœur heavily insists on the “mechanical”, “objective” and 
causal aspect of the Freudian explanation. When analyzing the pathological cases 
described by psychoanalysis, he mentions the “quasi-physical language” of 
                                                
1075 Ricœur, Freedom and Nature, p. 374 [Modified translation]. 
1076 Ibid., p. 381. 
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“endopsychic conflicts”.1077 He seems to accept the possibility that some of these 
phenomena are accurate: “The possibility of psychosomatic illness is inscribed in 
the nature of these unconscious conflicts at the same time. A disorder is possible 
when we confront a plurality of forces.”1078 But he seems much less ready to 
accept what he calls “Freud’s realism” and the causal model of the unconscious. 
Ultimately, his diagnosis of psychoanalysis is mostly critical, as he is not ready to 
fully accept a style of suspicion. 
Consequently, he claims that: 
 
It is I who think, give meaning, weigh my motives, wish, and move my body. This 
assurance, infected with the suspicion that I am acting out a comedy on the stage of a 
mythical opera and am a dupe of a conjuration of hidden forces in some mysterious wings 
of existence – this assurance, that “I” which I was tempted to sacrifice into the hands of 
the decipherers of enigmas, must be won back constantly in the sursum of freedom.1079 
 
This primacy of the assurance of the “I think” is what, in the last analyzis, saves 
the possibility of freedom and responsibility. But the main trait to retain is that in 
1950, Ricœur seems to accept part of the accuracy of Freud’s depiction (there are 
indeed unconscious conflicts, understood as conflicts of forces) but he ultimately 
rejects the determinism of the causal model and, furthermore, does not seem to 
capture the fertility of what he later would call the dialectic of energetic and 
hermeneutics in Freudian psychoanalysis. 
Finally, after all these phenomena of conflict, which seem to cut 
progressively deeper and deeper into the flesh of the subject, we are led back to 
Ricœur’s final conclusions concerning the overall role of negation in philosophy, 
and in human life. 
 
3.2.6 – Saying yes to a world that says no 
 
Coming back to the previous discussion of the relation between confusion 
of values and motives and the effort to overcome it through habit and choice, we 
can note that Ricœur assumes a Spinozist depiction of freedom of choice (omnis 
                                                
1077 Ibid., p. 398. 
1078 Ibid., p. 399. 
1079 Ibid., p. 403. 
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determinatio est negatio): 
 
to choose means to exclude, man assumes appearance and form in a series of amputations. 
(…) 
we cannot break a form except in the name of another form and there is a greater danger 
than the one of being limited – the danger of not being at all: there is no being without 
choice, no choice without willing, no willing without ability, no ability without a 
particular being. We have to go back to the Cave. At least this negative moment is an 
essential moment of freedom.1080 
 
Shortly after this passage, Ricœur invokes Hegel’s famous “labor of the negative”, 
which shapes consciousness. Nonetheless, he also states that effort is based on 
desire and that it only says no, on condition of (also) saying yes1081 because “joy is 
the emotion which I can no longer oppose, which the ‘work of the negative’ 
cannot broach”.1082 He also states that the sources of negation are so complex that 
it is “dangerous” to try to embrace them systematically.1083 And he clearly 
assumes that “philosophy for us is a meditation of the yes, and not a surly 
identification of the no.”1084 
As is easy to discern, Ricœur has a dialectic perspective on the 
development of human life in the world. For him, both what can metaphorically be 
designated as the “positive” and the “negative” in human life are always present. 
There is sadness and suffering, but there is also joy. There is death and finitude, 
but also life and allegedly the possibility to entertain a relation with 
Transcendence. As Alison Scott-Baumann has forcefully argued, the emphasis on 
negation in its many aspects is a major – if incomplete – project on Ricoeurian 
philosophy. But if negation and conflict are omnipresent, Ricœur’s conviction – 
and this is really a conviction, not something that can be logically demonstrated – 
is that the positive trumps the negative, that we must say yes in spite of the 
overwhelming presence of the no; this conviction would find a remarkably poetic 
expression in Fallible Man, and is given its theoretical support in the already 
mentioned article on “negativity and primary affirmation”. And this is the reason 
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1081 Ibid., p. 317 
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1083 Ibid., p. 445. 
1084 Ibid., p. 446. 
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why, according to Ricœur, we must consent to necessity. 
Ultimately, the great conflict that is here at stake is obviously the one 
between the voluntary and the involuntary, between freedom and nature. And 
Ricœur does not wish to hide it. He assumes that the relation between these two 
overarching elements in us is paradoxical, but his conviction is that this conflict 
entails a conciliation, that the paradox is mysteriously reconciled. He reaffirms 
this in part three of Freedom and Nature1085; he states that the “yes of consent is 
always won from the no” but also that “it is the essence of consent to be always on 
the way and of conciliation to be incomplete”1086, which means that consent is also 
an effort, and that, in last analyzis, it can never be taken for granted. The 
conclusion to be drawn from this is that consent, in the way Ricœur presents it, is 
also somewhat normative: it is an existential attitude that he is proposing, more 
than a factual description. 
This attitude has more to do with our attitude towards life than with 
anything else. After delving into the depths of consciousness, Ricœur proposes to 
tackle life itself, to discern the significance of the pure fact of being alive. Life is 
obviously the sine qua non of willing and consciousness; after going through the 
level of the biological explanation, he argues for the consent of our personal 
character. This, in turn, entails the consenting of the mere fact of having been 
born, in spite of the “sorrow of finitude”1087 and the omnipresence of human 
suffering. Ricœur describes this path as “the asymptotic progress of freedom 
towards necessity”.1088 
The last pages of Freedom and Nature are a forceful argumentation that 
shows the alleged need of going from refusal to consent. Ricœur follows a path of 
different forms of consent, from “stoicism or imperfect consent” to “orphism or 
hyperbolic consent”; in fact, these are existential possibilities he is depicting, ways 
of positioning oneself towards life, death, and the meaning of life. In these last 
chapters, he undertakes a somewhat virulent refutation of Sartre and the “dark 
existentialism”, affirming that we must have the courage of existing amid the 
absurd, and of facing it, owning up to it. Ultimately, Ricœur thinks that we have to 
make the final decisions concerning freedom and necessity in the context of our 
                                                
1085 See the whole kernel of the problem on pages 353-354: “the philosophical difficulty”. 
1086 Ricœur, Freedom and Nature, p. 354. 
1087 Ibid., p. 447. 
1088 Ibid., p. 346. 
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relation to Transcendence. He hints at the conciliation that a poetics of freedom 
would bring, but that only the idealized third volume we have already mentioned 
would develop in detail.   
The conclusion of the book argues for a purely human conception of 
freedom. As Ricœur claims: “Freedom is not a pure act, it is, in each of its 
moments, activity and receptivity. It constitutes itself in receiving what it does not 
produce: values, capacities, and sheer nature”.1089 Ultimately, freedom is only 
human because it is freedom; not Transcendence. And, as Pamela S. Anderson has 
emphasized, the will and other fundamental concepts in Freedom and Nature 
ultimately have the double status of being both Husserlian ideal essences and 
Kantian regulative ideas: “The limiting concepts of human willing have two 
interpretations: they are the regulative ideas of human freedom imagined as not 
being subject to any natural motivation, incarnate and contingent; and they are the 
ideal essences of freedom as perfectly enlightened, gracious, and creative.”1090 
Choosing will always remain a risk. The last sentence of Freedom and 
Nature states that “To will is not to create”1091 which is a reaffirmation of the 
limits of freedom and, once again, a refutation of the Sartrean concept of freedom, 
largely anchored in a Spinozist attitude of joy and affirmation, framed by a 
phenomenological and Kantian framework of finitude and rejection of totality. 
However, as I have claimed before, consent remains an existential attitude. One 
that, in last the analyzis, will be no more than… Ricœur’s own solution. I have 
serious reservations about the need for such a solution, and I think that it certainly 
conflicts with the later Ricoeurian anthropology and its emphasis on human 
capabilities. But I will leave a critical examination of this problem for part six of 
this dissertation. In the next chapter, we will see the first form that Ricœur’s 
philosophical anthropology assumes. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1089 Ibid., p. 484. 
1090 Pamela S. Anderson, Ricœur and Kant, p. 46. 
1091 Ricœur, Freedom and Nature., p. 486. 
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3.3 – The Conflict Between Finite and Infinite 
 
The second volume of the Philosophy of the Will was published ten years 
after Freedom and Nature, in 1960. It contains two different parts, a first book, 
Fallible Man1092, presents Ricœur’s philosophical anthropology, and a second 
book, The Symbolism of Evil, initiates the hermeneutic turn in his philosophy, by 
looking for the indirect expressions of evil that we can find in particular myths. 
This chapter will delve into the conflicts made apparent by Fallible Man. In a way, 
no other Ricœur book goes as deep in its analyzis of conflict’s ontological 
significance for human being. Nonetheless, maybe we can say without fear of 
losing all objectivity, that it is also true that in no other book does Ricœur offer 
such a beautiful, almost poetic answer, to that omnipresence of negativity in 
human life. 
Some of the best interpreters of Paul Ricœur’s work, such as Jean 
Greisch,1093 Gaëlle Fiasse1094 and Domenico Jervolino1095 have seen in Ricœur’s 
philosophical anthropology, and mainly in the connection that can be established 
between the “fallible human being” of the 1960s and the “capable human being” 
of the 1990s – no matter if the interpretation is more continuist or discontinuist – 
the main unity of his work.  
On the other hand, other interpreters such as Pamela S. Anderson and 
Fernanda Henriques have argued that the single, most crucial influence for Ricœur 
is Kant’s Critical Philosophy, and that his framework is to a large extent Post-
Kantian. I tend to agree, up to some extent, with this depiction, even though I also 
emphasize the Hegelian and Hermeneutic aspects playing a decisive role in his 
philosophy. Anderson forcefully argues that “Ricœur’s seminal project on the will 
reveals a crucial debt to Kant; and a post-Kantian account of a dual aspect subject 
remains at the core of all his thinking. This means that, according to Ricœur’s 
account of human willing, the subject is not merely passive in receiving the 
intuitions of experience but is actively involved in the constitution of objective 
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experience and in the self-recognition of human freedom as a captive free 
will.”1096 This description is exact, but in no other place is it so clear as precisely 
in Fallible Man and The Symbolism of Evil. 
Ricœur admits that Fallible Man was written as a sort of introduction to 
the Symbolism of Evil, it was to be an attempt to provide a transcendental 
grounding for the hermeneutic turn initiated in that second book, and which would 
radically change his philosophy. Fallible Man is dedicated to the concept of 
fallibility, defined as “a certain non-coincidence of man with himself”.1097 Human 
being’s propensity to fail, to err (faillir) is, in turn, grounded in an inner fragility. 
This fragility and this disproportion are not only empirical and psychological but 
really ontological, for human being “is the only reality that presents this unstable 
ontological constitution of being greater and lesser than himself.”1098 
Ricœur’s working hypothesis is that these ontological characteristics are 
wholly accessible to pure reflection. Therefore, he develops his style of reflexive 
philosophy, in the sense we have seen above, to try to capture the essence of these 
phenomena. Nevertheless, and differently from what he had done in Freedom and 
Nature, he does not undertake phenomenological analyzes. The noetic-noematic 
analyzes of the structures of the voluntary and the involuntary having been 
accomplished ten years before, he will now try to ground what he calls the 
“pathétique of misery” in pure reflection. This last assertion means – and this is 
decisive for Ricoeurian philosophy – that reflection does not spring from itself and 
start anew. Rather, it is anchored in a certain precomprehension – we can say it, a 
hermeneutic precomprehension – of the totality in which human being is. The 
“pathétique of misery” is therefore the precomprehension of a being who 
understands him or herself as being “miserable”, that is, broken, split, torn apart 
between two poles: in other words, conflict is now ontological. 
This reflective philosophy is transcendental in that, in the good Kantian 
tradition, it does not start from the subject but rather from the object before him or 
herself and from that traces back the analyzis to the conditions of possibility of 
that object. However, since it is not the object that reveals our inner disproportion, 
the task of reflection will be to progressively integrate the precomprehension of 
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the pathétique of misery into transcendental philosophy. Ultimately, this step-by-
step enlargement of philosophical reflection will not be able to incorporate all that 
stems from its other. There will always be a rest, a residue, which philosophy will 
not be capable of grasping directly, conceptually. And that would lead Ricœur to 
try a different hermeneutic style. 
We have seen before how Ricoeurian philosophy oscillates between a 
description of the many conflicts that permeate everything and the postulation of 
the possibility of reconciling these conflicts. Well, in Fallible Man this possibility 
attains a very specific ontological feature: human being is depicted as being the 
intermediary, the mediator between the two poles between which he or she is torn. 
And this both at a theoretical, a practical and an affective level. The depiction of 
human being as miserable, because torn apart between two different realms or 
orders, has a respectable tradition in philosophy, and Ricœur mentions Plato and 
Pascal. In Plato we are a mélange, the offspring of Poros and Penia, an 
intermediary between the empirical realm and the realm of ideas. We have also 
seen, in part one of this thesis, Plato’s descriptions of inner conflict, with the 
metaphor of the white horse and the black horse. In Pascal we are suspended 
between two infinites, a mean between everything and nothing.  
Ultimately, the main conflict which is here at stake, the main rift, is that 
between the poles of finitude and infinitude. How can it be that human being is 
finite, and yet formulates a precomprehension of totality and tends towards 
infinitude? Is this an illusion, or a problem of perspective? Let us follow the lead 
of the three main forms this conflict assumes in Fallible Man. 
 
3.3.1 – The transcendental conflict: finite perspective and infinite verb 
 
Each of the three main parts of Fallible Man has a well-drawn conflict 
between two poles: one representing finitude, the other infinitude. Each of them is 
mediated by a different function pertaining to human being. Thus in chapter 
two1099 the conflict is between finite perspective and infinite verb, mediated by the 
transcendental pure imagination. 
This chapter deals with theoretical philosophy, in the Kantian sense. It 
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investigates human being’s power of knowing and its modes; this is the reason 
why it deserves to be called “transcendental”. Ricœur accepts, for the most part, 
the Kantian depiction of our faculties as being a mixture between spontaneity and 
passivity. We have a finite understanding that does not create its objects; instead, 
it receives them through sensibility. And in here he is particularly interested in the 
role of imagination that is, in Kant, precisely the mediating faculty between the 
two domains of sensibility and understanding. 
Ricœur firstly remarks that “I am first directed toward the world”.1100 I 
have a perspective towards the world, and what I first see is the world itself (and 
not myself): I see objects, other human beings, and so on. My body opens up the 
world to me; through my body, I perceive the world. Nevertheless, this opening is 
not unrestricted; rather, it is limited and qualified; this is what “perspective” or 
“point of view” actually means: 
 
In what does the finitude of receiving consist? It consists in the perspectival limitation of 
perception. It causes every view of… to be a point of view on… But this characteristic of 
the point of view, inherent in every viewing, is not directly noticed by me but realized 
reflectively. Thus it is on an aspect of the appearance, taken as an intentional correlate of 
receiving, that I must catch sight of the finitude of my point of view. This aspect of the 
appearance, which refers me back to my point of view, is the perceived object’s 
insurmountable and invincible property of presenting itself from a certain angle, 
unilaterally. I never perceive more than the presumed unity of the flux of these 
silhouettes. Thus it is upon the object that I apprehend the perspectival nature of 
perception, which consists in the very inadequacy of the percept, that is, in the 
fundamental property that the sense outlined may always be canceled or confirmed, that it 
may reveal itself as other than the one I first presumed. The intentional analyzis of this 
inadequacy makes me turn back from the object to myself as a finite center of 
perspective.1101 
 
This rather long passage shows us that Ricœur is undertaking a 
phenomenological analyzis of the intentionality of consciousness and inscribing it 
within the Kantian framework. The fact that the noematic object presents itself in 
silhouettes and profiles, unilaterally, means that it must be me to synthetize it, to 
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grasp its meaning in the abovementioned flux of the silhouettes. Now, Ricœur’s 
remark that “the sense outlined may always be canceled or confirmed,” that it may 
reveal itself as being other than anticipated, is very important. At stake is here not 
only a description of knowing and perception; actually, if we extrapolate this to an 
epistemology of interpretation, a very important clue on Ricoeurian hermeneutics 
might be provided. Direct perception is not the only way in which knowledge is 
attained. Anticipating something I will discuss in more detail in part four, let me 
mention that an interpretation – for instance, one stemming from the reading of a 
text –  also provides meaning and is incorporated into subjective knowledge. The 
passage above reveals us Ricœur’s stance on perceptive perspectivism but it also 
might indicate how his interpretive perspectivism takes place: every interpretation 
of a phenomenon (be it a concept, a text, or ourselves) can be considered as being 
a unilateral profile or, at best, to continue using this analogy, a provisional unity of 
the presumed flux of silhouettes of the phenomenon at stake. As such, this unity 
might be canceled or confirmed. Except that the process of verification is not as 
straightforward as in perception; rather, it is probably tied to processes of 
subjective probability. But in order to better understand that phenomenon itself, 
whatever it may be, there will be a need to enlarge the perspective, to push 
through with the process of interpretation, such as in perception, every new profile 
will give a more complete representation of the noematic object. In the next 
chapter I will explicate fully this connection between perceptive perspectivism and 
the perspectivism of interpretation, which is a feature shared by the philosophies 
of both Ricœur and Gadamer. It is noteworthy, that the characteristic of 
enlargement, of a perspective being able to go beyond itself, is presented in this 
chapter of Fallible Man we are now summing up. Let us see how. 
The solution to the problem of the finitude of perspective will be sought 
after by Ricœur in the event of meaning. For him, the very fact that we can talk 
about our finitude (and thus that we take notice of it, that we are conscious of the 
fact of finitude) means, eo ipso that we can and do in fact go beyond it, albeit in a 
very peculiar form (not, of course, in the mode of Hegel). Indeed, if my body and 
my situated perspective is the “here” in which my finite openness to the world 
takes place, the fact that I can speak about myself as being finite presupposes the 
dedoubling of my own perspective: I have a perspective on myself. 
Thus, according to Ricœur, “This means that every description of finitude 
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is abstract, i.e., separate and incomplete, if it neglects to account for the 
transgression that makes discourse on finitude possible. The complete discourse 
on finitude is a discourse on the finitude and the infinitude of man.”1102 As we can 
see, at this point in his philosophy, it is meaning (as it expresses itself in language 
and discourse) that throws us towards the pole of infinitude, and that grasps a 
certain sense of totality. However, as we can easily guess from what we have seen 
in part one, this totality is only a limit idea, within the strict delimitation provided 
by the Kantian framework. Never can it be transformed into a Übersicht, a non-
situated, total and systematic view.1103 The verb, and the act of saying are thus 
what point us towards Transcendence; there is a “transcendence of the saying”1104: 
 
This transgression is the intention to signify. (…) If I now note that to signify is to intend, 
the transgression of the point of view is nothing else than speech as the possibility of 
expressing, and of expressing the point of view itself. Therefore, I am not merely a 
situated onlooker, but a being who intends and expresses as an intentional transgression of 
the intention. (…) The mute look is caught up in speech that articulates the sense of it. 
And this ability to express sense is a continual transcendence, at least in intention, of the 
perspectival aspect of the perceived here and now.1105 
 
There is therefore a double movement, one that binds me to my finitude, 
and another that tends to detach me and point towards the totality of meaning. In 
1960, Ricœur tends to consider that language and meaning are the domains of the 
universal and, therefore, by being immersed in language, I go beyond myself. 
Curiously, in this phase, a certain linguistic idealism might be detected. 
This is the moment when imagination makes its appearance. Synthesis 
comes into play, firstly, in things themselves: they are a synthesis of meaning and 
presence.1106 However, if Ricœur is to find a synthesis in the subject himself, in 
the context of a Post-Kantian framework, he will have to develop a schematism 
that allows him to describe the function of knowing itself. It must be said that at 
this level, Ricœur is more following Kant than providing a tenable theoretical 
alternative. Pure, a priori imagination, will provide representations to concepts and 
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vice-versa, thereby forming the objects which we can claim to legitimately know. 
In this sense, the transcendental conflict, and its solution, remain purely formal: 
they explain the double movement inside one’s act of knowing, and they show 
how there is an intermediary function that renders knowledge possible, in spite of 
its double force. That said, Ricœur remains convinced that formality is no 
objection: 
 
the synthesis it brings about between understanding and sensibility (or in our terminology, 
between meaning and appearance, between speaking and looking) is consciousness but it 
is not self-consciousness. (…) 
It would be a mistake to conclude from this reflection that a philosophy of a 
transcendental style is empty because it is only formal. It is the first stage of a 
philosophical anthropology. Whoever would want to commit it to the flames and start 
right off with a philosophy of the person would leave the pathétique only to fall into a 
fanciful ontology of being and nothingness.1107 
 
It is easy to detect, in the background, the continuation of Ricœur’s polemic 
against Sartre. He contends that the first, exterior synthesis (that of the object) is 
instrumental to ground human being’s position as intermediary, as a mean 
between being and nothing. 
 
3.3.2 – The practical conflict 
 
The first chapter of Fallible Man was able to explain the act of knowing 
in a transcendental manner. It showed us the constitution of consciousness, but not 
of self-consciousness. In the second chapter Ricœur positions himself in the 
practical domain, and reshapes some of the analyzes he had undertaken in 
Freedom and Nature. A strictly transcendental method is not able, according to 
him, to reintegrate in reflection the concern for totality (understood, as stated 
above, as a limiting idea, that is: a task). In chapter three1108 he is therefore trying 
to grasp the significance of the “overflow” of meaning [le trop plein], the practical 
significance of the pole of infinitude in my life. Hence we go from the “I see, I 
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have consciousness of” to the “I desire, I want, I can”. In this chapter, the conflict 
unfolds between character and happiness, being mediated and synthetized by the 
feeling of respect, which constitutes the notion of person. 
The “character”, my character – which had already been examined in 
Freedom and Nature is the equivalent, in the practical domain, of perspective: it is 
this specific character that mediates my access to the world and to other people, 
with my particular desires, ideals, etc.: “character is the finite openness of my 
existence taken as a whole”1109 or “the limited openness of our field of motivation 
taken as a whole”.1110 We can say that our field of motivation is open to all values 
of all men in all cultures; if “nothing of human is foreign to me”, all the different 
values appear before me as possibilities, in what Ricœur calls the “whole soul”. 
However, what I choose and the way in which I choose are something personal. 
This is, once again, Ricœur’s perspectivism, at the practical level. However, its 
enlargement is not an easy process. If I can change my position and try to grasp a 
new perspective – and this is also valid, in my opinion, when applied to the 
conflict of interpretations – I cannot as easily change my character. 
Happiness, on the other hand, is the “total aim of all the facets of 
transgression”.1111 In here, we are recalled, with Aristotle and the teleological 
tradition, that every action, pursuit, inquiry or art aims at some good. In this 
tradition, happiness is indeed the ergon of mankind, the formal task to accomplish, 
no matter the content attributed to it. In Oneself as Another, this is what 
determines the primacy of ethics over morality. 
Even in Kantianism, the idea of totality plays a very specific role. In fact, 
as we might recall from part one of this thesis, reason is the search for the 
unconditioned, and thus, strives for totality. And this plays a practical role: “The 
idea of totality, therefore, is not merely a rule for theoretical thought. It dwells in 
the human will and in this way becomes the source of the most extreme 
“disproportion”: that which preys on human action and strains it between the 
finitude of character and the infinitude of happiness.”1112 Furthermore, what is 
peculiar to this idea of happiness, expressed as a totality, is that as such the 
actualization of happiness is really never fully given. In fact, and this can be taken 
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as another expression of Ricoeurian hermeneutics, all that can be discerned in our 
experience are signs which tell us whether or not we are moving in the right 
direction: 
 
happiness is not given in any experience; it is only adumbrated in a consciousness of 
direction. No act gives happiness, but the encounters of our life that are most worthy of 
being called “events” indicate the direction of happiness. (…) The events that bespeak 
happiness are those which remove obstacles and uncover a vast landscape of existence. 
The excess of meaning, the overflow, the immense: that is the sign that we are “directed 
toward” happiness.1113  
 
It is therefore reason that demands totality, but it is the feeling of happiness that 
attests that I am (or am not) in the right direction. 
Consequently, between the limited access of my particular character, and 
the explosion towards the infinitude of totality provoked by my desire for 
happiness, where am I? I am, as always, in the middle. It is at this point that 
Ricœur’s reflective philosophy, in the abovementioned sense, becomes patent: 
 
Can there be a synthesis of happiness and character? Most assuredly, and that synthesis is 
found in the person. The person is the Self that was lacking to the “I” of the Kantian “I 
think”, to consciousness in general, the correlate of the synthesis of the object.1114 
 
Thus, for the first time, Ricœur explicitly addresses the problematic of the self as 
such. We are still far from Oneself as Another. However, the “detour” is already in 
place: there is no experience of the person in itself and for itself. 
According to Ricœur, the “person” is, firstly, a “project”: the project of 
humanity, that is, the qualitative characteristic that makes us humans as such.1115 
Consequently, it is an “end of my action” that also constitutes “an existence”1116: 
we might recall that in the context of Kantian practical philosophy, persons are 
precisely “ends-in-themselves” and that they must, therefore, be respected. 
Respect is, in Kant, the a priori feeling, the way in which reason affects 
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sensibility and commands that we respect the law of duty. However, what is 
interesting to note is that even if Ricœur chooses respect for his practical 
synthesis, he does not cease to emphasize that this synthesis itself bears the 
indelible mark of fragility: 
 
The paradoxical constitution of “respect”, like that of the transcendental imagination, is 
such that this feeling upon which the practical synthesis rests cannot be reflected without 
being destroyed. In respect I am obeying subject and a commanding sovereign; but I 
cannot imagine this situation otherwise than as a twofold mode of belonging (…) Into this 
twofold belonging is written the possibility of a discord and what is, as it were, the 
existential “fault” that causes man’s fragility.1117 
 
As would become patent in the Symbolism of Evil, this is evil that Ricœur is 
talking about, and in order to investigate it, he undertakes a properly hermeneutic 
method. In the context of Fallible Man, the important aspect to highlight is that 
one of the meanings of fallibility is thus revealed: to fail is also the possibility to 
choose evil, to embrace an evil maxim. For Ricœur, as for Kant, evil might be 
radical, but it is not primordial. Therefore, even though we might appear as guilty 
(let us recall that faute also means guilt), it might as well be that human being is 
primordially innocent. 
Therefore, if human being is always already divided, torn, and if this rift 
expresses itself in the multiple conflicts whose lead we have been following up 
until now, Ricœur will want to find its origin, undertake an “exploration of the 
primordial”1118 and to find a principle of limitation which is different from 
primordial evil. This he will find in the thumos, (the heart, or feeling). It is 
therefore at the affective level that the next conflict will unfold. 
 
3.3.3 – The affective conflict 
 
Having arrived at this stage of our course, when we are near the last stop 
of “existential conflict”, it might seem as if there is a repetition of certain topics, 
and that what Ricœur is doing is just describing in different words the same 
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phenomena. This is true, to some extent, and it might be also a consequence of his 
“latent hermeneutics”. When dealing with affective conflict, and the mediating 
function of thumos, Ricœur does not directly call it existential conflict but, in a 
way, what he is doing is letting existential conflict reach its peak. Augustine, 
addressing God, described Him as being interior intimo meo superior et summo 
meo1119, that is, my superior to the highest point, and more inward than my inner 
self. Maybe we could say, mutatis mutandis, that in Fallible Man and namely in 
this chapter, conflict will reveal itself as indeed being more inward than my inner 
self, as constituting my inner self, which is forced to mediate between the two 
margins of this rift. 
In chapter 41120 of Fallible Man, “The Affective Fragility” what is at 
stake is the conflict between bios and logos, between pleasure and happiness as it 
is existentially felt. Furthermore, this chapter also deals with the constitution of 
self and others amid the intersubjective relationships of recognition, in a first, yet 
at this point critical, approach. Ultimately, in his conclusion1121 Ricœur draws a 
moral consequence from this anthropological description, which is that the 
possibility to fail, to err, is the possibility to tend towards evil: “the concept of 
fallibility includes the possibility of evil in a still more positive sense: man’s 
disproportion is a power to fail, in the sense that it makes man capable of 
failing”.1122 Within the framework of his Post-Kantian philosophy, Ricœur would 
ultimately use and redefine the content of the Kantian categories of modality to 
identify limitation with fragility. Fragility will be the result of the conflict between 
originary affirmation and existential difference. This affective conflict, as 
existential conflict, is thus the defining trait of ourselves, as human beings. Let us 
see exactly how it unfolds in this last chapter and the conclusion of Fallible Man. 
At the outset, Ricœur affirms that feeling, affectivity, is itself doubled, 
divided by a double polarity (thus the echo of Maine de Biran’s: “Homo simplex 
in vitalitate, duplex in humanitate”). Therefore, any anthropological investigation 
that wishes to complement the faculty of knowing and acting with the faculty of 
feeling, must start from this polarity – “Our whole previous reflection bids us to 
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start not with the simple, but with the dual”, says Ricœur in page 92 –, in order to 
later understand the specificity of man as mediator between this dual aspect of his 
existence. Our humanity is thus made by the heart, which is placed between these 
two demands. And one of the ways in which this polarity expresses itself is in the 
tension between pleasure and happiness: 
 
It can be shown, in fact, that there are two kinds of terminations of affective movements: 
one of them completes and perfects isolated, partial, finite acts or processes. This is 
pleasure. It falls to the other one to be the perfection of the total work of man; this would 
be the termination of a destiny, of a destination or an existential project. This would be 
happiness, no longer the empty idea of happiness that up to now we have opposed to 
character, but the fullness of happiness or beatitude. (…) For this duality of “ends” 
animates and rules the duality of “movements” and “appetites” and internally divides 
human desire.1123  
 
Let me emphasize, from what is attested above, that it is 
methodologically very important that Ricœur chooses to start his analyzis from the 
dual, from polarity. This means – and that much can be latently assumed when he 
invokes, in the following page, the maxim primum vivere, deinde philosophari 
(live first, philosophize afterwards) – that if philosophy is to come back to the 
lived situation and shed light upon it, it must admit that what is felt, what is lived 
is the polarity. In this case, I desire two things, pleasure and happiness, and they 
are, more often than not, conflicting. The epistemological consequence is that 
conflict is, for Ricœur, the first felt experience. Ontologically, this would make 
conflict first quoad nos, for us, even though not necessarily quoad se, in itself. 
Thus it will increasingly become apparent how, following this lead – and even 
though this is my claim, I am only trying to make explicit what is an implicit 
movement in Ricoeurian philosophy – Ricœur will first and foremost detect 
conflicts, namely in his hermeneutical method, and then proceed to construct his 
philosophy from those, trying to provide solutions for them. 
Ricœur proceeds to emphasize how the thumos, the feeling felt by the 
heart, will proceed to internalize that duality and transform it into a drama (a move 
akin to that made in Freedom and Nature); more importantly, he seems to derive 
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the genesis of the self from this intermediary position of the thumos: 
 
We may place the whole median region of the affective life under the sway of this 
ambiguous and fragile thumos, the whole region situated between the vital and spiritual 
affections, or, in other words, all the affectivity that makes up the transition between 
living and thinking, between bios and logos. It should be noted that it is in this 
intermediate region that the self is constituted as different from natural beings and other 
selves (…) Only with thumos does desire assume the characters of otherness and 
subjectivity that constitute a Self. In this sense the Self is a “between-two”, a 
transition.1124  
 
Thumos is thus the specifically human feeling, even more so than the types of 
desire that are designated by epithumia or eros. Ricœur proceeds to analyze the 
several relations that we can assume with others in society, under the banner of 
having, power and worth. 
I think that there is an implicit critique of egoism (in its many forms, be it 
psychological egoism or logical egoism, as we would say in contemporary terms) 
in all of Ricœur’s writings that deal with moral or existential issues. Thus he 
deploys a critique of the relationships based on mere having (like Marcel had done 
before him) and also examines the perverse forms of power-over, that is, the 
phenomena of domination in society. However, the most interesting part to delve 
into, in my opinion, are the few pages in which he scrutinizes the relationships 
based on “worth” (valoir), because this is where he undertakes a rather severe 
analyzis of what we call recognition.  
We have seen in the first and second parts of this thesis how both Hegel 
and Honneth developed social theories anchored in recognition and how they both 
developed tripartite models with different spheres of recognition. In 1960, Ricœur 
scrutinizes a form of the process of recognition but choosing to accentuate its 
fragile character and the possibility of its pathological perversion. As such, we can 
consider that this take on recognition is the negative side of the positive 
evaluations of recognition that are undertaken by Hegel, Honneth and Ricœur 
himself (in 2004). However, the objection that he would formulate to the neo-
Hegelian model of recognition in 2004 is, more or less, grounded in this negative 
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take on recognition from 1960. In a nutshell, Ricœur loosely identifies the request 
for esteem with the request for honor and the dependence on the opinion of the 
other(s). He shows that this dependence on the opinion of others reveals a 
fundamental fragility of one’s own self, in line with the main depiction of fragility 
outlined throughout Fallible Man. This is a curious aspect because, if already in 
Freedom and Nature Ricœur had sketched a description of intersubjectivity and 
the dependency of the self towards it, Fallible Man seems to be a step back in the 
direction of a self that should be more independent, not relying too much on the 
opinion (or the gaze) of the other. I will allow myself to quote some rather long 
passages, so that we can fully appreciate the extent, and even the virulence, of 
Ricœur’s critique: 
 
But the fragility of this existence as recognized is that the “esteem” that establishes it is 
merely “opinion”, that timé is doxa. Here there is a threat of existing in a quasi-
phantasmal manner, of being a reflection. The possibility of being no more than the word 
of another, the dependence on fragile opinion – these are precisely the occasion of the 
passions of glory that graft their vanity onto the fragility of esteem as opinion.1125  
 
Because it is believed, the worth of the self may be sham, feigned, or alleged; it may also 
be neglected, contested, disputed, as well as scorned, belittled, choked back, and 
humiliated. And when, rightly or wrongly, it is neglected, the lack of esteem may be 
offset by a self-overestimation or by a depreciation of others and their values: in this case 
aggressiveness, reprisals, resentment, and revenge are the defiant measures used against 
non-recognition, which itself can be understood only through the search for recognition. 
(…) 
The possibility of a pathology of esteem is thus inherent in the very nature of esteem as 
opinion. Nothing is more fragile, nothing is easier to wound than an existence that is at the 
mercy of a belief; and one can understand how the “feeling of inferiority” could serve as a 
clue to the genesis of neuroses.1126 
 
the desire of desire has no end (…) Thus human action regenerates and nourishes itself of 
itself, drawn forward by its insatiable quests.1127  
 
                                                
1125 Ibid., p. 121. 
1126 Ibid., pp. 124-125. 
1127 Ibid., pp. 127. 
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                These several different passages contain different claims and objections. 
The third is the one that Ricœur would ultimately retain in his late philosophical 
anthropology: the desire of recognition (or the desire of desire) can fall into a logic 
of bad infinity whereby it runs the risk of becoming unhappy consciousness. This 
is what would later drive him to propose a different paradigm, that of mutuality 
and the states of peace.  
The second quote shows Ricœur’s perspicacity in understanding the 
social dynamics of the quest for recognition and the potential devastating effects 
of misrecognition, even though this was not his subject-matter at the time. 
Furthermore, it continues his “dialectic of the diagnostic” and even hints at the 
possibility of turning it into a diagnosis of social pathologies, in the sense given by 
it by Critical Theory, in that a society that breeds pathologies of esteem might be a 
society which deserves to be criticized. However, Ricœur chooses to emphasize 
the fragility of the reliance on opinion. In fact, he does not want to take the 
pathological as the constitutive, but he points towards the dangers of fragility. For 
instance, self-overestimation is not constitutive; but fragility is constitutive and 
Ricœur seems to be saying that all too often the response to fragility might be 
pathological. Let us try to discern this appreciation in fuller detail. 
As we can see in the first passage, there is a conflation between esteem 
and glory; the main charge that Ricœur seems to be addressing to recognition at 
this point in time is that the request for esteem can easily turn into vanity; this is 
somewhat resonant with the critique of the vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas of 
the Ecclesiastes. There is thus a slippery slope that leads from “I want to be 
granted value” to “I want to be recognized as superior”. Ricœur is not taking into 
consideration, something which he would later do in 1990, the importance of self-
esteem, co-dependent on the esteem of others, for the aim of the good life in 
general. However, there is another conflation at work here: that between a singular 
characteristic (that I wish to be recognized as such) and a universal trait that 
identifies me as a member of the human race: 
 
It seems to me that we can say two things: Esteem involves a kind of objectivity, quite 
formal, it is true, which we can back up with a reflection of a Kantian style. The quid of 
esteem, what I esteem in others and for which I expect confirmation from others in 
myself, is what may be called our existence-worth, our existing worth. (…) Thus esteem 
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indeed involves a representation, the representation of an end that is not merely an “end to 
be realized” but an “end existing by itself” 
(…) Kant gives the name of humanity to this objectivity. The proper object of esteem is 
the idea of man in my person and in the person of another. 
I expect another person to convey the image of my humanity to me, to esteem me by 
making my humanity known to me. This fragile reflection of myself in another’s opinion 
has the consistency of an object; it conceals the objectivity of an existing end that draws a 
limit to any pretension to make use of me. It is in and through this objectivity that I can be 
recognized.1128 
 
As we can see, the second conflation entails two types of categorization that will 
later be discerned differently. On the one hand, this judgment bears a mixture 
between recognition as identification, recognition of oneself and recognition by 
others: it is the other who recognizes me, and he does so by identifying an alleged 
objective trait that identifies me as being human. On the other hand, the esteem – 
which, for Honneth, (whose analyzes Ricœur for the most part accepts in The 
Course of Recognition) is tied to the recognition of difference, not the recognition 
of a universal trait – required is supposed to be the esteem of a universal trait, the 
same for everyone and that precisely identifies me as being human. Now, this is 
closer to what Kant, Honneth and the later Ricœur (namely in Oneself as Another) 
see in the notion of self-respect. Self-respect is tied to the recognition of rights and 
to our common humanity. The consequence of these several conflations is that the 
negative aspect of recognition emphasized in Fallible Man might be due to an 
insufficient effort of categorization that Ricœur would only develop later, and with 
the help of other theoretical influences. 
That said, Ricœur’s appreciation of recognition is not entirely negative at 
this point. In fact, he already hints at both the connection of recognition with 
identity theory and the making of one’s own self, and the reflective version of self-
recognition (or self-attestation, or the several relations to self that are self-
ascription, self-esteem, and self-respect) by saying that “I love myself as if what I 
loved were another” [je m’aime comme un autre]; and this without having 
discovered the brief saying of George Bernanos that he liked to repeat and that 
gave Oneself as Another its title. 
                                                
1128 Ibid., pp. 122-123. 
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 If humanity is what I esteem in another and in myself, I esteem myself as a thou for 
another. I esteem myself in the second person; in that case self-love, in its essential 
texture, is not distinct from sympathy, which means that reflective feelings do not differ 
from intentional feelings. I love myself as if what I loved were another; (…) I believe that 
I am worth something in the eyes of another who approves my existence; in the extreme 
case, this other is myself. Insofar as I am affected by it, this belief, this credence, this 
trust, constitutes the very feeling of my worth. This appreciative affection, or this 
affective appreciation, is the highest point to which self-consciousness can be raised in 
thumos.1129 
 
This is not yet a hermeneutics of the self, as Ricœur would develop in the decade 
to follow. But it is already a theory of self-formation. This “trust” that “constitutes 
the feeling of my worth” would be, in 1990, attestation of the self. The only 
difference is that the emphasis is here not on the mediation through signs and the 
human sciences, but rather on affectivity, on the thumos as mediator between life 
and logos, pleasure and happiness, finite and infinite. 
 This discussion on recognition notwithstanding, I will say, to reiterate, 
that Fallible Man remains the peak of existential conflict. As Ricœur explicitly 
states: “conflict is a function of man’s most primordial constitution; the object is 
synthesis; the self is conflict.”1130 What seems interesting is that he tries to 
theoretically ground the whole book and actually his whole early anthropology in, 
let us say, an existential transformation of the Kantian categories of quality: 
 
In passing from an axiomatics of physics to a philosophical anthropology, the triad of 
reality, negation, and limitation may be expressed in the following three terms: originary 
affirmation, existential difference, human mediation. Our study expresses the progression 
of this triad through knowing, acting and feeling. What is in play in this dialectic is a 
more and more concrete determination of the third term that truly represents man’s 
humanity.1131  
 
Ricœur reaffirms once again that for him, originary, or primary, affirmation is the 
                                                
1129 Ibid., p. 124. 
1130 Ibid., p. 132. 
1131 Ibid., pp. 135-136. 
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constitutive aspect of human being; however, he also states that in order for 
negation to become human (that is, in order for humanity to be constituted) the 
vital need of affirmation has to be transformed and combined with existential 
difference, thus forming the torn but mediating human. He claims that what has 
been lost in Hegel and Sartre, and their “victorious march of negation”1132 is 
precisely the “true relation to the power of affirmation that constitutes us”.1133 This 
aspect is important to understand how, in the framework of Ricoeurian ontology, 
negation is related to conflict. Indeed, at least at an anthropological level, conflict 
is moved by negation. It is by being negated that primary affirmation becomes 
existential conflict, and it is this conflict, and its mediation and limitation, that 
constitutes us as humans as such. So negation is the hidden cause of conflict.  
Ultimately, Ricœur remains Spinozist. Beyond Kantian formalism and 
theoretical framework (which provides Ricoeurian philosophy its limits) and also 
beyond (broken) Hegelian dialectic and its powerful capacity to provide thought 
with movement, he reasserts the power of the conatus. Heidegger often speaks 
about the forgetfulness of being. It seems as if Ricœur is drawing our attention to 
some sort of forgetfulness of our conatus, of our power of self-affirmation. 
Connecting this to feeling, and to the feeling of finitude (finitude which he never 
denied) he speaks about sadness, the sadness of the finite. And this because 
ultimately our fallibility also expresses itself in the frailty of life, our finite life. 
But Ricœur’s definitive depiction of this topic is also perhaps his most poetic and 
beautiful motto: 
 
Man is the Joy of Yes in the sadness of the finite1134 [L’homme c’est la Joie du Oui dans 
la tristesse du fini.] 
 
Human Being remains a conflict for him or herself. And the conciliation 
of conflict, of which Ricœur never loses sight, continues to be a difficult and 
incomplete task.1135 We live between two abysses. And the effort of our distension 
and our negotiation with them makes the reappearance of conflict inevitable. We 
                                                
1132 Ibid., p. 137. 
1133 Ibid. 
1134 Ibid., p. 140. 
1135 Ibid., p. 141. 
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are the “becoming of an opposition”.1136 Nevertheless, in spite of conflict, in spite 
of negation, in spite of suffering, we are also resilience and capacity to overcome 
obstacles. To affirm life and to aim at the good life. 
In the Symbolism of Evil Ricœur undertakes an analyzis of the several 
myths of evil, in order to explain how is it that evil comes about, in spite of our 
primordial innocence. His indirect hermeneutical style is therefore inaugurated. I 
will not delve in detail into that book, because conflict is not as important for it as 
it is in the works we have just scrutinized, nor in the following ones, namely 
Freud and Philosophy and The Conflict of Interpretations. But before entering into 
the hermeneutic conflict I want to introduce both the kernel of Ricœur’s method 
and its relation with the notion of truth, also to cover the main aspects of his 
intellectual development in the decade from 1950-1960. I will thus briefly mention 
History and Truth, his first collection of texts, reassembling for the most part texts 
of the Strasbourg period, written in between the two volumes of the Philosophy of 
the Will. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1136 Ibid. 
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3.4 – History, Method and Truth 
 
Ricœur lived in Strasbourg from 1948 to 1956, a period in which he 
taught at the University of Strasbourg (replacing Jean Hyppolite), before moving 
to Paris and becoming a Professor at the Sorbonne. This period thus encompasses 
the last years before the defense of his thesis (which was ready by 1948) and his 
appearance in the French intellectual scene, as the translator of Husserl and an 
original phenomenologist in his own right. However, this period is also one of an 
active public engagement, namely in Esprit. As I said before, Ricœur was often 
attentive to the spirit of his own time, and discussed its main political events. 
Parallel to the development of his Philosophy of the Will, whose 
transition from phenomenology and existential philosophy to a more 
anthropological and hermeneutic tone is thus bred in these years, the Strasbourg 
period saw the beginning of Ricœur’s systematic interest in thinking history and 
its relationship with philosophy. Thinking (and contributing to the epistemology 
of) historiography would eventually become one of his lasting interests. It is 
during the Strasbourg period that Ricœur publishes a bunch of small texts that 
were to be republished in 1955 in History and Truth (later reprinted with additions 
in 1964) but his reflections on history would later change with the publication of 
Time and Narrative in the 1980s and of Memory, History, Forgetting in 2000.1137 
In this thesis, I will not dedicate whole chapters to these later books, whose impact 
on historians has been considerable, originating important debates and that have 
been thoroughly analyzed elsewhere.1138  
Furthermore, the Strasbourg years were a very important formative period 
                                                
1137 Even though I am not dedicating whole chapters to Ricœur’s theory of history in this already 
very long thesis, I must emphasize that conflict plays a role in them. This is more evident in 
Memory, History, Forgetting than elsewhere, where Ricœur dedicates whole pages to the topics of 
conflict between individual memory, collective memory and historical memory; he also takes into 
account the possibility of controversy between testimonies (the so-called conflict of memories) 
which happens when a testimony is contradicted or attacked by an hermeneutics of suspicion (see 
Memory, History, Forgetting, pp. 164-166). Furthermore, he makes of dissensus one of the main 
presences in the book and, coming back to analyze Lyotard’s differend, Ricœur chooses to 
emphasize the importance of litigation, a notion that had been played down by Lyotard in 
comparison with the differend. See Memory, History, Forgetting, pp. 314 ff. 
1138 See “Temps et Récit” de Paul Ricœur en débat, edited by Christian Bouchindhomme and 
Rainer Rochlitz (Paris: Cerf, 1990), La juste mémoire. Lectures autour de Paul Ricœur, edited by 
Olivier Abel, Enrico Castelli-Gattinara, Sabina Loriga et Isabelle Ullern-Weité (Genève: Labor et 
Fides, 2006) and Paul Ricœur: penser la mémoire, edited by François Dosse and Catherine 
Goldenstein (Paris: Seuil, 2013). 
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for Ricœur’s thought. He often referred to these post-War years as the “the best he 
has ever known”1139 and we know that he made an effort to get acquainted with as 
many classical authors as possible. One year he tried to read the complete works 
of Plato, then Aristotle, Spinoza, and so on. Given the fact that some of his 
lectures are now being published by Le Seuil, and the first of these lectures, the 
Cours sur Platon et Aristote, from 1953-1954, is already available, I will briefly 
mention it, because of its importance to the making of Ricœur’s famous “long 
route”. Ricœur only read Gadamer in the 1960s, following Gadamer’s publication 
of Truth and Method1140 at the beginning of that decade. I will scrutinize the two 
phases of Ricoeurian hermeneutics in the next part. However, it seems important 
to me, also to prepare the incursion in the hermeneutic conflict, to already show 
the differences between Gadamer’s and Ricœur’s respective takes on the relation 
between truth and method. This will also contribute to showing how for Ricœur, 
hermeneutics was probably the most encompassing method. Indeed, Ricœur did 
not resort to the phenomenological method in every one of his works. But we can 
argue that as soon as he became, let us say, hermeneutically self-aware, he never 
ceased to use the hermeneutical method and, by continuous processes of 
“deregionalization”, to apply it to different domains. As such, it will be important 
to clarify it right now. 
But let me first of all mention his particular conception of truth. His will 
be a hermeneutic truth, not fully logical and objective in a scientific sense, but 
which rather stems from a certain precomprehension and immersion in the world. I 
already mentioned his perspectivism. It is time to add that this particular sort of 
perspectivism is not akin to relativism; in fact, it is a hermeneutic perspectivism. 
And the interesting part is that this is already hinted at in History and Truth, even 
before the hermeneutic turn of his philosophy is consummated. In the last parts of 
this chapter, I will also strive to show, through a comparison with Gadamer and by 
drawing a brief history of the notion of perspectivism, how Ricœur’s early take on 
perspectivism, demonstrated and upheld both in History and Truth and Fallible 
Man, gains in breadth and scope when it is hermeneutically grasped and 
refashioned through the conflict of interpretations. 
                                                
1139 Ricœur, Critique and Conviction p. 20. 
1140 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, translation revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald 
G. Marshall (London: Continuum, second edition 2004). 
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3.4.1 – The history of philosophy and the unity of truth 
 
In “The History of Philosophy and the Unity of Truth”1141, an article 
originally written in 1954 and republished in History and Truth, Ricœur states his 
intention to “do a history of philosophy without doing a philosophy of history”1142, 
that is, to take an approach that simultaneously grasps the singular, original 
character of each philosophy and avoids falling back into full blown relativism, by 
grasping the relation of each of these philosophies and philosophers to the problem 
of truth itself. This leads to a questioning about the existence or inexistence of 
meaning in the historical movement itself, or, as Hegel would put it, of the 
mediation between history and the present, in terms of self-knowing Spirit. 
In the same volume, in the article “Objectivity and Subjectivity in 
History”1143, Ricœur had already sketched the two approaches to the history of 
philosophy that he deemed possible for the philosopher to take: 
 
By a way of a “logic of philosophy” which looks for a coherent meaning throughout 
history, or by way of a “dialogue” with philosophers and particular philosophies, a 
dialogue which is always unique and exclusive.1144  
 
In this article, he concedes that both approaches are constitutive of the 
construction of a historical narrative; there is thus a complementarity between the 
perspective on history as an “extensive development of meaning” and as “an 
irradiation of meanings from a multiplicity of organizing centers”.1145 
Nonetheless, even though both these perspectives are, according to Ricœur, valid 
(at least in the sense that we can understand why one can take them) he does 
implicitly admit his preference for the second standpoint, the one which privileges 
the singularity of dialogues which form a plurality of centers emanating meaning. 
That much is implied when he assumes that “no man who is immersed in history, 
                                                
1141 Ricœur, “The History of Philosophy and the Unity of Truth” in History and Truth, pp. 41-56. 
1142 Ibid., p. 43. On the connection between philosophical discourse and the unity of truth in the 
early Ricœur, see Michel Renaud, “O discurso filosófico e a unidade da verdade nas primeiras 
obras de P. Ricœur” in Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 46/1 (1990): 19-48. 
1143 Ricœur, “Objectivity and Subjectivity in History”, in History and Truth, pp. 21-40. 
1144 Ibid., p. 33. 
1145 Ibid., p. 39. 
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however, can arrange the total meaning of those radiated meanings.”1146 
As a consequence, even though the construction of a “logic of 
philosophy”, as the one developed by Eric Weil in the wake of Hegel, is possible, 
Ricœur seems to imply that it is not more than a mere possibility, insofar as the 
finitude of our understanding prevents us from asserting categorically a fully 
teleological development of meaning in history. He therefore wagers on the 
deepening of these singular encounters which he will later thematically deal with 
in his hermeneutic theory of reading. At this point, Ricœur uses a metaphor, that 
of friendship, to explain the link between the philosopher from the past whose 
work is made available by the fixation provided by writing, and the philosopher 
from the present, the one who, through his act of reading, encounters the work 
from the past when making his own philosophy: “This long frequentation of an 
author, or of a small number of authors, tends toward the kind of close, exclusive 
relation that a man may have with his friends.”1147  
What we are thus faced with here is an intersubjective definition of truth. 
A truth that is made up, each time, by the communication between several 
different perspectives. This is made clearer in “The History of Philosophy and the 
Unity of Truth”. On the one hand, every great philosophy is defined by a peculiar 
style. In a way, every great philosophy is unique, and to try to compare 
philosophies so radically different as, for instance, Plato’s and Hegel’s, might 
result in a shallow exercise. As such, every philosophy might be radically 
characterized and situated against the backdrop of its particular questioning; thus 
the classic definition of truth as adaequatio intellectus et rei  (adequation of 
thought to reality) becomes the adequation of “answers to questions, of solutions 
to problems. And the great philosopher is the one who revives a problematic and 
offers a solution for it.”1148 
As is now becoming apparent, Ricœur’s definition of truth is partly 
contextual and partly pragmatic. However, to say that it is contextual is not akin to 
saying that it is monadic or solipsistic. It is contextual because it is ineluctably 
marked by the situation of he or she who begins a specific questioning, marked by 
his or her own position in existence. And it is pragmatic because it is tied to the 
                                                
1146 Ibid. 
1147 Ibid., p. 37. 
1148 Ricœur, “The History of Philosophy and the Unity of Truth”, op. cit., p. 48. 
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solutions that must be brought to these specific problems. By doing this it obeys a 
logic of question and answer. Ergo, there is an inbuilt methodological concern in 
the quest for truth because, clearly, assuming one methodology or another will 
lead to different questions and different answers. 
Consequently, truth appears as something very different from a timeless 
and impersonal abstraction. It can only appear to be such an abstraction because it 
takes on the form of a horizon: 
 
The idea of truth is sustained only by the duty of thinking. Henceforth, the other term 
which pairs off with history is not the idea of truth but my personal search whose idea of 
truth is on the horizon as my intended goal.1149 
 
Now, it is clear that this search for truth could be monadic, insofar as it is 
supposed to be my truth. As Kierkegaard would put it, “I need a truth which is a 
truth for me, an idea for which I can live and die”.1150 However, it is not, because 
– and this is crucial for the course of conflict we are following – it is open to the 
conflict of interpretations, at this point in time defined by Ricœur as the loving 
struggle (borrowed from Jaspers) and whose definition we have already seen 
above. I will allow myself to quote a longer passage: 
 
We now approach an intersubjective definition of truth according to which each one 
“explains himself” and unfolds his perception of the world in “combat” with another; it is 
the “liebender Kampf” of Karl Jaspers. Truth expresses the being-in-common of 
philosophers. Philosophia perennis would then signify that there is a community of 
research, a “symphilosophieren”, a philosophizing-in-common wherein all philosophers 
are in a collective debate through the instrumentality of a witnessing consciousness, he 
who searches anew, hic et nunc. In this debate, the philosophies of the past are always 
changing their meaning; the communication that saves them from oblivion and death 
brings out the intentions and possibilities of response that their contemporaries had not 
seen. (…) These renovating interpretations constantly shift the pivotal point of the initial 
doctrine.1151 
                                                
1149 Ibid., p. 50. 
1150 This is taken from Kierkegaard’s journals (the so-called Papirer), and I found it quoted by 
David F. Swenson, Something about Kierkegaard, edited by Lillian Marvins Swenson (Macon: 
Mercer University Press, 1983), p. 40. 
1151 Ricœur, “The History of Philosophy and the Unity of Truth”, pp. 51-52. 
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This very dense citation has a lot to unpack. It contains, in a nutshell, 
some of the most important features of Ricœur’s dialectic of sedimentation and 
innovation, and also of creativity and creation of meaning through the act of 
reading that will mark the hermeneutic stage of Ricœur’s production and which we 
will explore in further detail in part four. Here we can arguably find a depiction of 
Ricœur’s ideal of philosophical research: an ideal where one’s questioning is aided 
by the questioning of others, one where one struggles to find his or her truth, the 
response to his or her questions, and even to impose his or her own standpoint, but 
through an act of communication with tradition, and with others. 
There is, of course, the following problem: the written work does not 
answer; and because of this, the act of communication risks being unilateral. 
Ricœur would find an answer to this objection, already posed by Plato, in the 
opening up of different interpretations that is allowed for by the fixation in 
writing. Therefore, truth is an horizon, a task, which is made up by the constant 
intersections between different searches for it, and what is endless is this task 
itself, the search for truth; furthermore, the “object” of truth taken as a whole is 
therefore something to be interpreted, it is not a merely “cognitive” issue, in the 
scientific sense of this word that is conferred by the natural sciences. 
Ricœur draws a modest epistemological conclusion from these 
reflections. He argues that the fact that I am right, that I am in the right direction in 
my search for truth, is more a matter of “hope” than of Absolute Knowing. This 
applies especially to objects that transcend the bounds of all experience, such as 
the knowledge of God. This much we had already seen in part one, when 
discussing Ricœur’s Post-Hegelian Kantianism. But now we see the consequences 
of this standpoint for his theory of knowledge. In this article, Ricœur thus 
proposes that we say that we hope we are “within truth” (je suis dans la vérité) 
instead of the more arrogant I have the truth1152 because actually no one can claim 
to apprehend the whole process, which is beyond the bounds of our finitude. 
The conclusion to be drawn is that the unification of these singular 
perspectives can only be provisional. Unity is a “wish and endeavor”1153 and truth 
                                                
1152 Ibid., p. 55. 
1153 See Ricœur, “Note on the Wish and Endeavor for Unity”, in History and Truth, pp. 192-196. 
 392
can, at most, be organized in several different intersecting circles.1154 This attests 
the fundamental fact of the plurality of interpretations and Ricœur goes so far as to 
state that the interpreter that moves beyond the different historical narratives – and 
between the different spheres and circles of truth, we could also say – is like a 
chess player simultaneously playing several different matches: “We enchain, 
abandon, and resume several histories, much as a chess player who plays several 
games at once, renewing now with one, now with another.”1155 
This strong image of a strategic reader of alternative narratives or 
interpretations suits well Ricœur’s own methodology, as is easily attested by his 
books, where he seems to fight battles on several different fronts, before arriving 
at his own standpoint. We are now at the threshold of Ricœur’s thematic 
exposition of the conflict of interpretations. But let me start by grounding this 
notion in a more systematic connection between the notions of perspectivism and 
truth in Ricœur’s thought. 
 
3.4.2 – Perspectivism, truth and the conflict of interpretations 
 
In section 3.3.1 above I analyzed Ricœur’s take on perspective and 
perspectivism in Fallible Man. This account is probably the more exhaustive take 
on this topic that we can find in his writings. However, there are some meaningful 
connections that we can establish between the philosophical position known as 
perspectivism, and the notion of conflict, namely the conflict of interpretations 
such as it has been established by Ricœur, and that he himself did not fully 
draw.1156 These were obviously not drawn in 1960 in Fallible Man because the 
conflict of interpretations only gets thematic attention a few years later. What I 
want to argue now is that we can find in Ricœur’s work an intrinsic connection 
between a perspectivistic notion of truth – which is at the same time marked by 
cognitive finitude (the constraints of perception analogically grafted onto the 
problem of interpretation) and linguistically embedded – and a method that tries to 
get to the truth as much as possible, by trying to enlarge that perspective through 
                                                
1154 See Ricœur, “Truth and Falsehood”, in History and Truth, pp. 189-190. 
1155 Ibid., p. 186. 
1156 I offer a fuller account on the connection between hermeneutics and perspectivism, partially 
through the conflict of interpretations, in Gonçalo Marcelo, “Perspectivismo e Hermenêutica”, in 
Impulso 24/59 (2014): 51-64.  
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the process of the conflict of interpretations. I am aware that this is a complex 
claim and that it needs to be spelled out in more detail. I also further clarify that 
this is by and large my own interpretation of Ricœur’s own standpoint and 
method, certainly supported by his writings, but somehow sorting out the pieces of 
his theoretical puzzle in my own way. Hence, this section will clarify in more 
detail the connection between truth and method in his philosophy. But firstly, let 
me take a step back and make a short digression on the notion of perspectivism, in 
order to pinpoint its main epistemological traits, as well as its historical roots, so 
that I can later finally show how it intersects with Ricœur’s conflict of 
interpretations. 
 Perspectivism is often discredited as an untenable philosophical position, 
depicted as being self-refuting and many times confused with relativism. As 
Alexander Nehamas has rightfully argued, perspectivism is different from 
relativism, in that I can assert that a given perspective is the best perspective for 
me, (that it is, so to speak, my truth) without wanting everybody else to adhere to 
it.1157 
If we are to understand perspectivism, we first have to break down the 
hermeneutic significance of notions such as “point of view” (or situated 
perspective) and horizon. Perspectivism is something like the theoretical 
generalization of a simple assertion: our everyday experience of perception is 
naturally experienced as stemming from a certain angle. From this, it tends to leap 
towards the affirmation of the ineluctably situated aspect of perception. It goes 
without saying that the roots of this notion and its common usage derive from that 
of perspective, or “point of view”. Now, as Mário Jorge de Carvalho points out, 
the notion of point of view itself derives from the experience of vision and its 
limitations and properties, “specifically with the identification of the way in which 
the characteristics of vision are dependent on an observer’s situation in space.”1158 
He points out that the fragmentary character of our visual perception always leads 
to an unequal apportionment of the “visible” and the “invisible” in our perception. 
In fact, what we are always seeing are really “points”, in that each perception, 
                                                
1157 See Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche, Life as Literature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1985), p. 72: “Perspectivism does not result in the relativism that holds that any view is as 
good as any other; it holds that one's own views are the best for oneself without implying that they 
need be good for anyone else.”  
1158 See Mário Jorge de Carvalho, “A further point of view on points of view” in Proceedings of 
the European Society for Aesthetics, vol. 4 (2012): 15. 
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even if it entails a relation to totality and the anticipation of meaning, is always 
only a tiny fragment of all possible perception. From these phenomenological 
observations we arrive at the conclusion that if we perceive something in such and 
such a manner from “here” or “there”, someone else (or some other viewpoint) 
from somewhere else, will probably see it differently, whether or not I have access 
to that alternative viewpoint. 
Husserl makes this aspect of perception very clear in paragraph 41 of his 
Ideen. The perception of the object is that of a “continuity of changing 
perceptions”1159, a continuity made up of the irreducible multiplicity involved in 
those perceptions. As mentioned before, our phenomenological perception of the 
object amounts to nothing more than a flux of silhouettes and profiles, from which 
we construct the object as such. Now, this aspect of perception of objects and, by 
analogy, of reality itself as being partial, limited, finite, was accounted for in our 
philosophical tradition centuries before Husserl’s detailed phenomenological 
analyzes. I can only offer a very partial and incomplete depiction of it, and only in 
the very specific points which are of interest for my main argument. 
One of the more important traits, and that amounts to a certain version of 
perspectivism, is the possibility to take this epistemic condition of our perception 
of objects and to analogically transform it into a certain configuration which is 
characteristic of oneself. I can see things in a certain manner, different from the 
way in which everybody else sees them. Did not Frege argue that, ultimately, 
when I am with a friend and see a tree with green leaves, I am not sure that the 
“green” I see is the same “green” seen by my friend in his Vorstellung of the tree 
in front of us, because we each have particular representations of it? And at a 
deeper level, regardless of our representations, cannot the issue of multiplicity of 
perspectives be stated metaphysically? It certainly can, and Leibniz’s Monadology 
is sufficient proof thereof. In fact, in paragraph 57, Leibniz states that there are as 
many universes as there are monads, because each monad expresses a different 
point of view.1160 
                                                
1159 See Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy. First Book, General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, translated by F. Kersten, 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), p. 86. 
1160 See G. W. Leibniz, Monadology, edited by Nicholas Rescher (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1991), §57, p. 24: “And as one and the same town viewed from different sides 
looks altogether different, and is, as it were, perspectivally multiplied, it similarly happens that, 
through the infinite multitude of simple substances, there are, as it were, just as many different 
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Whether Leibniz wanted it or not – and I most certainly think he did not – 
this was already a step towards full-blown, radical relativism, both in 
epistemological and moral terms, because it granted ontological grounding to 
perception pluralism. A few centuries later, and with the complex and many-sided 
revolution of German Idealism in between, Nietzsche would advance the far more 
radical thesis according to which “there are no facts, only interpretations.” Now, 
this is of far graver consequences than Husserl’s depiction of the flux of 
silhouettes. In fact, Husserl maintains the epistemological grounding of 
objectivity, in his own terms, whereas in a Nietzschean standpoint we really risk 
falling back into full-blown relativism. Nietzsche’s quarrel with the “truth”, with 
science and objectivity is well known and has been widely debated. We can accept 
that his own epistemological standpoint is a moderate perspectivism, such as the 
one which is upheld by Nehamas, and therefore save it from its self-refuting 
possibilities; or we can indeed choose to classify it as self-refuting. Be that as it 
may, Nietzsche, probably of the brightest geniuses of Western thought, brings 
about changes in our philosophical landscape that cannot be ignored. He also put 
forward an early version of what am I claiming Ricœur is achieving with the 
conflict of interpretations, i.e., a better grasp of the phenomena at stake in his 
philosophy. According to Nietzsche’s own version, what we reach through 
perspectivism and the complementarity of perspectives is a more complete 
objectivity; for him, this is accomplished through a complementarity not only of 
our perspectives, but indeed of our “affects”: 
 
There is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival ‘knowing’; the more affects we are 
able to put into words about a thing, the more eyes, various eyes we are able to use for the 
same thing, the more complete will be our ‘concept’ of the thing, our ‘objectivity’.1161 
 
With this last passage, we can catch a glimpse of Nietzsche’s genius. The 
                                                                                                                                 
universes, which however are only the perspectives of a single one according to the different points 
of view of each monad.” 
1161 See Friedrich Nietzsche, §12 of the third essay of On the Genealogy of Morality, edited by 
Keith Ansell-Pearson and translated by Carol Diethe (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2007), p. 87. On this notion of objectivity in Nietzsche and also on the meaningful way it can be 
connected with the type of “enlarged thinking” I mention in Kant several times in this thesis, see 
João Constâncio, “Verso un ‘ampliamento del modo di pensare’. Il sensus communis di Kant e la 
nozione di ‘obiettività’ di Nietzsche in GM III 12” in Teorie e pratiche della verità in Nietzsche, 
edited by Pietro Gori and Paolo Stellino (Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2012), pp. 75-100. 
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fact that he chooses to speak about affects means that for him perception, and 
hence also knowledge, can only be realistically envisaged as an embodied process. 
By claiming this, he anticipates Merleau-Ponty and Ricœur. In the same way, his 
insistence on perspectivism foreshadows modern hermeneutics. Indeed, in a way, 
by insisting in the inescapable character of interpretation in all human knowledge, 
he can be credited with being one of the modern “rediscoverers” of the 
fundamental character of hermeneutics; as such, he is as much a precursor of 
Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricœur – as well as, in many different ways, Derrida, 
Foucault and the Frankfurt School – as Schleiermacher and Dilthey. We will see 
below how Ricœur captures the resemblance between his project and Marx’s and 
Freud’s by insisting on their common project of a hermeneutics of suspicion. 
However, the difficulty of Nietzsche’s claim lies in his own interpretation of 
“objectivity”. The challenge brought about by the assertion that “all is 
interpretation” cannot be taken lightly. In fact, assuming that all is indeed 
interpretation, how can we separate valid or invalid, good or bad interpretations? 
The answer, in my opinion, has to be tied up with the adoption of a 
certain method. This is, of course, the modern, Cartesian answer: not only do I 
need to be right, I also need to be sure I am right, that what I found has a solid 
enough status of epistemic certainty. But to uphold this thesis is, eo ipso, to be at 
odds with the other major hermeneutic figure of the late 20th century, Gadamer. 
Next section will deal with the differences between his take on the relation 
between truth and method, and Ricœur’s.  
But let me come back to the limitations of our own perception, in order to 
show how these can be, up to a certain extent, be made to apply to our 
interpretation taken as a whole. Mário Jorge de Carvalho emphasizes, “paradoxical 
as it may seem, the realm of vision and the visible corresponds to something that 
can only be discovered by peeping through an extraordinary multitude of 
‘keyholes’.”1162 When we apply this, mutatis mutandis, to interpretation, we can 
feel how serious the epistemological threat falling upon our heads is. We may find 
ourselves to inhabit a world that is more unknown to us – no matter how familiar 
we feel with it – than we might be ready to admit. Carvalho captures this well with 
the depiction of it as labyrinth:  “whether we are conscious of it or not, the realm 
                                                
1162 Mário Jorge de Carvalho, “A further point of view on points of view”, p. 8. 
 397 
of vision is full of hiatuses – it is, as it were, full of ‘folds’ and ‘trap-doors’ where 
the unseen looms. Like a labyrinth, it is full of ‘peripeteiai’ and possibilities of 
revision.”1163 However, as he also stresses, there are indeed possibilities of 
revision of the “seen” because we do have some kind of access to other “angles”, 
other perspectives. If this is the perception of an object we are talking about, I can 
simply move, change my angle, and get a different profile. 
Now, if this is interpretation we are talking about, and let me now adopt a 
narrow definition of interpretation as textual interpretation, in the sense I will 
mention in the next part of this thesis, the access to other angles might very well 
be provided by the act of reading. And this inevitably has methodological 
implications. In fact, if we are those beings whose being consists in interpreting, 
or, in Heidegger’s words, if in the “existential constitution of Dasein” is rooted the 
phenomenon of “the understanding which interprets”1164 (and this is the broader, 
ontological definition of interpretation) and if each and every time the new 
experiences we acquired potentially bring about a refiguration of the totality of 
experience we are immersed in, and the meaning we confer upon it, it might very 
well be that the revision of our own standpoint, the discovery of new horizons and 
the enlargement of our own horizon is our own way of being in the world. 
To take it a step further, it might as well be that this is one of the tasks of 
the hermeneutic philosopher, or, for that matter, of philosophy in general. In order 
to spell out this claim, I will have to come back to Ricœur’s onetime explicit 
connection between hermeneutics and Kantianism, which I mentioned in part one. 
As it was stated, it was meant to emphasize that both hermeneutic philosophy and 
the Kantian “philosophy of limits”, as Ricœur sees them, implicitly recognize 
human finitude, and hence the finitude of every act of interpretation. This is seen, 
furthermore, as a structural impediment to the overblown pretentions of 
exhaustive, complete knowledge. 
Now, my claim is that in Ricœur’s rejection of Hegelianism and 
embracing of Hermeneutics in the context of a Kantian framework, we find a 
meaningful and creative alternative. This alternative will be largely grounded in 
the hermeneutical methods of creative reading, linguistic innovation, and so forth. 
                                                
1163 Ibid., p. 14. 
1164 See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson 
(Malden: Blackwell, 1962), §32, “Understanding and Interpretation”, p. 195. 
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But I want to claim that even though Ricœur did not explicitly assume it, there was 
at work in his hermeneutic methodology, and specifically in the conflict of 
interpretations, a research method that is intrinsically tied up with his 
perspectivistic notion of truth (which can be compared to Nietzsche’s, to some 
extent) and that more or less follows some indications contained in Kant’s critical 
philosophy. Since this might seem a complicated claim, I will attempt to shed 
some light in it by taking a step back into Kantianism. 
In several writings, and most notably of which in §40 of the Critique of 
the Power of Judgment to which I alluded in passing above, Kant provides some 
formal indications concerning “ways of thinking”. In the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment he calls them “maxims of the common understanding” and he lists three 
of them: the unprejudiced way of thinking, the broad-minded way of thinking, and 
the consistent way of thinking. In simpler terms, he breaks this down as the need 
“to think for oneself”, “to think in the position of everyone else” and to “always to 
think in accord with oneself”.1165 Or, in still other terms, this could be dubbed 
something like the following advice: when thinking, try to be autonomous, to take 
other perspectives into account, and to be coherent. This is, in a nutshell, a whole 
research program. Or at least a minimalist depiction of some of the essential 
features for putting forward a sound interpretation (or for producing a sound 
judgment, as Kant would probably have depicted it). 
Mário Jorge de Carvalho, in a couple of articles1166 has shown how in 
Kant’s work these notions are meant to avoid “logical egoism”. He clarifies that 
what is at stake in the “broad-minded way of thinking” is not necessarily taking 
into account the perspectives of others, but simply other perspectives than the one 
we are assuming at any given moment. That is, this has to do with other logical 
possibilities. When assessing a given phenomenon, why limit oneself simply to 
what others have thought before? Why not mention other possible – whether or 
not they are feasible is another problem – perspectives? Hence, what Kant aims is 
at a “logical pluralism” which, in its second maxim, (the broad-minded way of 
thinking) indeed aims at an enlargement that could result in a maximal 
perspectivism. To be clear, I am not affirming that Kant held a perspectivistic 
                                                
1165 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, §40, p. 174. 
1166 See Mário Jorge de Carvalho, “O egoísmo lógico e a sua superação”, op. cit., and also 
“Problemas de desconfinamento de perspectiva”, op. cit. 
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notion of truth; that claim would be simply wrong. But, according to his account, 
to be able to satisfy the conditions of the broad-minded way of thinking, one 
would have to take the maximum number of other possibilities of judgment into 
account. In the Critique of the Power of Judgment what Kant wants is to liberate 
reason from its passive use, from what he calls “prejudice” or “superstition”. He 
uses the metaphor of the enlightenment to name the contrary of superstition, that 
is, the sound use of reason. As such, in order to avoid being “narrow-minded”, 
Kant asserts that we need to put ourselves in a “universal standpoint”1167 and ties 
its conditions to the exercise of reflective judgment. Certainly, this “universal 
standpoint” has nothing to do with Hegel’s Absolute Knowing, since Kant clarifies 
that this is to be done by “putting oneself into the standpoint of others”. 
Now, as is easy to see, this is an incredibly demanding task. And if this is 
what is really needed in order to produce sound judgments and interpretations, let 
me ask: how many of us, when putting forward claims, really strive to do this? 
And even if we strive, how far along are we capable of exerting this pressure to 
our own claim? I will refrain from providing any tentative answer to this question, 
because it might be an embarrassing one. And yet, difficult as it might seem, I am 
convinced that Ricœur tried (in a voluntary or involuntary manner, I do not know, 
and neither does this matter) to obey to that criterion of the broad-minded way of 
thinking. That is, through his own fragmentary style fed by the conflict of 
interpretations, he tried to take the perspective of others (or if we prefer, other 
perspectives) into account, when constructing his own theoretical proposal. As 
such, and I have asserted this in several different places, Ricœur’s philosophy can 
be characterized as being an informed original thinking. Original, because he tries 
to be autonomous in giving his own interpretations. Informed, because when 
trying to put forward his claims, he does not ignore other perspectives, but rather 
uses and acknowledges them as best as he can. As to knowing whether or not his 
thinking is consistent, that is the most problematic claim, because his ideas 
evolved through time. But I do think there is a coherent kernel to it, and because of 
that I will try to put forward my own synchronic interpretation of it in part six. 
Ultimately, these three principles, and the possibility of enlarging one’s 
perspective, have evidently been detected and upheld in creative ways by many 
                                                
1167 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, §40, p. §175. 
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others before me. Hannah Arendt, for instance, follows Kant’s lead of the 
connection between these principles, reflective judgment and the communicative 
establishment of sensus communis and gives it a practical application. In her 
depiction of the agonistic public space, she includes the possibility of 
communication through the enlarged standpoint, the putting oneself in the place of 
others (thus, in a much less formalized version than Habermas’s). Hence, 
according to her interpretation, reflective judgment would be the implicit political 
judgment of Kant’s critical philosophy.1168 Ricœur, for his part, in “Aesthetic 
Judgment and Political Judgment”, an article included in The Just, mentions the 
“lovely phrase ‘a broadened way of thinking’”1169 and, stating how it turns us 
“other possible judgments”, seems to commend it. 
However, if this is valid for a theory of judgment such as Kant’s, its 
validity must ultimately also hold for hermeneutic philosophy and its 
embeddedness in language. This is not the place to draw a history of hermeneutics. 
But I do want to emphasize how this might play out in the linguistic domain of 
interpretation. Gadamer forcefully argues that language (Sprachlichkeit) is the 
medium of hermeneutic experience.1170 Taking the same paragraph 41 of Husserl’s 
Ideas we already mentioned above as his point of departure, he states that as in 
perception, we can also speak about “profiles” or shadings in language. However 
he strongly emphasizes how each of these perspectives can aim at encompassing 
totality and, furthermore, how each “shading” seems to want to encompass the 
other and can in fact do so: 
 
In the same way as with perception we can speak of the "linguistic shadings" that the 
world undergoes in different language-worlds. But there remains a characteristic 
difference: every "shading" of the object of perception is exclusively distinct from every 
other, and each helps co-constitute the "thing-in-itself" as the continuum of these nuances 
– whereas, in the case of the shadings of verbal worldviews, each one potentially contains 
every other one within it – i.e., each worldview can be extended into every other. It can 
understand and comprehend, from within itself, the "view" of the world presented in 
                                                
1168 See Hannah Arendt, Thinking, Willing, Judging (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982) and 
“The Crisis in Culture” in Between Past and Future (New York, Viking Press, 1961), pp. 197-226. 
1169 Ricœur, “Aesthetic Judgment and Political Judgment According to Hannah Arendt”, in The 
Just, p. 105. 
1170 Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 384-404. 
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another language.1171 
 
There is thus something like a principle of universal translatability of verbal 
worldviews into one another. He further adds that the discovery of these new 
worlds does not entail, eo ipso, a forgetting of our own cultural background and 
worldview (this kind of possibility would probably appear to Gadamer as almost 
being absurd). He illustrates this proposal with the beautiful metaphor of the 
traveler: 
 
Thus, we hold, the fact that our experience of the world is bound to language does not 
imply an exclusiveness of perspectives. If, by entering foreign language-worlds, we 
overcome the prejudices and limitations of our previous experience of the world, this does 
not mean that we leave and negate our own world. Like travelers we return home with 
new experiences. Even if we emigrate and never return, we still can never wholly 
forget.1172 
 
These descriptions seem to capture well how this process works, or at least should 
work, in non-pathological cases (which are always, evidently, possible). And let 
me add a personal note to attest how they strongly resonate with my own 
Portuguese background and cultural heritage, with its emphasis on the experience 
of adventure and discovery, yet at the same time with the characteristic longing for 
a situation of return, which duly expresses our fundamental experience of 
belonging, so well described by Gadamer. 
What must be emphasized is that Gadamer fully supports, even though 
not using the same terms, the notion of “broad-minded way of thinking” or 
“perspective enlargement” which we alluded to. This is in fact a process akin to 
what he described as the “fusion of horizons”, which is arguably the key to the 
type of hermeneutic experience he puts forward. He captures well many of the 
features we have been describing in the following passage: 
 
Every finite present has its limitations. We define the concept of "situation" by saying that 
it represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision. Hence essential to the 
concept of situation is the concept of “horizon.” The horizon is the range of vision that 
                                                
1171 Ibid., p. 445. 
1172 Ibid. 
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includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point. Applying this to the 
thinking mind, we speak of narrowness of horizon, of the possible expansion of horizon, 
of the opening up of new horizons, and so forth.1173 
 
Therefore, it is not only that Gadamer legitimates the extension of the notion of 
horizon from optical properties to our interpretive faculties. It is that he stresses its 
possibilities of expansion. He further emphasizes that: 
 
The historical movement of human life consists in the fact that it is never absolutely 
bound to any one standpoint, and hence can never have a truly closed horizon. The 
horizon is, rather, something into which we move and that moves with us. Horizons 
change for a person who is moving. Thus the horizon of the past, out of which all human 
life lives and which exists in the form of tradition, is always in motion.1174  
 
We can see that Gadamer’s account of this phenomenon is highly favorable, even 
laudatory. According to him, this process could be one of continual expansion. We 
could say, for instance, that insofar as life is a continual accumulation and 
experience, and interpretation thereof, one’s horizon keeps expanding. But it 
might be possible that this is not so. To be sure, one can, through the reification of 
bad habits, keep on living without doing much learning and therefore without 
radically expanding horizons. Of course that we know what Gadamer has in mind: 
some prejudices are good and even constitutively shape the way in which we see 
the world; the recovery of meaningful traditions is the best way to orient oneself in 
the world, and so forth.  
In fact, Gadamer stresses that the phenomenon which Ricœur will later 
describe as a dialectic between sedimentation and innovation is best captured as a 
fusion of horizons, whereby the horizon of the present time is constitutively 
formed by that of the past, to the point in which they almost fuse, as it were: 
 
In fact the horizon of the present is continually in the process of being formed because we 
are continually having to test all our prejudices. An important part of this testing occurs in 
encountering the past and in understanding the tradition from which we come. Hence the 
horizon of the present cannot be formed without the past. There is no more an isolated 
                                                
1173 Ibid., p. 301. 
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horizon of the present in itself than there are historical horizons which have to be 
acquired. Rather, understanding is always the fusion of these horizons supposedly existing 
by themselves. We are familiar with the power of this kind of fusion chiefly from earlier 
times and their naiveté about themselves and their heritage. In a tradition this process of 
fusion is continually going on, for there old and new are always combining into 
something of living value, without either being explicitly foregrounded from the other.1175  
 
Now, this description is probably too one-sided; the emphasis on tradition alone 
risks obnubilating the possibility that something really new comes along in human 
history, and in a way it runs against the emphasis on human praxis of all Critical 
Theory that we have seen above. 
Be that as it may, Gadamer does not shy away from formulating a 
comprehensive hermeneutic theory. He ultimately comes to the conclusion that 
hermeneutics is a universal phenomenon. It is universal because it is grounded on 
language (Sprachlichkeit). The whole third part of Truth and Method is an 
ontological definition of hermeneutics as founded on Sprachlichkeit. Its 
ontological cornerstone is easy to grasp: “Being that can be understood is 
language”.1176 This does not entail that there are not non-linguistic entities or 
properties. But it does entail that what can be understood presents itself in a 
linguistic manner and that, insofar as our experience of orientation in the world is 
an experience of interpretation, the only type of being that really matters to us, is 
the one that expresses itself in language, the one that can be understood. 
Gadamer’s conclusion is straightforward: “in view of the experience of art and 
history, we were led to a universal hermeneutics that was concerned with the 
general relationship of man to the world.”1177 
Let me stress the abovementioned point: for Gadamer, hermeneutics is 
universal. We could say that he has a “continuist” position regarding the 
phenomena of language and hermeneutics. Even though they take place in 
different domains, such as art and history, the different modes in which these 
phenomena are grounded can in principle be explained by one overarching 
principle, that of the fusion of horizons with the past, etc. What is more, Gadamer 
posits some sort of prior agreement that forms living communities, and which is, 
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1176 Ibid., p. 470. 
1177 Ibid., p. 471. 
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in itself, a linguistic agreement or understanding: 
 
Language has its true being only in dialogue, in coming to an understanding. This is not to 
be understood as if that were the purpose of language. Coming to an understanding is not 
a mere action, a purposeful activity, a setting up of signs through which I transmit my will 
to others. Coming to an understanding as such, rather, does not need any tools, in the 
proper sense of the word. It is a life process in which a community of life is lived out.1178  
 
This position could perhaps be described as a linguistic Sittlichkeit. It certainly 
emphasizes the importance of something like a lifeworld but, coherently with its 
continuist standpoint, it puts the emphasis on language. However, the strange fact 
is that the understanding (in the sense of entente) and even the possibility of 
dialogue are stated a priori. It is as if a communitarian political philosophy took 
its inspiration in a prior fiction, like the liberal fiction of an ahistorical social 
contract. 
Now, even though Ricœur agrees with Gadamer in many points and was 
inspired by his hermeneutic theory in several aspects, the universal trait of 
language and hermeneutics is, I would argue, a major source of contention 
between the two. Ricœur agrees with Gadamer that any “being that can be 
understood is language”, even though he will tend to emphasize, much more than 
Gadamer, the existence of pre-linguistic layers of experience. This is evident in his 
ambiguous attempts at a philosophy of life, such as all the times he insists on the 
primacy of the conatus. To be sure, he does not (nor, in my opinion, does 
Gadamer) contend that all being is language, but rather that being that assumes 
significance for us is language. But the object of contention is the unity of 
language itself, as well of the way of capturing, depicting and interpreting 
language, the world, and all the phenomena within it. In a way, Gadamer offers a 
more complete hermeneutical theory than Ricœur. But Ricœur’s hermeneutical 
toolbox is ultimately much better prepared than Gadamer’s to spell out a practical 
philosophy capable of understanding and responding to the many challenges in our 
life. It is more nuanced. And maybe, even though it contains no overarching 
principles stricto sensu, it does turn out to be more encompassing than Gadamer’s, 
because it brings so much more significant elements into account. In a nutshell, 
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unlike Gadamer, Ricœur wagers on the conflict of interpretations and provides a 
diagnosis of the broken status of language. 
Right at the outset of Freud and Philosophy, Ricœur states that language 
is precisely the area where “all philosophical investigations cut across one 
another”1179, namely those, in the 1960s, of Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Bultmann, 
anthropology, ordinary language philosophy, psychoanalysis… But instead of 
seeing in it a somewhat unitary phenomenon, he rather seems dumbfounded by 
this fragmentation.  
 
We have at our disposal a symbolic logic, an exegetical science, an anthropology, and a 
psychoanalysis and, perhaps for the first time, we are able to encompass in a single 
question the problem of the unification of human discourse. The very progress of the 
aforementioned disparate disciplines has both revealed and intensified the dismemberment 
of that discourse. Today the unity of human language poses a problem.1180 
 
And what problem is this? Simply put, each of these disciplines tends to claim – to 
a greater or lesser degree – that its analyzes are encompassing. Each seems to want 
not only to deplete its object, but to transform it in the universal hermeneutic key 
explaining, basically, almost everything. This brings Leibniz’s depiction of a 
viewpoint as a perspective over the whole to a new level. Because not only do 
these theories provide alternative interpretations of reality; they also provide 
different rules to which a good interpretation must obey. This problem is thus 
really a constitutive difficulty. Nietzsche stated that there are only interpretations. 
But if this is not to let us completely disoriented in a world in which no 
distinctions are made, we must be able to find a canon for the producing of sound 
interpretations. But it seems that we are left in a situation of aporia, because 
seemingly equally valid claims which are however apparently contradictory, draw 
our attention. Ricœur’s conclusion is brutal; there is no universal hermeneutics: 
 
The difficulty – it initiated my research in the first place – is this: there is no universal 
hermeneutics, no universal canon for exegesis but only disparate and opposed theories 
concerning the rules of interpretation. The hermeneutic field, whose outer contours we 
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have traced, is internally at variance with itself (brisé).1181 
 
We can therefore discern at least two levels of conflict operating here: the first is a 
conflict at the level of content, of what a certain phenomenon will be revealed to 
be, as a result of being encompassed by a certain theory. The second is a meta-
conflict: how will that theory have arrived at such a conclusion and what are the 
implicit or explicit rules and principles governing that interpretation and which 
will also, in a stable theoretical framework, guide the description and 
interpretation of other phenomena in a similar manner. This agon will assume a 
bewildering array of forms in the philosophy of Paul Ricœur. At this point, in 
1965 in the book on Freud, it will assume mainly two: the conflict between a 
hermeneutic as recollection of meaning and what Ricœur dubs a “hermeneutics of 
suspicion”, and a second conflict, somewhat derived from the first one, between 
archeological and teleological hermeneutics. We will spell out what is at stake in 
this debate in the next part of this thesis. But for the moment let me just emphasize 
that it is precisely the existence of this meta-conflict that forces Ricœur to really 
take into account the methodological aspect at stake in hermeneutics. For him, in 
fact, something in which there is not necessarily a conflict – even though there 
might be a creative, dialectical tension – is the relation between truth and method. 
Now, this puts his standpoint in stark contrast with Gadamer’s. 
 
3.4.3 – Ricœur and Gadamer on truth and method 
  
Both Ricœur and Gadamer subscribe to a version of what came to be 
known as the hermeneutic circle. This notion is in itself very ancient but was 
mainly defined by Heidegger in the 20th century, whose ontological take on 
hermeneutics was overwhelmingly influent in all subsequent hermeneutic 
research; and Heidegger chooses to stress precisely the importance of 
precomprehension.  
As such, for both Gadamer and Ricœur, as well as for Heidegger, 
philosophy does not start, in itself, anything anew. But what this means for its own 
method is a source of contention. In fact, Ricœur states already in Fallible Man 
that the insertion in the hermeneutic circle is not incompatible with the adoption 
                                                
1181 Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
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and emphasis of a certain method: 
 
This means that we must completely dissociate the idea of method in philosophy from the 
idea of a starting point. Philosophy does not start anything independently: supported by 
the non-philosophical, it derives its existence from the substance of what has already been 
understood prior to reflection. However, if philosophy is not a radical beginning with 
regard to its sources, it may be one with regard to its method. Thus, through this idea of a 
difference of potential between the non-philosophical precomprehension and the 
methodical beginning of elucidation, we are brought closer to a well-defined working 
hypothesis.1182 
 
This would only be made fully explicit in the 1980s, with what Ricœur 
calls the dialectic between explanation and understanding.  It must be stressed that 
in the context of the development of Ricœur’s philosophy, even though conflict 
played a part since the beginning, its methodological pertinence only becomes 
fully apparent with the hermeneutic turn. 
Now, for Gadamer, the relation between truth and method is rather 
presented as an alternative. This is made clear from the very first pages of Truth 
and Method: 
 
The following investigations (…) are concerned to seek the experience of truth that 
transcends the domain of scientific method wherever that experience is to be found, and to 
inquire into its legitimacy. Hence the human sciences are connected to modes of 
experience that lie outside science: with the experiences of philosophy, of art, and of 
history itself. These are all modes of experience in which a truth is communicated that 
cannot be verified by the methodological means proper to science.1183 
 
Commenting on the way in which this issue is addressed in Gadamer’s most 
important work, and its perhaps misleading title, Ricœur makes a perceptive 
comment: 
 
The very title of the work confronts the Heideggerian concept of truth with the Diltheyean 
concept of method. The question is to what extent the work deserves to be called Truth 
                                                
1182 Ricœur, Fallible Man, p. 4. 
1183 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. xxi. 
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AND Method, and whether it ought not to be entitled instead Truth OR Method.1184 
 
which has a rather self-evident answer: for Gadamer, the relation of truth and 
method is more of a disjunction than a conjunction. 
In fact, Gadamer equates the methodological concern with the scientific 
approach. And for him, this is always a secondary concern. In this, he follows 
Heidegger’s ontological grounding of hermeneutics. In this view, the sciences 
entail an alienating distanciation that forces one to forget the essential belonging 
that is constitutive of our orientation in the world. There is actually a thesis in 
which Gadamer is in fact, up to some extent, in agreement with the Frankfurt 
School: science can be seen as a tool of instrumental reason. For him, this is 
particularly evident in the way science uses language: it creates a method. Now, 
this method is for him in blatant contradiction with the universal character of 
hermeneutics as dialogue, in the sense I mentioned above. 
Ricœur disagrees with this view. He develops a dialectical relationship 
between truth and method, through his own radical rearrangement of explanation 
and understanding. I will not fully explicate this dialectic here, only in the next 
part of the thesis; but, in a nutshell, what can be said is that for him our primary 
goal is the understanding of truth; however, Ricœur also argues that there is an 
inbuilt solidarity between truth and method, in that methodological procedures 
will be instrumental – and this not in a pejorative way – in the search for truth. 
Hence, he proposes that phases of understanding will alternate with phases of 
explanation. In fact, this is very coherent with his longstanding insistence on the 
need for mediation, or what he calls the “long route”, the one that goes through a 
“great detour”.  
Apparently, the genealogy of the notion of “long route” in Ricœur’s 
philosophy stems, at least in part, from Plato’s Seventh Letter. We can find this 
interesting passage in Ricœur’s Lectures on Plato and Aristotle, from the 
Strasbourg period: 
 
The Seventh Letter aims at dissolving a snare of the philosophy of essences: philosophy is 
not an anti-Heraclitean chitchat about essences. Philosophy is difficult, it always takes an 
effort, a sacrifice. Essence is not what is nearer, rather what is farther. This letter, which 
                                                
1184 Ricœur, “The task of Hermeneutics” in From Text to Action, p. 71. 
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entails a morality of knowledge, has the same emphasis we can find in the last scolium of 
Spinoza’s Ethics: “All things beautiful are as difficult as they are rare”. Truth’s time is a 
time with its own maturation, its own rhythm and which is very different from the time of 
industry, where we can always speed up a fabrication process. The Sophists made it 
possible to believe that philosophical education was just a technique that we could 
facilitate or hasten. Instead, it is a discipline which bears more resemblance to the 
purification of mysteries than with the artisan’s technique; essence is always grasped by 
the “long route”. Plato’s terminology is in here the same used by the Pythagoreans and 
Parmenides: philosophy is a route, a journey. Distanciation from truth is thus a first reason 
for us to multiply the degrees of knowledge: the topic of the intermediaries is introduced 
like an ascetical progression. Each stage is there fulfilling a negative role: it is not yet the 
truth.1185 
 
This is an important quote and it has a lot to unpack. In fact, as I have 
been arguing throughout this chapter, even though Ricœur seems to adopt an 
epistemological standpoint corresponding to a particular strand of perspectivism, 
this does not mean that it is a perspectivism incompatible with truth. Now, I would 
argue that this truth appears as a limit idea, but that it is striven for, precisely 
through the procedure of the mediations and the long route / long detour. In the 
quote above, it would seem that, commenting on Plato, Ricœur would be adhering 
to a strictly idealistic view, defending truth as some kind of “essence”. This could 
even be supported by the fact that in his early career, as we have seen, Ricœur was 
influenced by the Husserl of the Ideas. Whether or not this is the case for the 
lectures on Plato and Aristotle, it certainly does cease to be so as soon as Ricœur 
definitely enters his hermeneutic phase. He does maintain this metaphor of the 
                                                
1185 See Ricœur, Être, essence et substance chez Platon et Aristote. Cours professé à l’Université 
de Strasbourg en 1953-1954, edited by Jean-Louis Schlegel (Paris: Seuil, 2011),  p. 41: “Le sens 
de la Lettre VII est de dénoncer un piège de la philosophie des essences : la philosophie n’est pas 
un bavardage anti-héraclitien sur les essences. La philosophie est difficile, elle demande toujours 
un effort, un sacrifice. L’essence n’est pas le plus proche, mais le plus lointain. Cette lettre, qui 
implique une morale de la connaissance, porte le même accent que la dernière scolie de l’Éthique 
de Spinoza : ‘Tout ce qui est beau difficile autant que rare.’ Le temps de la vérité est un temps qui 
a sa propre maturation, son propre rythme et qui est bien différent du temps de l’industrie où l’on 
peut toujours raccourcir un procédé de fabrication. Les Sophistes ont laissé croire que l’éducation 
philosophique était une technique comme les autres, qu’on peut hâter et faciliter. C’est une 
discipline qui a plus de parenté avec la purification des mystères qu’avec la technique des artisans ; 
l’essence est toujours la ‘voie’ longue. Le langage platonicien est ici le même que celui des 
Pythagoriciens, de Parménide : la philosophie est une voie, un voyage. L’éloignement de la vérité 
est une première raison de multiplier les degrés du savoir : le thème des intermédiaires est introduit 
à titre de progression ascétique. Chaque stade n’est là que comme un négatif : il n’est pas encore la 
vérité.” [My translation] 
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long effort / detour, and he will always emphasize the voluntary and ascetic 
aspects of it: in fact, in many different ways, the concepts of work and effort will 
remain vital for his definition of philosophy. However, the “long route” will be 
opposed to a “short route” as two opposing hermeneutic styles. And even though 
the “route” will keep changing directions, bifurcating and crisscrossing to the 
point in which any attempt at cartography will inevitably have a shape close to an 
intricate labyrinth, the fact is that Ricœur emphasizes that this is the route of 
language in its many forms: myths, signs, literary works, and so on. 
A first attempt to define this long route is made in “Existence and 
Hermeneutics”1186, a crucial article, which opens the seminal The Conflict of 
Interpretations and that, in a way, sums up some of what we have seen in this part 
of our dissertation, and also initiates in a definitive manner the hermeneutic 
sources from which his later philosophy will draw some of its inspiration. 
Right from the start, Ricœur states that his purpose is to “explore the 
paths to contemporary philosophy by what could be called the graft of the 
hermeneutic problem onto the phenomenological method.”1187 The fact that 
Ricœur stresses that the method he is talking about is the phenomenological one 
should not be understood in a narrow sense. Indeed, what Ricœur is worried at this 
point in time is with legitimating the hermeneutic problem, in relation to his own 
background, still understood as having a major debt to phenomenology. What 
hermeneutics brings about is, among other aspects, the immersion in language. 
And the methodological analyzes of language will originate different methods, 
such as structuralism and psychoanalysis. But that the metaphor of the graft is 
used to theoretically ground the connection between hermeneutics and 
phenomenology is a testament to the fact that for Ricœur, phenomenology came 
first, and that inscribing hermeneutics within that horizon opens up radically new 
possibilities. This is, in a way, some sort of homage to the role phenomenology 
plays in modern hermeneutics, and the recognition that it is within the 
phenomenological field that hermeneutics would be rediscovered in the 20th 
century. Indeed, this is coherent with the likely historical origin of the metaphor of 
the graft which, as it has been noted by Boyd Blundell, probably stems from Saint 
                                                
1186 See Ricœur, “Existence and Hermeneutics” in The Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 3-24. 
1187 Ibid., p. 3. 
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Paul, who speaks about the gentiles being grafted into the tree of Israel.1188 Thus 
we have the image of an ancient lineage, enriched by its new offspring. 
Nonetheless, as we shall see more thoroughly in the next part, in the interaction 
between phenomenology, structuralism and psychoanalysis, none will really 
assume a preponderant weight. And the ground for this theoretical framework 
would be laid exactly in the article we are dealing with now. 
Now, at the fore of Ricœur’s onto-methodological manifesto of this 
significant piece of his production, is his ambiguous relationship with Heidegger. 
On the one hand, he credits Heidegger with having dealt away the idealistic 
interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology. On the other hand, he reproaches 
Heidegger (and a fortiori Gadamer, as we have seen) with having become blind to 
the methodological problems and their respective fertility for hermeneutics, 
because of his insistence on immediately grounding hermeneutics in ontology, 
with his Daseinsanalytik: 
 
There are two ways to ground hermeneutics in phenomenology. There is the short route, 
which I shall consider first, and the long route, the one I propose to travel. The short route 
is the one taken by an ontology of understanding, after the manner of Heidegger. I call 
such an ontology of understanding the “short route” because, breaking with any 
discussion of method, it carries itself directly to the level of an ontology of finite being in 
order there to recover understanding, no longer as a mode of knowledge, but rather as a 
mode of being.1189  
 
But what is thus the “long route”, at this point in time, for Ricœur? In what 
manner does it differ from Heidegger’s alleged “short route”? And ultimately, why 
is Ricœur suspicious of shortcuts and direct apprehensions of “truth” or too hasty 
ontological constructions? Let me start by answering the first two questions. In 
fact, for Ricœur, at the start of his hermeneutic turn, the “detour” that the “route” 
must assume is the one through language. In a way, the later Heidegger, as well as 
– we have seen it – Gadamer, agree with the fundamental importance of language 
for our interpretation as Being-in-the-world. Similarly, as Heidegger and 
Gadamer, in the 1960s Ricœur will still wants to develop an ontology; but this will 
                                                
1188 See Paul, Romans 11, 17-24, quoted by Boyd Blundell, “Creative Fidelity”, op. cit., p. 89. 
1189 Ricœur, “Existence and Hermeneutics”, p. 6. 
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already be something like a postponed ontology, almost something of an aborted 
one. 
This means the dialectic between truth and method is already affirmed 
here. Method will help us to understand truth as much as possible, but a definitive 
explication of that truth and the consequent possibility of a solid ontological 
grounding will prove to be elusive. But it also means, likewise following 
Heidegger, that the understanding of the world, and truth, will at the same time be 
a disclosing of ourselves as Being-in-the-world. Interpretation and self-
interpretation will thus almost assume the same extension – and with this, Ricœur 
recuperates his earlier influences, stemming both from existentialism and 
reflective philosophy. He thus proposes that understanding, and self-
understanding, go through a process of learning, that they explore the frontiers of 
semantics and reflection, before returning to themselves. This is in fact his 
alternative to Heidegger’s stance, his own positive proposition at this point in 
time: 
 
that of substituting, for the short route of the Analytic of Dasein, the long route which 
begins by analyzes of language. In this way we will continue to keep in contact with the 
disciplines which seek to practice interpretation in a methodical manner, and we will 
resist the temptation to separate truth, characteristic of understanding, from the method 
put into operation by disciplines which have sprung from exegesis. If, then, a new 
problematic of existence is to be worked out, this must start from and be based on the 
semantic elucidation of the concept of interpretation common to all the hermeneutic 
disciplines. 
[But]… a purely semantic elucidation remains suspended until one shows that the 
understanding of multivocal or symbolic expressions is a moment of self-understanding; 
the semantic approach thus entails a reflective approach. But the subject that interprets 
himself while interpreting signs is no longer the cogito: rather, he is a being who 
discovers, by the exegesis of his own life, that he is placed in being before he places and 
possesses himself.1190 
 
As we can see, Ricœur is undertaking here, in this programmatic text and namely 
in the above quote, a very complex connection of different theoretical influences 
which he aims to integrate in his project. The passage through semantics, and 
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namely through the meaningful theories that, in a way, add something to the truth 
about the self – like psychoanalysis, Marxism, Hegelianism, etc. – transforms 
reflective philosophy in that its horizons will be radically problematized and 
thereby transformed, by the abovementioned assertion that language is broken and 
that all we are left with is the conflict of interpretations and its dialectic. 
In the rest of this article, which inaugurates and gives theoretical 
grounding to Ricœur’s first hermeneutics (and which will be more thoroughly 
analyzed in chapter 4.1 below) Ricœur eventually puts forth a criteriology of 
interpretation that aims at justifying both the existence of the conflict of 
interpretations – their content – and the meta-conflict of their methodologies, in 
the context of his own project. But his stroke of genius, the one that provides him 
with a certain unity of intention (if not completely of topic, method and 
conclusions) between his first incursions in existential and reflective philosophy, 
and his hermeneutics1191 is that he specifically grounds the different 
methodologies, and therefore the different aspects of truth revealed by each 
theory, in different aspects of existence: 
 
In every instance, each hermeneutics discovers the aspect of existence which founds it as 
method.1192 
 
Now, this could lead us to conclude that the “truth” with which Ricœur is worried 
about is only the truth “about ourselves”, and not with the world and reality itself. 
As such, it would be a reflective philosophy, or a hermeneutic philosophy, but 
without any significant breach beyond ourselves. 
It is undeniable that the hermeneutics of the self is of crucial importance 
for him. But this stroke of genius, the one that makes each different theory reveal a 
fundamental aspect of existence, would in fact later be taken further, by the 
adoption of a similar method but with different results. In fact, six years after the 
publishing of the Conflict of Interpretations, in The Rule of Metaphor1193 (and in 
fact, already before, since the beginning of the 1970s, and the preparatory texts of 
                                                
1191 On the connection of reflective philosophy and hermeneutics in Ricœur see Luís Umbelino, 
“Dualidade e Mediação. Raízes Reflexivas da Hermenêutica de Paul Ricœur”, in A Filosofia de 
Paul Ricœur, edited by Fernanda Henriques, op. cit., pp. 93-107. 
1192 Ricœur, “Existence and Hermeneutics”., p. 19. 
1193 See Ricœur, The Rule of Metaphor. The Creation of Meaning in Language. Translated by 
Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello, SJ (London: Routledge, 1977). 
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these books and of his mature hermeneutics taken as a whole) Ricœur would talk 
about the discovery of new aspects not only of existence, but also of reality itself 
through the adoption of an alternative standpoint: that of semantic innovation 
taking place at a metaphorical level. And indeed this metaphorical process can 
also be seen as providing an alternative model for grasping what is at stake in the 
process of understanding itself. Such an attempt has recently been made by 
George Taylor.1194 Still other possibilities are available, such as taking the 
paradigm of translation as the model for hermeneutics. Ricœur himself seems to 
have hinted at this possibility in his late contributions, and Scott Davidson has 
followed and further developed this lead.1195 
In this last section, I have chosen to emphasize, in a manner similar to 
what Daniel Frey1196 has done before me, the divergences between Gadamer’s and 
Ricœur’s hermeneutic theories. It now has become fully apparent the difference 
between Ricœur’s and Gadamer’s – as well as Heidegger’s – take on the 
relationship between truth and method. Whereas both Heidegger and Gadamer see 
this as a logical disjunction, Ricœur maintains that a good hermeneutic theory will 
rather combine them in a dialectical conjunction. And while Gadamer accentuates 
more fully than Heidegger the importance of language, Ricœur accepts this 
linguistic turn, but chooses to introduce the conflict of hermeneutics1197 at its core 
and so sees no universal and encompassing hermeneutic theory, where for 
Gadamer there is indeed such a universal hermeneutics. For Ricœur language is 
fundamentally broken and dispersed, while Gadamer emphasizes the continuity 
between the several domains in which the hermeneutic experience takes place. 
Thus for Gadamer the emphasis is on the fusion of horizons, while for Ricœur this 
same emphasis is put on the conflict of interpretations. In what comes down to 
their theory of the text, and one’s stance towards a given text and meaningful 
                                                
1194 See George H. Taylor, “Understanding as Metaphoric, not a Fusion of Horizons” in Gadamer 
and Ricœur. Critical Horizons for Contemporary Hermeneutics, edited by Francis J. Mootz III and 
George H. Taylor (London/New York: Continuum, 2011) pp. 104-118. 
1195 See Ricœur, “The Paradigm of Translation” in Reflections on the Just, pp. 106-120. See also 
Scott Davidson, “Ricœur’s Later Thought. From Hermeneutics to Translation and Back Again” in 
Philosophy Today vol. 57, 1 (Spring 2013): 61-71. 
1196 See Daniel Frey, L’interprétation et la lecture chez Ricœur et Gadamer (Paris: P.U.F., 2008), 
especially part one, “Le conflit des herméneutiques de Gadamer et de Ricœur”, pp. 31-102. 
1197 Ricœur explicitly defines the conflict of hermeneutics in the first phase of his hermeneutical 
theory, and the epistemological consequences this has for hermeneutics in Paul Ricœur, “Le conflit 
des herméneutiques: épistémologie des interprétations” in Cahiers internationaux de symbolisme 
1/1 (1963): 152-184. See also, for a very good presentation of this problem, Maria Luísa 
Portocarrero, A Hermenêutica do Conflito em Paul Ricœur, op. cit. 
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traditions, as Merold Westphal recently argued, they are both caught between the 
dialectic between belonging and distanciation.1198 This is true, even though there is 
also a difference of emphasis, Gadamer insisting much more on belonging and 
listening, and Ricœur emphasizing the critical aspect of distancing from one’s 
point of departure in order to develop an internal critique. Now, this is obviously 
not to say that there are not similarities between these two projects. There certainly 
are, and if I decided to emphasize the differences, it was precisely because the 
similarities are so many that they can tend to become overwhelming, and 
obnubilate the meaningful differences that do exist. My own depiction of the 
conflict of interpretations needed to emphasize its departure from Gadamer’s 
fusion of horizons. 
In the next part of this thesis I will cover some of the aspects left out in 
this cursory incursion into the conflict of interpretations; I will also include, for 
instance, an assessment of the only published debate between Gadamer and 
Ricœur. 
At the end of this part of the thesis, I hope that it has been made clear 
how there is a certain continuity between Ricœur’s first philosophical analyzes, 
those dealing with existential philosophy, and the hermeneutic turn of the 1960s. I 
showed that the conflict of interpretations is ultimately grounded in different parts 
of existence and how it is trough his own methodology of embracing the conflict 
of interpretations that Ricœur methodologically enlarges his own perspective, thus 
aiming at truth through interpretation and language, striving to sketch an ontology, 
without however ever completely developing it; i.e., without claiming to have the 
truth. In this, his interpretations of others, and of history, are of crucial importance. 
In fact, truth would later be seen as a task, and even later, it would be depicted as 
attestation, at the level of a theory of the self. It remains to be seen how his own 
hermeneutical toolbox will ultimately provide him with the right instruments – 
namely a theory of reading and of the construction of meaning through reading – 
to further ground both the hermeneutic methodology, and its connection with the 
quest for truth. But in order to fully develop this complex dialectic, conflict will 
have to arrive at the second stage of its course. 
                                                
1198 See Merold Westphal, “The dialectic of Belonging and Distanciation in Gadamer and Ricœur” 
in Gadamer and Ricœur. Critical Horizons for Contemporary Hermeneutics, edited by Francis J. 
Mootz III and George H. Taylor, pp. 43-62. 
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Part Four 
 
The Hermeneutic Conflict 
 
Ricœur’s hermeneutic turn can be located at a precise point in time, at 
least in terms of his publications. We have seen in part three how in Fallible Man 
he sketches a philosophic anthropology that revolves around the notions of 
fragility and fallibility. This philosophic anthropology, valuable as it is for our 
own investigation on conflict, is nonetheless written by Ricœur only as an 
introduction, a preparatory study that needed to exist in order for philosophical 
reflection to be able to delve into an applied hermeneutic exploration. Thus in the 
second part of the second volume of the Philosophy of the Will, The Symbolism of 
Evil, Ricœur aims at going from the possibility of evil to its reality, from fallibility 
to fault.1199 I shall note in passing that evil is obviously radically tied to the 
existence of conflict. In radical cases of conflict, such as violence, or in the decline 
of the will that consists in wanting something bad, having a bad maxim, what we 
find is the possibility of political and moral conflict, either in the form of violence 
against a fellow human being or in the choosing of a bad maxim over a good one.  
In the Symbolism of Evil the goal is to undertake a culturally specific 
investigation dealing with the symbols of evil in the Babylonian, Greek and 
Hebrew traditions. How is it that the human being, a being who is constitutively 
fragile and prone to failure, comes to actually fail, to incur in a fault, and to feel 
guilty about it thereafter? More importantly, how does this guilt express itself in a 
permanent manner that is inscribed in one’s specific culture and what does this 
reveal about our human nature? These are some of the questions Ricœur is 
addressing in 1960. The book revolves around the notion of faute, which in French 
means both fault and guilt. He starts by laying out a phenomenology of 
confession, which is his way of trying to rationally reconstruct the religious belief 
that expresses itself in the symbols of evil. He thus proposes to undertake a 
philosophical “re-enactment” of the confession of evil, of one’s fault / guilt. He 
                                                
1199 Ricœur, The Symbolism of Evil, p. 3. On the topic of evil in Ricœur see also Répliquer au mal. 
Symbole et justice dans l’œuvre  de Paul Ricœur, edited by Jérôme Porée and Gilbert Vincent 
(Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2006) and Paul Ricœur e a Simbólica do Mal, edited by 
Fernanda Henriques (Porto: Edições Afrontamento, 2005).  
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describes this operation by stating that the philosopher does not feel this like the 
religious believer does; he rather “re-feels” it in a neutralized mode by means of a 
re-enactment in sympathetic imagination.1200 I believe he would later express this 
in clearer terms in the decades to follow, when he thematically describes the 
hermeneutical function of distanciation.  
This book analyzes in detail the significance of symbols such as those of 
defilement, sin, guilt and all the major myths of the beginning and end of the 
world, including the Adamic myth and those contained in Greek tragedy, which 
will always remain a fertile source for Ricoeurian philosophy. The Symbolism of 
Evil is therefore of major importance for the history of religious ideas and 
symbols. Delving in it in detail would go beyond the purpose of this thesis. 
However, I will have to mention Ricœur’s short 10 page conclusion, “Symbol 
gives rise to thought” (le symbole donne à penser) because it is of great 
significance for his philosophy, in that it precisely marks the beginning of his 
hermeneutic turn. 
As is slowly becoming apparent, Ricœur has a knack for summarizing 
long, complicated and nuanced debates in short formulae that finally encapsulate 
the whole problematic in a concise and beautiful conclusion. This was the case 
with “l’homme est la joie du oui dans la tristesse du fini”; now, this time, he 
explicates his conclusion, that symbol gives rise to thought (even though this 
formula is borrowed from Kant) in the following terms: “That sentence, which 
enchants me, says two things: the symbol gives; but what it gives is occasion for 
thought, something to think about.”1201 Ricœur asserts that human being is 
immersed in language, made up of language. This does not mean that there are not 
pre-linguistic layers of experience. However, whatever has meaning is expressed 
in language. But the fact is that this expression is not always direct. As the 
existence of myths and symbols shows us, argues Ricœur, some of the paths that 
expression can take are indirect. And because language can be symbolic1202, an 
interpretation is called for; as Ricœur puts it, in a more beautiful way than I could: 
 
                                                
1200 Ricœur, The Symbolism of Evil., p. 19. 
1201 Ibid., p. 348. 
1202 For a very good and exhaustive account of the symbolic expression of meaning in the 
philosophy of Ricœur, from symbols and metaphors to narratives and Ricœur’s mature 
hermeneutical theory, see Carlos João Correia, Ricœur e a Expressão Simbólica do Sentido 
(Lisboa: Gulbenkian, 1999). 
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wherever a man dreams or raves, another man arises to give an interpretation.1203  
 
The result of this inner connection between symbolic language, like that of 
confession, and interpretation, is a definition of symbol itself as being double-
layered, as having a double meaning: a meaning that is patent, that expresses itself, 
and another, latent meaning which hides beneath the first one and that calls for an 
interpretation; this latter point will be made clearer in Freud and Philosophy. But 
it also has a different consequence, in terms of the task of the philosopher, as 
Ricœur sees it in 1960: his task comes to be defined as a “restorative critique”, that 
is, a task of grasping the pre-comprehension, of entering correctly in the 
hermeneutic circle, not by innocently believing in symbols, but rather by thinking 
from symbols, by taking them as our starting point in reflection.1204 
Now this of course implies a wager. In fact, we have to be convinced that 
these symbols that speak to me are, at least indirectly, true; as Ricœur puts it in the 
last sentences of this book, “philosophy endeavors, through reflection and 
speculation, to disclose the rationality of its foundation”.1205 This trust in the 
fullness of language, that is, in its capacity to bear meaning, could, in itself, be a 
very naïf and uncritical exercise, were it not to be later complemented by its 
dialectical counterpart: critique as an exercise of suspicion. Be that as it may, the 
first phase of Ricoeurian hermeneutics is marked by this insistence on symbols as 
being dual, constituted by a double meaning, and by the effort to find the latent 
meaning that lies beneath what is at first apparent. 
In the years after the publishing of The Symbolism of Evil, Ricœur would 
radically enlarge his hermeneutical toolbox, and develop it in unexpected ways 
that would ultimately transform his philosophy altogether. Why and in what 
manner? A few biographical details need to be addressed1206. The first, most 
radical experience certainly is the discovery of Freudian psychoanalysis as an 
approach that would become complementary to Ricœur’s early phenomenological 
analyzis of consciousness. In fact, Freud had proved to be an influence for Ricœur 
ever since his contact with the lectures of Roland Dalbiez, who had been Ricœur’s 
                                                
1203 Ricœur, The Symbolism of Evil., p. 350. 
1204 Ibid., p. 355. 
1205 Ibid., p. 357. 
1206 A detailed account of this period can be found in parts six (“Face aux maîtres du soupçon: 
1960-1970, pp. 289-365) and seven (“L’aventure de Nanterre”: 1965-1970, pp. 369-435) of 
Dosse’s biography. See Dosse, Les sens d’une vie, op. cit. 
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teacher in his youth. However, it was only in 1958, after having read an article by 
Antoine Vergote1207, that Ricœur started to seriously tackle Freud’s works, and 
teaching his psychoanalytical theory in his lectures. At this point in time, he 
undertook a systematic reading of Freud’s complete works in German. His first 
production in this domain took place precisely in 1960, in the context of a 
symposium organized by Henri Ey and taking place in Bonneval.1208 This was 
followed by three conferences in 1961 in Yale (The Terry Lectures) and eight 
conferences in 1962 in the context of the Université Catholique de Louvain’s 
Chaire Mercier. These would be the kernel of Freud and Philosophy and it is in 
these lectures that finally the notion of a conflict of interpretations takes shape, 
namely with the affirmation of the hermeneutics of suspicion, as we have seen in 
the last chapter. In a nutshell, we can say that the Freudian discovery of the 
unconscious proves to be, for Ricœur, another confirmation of the encrypted 
character of consciousness, and of the need to find a suitable technique to decipher 
it, a technique of interpretation. I will dedicate a chapter in this part to 
psychoanalytic conflict, which is of the utmost importance for Ricœur. 
However, this is not the only decisive influence in Ricoeurian 
hermeneutics. In fact, the context of 1960s intellectual France bore testimony not 
only to a lasting influence of Marxism and psychoanalysis but also, significantly, 
to the linguistic turn, largely inspired by Saussure, and resulting in structuralism. 
In his characteristic fashion, Ricœur refused both to totally accept or totally reject 
its premises, which radically criticized Ricœur’s own phenomenological 
background; instead, he chose to accept their challenges and, ultimately, to 
integrate their analyzes, to the best of his abilities, in his own philosophy. This is 
true both in what concerns Lévi-Strauss’s structural approach and Greimas’s 
semiotic analyzes.  
Lévi-Strauss’s La Pensée Sauvage was published in 1962. Ricœur 
decided to organize a reading group with his team in Esprit and one year later they 
engaged in a direct debate with Lévi-Strauss (among the participants were, for 
instance, Kostas Axelos and Pierre Hadot). The result, “La pensée sauvage et le 
                                                
1207 See Antoine Vergote, “L’intérêt philosophique de la Psychanalyse freudienne”, in Archives de 
Philosophie XXI (janvier-mars 1958), quoted by Dosse, Les sens d’une vie, p. 290). 
1208 And whose text, “Consciousness and the unconscious” was republished in The Conflict of 
Interpretations, pp. 99-120. 
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structuralisme” was published in 1963.1209 In this interesting debate, Ricœur 
refuses to closely distinguish between explanation and understanding, but he 
certainly tries to recuperate the structuralist method as a part of the explanatory 
procedures needed in the effort of understanding. He goes so far as stating that 
“we can never practice hermeneutics without structuralism”.1210 However, he is 
also, as in the case of psychoanalysis, setting out to discover its limits.  
Again, the same can be said vis-à-vis Greimas’s – whom Ricœur 
encounters in 1968 – semiology. According to Dosse, Ricœur’s relationship with 
Greimas was as close as he could get to the famous liebender Kampf that we 
already mentioned several times. In this debate, each one wanted to include the 
other’s theory in his own approach; to Ricœur’s own insistence in the 
encompassing character of the hermeneutic circle, Greimas opposes the totalizing 
aspect of semiotics: everything can be analyzed in semiotic terms and thus broken 
down into its signifying elements. As a consequence of this intersection with 
semiotics, Ricœur’s theory of the text would grant a major importance to semiotic 
analyzis, as we shall see below.  
However, structuralism and semiotics are only one part of Ricœur’s 
delving into the linguistic domain. We have seen in the previous chapter how 
language was a topic of discussion between Gadamer and Ricœur, and how even 
though Ricœur appreciates and up to a certain extent agrees with Gadamer’s 
depiction of Sprachlichkeit, he contends that we have no single universal 
hermeneutic key. Precisely because of that fragmentation, he aims at 
understanding the inner workings of all these theories of language, without 
conceding that any of them is universal. It is against this background that he 
discusses Saussure’s linguistic theory, his distinction between langue and parole, 
and, more importantly, tries to develop a philosophy of discourse in the wake of 
Émile Benveniste.  This would, in turn, lead to Ricœur’s own theory of the text. 
A last piece in this complex puzzle of the theoretical influences at work 
in Ricœur’s hermeneutics is the discovery of analytical philosophy and, most of 
all, of ordinary language philosophy, as it is exemplified in the works of Austin, 
Searle, Anscombe and the later Wittgenstein. In fact, Ricœur would act as an 
                                                
1209 See Claude Lévi-Strauss, Paul Ricœur, et. al. “La pensée sauvage et le structuralisme” in Esprit 
31/11 (novembre 1963): 628-653. 
1210  Ibid., p. 635 (quoted in Dosse, p. 318) 
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introducer of most of these strands in France, due to another biographical fact: 
from 1969 onwards, he was responsible, in partnership with François Wahl, for the 
collection “L’ordre philosophique” at the French publisher Le Seuil. This 
collection, which still exists nowadays – now run by Jean-Claude Monod and 
Michaël Foessel, after a period in which Alain Badiou and Barbara Cassin 
replaced Wahl and Ricœur – had Ricœur at its helm for decades. It was in the 
context of that collection that Gadamer’s Truth and Method was published for the 
first time, and as a result of a steadfast commitment assumed by Ricœur. In the 
collection were also published some of the classics of analytical philosophy and 
the philosophy of language, such as Austin’s How to do things with words1211, 
Strawson’s Individuals1212 and Frege’s main works1213 in French translations. Up 
until that time, these authors were not really mainstream in the French 
philosophical landscape. It must also be emphasized that one of Ricœur’s 
longstanding theoretical concerns in this period was the articulation between 
Husserlian phenomenology – and the possibility of putting forward a 
phenomenology of language, with or without Husserl – and analytic philosophy, 
mainly the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein and ordinary language 
philosophy.1214 
Moreover, Ricœur hosted a CNRS seminar in Paris, which lasted from 
1967 to 1979 (November-May each year, from 1967-1971 at Sorbonne’s “Salle 
des Indiens” and then from 1972-1979 at Rue Parmentier). This seminar, which 
had a strong adhesion from international researchers, was dedicated to discussing 
analytical philosophy and the philosophy of language. It also served as a means for 
Ricœur to discuss his new lines of research with a group of motivated and 
                                                
1211 John L. Austin, Quand dire c’est faire (Paris: Seuil, 1970). 
1212 P. F. Strawson, Les individus. Essai de métaphysique descriptive (Paris: Seuil, 1973). 
1213 Gottlob Frege, Les fondements de l’arithmétique (Paris: Seuil, 1970) and also Frege, Écrits 
Logiques et Philosophiques (Paris: Seuil, 1971). 
1214 This possible connection is explored in some of Ricœur’s lesser-known articles. On the 
connection of Husserl’s and Wittgenstein’s respective theories of language, see Paul Ricœur, 
“Husserl and Wittgenstein on Language” in Phenomenology and Existentialism, ed. E. N. Lee e M. 
Mandelbaum (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1967). On the possibility of putting 
forward a phenomenology of language and the way in which, following the footsteps of Merleau-
Ponty, it had been developed in France in the 1960s, see Ricœur, “New developments in phenome-
nology in France: The phenomenology of language” in Social Research 34/1 (1967): 1-30. For an 
account of the connection between phenomenology and philosophy of language in the trailblazing 
works of the German phenomenologist Alexander Pfänder, and the meaningful way in which this 
connection can be revitalized by ordinary language philosophy, see “Phénoménologie du vouloir et 
approche par le langage ordinaire”, in Ricœur, Écrits et conférences 3: Anthropologie 
philosophique, op. cit., pp. 147-171.   
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knowledgeable graduate students. The group discussed texts of Austin, Searle, 
Anscombe and, most of all, the later Wittgenstein. Subjects so important for that 
period of Ricœur’s production were discussed first and foremost with that group, 
such as the topics of hermeneutics (1972-1973), imagination (1973-1974), 
narrativity (1976-1977) and history (1977-1979). The work method consisted in 
Ricœur providing a long introduction, followed by questions, discussion, and, in 
each of the sessions, a presentation by one of the graduate students and 
international scholars. Usually, these contributions were published in the 
collection of the CNRS. They sometimes provide, along with other of Ricœur’s 
important lectures1215, very important summaries of the sources with which 
Ricœur dealt when developing his own philosophy. 
Even if rendering a complete depiction of Ricœur’s hermeneutical theory 
is not the goal of this section, I will venture to lay out its main traits, recurring to 
the important polycopié called Cours sur l’herméneutique (Lectures on 
Hermeneutics), which was lectured in 1971 at the Université Catholique de 
Louvain. Ricœur’s hermeneutical theory has, broadly speaking, two distinct 
phases. We can even distinguish, for analytic purposes, a general hermeneutic 
theory (whose object are myths, signs, symbols, sentences, discourse, and, finally 
texts – in a nutshell: language and its works, the meaning of its events) and a 
hermeneutics of the self1216, properly dealing with the way in which the subject 
constitutes itself through the long detour of the interpretation of language. As 
Scott Davidson and Johann Michel rightly emphasize, quoting Bernard Stevens 
(who is in turn quoting Ricœur himself)1217, the hermeneutics from the 1960s is 
                                                
1215 Namely the so-called polycopiés, lectures that were very famous at the universities in which 
Ricœur gave them, and so were made publicly available in those universities, without however 
having been published by any major publisher. In fact, very few Ricœur lectures were published 
during his lifetime, with the notorious exception being the Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, edited 
by George Taylor. However, some of these polycopiés are now in the process of being published. I 
mention a few of them in this thesis, such as Être et essence chez Platon et Aristote, the Cours sur 
l’herméneutique and La sémantique de l’action. 
1216 On this first phase of the hermeneutics of the self, and the topic of the subject before Oneself as 
Another, see Manuel Sumares, O Sujeito e a Cultura na Filosofia de Paul Ricœur. Para além da 
Necessidade (Lisboa: Escher, 1989). On the Hermeneutics of the self and of the human condition, 
with a good overall presentation of Ricœur’s hermeneutics in its main traits, see Miguel Baptista 
Pereira, A Hermenêutica da Condição Humana de Paul Ricœur in Revista Filosófica de Coimbra 
24 (2003): 235-277. 
1217 See Davidson’s and Michel’s preface to Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricœur Studies (ERRS) vol. 1, 
number 1 (2010): 7. See also Bernard Stevens, L’apprentissage des signes: lecture de Paul Ricœur 
(Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1991). The origin of this formulation is to be found in Ricœur’s Freedom and 
Nature, p. 13 [Modified translation].  
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conceived in terms of an “apprenticeship of signs”. What is at stake is, as we have 
seen, a hermeneutics based on symbols as a dual structure that contains both a 
patent and a latent meaning. Thus Ricœur emphasizes the way in which these 
symbols come about, how they are constructed and the layers of meaning they 
convey, as well as the significance they have for the way in which the subject 
interprets him or herself. This first phase is marked by both an extension and a 
delimitation of the early phenomenological method, in debate, as I just mentioned, 
mainly with structuralism, and psychoanalysis, and also extending to a 
phenomenology of religion. In particular, the debate between Freud and Hegel 
concerning the formation of consciousness would assume a particular importance, 
as both their theories represent a particular process of the formation of 
consciousness and meaning. This first phase will receive proper attention in 
sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 below. One of the main emphases will be granted to 
psychoanalysis in section 4.2, because it reveals a new, and fundamental domain 
in which conflict will unfold in a decisive manner for us. The second hermeneutic 
phase, the one that roughly starts after the publication of The Conflict of 
Interpretations in 1969, and extends up until the publication of From Text to 
Action in 1986 focuses much more on the hermeneutics of texts (such as the 
dialectic between distanciation and appropriation in the theory of writing and 
reading), in the refiguration of the world through the three types of mimesis, in the 
phenomena of semantic innovation in metaphor and narrative, and in the particular 
interaction with the domain of social philosophy and human action in general 
(sometimes understood using the metaphor of the text). Sections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 
will analyze in detail the dialectic between explanation and understanding, and the 
phenomenological, linguistic and hermeneutic analyzes of action that Ricœur 
undertakes in the 1970s. However, in order that a general presentation of his 
hermeneutic theory, in its main points, be made, I find it useful to return to the 
Cours sur l’herméneutique because, although it was written in the early 1970s, it 
already contains, in a didactic and condensed manner, some of the systematic 
developments that would eventually appear in the later hermeneutical theory. It 
thus operates as a mediation between the two phases that we will analyze in detail 
in the chapters below. I will afterwards complete this introduction by briefly 
mentioning Ricœur’s work on metaphor and narrative, two products of productive 
imagination, and also by concisely alluding to how the conflict of interpretations 
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unfolds in some of the texts of this period pertaining to Biblical exegesis. 
In his famous Lectures on Hermeneutics, Ricœur already defines, and this 
right from the start, hermeneutics as being coextensive with the problem of 
understanding texts.1218 Therefore, after briefly sketching a history of 
hermeneutics, from the applied exegeses of texts in Antiquity, to the reappearance 
of the term Hermeneutik in eighteenth century Germany, he dedicates the first 
part1219 of these lectures to the theory of the text. Ricœur reminds his 
listeners/readers, at that time the students in Louvain (today Leuven), that unlike 
in Germany, French and francophone philosophers when analyzing language and 
wanting to delineate something like a hermeneutic theory, felt obliged to include 
properly linguistic analyzes. This happened, according to him, because the French 
cultural scene in the social sciences was heavily influenced by Saussure and his 
linguistic theory. He proceeds by recalling Saussure’s distinction between langue 
and parole, and the four main laws of his linguistic theory, the one made famous 
in his Cours de Linguistique Générale, namely 1) linguistic units are differential 
and oppositive; 2) all their relations are of form and not of substance; 3) these 
relations can be synchronic or diachronic and we cannot mix the two, since we 
cannot simultaneously ask how a given system works at a certain time and how its 
parts change; 4) a linguistic system is a closed system of internal dependencies 
and all oppositions take place within closed systems.1220 
Ricœur stresses that while the fourth axiom is the most important one, 
because it is precisely this closed character that provides linguistics with the finite 
object and the set of laws that allows it to become a science, it also is the most 
problematic. In fact, one of Ricœur’s longstanding theses will be that language is 
never only about itself, but also always at the same time about the world. It is not 
entirely self-referential. Its reference will be reality, even if, at times, this can be a 
very different reality than what we are used to. 
Thus Ricœur distances himself from Saussure’s linguistics and rather 
chooses to take as his point of departure Émile Benveniste’s own linguistic 
analyzes, in order to undertake a hermeneutic not of language (langue), but rather 
of discourse. The first meaningful difference between these two approaches is that 
                                                
1218 Ricœur, Cours sur l’herméneutique, op. cit., p. 2. 
1219 Ibid., pp. 9-66. 
1220 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
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its constitutive units are not the same: for a linguistics of language these are signs, 
understood as being in a synchronic relationship with each other, whereas for a 
linguistic theory of discourse, these are sentences. In Saussurian linguistics 
meaning can be reduced to the analyzis of signs. And a sign is nothing more than a 
double-faced phenomenon: a signifier and a signified. As such, signs are 
intrinsically arbitrary and the relation between signifier and signified is purely 
linguistic, that is, it does not turn us towards what goes beyond language.  
However, for Ricœur, there is more to meaning than this. On the one 
hand, discourse happens as an event. On the other hand, it can only be understood 
as meaning.1221 Now, the meaning of what is said is itself an object of dispute and 
therefore open to the conflict of interpretations; and this has decisive 
consequences, because language has the power to express reality and even to 
define the self, through narrative. 
This can, of course, take place in a number of different ways. One of the 
questions that intrigued Ricœur was the fate of discourse in writing. He concedes 
that language is fragile1222 but he claims that this frailty is provided a solution with 
the invention of writing: verba volant, scripta manent. Eventually, Ricœur would 
even undertake to answer Plato who, in the Phaedrus, addressing the myth of the 
invention of writing, accuses written works of being orphan, left without the 
author who wrote them. 
With the theory and even the apology of writing, a new emphasis is put 
forward: hermeneutics deals not only with sentences, but also with texts. This, in 
turn, calls for a theory of reading. Both Gadamer and Ricœur rightly emphasize 
the importance of this theory of reading, the difference between them being that 
Ricœur is much more attentive to the plurality of different readings than Gadamer, 
which ultimately brings him closer to Umberto Eco’s notion of “open work”: 
 
With writing, the other becomes virtual. Something written addresses itself to anyone who 
can read (Gadamer). The potential audience is not predetermined by the closed situation 
of dialogue; writing shatters that closed situation. In dialogue we have an interlocutor, in 
                                                
1221 Ibid., p. 16. 
1222 Ibid., p. 25. 
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writing we have an audience. We therefore arrive to the notion of “open work” (Eco). 
Every work is open to an undetermined number of readers and readings.1223 
 
Daniel Frey has rightly emphasized that the main difference between 
Gadamer’s and Ricœur’s theories of reading is that for Gadamer truth is 
primordial. It is expressed in tradition and reflected in the text as well as, a fortiori, 
in reading. Thus the active part of construction of meaning on the part of the 
reader is kept to a minimum. Reading is understood as an application of 
interpretation. Whereas for Ricœur truth is an effect of meaning – and let us recall 
that meaning is dependent on the conflict of interpretations – and therefore the 
reader is forced to take an active part not only in the discovery but also, in some 
way, in the creation of this meaning. Therefore, for Ricœur, reading is much more 
than “pious hearing”.1224 It is, up to some extent, an active exercise of critique 
where belonging and appropriation are problematized by distanciation and 
reformulation. This is partly what Ricœur expresses with his notion of the “world 
of the text” and it is thus tantamount to his claim that in the act of reading this 
world “intersects” with the world of the reader and thus that each finite act of 
interpretation is, in a sense, unique and different. In part seven I will argue that 
this is not always the case in Ricœur, but whatever the case may be, it is more so 
in Ricœur than in Gadamer. 
Consequently, every reader is always, whether he wants it or not, 
somewhat original, because his act of understanding will, up to some extent, be 
different from all the others. To this corresponds also a notion of originality of 
authors; in fact, Ricœur stresses the importance of the notions of (authorial) work 
and particular style, following Gilles-Gaston Granger. Indeed, he states that it is 
the notions of work and style that mediate between discursive events and 
meaning.1225 
In the second part of these lectures Ricœur introduces the major 
contributors to hermeneutic theory, from Schleiermacher and Dilthey to Heidegger 
and Gadamer, in order to later spell out, in the third part, his own second version 
of the methodology of interpretation. The theory of reading is here crucial. It is in 
                                                
1223 Ibid., p. 31. [My translation] 
1224 See Daniel Frey, L’interprétation et la lecture chez Ricœur et Gadamer (Paris: P.U.F., 2008), 
p. 288. 
1225 Ricœur, Cours sur l’herméneutique, p. 42. 
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this act that Ricœur sees the dialectic between explanation and understanding, 
which we will see in detail below. His aim will ultimately be to sketch in a 
provisional manner an ontology, as we have seen, but one that sees in the texts 
themselves, and in their interpretations by readers, the existential possibilities that 
lay there for us; in a way, to read a text is to grasp an existential possibility, and 
this is the last, definitive way in which Ricœur grounds hermeneutics in existence. 
Thus the hermeneutics of the self is, properly speaking, interpretation of the 
“world”, and not really self-discovery. The “long detour” will be not only through 
signs and symbols, but also through works and texts, all the meaningful 
productions of our civilization. 
The result of all these elements is that language and world are not kept 
apart but made dialectical in relation to each other. Language thus ceases to be a 
“closed system” and becomes an open one: 
 
Is it not in this passage from the closed system to the open system that the transition from 
explanation to interpretation is also effectuated?1226 
 
Ricœur concludes these lectures with his often-repeated assertion that 
between hermeneutics and Absolute Knowing, one must choose. His last pages are 
dedicated to the phenomena of ambiguity in discourse and its written and poetic 
equivalent: metaphor. Let us recall that these were the preparatory years of his 
excellent The Rule of Metaphor. Now, even though I am not consecrating any 
complete chapter to this book, I do not want to underrate its value. The book is 
published in 1975, the same year in which Ricœur gives in Chicago his Lectures 
on Ideology and Utopia as well as his Lectures on Imagination. We can therefore 
safely assume that this is the period in which he dedicates more attention to what 
he calls, in the wake of Kant, productive imagination. In fact, Ricœur 
distinguishes between productive and reproductive imagination, consecrates an 
important text, republished in From Text to Action to imagination1227, and he 
                                                
1226 Ibid., p. 188. [My translation] 
1227 Ricœur, “Imagination in Discourse and in Action”, in From Text to Action, pp. 168-187. For an 
account of Ricœur’s topic of imagination, see Jean-Luc Amalric, Paul Ricœur, l’imagination vive. 
Une genèse de la philosophie ricœurienne de l’imagination (Paris: Hermann, 2013), Maria 
Gabriela Castro, Imaginação em Paul Ricœur (Lisboa: Piaget, 2006) and George H. Taylor, 
“Ricœur’s Philosophy of Imagination” in Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy, 16/1-2 
(2006): 93-104. 
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would publish at least four books (The Rule of Metaphor as well as, up to some 
extent, the volumes of Time and Narrative) to theoretical imagination, that is, 
more specifically, the poetic and narrative phenomena. He also consecrates his 
Lectures on Ideology and Utopia to practical imagination, and namely to the social 
imaginary. 
I have no definitive explanation for this but, for one reason or another, it 
seems as if this year of 1975 bears witness, through Ricœur’s reflection on 
productive imagination, to a level of radicality and thought vitality that in a way 
goes beyond all his other production. He has bolder claims in this period, both in 
terms of ontological insights and social and political statements, than in any other 
time. I will come back to this in the last part of this dissertation, arguing that there 
is something of that radicality that needs to be re-enacted and further developed. 
In a nutshell, the goal of the Rule of Metaphor1228 is to show that poetic 
language, namely the kind of language expressed in “living metaphors” 
(métaphores vives) is a type of language able to disclose hidden layers of reality 
that are usually hidden from our ordinary experience. Against ancient rhetoric, 
Ricœur’s point of departure is not that of metaphor as a trope, an ornament with 
which we make a beautiful speech by substituting a worn out word for a more 
exuberant one; instead, his locus of analyzis is the propositional framework within 
which metaphoricity is at work. Metaphors are not in themselves mere words, it is 
only in the context of the whole sentence that they can make sense. And in fact, 
“making sense” is the exact expression to use in this context, because this is 
actually what they do. When Ricœur invokes some famous poetic examples, such 
as Baudelaire’s “Correspondences”: “Nature is a temple where living 
pillars…”1229, or Gerard Manley Hopkins’s “Oh! The mind has mountains”1230 he 
claims that the reader knows that nature does not literally have columns, nor mind 
has mountains. This much can be said about Camões’s famous depiction of love: 
“Love is a fire that burns unseen”. Love is not fire. But certainly the experience of 
                                                
1228 See Ricœur, The Rule of Metaphor, op. cit. The topic of metaphor has unfortunately not been 
the object of much attention in Ricœur scholarship, asides George Taylor’s many insightful 
contributions. One of the best books available on this topic is Jean-Luc Amalric’s L’enjeu de la 
métaphore. See Jean-Luc Amalric, Ricœur, Derrida: L’enjeu de la métaphore (Paris: P.U.F., 
2006). See also George Taylor and Michael J. Madison, “Metaphor, Objects and Commodities, in 
Cleveland State Law Review 54 (2006): 141-173, and George H. Taylor, “Reenvisioning Justice” 
in Lo Sguardo – Rivista di Filosofia 12, II (2013): 65-80. 
1229 Ricœur, The Rule of Metaphor, p. 197. 
1230 Ibid., p. 253. 
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passionate loving, of letting logos being overcome by thumos and eros, can 
assume the sort of fiery, bittersweet impetus of both pleasure and pain that 
Camões is alluding to, in the same way the mysteries and vast regions of our inner 
life can be compared to an intricate landscape, one that has mountains. 
This leads to what Ricœur calls, at this point in time, “metaphoric truth”. 
Consistently with his hermeneutic theory, he uses a semantics of discourse and 
written works to insist that language refers back to reality. His wager in this book, 
and the novelty properly speaking, is that Frege’s distinction between meaning and 
reference applies to all language, but in different ways. A simple empirical 
assertion discloses a part of reality, that part which is to us more evident; thus if I 
say that the tree in front of me stands three meters tall, or that its foliage is dense, I 
am not saying anything unusual or odd (except, let us say, if this is a bonsai I am 
alluding to). I am saying what seems, in principle, rather self evident, at least for 
anyone sharing the same categories that I use, acquainted with the metric system, 
etc. But if, in turn, I say that the tree is a “fountain of life”, or “the keeper of our 
ancestors” I am metaphorically pointing to other, symbolic dimensions that this 
hypothetic tree might contain. 
In these types of assertions, Ricœur contends, the metaphoric function of 
the copula (the tree is this or that) assumes center stage in the metaphoric process. 
According to him, when formulating them, we incur in some sort of voluntary 
“category mistakes” (a notion borrowed from Gilbert Ryle) by virtue of which, 
new dimensions of reality are disclosed. Thus things can have multiple references; 
and what the metaphoric meaning points is to these poetic, symbolic realities, 
which no literal, prosaic use of language can grasp. 
Now, if we look closely at this process, it becomes apparent that, once 
again, conflict plays the decisive role in it. What metaphor requires is a “semantic 
impertinence” and therefore a “tension between two interpretations: between a 
literal interpretation that perishes at the hands of semantic impertinence and a 
metaphorical interpretation whose sense emerges through nonsense”.1231 So this is, 
in fact, a conflict of two interpretations, one which “employs only values that are 
already lexicalized and so succumbs to semantic impertinence; the other, 
                                                
1231 Ibid., p. 292. 
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instituting a new semantic impertinence, requires a twist in the word that displaces 
its own meaning.”1232 
This last remark reveals yet another conflict: the one between 
sedimentation and innovation. But this particular conflict turns out to be 
dialectical. Living metaphors struggle with sedimented meaning; in that way, they 
innovate, and have to defeat the narrowness of the ancient meaning, in order to 
impose the new one. Ricœur follows Nelson Goodman in saying that the subject of 
this new, impertinent predicate “yields while protesting”.1233 But this does not 
mean, eo ipso, that by acquiring new meanings, the old predicates just vanish or 
disappear. This might happen, when a new image or metaphor succeeds so well in 
describing a particular property, that we virtually forget the ancient meanings. 
This can also happen with metonymy, as when we speak of the “back” of the 
chair, by reference to the part of human anatomy that is usually in contact with 
that part of the chair. But the process is not necessarily based on exclusion of 
meaning. In fact, most of the time, this is a process whereby new meaning gets 
sedimented and thereby semantically enriches the subject we are talking about. 
Particular objects that are reflected on our language cease to be one-dimensional, 
to borrow Marcuse’s famous predicate in a slightly different way from him. 
Thus in the metaphoric process there are at least two conflicts at stake: 
the conflict between the ancient and the new meaning and also that between 
tradition and innovation. However, precisely in the cases when the new meaning 
imposes itself without obliterating the ancient meaning, what we end up having is 
some sort of enlargement of meaning, akin to the process of enlargement of 
perspective I described above (these are largely my assertions, not Ricœur’s). 
Once again, this process is made possible by the conflict of interpretations. 
In a way, in this hermeneutic phase of Ricœur’s production, almost 
everything can be seen as being epistemologically made intelligible through a 
methodological process of conflict. What I said about metaphor could also apply, 
to some extent, to the other process of semantic innovation Ricœur tackles, 
namely, narrative. In the three volumes of the masterpiece Time and Narrative 
what is at stake is a conflict between the several experiences and configurations of 
time, from lived experience to historical time and fictional narrative. Once again, 
                                                
1232 Ibid., pp. 343-344. 
1233 Ibid., p. 154. 
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many processes of conflict can be detected here. There is the decisive conflict 
between Hegelianism and the hermeneutic method, to which I alluded in part one, 
a conflict in which Ricœur obviously chooses hermeneutics. There is the collision 
between the world of the text and the world of the reader, a conflict so decisive 
that only it provides meaning to the reading of any text. There is an 
epistemological conflict between those theories which want to rehabilitate the 
epistemic pertinence of narrative and those who want to fully discard it, and so 
forth. Also, as I mentioned before, conflict in the domain of historiography would 
be further pursued in Memory, History, Forgetting.  
These descriptions could continue on and on, and be very hard to fully 
explicate in an exhaustive manner. Nonetheless, within the economy of this thesis, 
I have to restrain myself to analyzing the more significant occurrences of these 
conflicts, in order to be able to put forward a meaningful typology. These are the 
occurrences we will explicate in more detail in the chapters that immediately 
follow. However, two brief conclusions can be drawn already. The first is that 
once it reaches the hermeneutic phase, conflict ceases to be a scattered 
phenomenon in Ricœur’s philosophy: it assumes center stage as the 
epistemological tool that animates his philosophy in its many forms. The second is 
that this conflict is mainly a conflict of interpretations and thus, if there is 
something from which Ricœur would never go back, is from his hermeneutic 
assumptions and method. From this point on, Ricœur sees himself as a 
hermeneutic philosopher. Therefore, even though he never really wrote a 
systematic book about hermeneutics – maybe he couldn’t, maybe this reflects only 
his own depiction of hermeneutics as being fragmentary, conflictual and 
incomplete – the collections of articles about hermeneutics (The Conflict of 
Interpretations, From Text to Action and now Écrits et Conférences 2: 
Herméneutique1234) remain some of his most important contributions to 
philosophy. He even tried to define, following Hans Lipps, a “hermeneutic logic”.  
Thus in a 1978 text, “Logique Herméneutique?”1235, Ricœur argues that 
insofar as hermeneutics is a reflection on the assumptions of all understanding of 
the world, it assumes a transcendental character: it is hermeneutics, and the 
                                                
1234 See Ricœur, Écrits et Conférences 2: Herméneutique, edited by Daniel Frey and Nicola 
Stricker (Paris: Seuil, 2010). 
1235 See Ricœur, “Logique Herméneutique?” in Écrits et Conférences 2: Herméneutique, pp. 123-
196. 
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explanation of its precomprehension of the world, as well as its avowal of an 
irreducible opacity and the impossibility of Absolute Logic, that in a way 
underpins the limits of our knowledge.1236 Therefore, and to reiterate a claim that 
we have seen uttered by Ricœur many times, but now with a different grounding, 
hermeneutics renews with Kantianism. For Ricœur, in this text, hermeneutics 
assumes the inner workings of a certain logic, albeit not formal logic, but a 
transcendental one. It goes without saying that even though Ricœur does not 
emphasize it, the conflict of interpretations is an intrinsic part of this logic, 
inasmuch as the possibilities of transcending our perspective and incorporating 
other viewpoints in our interpretation goes through the conflictual process.  
But perhaps the most interesting part of this text is Ricœur’s articulation 
between analytic philosophy – mainly Wittgenstein – and hermeneutics. Ricœur 
argues that insofar as Wittgenstein admits that natural languages are both the basis 
and the horizon of all understanding, we can posit the existence of something like 
a hermeneutic circle in his philosophy.1237 He further argues that we must grasp 
the fertility of the several language games, including the one played by philosophy 
but, coherently with his earlier writings, tries to link these different linguistic 
aspects with different modes of being, different existential possibilities (therefore 
grounding, in a way, Wittgenstein’s philosophy on Heidegger’s). 
Hence, when speaking about a “logic of hermeneutics” Ricœur does not 
intend to say that hermeneutics must be universal, and he is far from alleging that 
it has one single canon. But he seems to be looking for some “rules of thumb” that 
help him to navigate interpretation. One meaningful objection could always be 
stated: don’t we risk falling back upon full-blown relativism? Is not every position 
as good as any other in the conflict of interpretations? In order to respond to this 
objection, Ricœur turns to E. D. Hirsch’s logic of probability. Thus in his theory of 
reading he comes back once again to perspectivism. This is made clear in 
Interpretation Theory. His model is still the Husserlian one: a text can be 
compared to an object. Like the object, it may be viewed from several sides, but 
                                                
1236 Ibid., p. 178. 
1237 Ibid., p. 192. 
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never from all sides at once. And “therefore the reconstruction of the whole has a 
perspectival aspect similar to that of a perceived object.”1238 
Every reading is unique and, in a way, one-sided. This is what Ricœur 
calls the “guess character of interpretation”.1239 This means that my own first 
understanding of a text is something like a guess. It is the own particular way in 
which the world of the text collides with my own world, in its first coming. Now, 
this does not mean that the first guess is right and that it will not be subject to 
change. It can, and often will. And this because the conflict of interpretations plays 
a crucial role: it is conflict that opens the work to several readings1240 which will 
be able to radically expand my own horizon and the way the world of that text will 
reshape my own world. 
But the conflict of interpretations is in this case the procedure by which I 
test the validity of my own guess, my own interpretation. Only if my guess 
survives falsification will it be able to pass the test of truth and incorporate the 
enlarged perspective. Hence, this process belongs to the order of the probable, of 
the likely: 
 
As concerns the procedures for validation by which we test our guesses, I agree with E. D. 
Hirsch that they are closer to a logic of probability than to a logic of empirical 
verification. To show that an interpretation is more probable in the light of what we know 
is something other than showing that a conclusion is true.1241 
 
And thus we have a new version of the hermeneutic circle, one that takes place 
between guess and validation. Nonetheless, if this is to escape some sort of vicious 
self-confirmation whereby we only confirm our prejudices, no matter how wild 
they might be, conflict will have to play a role of falsification: 
 
To the procedures of validation there also belong procedures of invalidation similar to the 
criteria of falsifiability proposed by Karl Popper in his Logic of Discovery. Here the role 
of falsification is played by the conflict between competing interpretations. An 
interpretation must not only be probable, but more probable than another interpretation. 
                                                
1238 See Ricœur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth, Tx.: 
Texas Christian University Press, 1976), p. 77. 
1239 Ibid. 
1240 Ibid., p. 78. 
1241 Ibid., p. 78. 
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There are criteria of relative superiority for resolving this conflict, which can easily be 
derived from the logic of subjective probability.1242 
 
Ricœur further adds that the logic of validation (and probability) allows us to 
move between the two limits of dogmatism and skepticism, in that it is always 
possible to argue for or against an interpretation. This puts hermeneutics in the 
neighborhood of legal theory, with its accompanying host of judiciary conflicts. 
We will explore this connection in part five of this thesis. Once again, as we can 
see, hermeneutics is seen as an extension of Kantianism. If, for Kant, critical 
philosophy was what allowed us to avoid skepticism and dogmatism, for the 
Ricœur of the 1970s it is the conflict of interpretations that permits us to do so. 
But what is interesting to note is that even though Ricœur claims in the above 
quote that the criteria of relative superiority of one interpretation over another can 
be “easily derived” from the logic subjective probability, he does not tell us 
anything else about it. We are left wondering how exactly he wanted to make this 
transition, and what criteria would he arrive at. Without the clear enunciation of 
these criteria, this solution is perfect, but stays at a very programmatic and general 
level. Maybe his insistence on the fragmentary character of language and 
hermeneutics prevented him from elaborating such a canon. But the result is that 
what we are left with is some sort of rules of thumb we can ourselves elaborate: 
does this interpretation pretend to be final? Is it immune to falsification, in 
Popper’s sense? If it is, it must be false, because it is probably biting off more than 
it can chew, and violating our conditions of finitude. Is this other interpretation 
merely reductive, without being able to formulate a positive depiction of the 
phenomena at stake, or a solution to a certain practical aporia? So it must be too 
skeptical, and no good for, unless complemented by another viewpoint. 
What Ricœur frequently repeats is his will to arbitrate between 
interpretations. Sometimes he posits their convergence. This is true, for instance, 
in his incursions in religious hermeneutics. For instance, in “Du conflit à la 
convergence des méthodes en exégèse biblique”1243, Ricœur assesses three 
possible methods for biblical exegesis: the historic/critical method, the semiotic 
                                                
1242 Ibid., p. 79. 
1243 See Ricœur, “Du conflit à la convergence des méthodes en exégèse biblique” in Exégèse et 
herméneutique, edited by Xavier Léon-Dufour (Paris: Seuil, 1971), pp. 35-53. 
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method and the hermeneutic one (hermeneutic here understood, since it is a text 
from 1971, as the interpretation of texts through understanding and explanation). 
After explicating what each one of these methods consists in, he posits the need 
for a “convergence without eclecticism”.1244 According to him, each of these 
methods sends us to the others. What it has not yet been made clear is what 
“arbitrate” or “converge” here might mean. Part 6 will attempt to make this 
clearer. For now, this introduction should have sufficed to show how pervasive 
conflict becomes, both methodologically and epistemologically, in the context of 
Ricœur’s hermeneutic turn. Let us now proceed to analyze its main occurrences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1244 Ibid., p. 51. 
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4.1 – The conflict of Interpretations: Structuralism, 
Psychoanalysis and the Phenomenology of Religion 
 
4.1.1 – The architecture of meaning in Ricœur’s early hermeneutics: the double 
meaning of symbols 
 
I mentioned in the introduction to this part that the first phase of Ricœur’s 
hermeneutics is marked by an analyzis of symbols. At this point in time, he 
defines symbols by the characteristic of having two possible meanings: 
 
I define “symbol” as any structure of signification in which a direct, primary, literal 
meaning designates, in addition, another meaning which is indirect, secondary, and 
figurative and which can be apprehended only through the first.1245 
 
We can see how, in this first phase, Ricœur’s hermeneutics runs the risk 
of becoming too schematic and encapsulated. Why double meaning? Why must 
there be two meanings, and not more? For him, the important point to emphasize 
is that there is a dialectic which takes place between something that is shown, and 
something that is hidden: 
 
It appears that their common element, which is found everywhere, from exegesis to 
psychoanalysis, is a certain architecture of meaning, which can be termed “double 
meaning” or “multiple meaning”, whose role in every instance, although in a different 
manner, is to show while concealing. It is thus within the semantics of the shown-
concealed, within the semantics of multivocal expressions, that this analyzis of language 
seems to me to be confined.1246 
 
To be sure, Ricœur appears to be admitting the hypothesis that symbolic 
expressions have multiple meanings. A symbolic expression can in fact be a myth, 
or a dream, or poetry. What he seems to be taking for granted in this phase, is that 
the “apparent” meaning, the first-order meaning, is self-explanatory and thus 
“unitary”. Thus even though different theories might reveal different aspects of the 
                                                
1245 Ricœur, “Existence and Hermeneutics” in The Conflict of Interpretations, op. cit., pp. 12-13. 
1246 Ibid., p. 12. 
 438
meaning of a given symbolic expression (such as, for instance, psychoanalysis or 
the critique of ideologies, or even deconstruction, which Ricœur, for obvious 
reasons, does not consider at this time) these different interpretations will all take 
place at the level of the hidden meaning, the meaning that they aim to decipher. 
Thus all this plurality of meanings, probably sometimes diverging among 
themselves, will be “concealed” meaning, needing the multiple canons of 
interpretation to be made accessible; and so they are redirected to their unity as 
“concealed meaning” and opposed to the “shown”, first-level meaning. This is 
why, I believe, Ricœur chooses to speak about “double meaning”. So what he is 
not taking into consideration is the possibility that the first-order meaning already 
contain within itself a myriad of possibilities, such as there will be, in the theory of 
reading of his mature hermeneutics, many possible “guesses” that will have to be 
verified or falsified. 
The necessity to go beyond this first-order meaning, to not let oneself be 
satisfied with it, is therefore what inaugurates hermeneutics as such: 
 
Interpretation is the work of thought which consists in deciphering the hidden meaning in 
the apparent meaning, in unfolding the levels of meaning implied in the literal 
meaning.1247  
 
Ricœur’s emphasis on the concept of symbol goes so far in the 1960s as to make 
interpretation and symbol correlative concepts: there is interpretation wherever 
there is multiple meaning, and it is in interpretation that the plurality of meaning is 
made manifest.1248  
There are obvious limits to this approach, and in a way, the much more 
complex and nuanced hermeneutic theory that Ricœur would put forward some 
years later is to a great extent able to explain much more than mere symbols. But 
the fact is that it is with this analyzis of symbols that Ricœur spells out in a 
systematic manner for the first time the methodological and epistemological 
significance of the conflict of interpretations. Indeed, there is a whole program of 
investigation in the long quote below: 
 
                                                
1247 Ibid., p. 13. 
1248 Ibid. 
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It is indeed notable that interpretation gives rise to very different, even opposing methods. 
(…) There is nothing surprising in this: interpretation begins with the multiple 
determination of symbols – with their overdetermination, as one says in psychoanalysis; 
but each interpretation, by definition, reduces this richness, this multivocity, and 
“translates” the symbol according to its own frame of reference. It is the task of this 
criteriology to show that the form of interpretation is relative to the theoretical structure of 
the hermeneutic system being considered. (…) 
[philosophical hermeneutics] begins by an expanding investigation into symbolic forms 
and by a comprehensive analyzis of symbolic structures. It proceeds by the confrontation 
of hermeneutic styles and by the critique of systems of interpretation, carrying the 
diversity of hermeneutic methods back to the structure of the corresponding theories. In 
this way it prepares itself to perform its highest task, which would be a true arbitration 
among the absolutist claims of each of the interpretations. By showing in what way each 
method expresses the form of a theory, philosophical hermeneutics justifies each method 
within the limits of its own theoretical circumscription. Such is the critical function of this 
hermeneutics taken at its purely semantic level.1249 
 
This long and complex quote has a lot to unpack; one cannot help feeling 
overwhelmed by the enormity of the task Ricœur is putting forward; and yet, this 
is precisely the task he sought to undertake, and which he did, or so I argue, 
undertake, to the extent of his capacities. 
We have seen before how Ricœur wants to escape both skepticism and 
dogmatism. This is the reason why he seeks truth, but within the limits of a 
hermeneutic perspectivism that uses the conflict of interpretations to enlarge its 
horizons. Now it becomes even clearer how this works. No theory (in this case 
psychoanalysis, phenomenology, etc.) is completely true. None depletes the 
richness of phenomena – in this case, symbols. Some theories seem mutually 
contradictory, such as, say, psychoanalysis and the phenomenology of religion. 
But the fact is that they are not mutually contradictory. In fact, according to 
Ricœur, each of these theories discloses a part of the complex phenomena we are 
dealing with. As such, all these methods are, let us say, regionally valid. The 
structural method of decomposing meaning into signs and their synchronic 
relations is valid within structuralism, the analyzis of dreams as a semantics of 
encrypted desire is valid within psychoanalytic theory, and so on. Each symbol, be 
                                                
1249 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
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it a myth, a poem, or a dream, constitutively contains the possibility of being 
“broken down”, “translated” in a plurality of different manners, each of which 
corresponding to a particular theory and a particular method. So, in a way, each 
method is justified. And as Ricœur would later claim, each is given the task of 
explaining more, so that we can understand better. 
Thus, for instance, psychoanalysis will not explain all there is to explain 
in, for instance, religious myths and symbols, or in the structure of our conscience. 
So we cannot take it as being absolute. But it will disclose important features of all 
those phenomena, features that would not be rendered intelligible, if it were not 
for psychoanalysis and its method. Therefore, psychoanalysis and our traversal of 
it enriches us, in that my own understanding of myself and the world will never be 
the same after I am acquainted with it. This is, in fact, Ricœur’s stroke of genius. 
And this is what prepares him to what he sees as “the highest task”, i.e., that of “a 
true arbitration among the absolutist claims of each of the interpretations.” 
Now, this is, in a nutshell, the core of Ricœur’s philosophy. It is true that 
he is only talking about symbols in this particular occasion. But this method is 
exactly what he had been, somewhat unconsciously, been practicing since the 
beginning of his philosophical investigations, and it certainly is the one he would 
continue to practice, even though with a degree of growing finesse, in the years to 
follow. 
Concerning symbols, Ricœur would eventually arrive at the conclusion 
that “true symbols contain all hermeneutics” (“les vrais symboles sont gros de 
toutes les herméneutiques”1250), another of Ricœur’s beautiful formulae. It means 
that great symbols – such as that of Oedipus – somehow have in them the potential 
to be interpreted differently and that it is therefore in this process that we find the 
reason for the existence of all these many interpretations. This is also the reason 
why we do not fall back into full-blown relativism. That is, not all theories are 
valid. In the explanation of someone’s behavior, say, astrology, will not have the 
same theoretical weight than does psychoanalysis. And this because there is some 
sort of objectivity in the phenomena we are dealing with that does not accept all 
explanations; this is why they must be validated. 
As we have seen before, Ricœur also escapes relativism by grounding the 
                                                
1250 Ibid., p. 23. 
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several language games and the validation criteria of theories in different aspects 
of existence. This is why what he has in mind in this phase is really self-
understanding, the beginning of a hermeneutics of the self, and of self-
consciousness. This means that the main conflict taking place during this period is 
the one between hermeneutics of suspicion and hermeneutics as recollection of 
meaning (whose emphasis is on the epistemological level) or, in a slightly 
different, reformulated manner, between the archeology or teleology of 
consciousness and meaning (whose emphasis is on the constitution of the self). 
The latter will be dealt with in chapter 4.3 below. But for now it is time to see in 
what manner Ricœur incorporates the “masters of suspicion” in his own 
theoretical framework. 
 
4.1.2 – Hermeneutics of suspicion and hermeneutics as recollection of meaning 
 
We have seen above in part three how Ricœur, under the influence of 
Gabriel Marcel, often stressed the importance of “innocence”, or “naivety”, 
especially in the form of “secondary reflection”, which assumed the form of 
something like a “recollection” or “restoration”. Also, in the Symbolism of Evil, as 
we pointed out in the introduction to this part, Ricœur adopts a stance of “re-
enactment” by means of “sympathetic imagination” of the experiences of evil 
contained in the symbols he undertakes to interpret. Besides, he often spoke of his 
own standpoint as standing somewhere between “critique” and “conviction”. Now, 
another notion that fits well in this semantic field is that of faith, understood not 
only in its religious sense, but also in a broader, secularized sense, as the strong 
adhesion to something. Something which might be the object of our strong 
evaluations, as Charles Taylor calls them. This might be belief in a value, or in an 
overarching goal. In fact, to continue borrowing Taylor’s insightful analyzes, this 
sort of personal adhesion might well be what, as it were, provides meaning to 
one’s life and sets the coordinates of the “moral space” within which we move. 
Defining this problematic in terms of a polarity – or a conflict, if we insist 
on continuing exploring the depths of this notion – between critique and 
conviction indeed helps to get a clearer picture of it. We cannot overemphasize the 
importance of critique for philosophy. However, Ricœur argues, there is 
something irreducible in our adhering to an object of belief. In some cases, in what 
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is, to use a Kierkegaardian notion, properly absolute in one’s life, belonging can 
be radical. This can take place in a state of first innocence – I believe in X, let us 
say, in God, or in the absolute adhesion to my country or its leader – that is 
properly pre-critical. 
In a way, the critical position is not the natural position. Plato and 
Aristotle placed the beginning of philosophy in the moment of wonder. This 
means that reflection, and critique, are some sort of interruption in the natural 
course of things. The Aufklärer, of course, believed that philosophy was to 
eliminate once and for all this state of “innocence”, understood in a pejorative way 
and, through education – and yes, radical critique – bring about progress. As we 
have seen in parts one and two, from Kant onwards, and with a particular 
emphasis in Critical Theory, philosophy is more often than not equated with the 
exercise of critique. But the question thus begs to be formulated: are “critiques” 
and “convictions” necessarily incompatible? 
For Ricœur the answer to this question is very straightforward: they are 
not. In fact, and this is a peculiar movement that he chooses to emphasize, there is 
indeed the possibility of a post-critical conviction, a post-critical faith. Which is to 
say, I already believed before I was given the possibility of exercising critique, I 
discovered critique and became a master of it; and however, even after critique, 
my conviction still stands. Perhaps it was transformed along the way, but it stands. 
Thus it is a post-critical conviction, or faith. So, in a way, critique is part of the 
long route. This is why critique is sometimes equated, in his works, with 
methodology. We will find a similar movement in his later little ethics of Oneself 
as Another, where innocent solicitude, after passing the test of critique – in this 
case, the formalization of the norm – comes back as critical solicitude. 
This is not to say that critique is a secondary movement. In fact, it is 
fundamental. But what Ricœur seems to be emphasizing is that it does not have to 
be totally destructive, and this in spite of Heidegger’s emphasis on Destruktion 
and Derrida’s on deconstruction. A part of the prior meaning, and of the prior 
adhesion, can still survive even after the attacks of critique, which sometimes are 
ruthless. These brief introductory remarks should be enough for us to understand 
this particular dialectic of the 1960s, the one between hermeneutics as recollection 
of meaning and the crucial hermeneutics of suspicion. Its terms are very clearly 
stated in Freud and Philosophy. 
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Ricœur starts by defining hermeneutics as recollection of meaning: 
 
The contrary of suspicion, I will say bluntly, is faith. What faith? No longer, to be sure, 
the first faith of the simple soul, but rather the second faith of one who has engaged in 
hermeneutics, faith that has undergone criticism, postcritical faith. Let us look for it in the 
series of philosophic decisions that secretly animate a phenomenology of religion and lie 
hidden even within its apparent neutrality. It is a rational faith, for it interprets; but it is a 
faith because it seeks, through interpretation, a second naiveté. Phenomenology is its 
instrument of hearing, of recollection, of restoration of meaning. “Believe in order to 
understand, understand in order to believe” – such is its maxim; and its maxim is the 
“hermeneutic circle” itself of believing and understanding.1251 
 
As we can see, in this particular book, the fundamental conviction is faith, faith 
that has undergone the test of critique and survived, and phenomenology is the 
methodology that is capable of apprehending it. Because this is religious faith we 
are talking about, the method capable of grasping it is also the phenomenology of 
religion. It seems as if Ricœur could have chosen another method; that is, it is 
almost as if Ricœur is depriving phenomenology of its axiological neutrality and 
directly fusing phenomenology and hermeneutics. It would perhaps have been 
preferable to speak about the hermeneutic presupposition of the phenomenology of 
religion, rather than describing the “philosophic decisions” that “lie hidden even 
within its apparent neutrality”. Be that as it may, what we can see is that Ricœur’s 
depiction of the hermeneutic circle here makes the phenomenology as recollection 
of meaning the version of his hermeneutics that is closer to Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics. As we have already described, and will explore in full detail below, 
Ricœur’s mature hermeneutics wanted to integrate the critical aspect more fully. 
However, in 1965, it seems as if Ricœur is wanting to justify – really, to give an 
account, to provide reasons for, logon didonai – his adhesion to Christian faith. 
This is perhaps one of the goals of the book, not comparable to the most important 
one, namely, to make a philosophical assessment of Freud and psychoanalysis, but 
arguably a goal that acts as a personal motive. This seems to be supported by his 
later confession that he had made the traversal of psychoanalysis, and written this 
                                                
1251 Ricœur, Freud and Philosophy, p. 28. 
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book, also as a “self-analyzis”.1252 And if he is to do this, he has to prove that 
Christian faith makes sense, that it is a plausible hypothesis, one that can be 
rationally defended and stood for, even after the most radical critiques it is 
subjected to – namely the Nietzschean critique. 
Regardless of our personal stance towards the religious phenomenon in 
general, and irrespective of our faith or lack thereof in God or more particularly in 
Christ, I think that he is really successful in defending this claim. He succeeds in 
defending the plausibility of post-critical faith and this brings him once again very 
close to Charles Taylor’s project, namely that expounded in A Secular Age. But in 
order to do this, he had to insist on the possibility of a certain transparence of 
meaning, over and above the shadows of doubt and suspicion cast upon it. This 
certainly has its risks. In a way, it is a wager. Probably not everyone will be able to 
make the same wager, and even if Ricœur himself believed this, there were many 
times in which he attenuated this claim and submitted it to some sort of dialectic. 
But he certainly had the right to hold that claim and defend it in a rational manner. 
He cites the phenomenology of religion of Leenhardt, Van der Leeuw, 
Eliade, and his own Symbolism of Evil as efforts pertaining to the phenomenology 
of religion and that led to this post-critical faith.1253 Hence, the dialectic of literal 
meaning and hidden meaning would, in this case, depart from the symbol in order 
to reach the experience of the sacred.1254 Ricœur’s claim is that in the case of the 
sacred, we can no longer practice a full epoché; rather, we have to believe that in 
the case of the sacred, that which is signified, that which is said, is said to me.1255 
According to him, this is what justifies confidence in language: 
 
Implied in this expectation is a confidence in language: the belief that language, which 
bears symbols, is not so much spoken by men as spoken to men, that men are born into 
language.1256 
 
Ricœur would not always maintain the claim that there is a fundamental dialectic 
between suspicion and faith. Later, in Oneself as Another, he would replace faith 
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1253 Ricœur, Freud and Philosophy, p. 28. 
1254 Ibid., p. 29. 
1255 Ibid. 
1256 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
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by attestation – always conserving the emphasis on the value of convictions – and 
even define truth by attestation; at that point, the fundamental dialectic is the one 
between suspicion and attestation. But he maintains that we need to have 
confidence in language. Without the confidence in language, so the claim goes, the 
intersubjective link is broken, because language is our most fundamental 
institution (language here understood in a very broad sense). This much should 
suffice to see how his perspectivism, which we alluded to so many times before, is 
not absolute. Rather, in this regard, Ricœur’s choice is clear. 
Be that as it may, his Redlichkeit forces him to submit his faith, and the 
confidence in language and the meaning of the sacred, to the critical test. And this 
is why he deems it fit to take very seriously the objections posed by the most 
serious enemies of this standpoint: the masters of suspicion. Ricœur usually 
mentions these “masters” as being Marx, Nietzsche and Freud, even though he 
sometimes also includes Feuerbach, or even Foucault in this lot. At first, he 
acknowledges the difficulty of finding a common thread in their projects: 
 
Three masters, seemingly mutually exclusive, dominate the school of suspicion: Marx, 
Nietzsche and Freud. It is easier to show their common opposition to a phenomenology of 
the sacred, understood as a propaedeutic to the “revelation” of meaning, than their 
interrelationship within a single method of demystification. (…) “truth as lying” would be 
the negative heading under which one might place these three exercises of suspicion.1257 
 
It must be emphasized the vigor with which Ricœur strives to do justice to these 
three projects. He refuses not taking them seriously, and he mentions the all too 
common objections against them: Marx and the theory of reflex consciousness, 
Nietzsche’s biologism and self-refuting perspectivism, and Freud’s pansexualism. 
Ricœur wants to go beyond these hasty readings, and to take up seriously the 
challenge presented by these philosophies. What is thus this challenge? According 
to Ricœur, it consists in making problematic the transparency, or even the 
existence of consciousness itself: 
 
If we go back to the intention they had in common, we find in it the decision to look upon 
the whole of consciousness primarily as “false” consciousness. They whereby take up 
                                                
1257 Ibid., p. 32. 
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again, each in a different manner, the problem of the Cartesian doubt, to carry it to the 
very heart of the Cartesian stronghold. The philosopher trained in the school of Descartes 
knows that things are doubtful, that they are not such as they appear; but he does not 
doubt that consciousness is such as it appears to itself; in consciousness, meaning and 
consciousness of meaning coincide. Since Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, this too has 
become doubtful. After the doubt about things, we have started to doubt consciousness.1258  
 
Let me note in passing that even though the English translation of this text speaks 
about consciousness, as a way to translate the French “conscience”, what is at 
stake here is both consciousness and moral conscience, the two equivalents to the 
German Bewusstsein and Gewissen. It is important to keep this in mind, because, 
as is well known, Nietzsche’s attack assumes, among many other variants, the 
form of a genealogy of morality, and thus a diagnostic of the falsehood of 
Gewissen. 
Another proof of Ricœur’s insistence in the seriousness and importance 
of this type of interpretation is his claim that Marx, Nietzsche and Freud were, 
above all, the inventors of a certain type of hermeneutics. In fact, if it were not for 
them, we would probably miss the very existence of something such as a latent 
meaning, and therefore we would also miss the opportunity to develop a depth 
hermeneutics. Let us pause for a moment and grasp the significance of this claim: 
without the hermeneutics of suspicion, a whole region of ourselves and of the 
world would have remained concealed. We would never have gone beyond the 
state of first naiveté. Now this is, in fact, a sort of alternative history of 
hermeneutics; one which starts not with Ancient exegesis and reappears with 
Schleiermacher and Dilthey; this is, one could say with a tad of humor, the dark 
side of hermeneutics; but what an interesting side it turns out to be. In fact, 
according to Ricœur, it is precisely in virtue of this characteristic that they go 
beyond destruction and, for those willing to incorporate their meaningful critiques 
without succumbing to their overwhelming weight, they are in a way very 
liberating indeed: 
 
All three clear the horizon for a more authentic word, for a new reign of Truth, not only 
by means of a “destructive” critique, but by the invention of an art of interpreting. (…) 
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Beginning with them, understanding is hermeneutics: henceforward, to seek meaning is 
no longer to spell out the consciousness of meaning, but to decipher its expressions. What 
must be faced, therefore, is not only a threefold suspicion, but a threefold guile. If 
consciousness is not what it thinks it is, a new relation must be instituted between the 
patent and the latent.1259 
 
Ricœur’s diagnostic of the result of these three critiques and techniques is that 
they create a mediate science of meaning, irreducible to the immediate 
consciousness of meaning: 
 
What all three attempted, in different ways, was to make their “conscious” methods of 
deciphering coincide with the “unconscious” work of ciphering which they attributed to 
the will to power, to social being, to the unconscious psychism. Guile will be met by 
double guile.1260  
 
And this “double guile” is none other than the process of demystification through 
deciphering itself. Thus this “hermeneutics” is not for the sake of itself. It has a 
project. A liberating project. So one of Ricœur’s most perspicacious insights 
consists in claiming that “all three, however, far from being detractors of 
‘consciousness’, aim at extending it.”1261 Marx wants to liberate praxis; Nietzsche 
wants to increase our will to power; Freud wants the analyzed to enlarge his field 
of consciousness.1262  
In fact, if we come back to Ricœur’s perspectivism, we can now grasp the 
full importance of the hermeneutics of suspicion: by inaugurating depth 
hermeneutics, and also by going against the grain, by questioning the evidence of 
self-consciousness, it is precisely this hermeneutics that pushes us more 
vigorously to enlarge our own perspective. Without it, we could not break the 
enchantment of the natural order. According to Ricœur, demystifying 
hermeneutics “sets up the rude discipline of necessity”1263 which amounts to the 
lesson of Spinoza: “one first finds himself a slave, he understands his slavery, he 
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rediscovers himself free within understood necessity.”1264 
This last conclusion is objectionable. Ricœur claims that all there is to the 
hermeneutics of suspicion is this “ascesis of the necessary” and that it ultimately 
lacks the “grace of imagination” and the “upsurge of the possible”.1265 I find this 
assessment very misleading. It might be correct to argue that there is an element of 
an “ascesis of necessity” in these three projects, and Ricœur captures this element 
very skillfully in Freud. We will see how in the next chapter. But to say that it 
lacks the power of the imagination, or of the possible, is not in itself accurate. Not 
to see in Nietzsche’s transvaluation of values, or in Marx’s project of 
emancipation, radical new possibilities put forward, in a way, by imagination, and 
even as the possible source of new normative orientations and ways of living, is 
stopping short of grasping all that there is in these philosophies. 
Somehow, one can understand why Ricœur makes this assessment. He 
needs to do it, in order to create the epistemological space for his own choice, that 
of post-critical faith which, in the economy of Freud and Philosophy, would be 
the necessary complement and even the supersession of the hermeneutics of 
suspicion. However, it goes without saying that there are more creative 
possibilities for a hermeneutics of suspicion than what Ricœur seems to allow for 
in Freud and Philosophy. 
I will note in passing a curious detail concerning the reception of this 
book. The fact is that, for better or worse, Ricœur’s depiction of the “hermeneutics 
of suspicion” became one of his most famous and longstanding contributions to 
philosophy. This has most certainly been unintended. Even though he ultimately 
wanted to overcome the hermeneutics of suspicion, and even though the book had 
a very harsh, unfair and even dishonest reception in Lacan and his circle1266 which 
granted it a rather cold reception in Paris, the fact is that it had a lasting impact in 
the U.S.A. and elsewhere.  
It thus seems as if many philosophers were very interested in Ricœur’s 
way of finding a similar characteristic in Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. This became 
an easy way to identify oneself with a particular style of exercising philosophy. 
And through a certainly partial and misguided assessment, Ricœur could risk be 
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seen as only the philosopher who coined the “hermeneutics of suspicion”. Alison 
Scott-Baumann dedicated an important book to dispelling this prejudice.1267 
In Ricœur and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion, namely in the chapter 4, 
“On the use and abuse of the term ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’”1268 Scott-Baumann 
claims that Ricœur ultimately chose to uncouple suspicion from hermeneutics 
because hermeneutics itself already contains enough doubt. Suspicion added to 
hermeneutical challenges would go too far and become a corrosive force, whereby 
we “doubt all and we see through everything and everybody. This is a curse”.1269  
Here she argues for a moderate use of suspicion, balanced and appropriate to its 
goals. This is why, she claims, Ricœur almost completely abandoned the 
expression “hermeneutics of suspicion” in the early 1980s, whereas the exercise of 
“suspicion” continued at least until Oneself as Another. Ultimately, according to 
her, suspicion is to be understood as a Kantian limit-idea. We cannot be suspicious 
of everything, nor can we attain a foolproof knowledge of everything. Suspicion 
should act as a mechanism to control both our pretension to immediate knowledge 
and our will to know everything. It is thus useful for unmasking ideologies and 
forms of false consciousness. Suspicion itself can have two poles in dialectical 
tension with each other. The negative moment is useful when applied to subjective 
consciousness, so that it can destroy false idols and overcome their domination. 
However, the masters of suspicion did not provide the recovery, the affirmation 
that should balance the exercise of suspicion and when exacerbated, suspicion can 
become some sort of a permanently suspicious state of mind, whereby we can 
ultimately destroy ourselves.1270 As such, suspicion should be handled with care. 
My own assessment of the hermeneutics of suspicion will be more 
positive than Scott-Baumann’s. But she is definitely right in pointing out that there 
is much more than that in Ricœur’s philosophy, and that his definitive position – 
even in Freud and Philosophy – is way beyond the hermeneutics of suspicion. 
In fact, Ricœur’s conclusion about the dialectic between hermeneutics as 
recollection of meaning and hermeneutics of suspicion is that both can be 
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reconciled in the richness of true symbols.1271 And this, for him, means that a 
critique of religion as giving birth to idols and illusions must be put forward, so 
that a true comprehension of symbols, from textual sources, might happen. This 
also means, for Ricœur, abandoning the narrow point of view of the self-centered 
subject, and embracing the whole. That is, post-critical faith, the faith for whom 
idols have died, is a faith that goes trough “non-narcissistic reconciliation”.1272 It is 
consenting to necessity, like he had already posited in The Symbolism of Evil. 
Ultimately, Ricœur invokes Freud’s reality principle. This principle forces the 
self-centered, narcissistic cogito to abandon its logic of desire and self-sufficiency. 
But he thinks that “reality” is more than what Freud allowed for; and so he posits 
that “love of Creation” is a hypothesis so valid as yielding to necessity. Because 
for the believer, Creation is there, has a meaning, is addressed to all of us, and can 
be loved. As such, no critique, no matter how dismantling it can be, will 
constitutively deprive the believer of the fundamental possibility of loving 
Creation. 
Shortly after the publication of Freud and Philosophy Ricœur would 
express in a clear manner what he then understood as the relation between religion 
and faith. In “Religion, Atheism and Faith”1273, a conference originally given in 
1966 at Columbia University in New York, he spells out what his apology of a 
“postreligious faith”, by which he means a faith for a “postreligious age”, looks 
like.1274 He clarifies that he is willing to accept the critiques put forward by an 
atheist standpoint, such as those of Nietzsche and Freud, but only up to some 
extent. He defines religion in harsh terms and this critique allows him to posit a 
faith that goes beyond religion. He chooses the topics of accusation and 
consolation as two of the main themes of religion and defines it as partly being 
anchored in these two intersubjective modes. This is seen as a weakness and as 
leading to the critiques of atheism. 
 
I thus understand religion as a primitive structure of life which must always be overcome 
by faith and which is grounded in the fear of punishment and the desire for protection. 
Accusation and protection are, so to speak, the “corrupt parts of religion”, in the same 
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sense in which Marx referred to religion itself as the corrupt part of philosophy. It is here 
that atheism discovers its true justification and perhaps reveals its double signification as 
both destructive and liberating.1275 
 
Because religion has its corrupt parts, they must be criticized. Since these 
parts are illusions, and since they portray God in such and such a manner, a certain 
god (or a certain conception of a god) must die, namely, the god of 
metaphysics.1276 Accordingly, the critiques addressed by the hermeneutics of 
suspicion to religion are partly welcome. For Ricœur, the destruction of “an onto-
theology which culminates in the idea of a moral god, conceived as the origin and 
foundation of an ethics of prohibition and condemnation”1277 is indeed an 
invaluable result of this critique. 
Nonetheless, this is, for Ricœur, the opportunity to reestablish a more 
solid ground for faith; a faith without consolation, a “tragic” one even.1278 
According to him, this faith must renounce theodicy and a rational reconciliation 
between nature’s laws and human destiny. Nevertheless, it must also be able to put 
forward, as it were, a positive ontology.1279 In this ontology, religion should be 
transformed in faith, through the mediation of atheism; the atheist critique would 
thus serve to purify faith, and to bring it closer to the origin. This purification, akin 
to some sort of ascesis, would liberate us from our desire for personal salvation. In 
fact, through it, we come to accept reality as it is. Not as a love of destiny but, to 
reiterate, as love of creation. As Ricœur puts it: “The love of creation is a form of 
consolation which depends on no external compensation and which is equally 
remote from any form of vengeance. Love finds within itself its own 
compensation; it is itself consolation.”1280 According to him, this would be 
tantamount to a postreligious faith, and also a return to the Judeo-Christian 
kerygma. It is a kind of amor fati; this is not entirely consistent with the emphasis 
on human agency of his more practical works. But it is a matter of attitude and 
existential positioning. It is the hope that there is something good that can be loved 
in Creation, from the standpoint of the believer. Now, this thesis is not taking 
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Ricœur’s religious standpoint as a topic for exhaustive analyzis. I am only 
mentioning it here because the content of faith and its relation with symbols is 
given an exemplary status in the application of hermeneutics as a recollection of 
meaning, in the recovery of the symbol of the Father1281, after the demise of its 
“idol”. Also, the analyzis of this particular case in Ricœur’s hermeneutics allows 
us to grasp how he actually uses the dialectic between suspicion and recollection 
of meaning. 
Ultimately, what is Ricœur’s position in the conflict between 
hermeneutics as a recollection of meaning and hermeneutics of suspicion? Firstly, 
it must be understood that “recollection of meaning” goes beyond religious 
meaning, or the content of faith. That is, for Ricœur, this indeed applies to the 
assertion of the true meaning of the religious symbols such as the symbol of the 
Father. But hermeneutics as “recollection of meaning” can be understood as 
applying to wholly different contents, not only those that properly pertain to 
religious belief. Broadly speaking, hermeneutic as recollection of meaning is 
simply restorative hermeneutics, even something akin to what Honneth calls 
reconstruction, and Walzer interpretation, as we have seen in part two. As such, it 
can be applied to any cultural phenomenon that is open to interpretation; we can 
look at traditions, values, texts, beliefs, indeed at anything that pre-exists us and to 
which we can attribute different meanings, and analyze them using this type of 
hermeneutics. In a simplified manner, we can say that this is a positive kind of 
hermeneutical stance, that is, it is a position in which the interpreter gives credit to 
the cultural phenomenon that is being considered. Instead of trying to dismantle it, 
he or she rather chooses to listen to it.  
Bearing this clarification in mind, I think it is safe to assume that 
Ricœur’s ultimate position in this conflict is one in which he does not really 
arbitrate the conflict inasmuch as he actually positions himself in it. That is, he 
says that symbols allow for the conciliation of many interpretations, simply 
because they are so complex that many different takes on them are possible. And 
even if they might seem contradictory at first glance, Ricœur’s enlarged standpoint 
allows him to give each interpretation its due. But insofar as hermeneutics of 
suspicion tends to be overarching, Ricœur ultimately tends to curb it. That is, it is 
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seen as valid as a means to let hermeneutics as a recollection of meaning unfold. 
Suspicion is there to fulfill a role: that of helping us to abandon the naïve 
standpoint that is somehow filled with illusions. But suspicion is only allowed to 
go so far. It cannot be allowed to eventually destroy our standpoint and all our 
meaningful belongings. Therefore, his aim is to see what is there in the endpoint to 
be recollected. It is a somewhat Hegelian process, we might say, but with the 
cautions already stated in part one. As such, and to sum it up, in the conflict 
between hermeneutics as recollection of meaning and hermeneutics of suspicion, 
Ricœur recognizes the usefulness of the latter but ultimately sides with the former. 
I will come back to assess this choice in parts six and seven below. 
This is a conflict within hermeneutics. However, in the 1960s Ricœur was 
still preoccupied with the epistemological status of hermeneutics as such and so he 
incurred in painstakingly long analyzes of other disciplines in order to be able to 
somehow pinpoint the position of hermeneutics towards them. Mainly, this was 
dealt with in an inclusive manner. In order to enlarge his perspective, Ricœur 
sought to appropriate other epistemological standpoints and their respective 
techniques in hermeneutics, while also highlighting the differences between his 
own hermeneutical standpoint and the angles of other disciplines. At each step, 
and exactly as he did with the hermeneutics of suspicion, Ricœur seemed to be 
saying to each of these positions: yes, I can go with you this far, but not any 
further. Not without relinquishing my overarching principles, something that I am 
not ready to do. This was evidently the case of the relation between his 
hermeneutics and the methodologies of structuralism and psychoanalysis. 
 
4.1.3 – Hermeneutics and structuralism 
 
Let us not forget how deeply the notions of hermeneutics, meaning, 
subject, etc., were being attacked in the Parisian intellectual scene of the 1960s. 
Ricœur was very attentive to these developments and at each time he was eager to 
debate them and, to the extent that there was a mediation to be operated, to include 
them in his own project. 
This is certainly the case with structuralism. In The Conflict of 
Interpretations he dedicates three articles to the relation he envisages between 
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hermeneutics and structuralism, namely “Structure and Hermeneutics”1282, “The 
Problem of Double Meaning as Hermeneutic Problem and as Semantic 
Problem”1283 and “Structure, Word, Event”.1284 In these articles, he puts forward 
some of the main claims of the first phase of his hermeneutics, such as: 1) 
hermeneutics is the interpretation of symbols; 2) symbols are cultural phenomena 
characterized by a structure of double meaning, one patent and the other latent; 3) 
it is the task of hermeneutics to force the latent meaning to become explicit. 
Nevertheless, he also clarifies in what ways structural analyzis can be incorporated 
into hermeneutics, and in what ways hermeneutics aims to go beyond 
structuralism. 
Ricœur is interested in incorporating structural analyzes, as he will later 
also do with semiotic analyzes, in his own hermeneutical standpoint. According to 
him, the goal of hermeneutics is understanding (a symbol, a text, etc.). But as he 
would later make clear, understanding can be aided by the processes of 
explanation, which are part of his long detour. Ricœur contends that the 
objectification of meaning is helpful, insofar as the human sciences (such as 
linguistics) are able to disclose hidden parts of meaning which a first, naïve 
approach would not be able to grasp on its own. As such, the goal of hermeneutics 
is to attain, as much as possible, a “full understanding”. This might include a 
diachronic approach on the genesis and evolution of the cultural object at stake. 
But according to Ricœur, the synchronic analyzes spelled out by the structuralist 
approach are valid, provided that they do not pretend to exhaust the phenomena 
they tackle: 
 
For the philosopher, structuralism’s raison d’être would then be to rebuild this full 
understanding, but only after having first stripped it, objectified it, and replaced it with 
structural understanding. Thus mediated by the structural form, the semantic base would 
become accessible to an understanding which, although more indirect, would be more 
certain.1285 
 
Hence, Ricœur is interested in including a “general theory of relationships” inside 
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his “general theory of meaning”1286 and Lévi-Strauss’s observations about the 
savage mind are a good example of the way in which the synchronic approach was 
included as a segment of explanation within Ricœur’s hermeneutic theory. 
Ultimately, for Ricœur, structural analyzes are relevant, but the same does not 
apply to something like a “structuralist philosophy”.1287 For him, the semantic 
analyzes always go beyond the syntactic relations. He argued many times that 
interpretations change through time, and that the unity of those significations is 
impossible to fully grasp in a single synchronic take.1288 Structuralism, at least in 
its strong, allegedly self-sufficing version, appears to Ricœur as “a Kantianism 
without a transcendental subject, even an absolute formalism”.1289 According to 
him, the type of intelligibility displayed by structuralism can only be applied to: 
“a) work on a corpus already constituted, finished, closed, and, in that sense, dead; 
b) establish inventories of elements and units; c) place these elements or units in 
relations of opposition, preferably binary opposition; and d) establish an algebra or 
combinatory system of these elements and opposed pairs”.1290 In other words, this 
is how structuralism works. But there are so many meaningful realities to which 
this type of approach cannot be applied, that its domain of application is ultimately 
very narrow. Structural synchronic linguistics applies to states of a system 
captured as frames in a given moment. But the phenomenon of meaning, its 
historicity and its permanent reactualization go beyond that. 
Furthermore, it goes without saying that one of Ricœur’s main 
contentions with structuralism and, we can even say, with all post-structuralist 
attempts to explain societies as mere loci of power-relations and so on, is the ease 
with which they sometimes seen to do away with subjects. And Ricœur, as we 
know, is halfway between the “exaltation of the cogito” and its humiliation and 
utter disappearance. His take on the self might be of a “conflicted self” as I will 
attempt to show below; but a self nonetheless. 
There is thus a conflict between hermeneutics and structuralism, insofar 
as both aim to somehow deplete the phenomena they want to describe. At some 
point, when meditating upon this phenomenon of conflict, he actually defines the 
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task of philosophy as that of arbitration among conflicts of interpretation: 
 
I like to grant philosophy the role of arbitrator, and I have previously attempted to 
arbitrate the conflict of several hermeneutics in modern culture.1291 
 
However, the metaphor of “arbitration” might be misleading, insofar as Ricœur 
does not really – or at least not always – attempt to put himself in a detached 
situation. Even if he strives to attain some sort of enlarged standpoint, as I have 
been arguing, his is not a “view from nowhere”. I mentioned above how in the 
conflict between hermeneutics of suspicion and hermeneutics as recollection of 
meaning he tends to favor the latter. The same can be said about the conflict 
between hermeneutics and structuralism. Even if he claims wanting to give 
structuralism its due, and even if he speaks of hermeneutics and structuralism as 
being two different “strategic levels”1292 it goes without saying that his standpoint 
is the standpoint from which the two levels are grasped, and since it is a 
hermeneutical standpoint… ergo, hermeneutics encompasses structuralism, and 
not the other way around. If these are two different strategic levels, hermeneutics 
is the more fundamental. And this is in fact seen as the striking feature of 
hermeneutics. For the Ricœur of the 1960s hermeneutics is tantamount to the 
conflict of interpretations. Speaking about the forces and weaknesses of 
hermeneutics he mentions: “the conspicuous weakness of delivering hermeneutics 
over to the warfare of rival philosophical projects. But this weakness is also its 
strength, because the place where language escapes from itself and escapes us is 
also the place where language comes to itself, the place where language is 
saying.”1293 
At first glance, it might seem that Ricœur is ambiguous about the broken 
character of hermeneutics, describing it as both “a force and a weakness”. But this 
is in fact, or at least it seems, part of his strategy of reappraising hermeneutics. 
Indeed, we can discern in it both a descriptive and an evaluative claim. Ricœur 
states the broken character of language and hermeneutics as a fact: we have no 
totally unified theory of language or philosophical system, all we have is a 
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fragmentary experience, fragmentary takes on language and rival theories of 
interpretation. This might, on a first approach, seem like a weakness, but it is 
actually an advantage because it brings with it a pluralistic perspectivism which 
allows us to go beyond fast, narrow and superficial explanations. Ultimately, no 
closed off, systematic explanation is able to deplete language because meaning is 
actualized in speech. Terms are polysemic and it is their use in different contexts 
that renews meaning. This is why Ricœur’s later discovery of Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations and the whole movement of ordinary language 
philosophy would prove to be so decisive for him. For Ricœur, indeed, polysemy 
is constitutive of the functioning of all language, and this is one of the reasons 
why the conflict of interpretations is inescapable.1294 For this reason, he would 
develop semantic analyzes in detail, very inspired by Benveniste’s discourse 
theory, and ultimately also drawing very much on speech act theory.  
In the last analyzis, Ricœur’s main objection towards structuralism is its 
temptation to consider language as a closed and isolated system. Indeed, to 
reiterate, Ricœur not only connects semantic analyzes to existence, but he also 
strongly asserts that language always refers back to reality (even though not 
necessarily empirical reality) and this is why it can meaningfully describe our life 
and the world. Language expresses the multiple dimensions of being; because 
language is open to change, but also intimately tied to reality, what it does is to 
disclose the multilayered dimensions of being. And to prove this is also, in a way, 
to make sure that hermeneutics ultimately wins over structuralism in this conflict. 
 
4.1.4 – Hermeneutics and psychoanalysis 
 
Hermeneutics also assumes a fertile relation with psychoanalysis. To be 
sure, Ricœur does not pay much attention to psychoanalytical practice, at least in 
his early writings. Nor to Post-Freudian psychoanalysis in its many forms. Jung, 
Lacan, and so forth, are not the object of much attention. And for all the bitter 
polemics with Lacan and his circle, Lacan’s unfair reception and so on, the truth is 
that Ricœur confesses he “didn’t understand a thing”1295 of what Lacan said in his 
seminar. Consequently, he chooses to mostly concentrate on the philosophical 
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significance of Freud, more than in anything else. In Freedom and Nature Ricœur 
already mentioned the unconscious and Freudian psychoanalysis, but in a 
somewhat pejorative way. Now, after the Symbolism of Evil and the beginning of 
his hermeneutic turn, he felt that he had somehow to confront himself with Freud 
and the other masters of suspicion, which led him, to reiterate, to the discovery of 
the inescapable character of the conflict of interpretations. Ricœur’s writings on 
Freud and psychoanalysis are spread throughout three books: some early articles 
in The Conflict of Interpretations, some later articles recently republished in Écrits 
et conférences 1: autour de la Psychanalyse1296 and the excellent Freud and 
Philosophy. Through his assessment of psychoanalysis’s mixed character, 
somehow halfway between energetics and hermeneutics, he finds in it an excellent 
tool for the assessment of the inescapability of conflicts in our psychic life. I will 
leave a more thorough assessment of these loci of conflict for chapters 4.2 and 4.3 
below. But I will now tackle the way in which Ricœur understands 
psychoanalysis’s relation with hermeneutics as such. 
I will start by mentioning the core and originality of Ricœur’s approach, 
which we can find in the article “A Philosophical Interpretation of Freud”.1297 In 
this article Ricœur clarifies his stance towards Freud’s work. He claims that what 
he does is more than a reading; being a philosophical interpretation, it entails 
taking a position towards the philosophical significance of Freud. It is a discourse 
of a “philosopher who thinks from Freud – that is, after, with, and against 
him”.1298 From the start, he announces the core of his standpoint: for him, 
Freudian discourse is a mixed discourse, in that it combines questions of meaning 
and questions of force. This results in a binding of force and meaning in what 
Ricœur calls a semantic of desire. 
For Ricœur, as we shall see in greater detail in chapter 4.3 below, 
Freudian psychoanalysis ultimately provides the model for a regressive self-
understanding, taken from the repressed memories of our childhood, our traumas 
and so forth, in what he dubs an “archaeology of the subject”. But, again, he finds 
this type of approach both useful and insufficient. Hence, he proposes to read 
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Freud with a sympathetic intention. In what seems to be an application of the 
recollection of meaning to the reading of Freud’s own work, he talks about doing 
an “architectonic reconstruction” in which one’s stance towards Freud is not one 
of repetition but reconstruction.1299 
Why does he choose to concentrate on Freud’s written words, rather than 
in the analytical situation itself? Because he has a fundamentally optimistic 
hermeneutical standpoint; that is, for him there is a somewhat a priori 
communicability of experiences whereby “what appears in the analytical 
relationship is not radically different from what someone who has not been 
analyzed can understand.”1300 Hence, Freudian psychoanalysis is interesting for us, 
its potential readers, insofar as it has something to tell us, something potentially 
universal regarding human experience and the constitution of consciousness. And 
from that wager results the decision to treat him philosophically: “a philosopher, 
as a philosopher, is capable of understanding psychoanalytic theory and even in 
part the psychoanalytic experience.”1301 
And what aspect of more or less universal human experience is it capable 
of grasping? Precisely the phenomena of desire, their interpretation and potential 
energetic repression they can undergo. Ricœur would find in Freudian 
psychoanalysis, and namely in the semantics of desire, a model to explain both the 
micro and the macro level, that is, both the inner workings of the psychic life of 
the subject and the overall movement of culture and civilization (more or less like 
Plato, who finds a model to depict both the human soul and the life of the city) in 
what is dubbed an “interlacing of desire and culture”.1302 
However, Ricœur’s assessment of psychoanalysis and its diagnoses is 
somewhat different according to the level it applies. At the micro level of the 
subject, and to reiterate, Ricœur wants to limit its overarching explanatory 
pretentions. He posits that psychoanalysis has a “breach” a “dissonance” between 
the experience it discovers and the conceptual analyzis it proposes. Therefore, he 
claims, the vocation of philosophy is not only to arbitrate the plurality of 
interpretations, but “the plurality of experiences as well”.1303 Accordingly, for 
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Ricœur, the language of force must be inserted within the framework of a 
vocabulary of meaning, and the discoveries of psychoanalysis concerning the 
human psyche must be inserted within the framework of a reflective philosophy 
and a philosophy of the subject. Because the conflicts of repressed desire can be 
viewed differently, and even partially overcome, if grasped from the standpoint of 
the effort to exist1304, following Spinoza and Nabert. 
That is, the conflicts detected by psychoanalysis exist and its diagnosis is, 
to some extent, valid. But they are not to be seen as so fundamental as the effort of 
to subject to exist and thrive: 
 
Finally, the concrete reflection makes sense only insofar as it succeeds in asking anew the 
Freudian question of the unconscious, the id, of instincts and meaning, in the promotion 
of the subject of reflection. 
We must hold onto this, for it is the bolt which keeps everything together and by which 
this interpretation stands or falls.1305 
 
Ricœur’s conclusion is that after Freud, our take on consciousness can no longer 
be the same. But this does not mean that consciousness does not exist or that we 
cannot articulate our desires or exercise free will. The result is what he will call a 
“humiliated cogito”, but a cogito nonetheless. As he puts it, “in this terrible battle 
for meaning, nothing and no one comes out unscathed.”1306 But someone comes 
out after all. 
Ultimately, Ricœur’s strategy in the conflict between hermeneutics and 
psychoanalysis is akin to the one adopted in the assessment of the relation between 
hermeneutics and structuralism. But this time around his interpretation is even 
more assimilatory. Hermeneutics aims to encompass structuralism while at the 
same time going beyond it, whereas psychoanalysis itself becomes a type of 
hermeneutics; more precisely, a certain strand of the hermeneutics of suspicion, as 
we have seen. In that, it is essential, but also fundamentally limited for Ricœur. 
Be that as it may, he seems to find a very meaningful application for it as 
a hermeneutics of culture, which is not without consequences for social 
philosophy. Thus in “Psychoanalysis and the Movement of Contemporary 
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Culture”1307 Ricœur finds it liberating that psychoanalysis “breaks out of the 
limited framework of the therapeutic relationship between the analyst and his 
patient and rises to the level of a hermeneutics of culture”.1308 Ricœur goes so far 
as to see in this a specifically social task for hermeneutics; in interpreting culture 
in such and such a manner, hermeneutics (in this case a very specific type of 
hermeneutics, that is, the one inspired by psychoanalysis) is supposed to be able to 
change it. This is of the utmost importance: 
 
Psychoanalysis takes part in the contemporary cultural movement by acting as a 
hermeneutics of culture. In other words, psychoanalysis marks a change of culture 
because its interpretation of man bears in a central and direct way on culture as a whole. It 
makes interpretation into a moment of culture; it changes the world by interpreting it.1309 
 
This direct mingling of hermeneutics and praxis is fundamental in Ricœur’s social 
philosophy, and it is vigorously defended, over against the Marxist reduction of 
cultural phenomena to superstructural ideology, in the 1970s, in the Lectures on 
Ideology and Utopia, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences and elsewhere. To 
interpret differently, claims Ricœur, is already a step towards a transformation of 
the world. 
In what comes down to psychoanalysis as a hermeneutics of culture, 
Ricœur adopts a somewhat maximalist approach; he pretends to show that 
psychoanalysis is “an interpretation of culture as a whole”.1310 Ricœur’s claim is a 
perspectivistic one, in the sense I explained before. Psychoanalysis is a total 
interpretation but only “in one genus”1311; that is, it is only a point of view. As a 
point of view, it aims to be encompassing, i.e., a perspective on the whole. But in 
order to discover its perspectivistic character one has to step outside of it, as it 
were. And this is, again, what Ricœur is claiming to do. The merit of 
psychoanalysis, according to him, is that “psychoanalysis disrupts traditional 
divisions”1312 because it applies its single, overarching models with its 
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topographic, economic and genetic depictions to separate domains and claims to 
explain them all with the help of these models. As such, it is a perspective on 
humanity and our behavior as a whole. But it is also “limited because it does not 
extend beyond the validity of its model or models”.1313 And with this assessment 
of both the validity and limitation of psychoanalysis, I think we find the core of 
Ricœur’s model of a conflict of interpretations and its arbitration. 
I will not go into the details of Ricœur’s appropriation of Freud in this 
section; I will rather leave a more detailed account of Ricœur’s traversal of 
psychoanalysis for the next chapter. But let me mention the way Ricœur detects in 
Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams1314 the positing of a unity between literary 
creation, myths and dream distortion1315 which prepares him to tackle culture as a 
unitary phenomenon later on. He takes the dialectics between “aesthetic 
seduction” and “religious illusion” and the backdrop of the topographic-economic 
interpretation as structuring Freud’s analyzes of culture, and this in works such as 
Totem and Taboo1316, The Future of an Illusion1317 and Moses and 
Monotheism.1318 According to him, we must read the partial and “genetic” 
interpretations against this topographic-economic background, otherwise we will 
lose the unity of perspective provided by the psychoanalytic take on culture. 
According to this model, then, civilization and culture are not really 
distinguished. Culture implies coercion and instinctual renunciation.1319 So society 
is uncovered, for Freud, as the locus of a major conflict between instincts and 
prohibition and culture is thus at pains to mitigate it through a triple quest: 
 
Lessening the burden of instinctual renunciation, reconciliation with the inescapable and 
compensation for sacrifice.1320 
 
Thus, notes Ricœur, for Freud this inescapable tension and the search for 
solutions that allow us to make it treatable, define culture itself. As cultural beings, 
we are inherently unsatisfied, and psychoanalysis attempts to answer why and to 
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provide solutions for it. 
Ultimately, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle1321 Freud introduces the 
instinct of destruction embodied in Thanatos and the way it can trump Eros as a 
source of our desires. At a social level, the death instinct unfolds as a sort of 
anticulture1322 which is progressively revealed at biological, psychological and 
cultural levels. With this claim we come to the human species’ struggle for life 
amid civilization. In Civilization and its Discontents1323 culpability comes into 
play as a result of this essential conflict between Eros and Thanatos, while Totem 
and Taboo gives an account of moral coercion.  
Ricœur accepts the pertinence of these analyzes, up to a certain point. He 
also comes to see in Freud the meaningful diagnosis of our psychic conflicts 
through the economic model, and the way the repression of instincts expresses 
itself in our psychopathological everyday life. However, in a typical move, Ricœur 
claims that many times what we find in the objects analyzed by psychoanalysis is 
not only the expression of our conflicts, but also of their putative solutions. This is 
blatant in Ricœur’s assessment of Freud’s interpretations of art and myths, such as 
those concerning the Oedipus myth or the cultural creations of Shakespeare or Da 
Vinci. 
 
If these works are creations, it is because they are not simple projections of the artists’ 
conflicts but are outlines of their solutions. The argument will be that the dream looks 
backward toward childhood and the past, while the art work is an advance on the artist 
himself. It is a prospective symbol of personal synthesis and of the future of man rather 
than a regressive symbol of his unresolved conflicts. This is why the art lover’s 
understanding is not a simple reliving of his personal conflicts, a fictive realization of the 
desires awakened in him by the drama, but a participation in the work of truth which is 
realized in the soul of the tragic hero.1324 
 
This interpretation is consistent with Ricœur’s dialectical correction of Freudian 
archaeology with Hegelian teleology that he presents in Freud and Philosophy and 
which we will see in more detail in the next two chapters. 
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Ultimately, Ricœur seems to have a perspectivistic take on the 
perspective of psychoanalysis itself. He states “everyone bears the responsibility 
of situating psychoanalysis in his own vision of things”.1325 His own take, as we 
already know, consists in placing Freud alongside the other “masters of suspicion” 
and of limiting their pretentions by positing the possibility of a restorative 
hermeneutics and even a phenomenology of the sacred. In this article, using 
another metaphor, akin to that of arbitration, Ricœur mentions that he wants to 
“coordinate the diverse styles of contemporary hermeneutics”1326 which means, at 
this point in time, to recover the possibility of a phenomenology and a 
hermeneutics of the symbols ready to accept and explicate their meaning instead 
of only unmasking them. 
In the last analyzis, Ricœur takes Freud to be a tragic thinker. According 
to him, the “Freudian revolution is that of diagnosis, lucid coldness, and hard-won 
truths”.1327 It is also, in its own way, and as I have described in another context, 
describing Kant’s philosophy, an ascesis. With the difference being that here, at 
least if we follow Ricœur’s reading, there is no morality whatsoever. Freud wants 
to constitute a science in its own right, capable of holding its own and explaining 
human consciousness and behavior. And this, for Ricœur, is actually one of 
Freud’s strengths: 
 
This is the misunderstanding: Freud is hearkened to as a prophet, while he speaks as an 
unprophetic thinker. He does not herald a new ethic but rather changes the consciousness 
of those for whom the question of ethics remains open. He changes consciousness by 
changing our knowledge of consciousness and by giving it the key to some of its 
deceptions. Freud can change our ethic in the long run because he is not a moralist for the 
immediate future.1328  
 
As such, and to sum up Ricœur’s reading of Freud at this point, he sees in 
Freudian psychoanalysis a meaningful depiction of inner and outer conflicts, and 
he sees Freud as proposing no immediate solution or them, and no positive ethics. 
But he does depart from Freud in his contention that symbols (artistic, religious or 
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any other meaningful symbol) are not only the display of our conflicts, but also of 
our ways of dealing with them and finding solutions to them. Freud’s difference in 
comparison with Hegel is thus that while both are tragic thinkers, Hegel does posit 
a possible consolation, while Freud apparently offers none. But because he does 
change the way we perceive consciousness, the world, and our behavior in it, his 
own ascesis of truth is perhaps capable of refiguring (to use a word that Ricœur 
would explicitly put forward in the 1980s) our own world vision. We are thus left 
with the task of incorporating the psychoanalytical standpoint in it, and to see how 
it changes our perspective. The great lesson that we learn from Freud then, and 
Ricœur seems to take up this lesson, is that there is an irreducible locus of conflict 
in our life. That conflict is inescapable in human interaction.1329 Should there be 
any reconciliation here, it would be none other than consenting to necessity, as in 
the Symbolism of Evil. But what necessity? In this case, it is consenting to the hard 
truth that there is a tragic residue in human life and so that some conflicts are 
inescapable. This seems to be the ultimate lesson that psychoanalysis has for 
Ricœur: 
 
Finally, it is the lucid awareness of the necessary character of conflicts which is, if not the 
last word, at least the first of a wisdom which would incorporate psychoanalytic 
instruction. In this way Freud renewed not only the sources of the tragic but “tragic 
knowledge” itself, insofar as it is the reconciliation with the inevitable.1330 
 
So even though Ricœur contends that in our own creations and in symbols we find 
the projection not only of the conflicts but also of the solutions to them, he 
acknowledges that maybe conflict in the form of human interaction is inescapable; 
or at least that there might be situations in which it is indeed inescapable. And to 
this he calls the tragic of action, which would play a fundamental role in Oneself 
as Another. Freud’s hermeneutics of culture is thus seen as providing us with a 
key lesson, and even though it is not be taken as a hermeneutics depleting social, 
psychic or moral reality, it is a hermeneutics useful to teach us the discipline of 
necessity. 
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4.1.5 – Hermeneutics and phenomenology 
 
The last of the methodologies I need to mention due to its relation with 
hermeneutics is phenomenology. Ricœur dedicates articles to outlining the relation 
between these two standpoints in both phases of his hermeneutical production, 
namely in The Conflict of Interpretations and From Text to Action. I will allow 
myself to very briefly recall the main traits of the way in which he envisions this 
relation in both phases, before coming back to his take on psychoanalysis in the 
next chapters. With this interaction between hermeneutics and phenomenology I 
will finish the assessment of the main standpoints in tension that overlap in a 
fertile manner in Ricœur’s thematic treatment of the conflict of interpretations. 
Firstly, it must be stated that phenomenology comes into play in The 
Conflict of Interpretations mostly to help Ricœur frame the topic of the subject, or 
selfhood, and the threats that other hermeneutical styles, like structuralism and 
semiology, pose to it. I mentioned before how in this book Ricœur recovers Nabert 
and his style of reflective philosophy in order to better ground the hermeneutic 
problem in existence and the subject. In two other texts of the same section, 
“Heidegger and the Question of the Subject”1331 and “The Question of the Subject: 
The Challenge of Semiology”1332 Ricœur explicitly spells out the standpoint of a 
hermeneutics of the self (or, as he sometimes puts it, a “hermeneutics of the ‘I 
am’”1333). In “Heidegger and the Question of the Subject” Ricœur examines 
Heidegger’s attacks on the Cartesian cogito and positively assesses his connection 
between hermeneutics and existence, that his, Heidegger’s insistence that Dasein 
is a questioning being, and that it is in our connection to Being and in the 
disclosure of that connection through (hermeneutical) questioning that we come to 
define ourselves. For Ricœur, it is important to emphasize that for Heidegger the 
ego who is implied in the question is not posited as being certain of itself1334 and 
also that it is as an “I am” and not as an “I think” that this question involves 
me.1335 This is important for Ricœur’s own alternative between the philosophies of 
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the subject and the philosophies without subject. He would spell this out more 
clearly later, but the main intuitions were already there with him in the 1960s. 
Ricœur’s main difference in relation to Heidegger, as stated before, is that 
Ricœur prefers to take the “long detour” of the mediation through signs. And he 
sees hermeneutics as being constituted by this detour. Sometimes he tries to find in 
Heidegger a confirmation of this claim: 
 
Dasein is ontically the closest to itself, but ontologically farthest. And it is in this distance 
that the “I am” becomes the theme of a hermeneutics and not simply of intuitive 
description.1336 
 
His conclusion in this article is that the destruction of the cogito as absolute is also 
the opportunity to put forward a hermeneutics of the self and its insertion in 
Being.1337 Moreover, Heidegger’s insistence on authenticity and on one’s 
“ownmost possibilities” is also seen by Ricœur as a valuable insight for depicting 
what a “true” ipseity could amount to. An ipseity which, as would later become 
clearer, is only attested to, but never completely sure of itself. 
In “The Question of the Subject: The Challenge of Semiology” which is 
perhaps the more encompassing article of the Conflict of Interpretations, the one 
which better sums up Ricœur’s position at this point in time, he offers a concise 
view of the different hermeneutic styles he is juggling with. And he also shows 
how not to lose sight of the subject amid all this putative confusion of competing 
claims. From the outset, Ricœur clarifies that something like a unified philosophy 
of the subject has always been a mirage, and that even in reflective philosophy the 
conflict of interpretations, whether it was acknowledged or not, always played a 
part: 
 
The philosophy of the subject, it is said, is in danger of disappearing. So be it; but this 
philosophy has always been challenged. The philosophy of the subject has never existed; 
rather, there have been a series of reflective styles, arising out of the work of redefinition 
which the challenge itself has imposed.1338 
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Ricœur thus mentions a Socratic cogito: “Look after your soul”, as well as the 
ones defined by Augustine (The inner man), Kant (The “I think” which 
accompanies all my representations), as well as the more known versions of 
Descartes, Fichte and Husserl.1339 To these we could certainly add the more 
contemporary depictions of Charles Taylor, MacIntyre, obviously Ricœur and 
even the later Foucault. Shortly after this assertion concerning the plurality of 
reflective styles, he again puts forward one of his methodological claims. When 
defining what reflective philosophy should do, he is actually describing what he 
himself does with his conflict of interpretations: 
 
By this challenge, reflective philosophy is invited, not to remain intact by warding off 
enemy assaults, but rather to take support from its adversary, to ally itself with that which 
most challenges it.1340 
 
He then recalls the main attacks on the subject brought about by structuralism and 
psychoanalysis, and which I already reconstructed in their main traits. He also puts 
forward his vision according to which language is never for the sake of itself. Over 
against the claim of dissolving the subject but assimilating some of the main 
observations brought about by these dissenting methods, Ricœur ultimately comes 
to the conclusion that while it can be certain that I exist, the question of what I am 
remains open.1341 This vocabulary would be slightly revised in Oneself as Another, 
where I attest who I am (and not what I am); however, who am I in the objective 
sense (that is, my defining traits and characteristics) is also an open-ended 
question, capable of revision; this is, I believe, the spirit of what Ricœur is 
claiming already in the 1960s. 
The ultimate conclusion to which Ricœur arrives is that a nuanced and, as 
it were, enlarged perspective can only be taken up by philosophy. In this case, a 
philosophy of the subject that would have absorbed and traversed the critiques of 
both psychoanalysis and semiology: 
 
The philosophy of the subject that holds a future in not merely one which will have 
undergone the test of psychoanalytic criticism and linguistic criticism; it is the philosophy 
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which will be able to project a new receptive structure for including in its thought both the 
lessons of psychoanalysis and those of semiology.1342 
 
Eventually, in the 1960s Ricœur aims at attaining such a position through 
a particular mix of hermeneutics and reflective philosophy, that is, of a cogito 
mediated by signs1343 who is only capable of discovering him or herself through 
cultural interpretation. Now, this perspective would be fine-tuned in the second 
phase of Ricœur’s hermeneutics, the one presented in From Text to Action, and in 
which he replaces signs by texts as the main units of his hermeneutical stance. In 
this mature phase, the relation between phenomenology and hermeneutics is also 
thematically analyzed in a more careful way. As such, and before delving more 
deeply into his traversal of psychoanalysis, allow me to conclude this chapter with 
these precisions on the relation between phenomenology and hermeneutics. 
The first part of From Text to Action is precisely called “For a 
Hermeneutical phenomenology” and it is composed of texts whose programmatic 
character is once again evident. In them, Ricœur sets out to define the task of 
hermeneutics1344; in order to do so, he chooses to begin with a description of the 
way in which his method draws from both phenomenology and hermeneutics, as 
well as the meaningful differences and similarities between the two standpoints. 
Thus in the text “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics”1345 Ricœur spells out this 
connection. He presents two main claims: 1) Hermeneutics is not a negation of 
phenomenology, only of one of its variants: Husserlian idealism; and 2) over and 
above the opposition there is a mutual imbrication between phenomenology and 
hermeneutics such that one cannot be properly understood without the other.1346 
Why is hermeneutics opposed to Husserlian idealism? Ricœur mentions 
several reasons: a) even though Husserl posited scientificity as the ideal of an 
ultimate foundation this foundation is put in check by the ontological condition of 
understanding1347; b) he wanted a return to intuition but understanding must 
always be mediated by interpretation; c) the cogito itself can be doubted; d) 
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subjectivity is not be considered as unquestionable and primal. In fact, the primal 
object of hermeneutics is the text and its interpretations; e) consequently, 
subjectivity is not to be found at the beginning but rather at the end of the enquiry, 
because only after the mediation of interpretation can it be established. 
However, even if there is, according to this depiction, a conflict of 
interpretations between phenomenology and hermeneutics, Ricœur ultimately 
thinks that a correct interpretation of phenomenology is able to sufficiently ground 
hermeneutics. So, for him, the similarities are to be found in the prevalence 
accorded to meaning, in the dialectics between belonging and distanciation, and in 
the emphasis put on the pre-linguistic layers of experience. Finally, there is a 
similarity which is noted by Ricœur only in passing, when commenting on 
Husserl, but which I think is really decisive for his method and that can be used to 
describe an aspect tied to his approach to philosophy: 
 
The “style” of the interpretation is characterized by the “infinite work” involved in 
unfolding the horizons of present experiences. Phenomenology is a meditation 
“indefinitely pursued” because reflection is overwhelmed by the potential meanings of 
one’s own lived experience.1348 
 
Indeed “work”, like “task” are two words that Ricœur often invokes when 
describing key concepts in his philosophy. The energetic metaphors are thus very 
important in his books, even if these are, paradoxically, energetic terms used in 
interpretation (showing that the degree of imbrication between energetics and 
hermeneutics is even greater than he admitted). But the fact that the work of 
interpretation can be “unending” because the “potential meanings” could become 
overwhelming is, I think, an aspect which was taken very seriously by Ricœur. 
And from this is derived not only the long detour but also the multiple crisscrosses 
between opposing poles, so characteristic of the conflict of interpretations. 
To sum up this section, I think we can say that the way in which Ricœur 
assesses phenomenology amid the conflict of interpretations is twofold: on the one 
hand, Ricœur considers phenomenology (and namely Heidegger’s version of 
hermeneutical phenomenology) as an interesting ally in the conflict against 
structuralism and psychoanalysis, a conflict in which what Ricœur aims is at 
                                                
1348 Ibid., p. 50. 
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saving the subject, albeit a radically transformed and less pretentious one. On the 
other hand, Ricœur plays a role in the conflict of different interpretations of 
phenomenology’s role and method and he considers that the only valid 
interpretation of phenomenology is the one that lets itself be pervaded by 
hermeneutics and its essential postulates of interpretation, textual mediation and so 
forth. 
To some extent, after the Conflict of Interpretations Ricœur would 
dedicate less time and energy thematically analyzing the notion of conflict. 
Nonetheless, with all he had written before, and with this course of conflict 
already being halfway, he probably thought he had by this time already 
sufficiently established its epistemological and methodological bases. 
Consequently, he could move on to other problems. Nevertheless, and from what I 
expounded before, I think it is fair to assume that these claims were taken for 
granted and Ricœur just kept on using his method of the conflict of interpretations 
in all his other books. The rest of this course of conflict, that is, the remaining 
chapters of this part and all the next part of this thesis will therefore continue to 
follow its thread. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 472
4.2 – Unconscious Conflict: the Traversal of Psychoanalysis 
 
4.2.1 – Conflicts in our psychic life: Freud and Philosophy and the early texts 
 
I already mentioned the influence of Freud and psychoanalysis in Ricœur 
quite a few times. More specifically, I explained in some detail how Ricœur wants 
to assess the philosophical significance of Freud, how he considers psychoanalysis 
to be a hermeneutics of culture and how he sees in Freud a master of suspicion, 
but ultimately wants to counterbalance the importance of suspicion with an 
emphasis on hermeneutics as recollection of meaning. Now, in this brief chapter, I 
will pick up the missing threads of Ricœur’s assessment of Freud and 
psychoanalysis. My approach will be chronological and thematic. Firstly, I will 
mention the aspects of Ricœur’s early take on psychoanalysis that have not been 
highlighted before in this thesis, and namely the loci of conflict he uncovers with 
Freud. Lastly, in an even shorter second section of the chapter, I will briefly assess 
the later take on psychoanalysis that Ricœur puts forward, one in which the 
psychoanalytical practice is more seriously taken into account. 
“Consciousness and the Unconscious”, a conference originally written in 
1960 and later republished in The Conflict of Interpretations was, as I mentioned 
before, Ricœur’s first systematic article on Freud. In it, some of the main claims of 
his assessment of the philosophical significance of Freud are already put forward. 
Let us not forget that in this year Ricœur had published the second volume of his 
Philosophy of the Will. As such, from the outset of the article, Ricœur 
acknowledges the “considerable shock” that constitutes for him, who had been 
“trained in phenomenology, existential philosophy, linguistic or semiological 
studies, and the revival of Hegel studies” the encounter of psychoanalysis.1349 And 
why? Because most of these strands, and more notably of which phenomenology, 
existential philosophy and Hegelianism, strongly asserted the existence and 
pertinence of consciousness – as well as Kantianism, to which Ricœur was, to 
reiterate, very close. 
With Freud, even more than with Marx and Nietzsche, Ricœur uncovers 
the possibility which in a way denied all his previous philosophy, i.e., “the lie of 
                                                
1349 Ricœur, “Consciousness and the Unconscious”, op. cit., p. 99. 
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consciousness and consciousness as a lie”.1350 Taking this possibility into account 
in a serious manner is thus tantamount to admitting that “The question of 
consciousness is just as obscure as that of the unconscious.”1351 And this because 
consciousness itself becomes some sort of dialectical reality. If it cannot be 
depicted as something which we can grasp with unfaltering certitude, and if this 
has all the unwanted consequences of lack of clarity concerning our motives and 
drives, an eventual loss of freedom and even maybe its correlative incapacity to 
assume responsibility for one’s actions, than its status itself must be transformed. 
Hence, according to Ricœur, “Consciousness in not a given but a task.”1352 Ricœur 
many times repeats Freud’s formula wo es war, soll ich werden, i.e., roughly 
translated, where “it” was, I must become. This is taken to mean that the 
hypothesis of consciousness is not at definitely lost in Freudian psychoanalysis. 
The first impact of Freud’s theory might be terrifying in that we discover that we 
are really not the masters of ourselves. Nevertheless, through psychoanalytical 
technique and interpretation there is the possibility of reconquering through work 
– and more notably of which Durcharbeiten, the “working-through” or 
perlaboration – what in traditional theory seemed like a point of departure, i.e. 
consciousness. 
So we can say that for Ricœur, what applies to the theory of the self is 
what also applies – at least to some extent – to consciousness. Instead of 
Bewusstsein (consciousness as a status, almost an entity) what we have is a 
process of Bewusst werden, of becoming a consciousness through the process of 
self-discovery promoted by the hermeneutics of the self. So the subject, and 
consciousness, are only attained (or better yet, they are never fully grasped but 
only permanently reinterpreted) after the long mediations and detours. One 
important mediation is evidently, for Ricœur, that of the meaningful teachings of 
Freudian psychoanalysis. 
That said, Ricœur envisages the relationship between consciousness and 
the unconscious as a conflict which needs to be turned into a dialectical 
relationship without, however, falling back into what Ricœur fears the most, 
namely, that his standpoint be taken as a “mere eclecticism”: 
                                                
1350 Ibid. 
1351 Ibid. 
1352 Ibid., p. 108. 
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We must enter into the most complete opposition between consciousness as history and 
the unconscious as fate if we wish to acquire the right to overcome this opposition and 
understand the identity of the two opposed systematics, one of which is a synthesis of 
consciousness, the other an analyzis of the unconscious. But neither their opposition nor 
their identity gives us the right to eclecticism. Three cups of the unconscious, two 
tablespoons of preconsciousness, and a pinch of consciousness is not our recipe at any 
price. Eclecticism is always the enemy of the dialectic.1353 
 
This wish to escape eclecticism leads Ricœur to make the most serious reading of 
Freud he is able to produce; and it accounts for his reading of almost all of Freud’s 
writings in German. 
He thus distinguishes between what amounts to “technique” and what 
escapes it in Freud’s psychoanalytical interpretations.1354 Psychoanalysis is a 
technique insofar as it “arises from a therapeutical maneuver which is constituted 
as a profession”.1355 However, for Ricœur, it also contains both an “art of 
interpretation” and a speculative theory.1356 But this “art” and this speculation are 
marked by what is in itself a conflictual situation. The unconscious, as it is 
presented in Freudian theory, is elusive. The effort of self-comprehension is met 
by resistance and its mechanisms. Therefore psychoanalysis is, in a sense, a way 
of hermeneutically struggling against the energetic concealing of the inner depths 
of our psychic life: “the art of interpretation should itself be considered as part of 
the art of handling resistances (…) Freud continually repeats that the struggle 
against resistance is arduous”.1357 
As such, psychoanalysis always deals with what are inherently conflictual 
situations. And Ricœur recalls Freud’s caution on the way interpretation and the 
analytical technique must be conducted, in order not to aggravate these conflicts 
and decrease the likelihood of cure.1358 We should not forget that the patient 
suffers; and Ricœur, who was always very attentive to human fragility, finds in 
this another motive of interest in psychoanalysis. The conflicts with which we are 
                                                
1353 Ibid., p. 119. 
1354 See Ricœur, “Technique and Nontechnique in Interpretation”, pp. 177-195. 
1355 Ibid., p. 178. 
1356 Ibid. 
1357 Ibid., p. 179. 
1358 Ibid., p. 180. 
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dealing here can become incapacitating such as in the case of neurosis, etc. 
Consequently, it is also as a subtle art for dealing with conflicts that Ricœur 
recovers psychoanalysis, even though he does not explicitly states this in these 
words. 
This claim finds perhaps a confirmation in Ricœur’s apology of Freud, 
the “liberator”, the Aufklärer. That is, behind consciousness as disguise lies 
deformation and conflict of instincts, transfer, and so forth. But one of the 
consequences of psychoanalysis will be to “force” people, as it were, to recognize 
these conflicts (and this not really in the analytical relation, but more broadly 
applied to the general insights on the human brought about by psychoanalysis and 
their social effects). Accordingly, Freud states that “they will have to be honest, 
confess to the instincts that are at work in them, face the conflict, fight for what 
they want, or go without it”.1359 And he even speaks about “psychoanalytic 
enlightenment” to describe this effect. And Ricœur actually praises this: 
psychoanalysis as a phenomenon of disoccultation and the possibility of salvation 
through psychoanalysis.1360 To reiterate, this position by Ricœur is not very 
different from the one Habermas adopted in the 1970s. Indeed, Ricœur really 
insists on psychoanalysis being a kind of hard discovery of truth and reconciliation 
with reality. Psychoanalysis is a project of liberation1361, and if that means 
accepting our conflicts – or partially solving them – so be it. This is explicitly 
stated: 
 
It seems to me that we can legitimately say that psychoanalysis, when it is well 
understood and thought through, frees man for projects other than that of domination.1362 
 
And in this interesting article, Ricœur already partiality anticipates what would 
later become his anthropology of the capacities; he tells us that one of the results 
of psychoanalysis will be to make us capable of doing two things; restoring our 
ability to speak and our ability to love. And he asserts that they are nothing but 
two aspects of the same project. 
Insofar as psychoanalysis is able to go beyond neurosis and to recognize 
                                                
1359 Quoted by Ricœur, Ibid., p. 191. 
1360 Ibid. 
1361 Ibid., p. 192. 
1362 Ibid. 
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our true desires, inasmuch as it is capable of establishing a semantics of desire that 
is more than the simple energetic result of tensions and conflicts, it eventually 
make us capable of speaking again, and perhaps even of articulating a more 
authentic desire. Accordingly, Ricœur’s hope is that this art of interpretation will 
also allow us to provide a new orientation to our desire, which is nothing more 
than a new power to love.1363 Why is it that Ricœur expresses this, and what does 
this hope amount to? It is not that conflicts will be eliminated. But being able to 
recognize and articulate them, as well as to articulate our true desires will perhaps 
provide a reconciliation with nature. Perhaps even an authenticity of our desire. Or 
a reeducation of it, as Ricœur sometimes says. But either way, by helping us to 
understand better our desires, it will have provided us an invaluable service.  
These elements would be put forward in a more systematic approach in 
Freud and Philosophy, Ricœur’s true confrontation, assessment and recovery of 
Freudian psychoanalysis and its philosophical dialectics with Hegel. I already said 
enough about the masters of suspicion, the conflict of interpretations and 
psychoanalysis as a global interpretation of culture, so I do not need to repeat the 
aspects of it which also make their appearance in this book. Instead I will just 
provide a rapid overview of the book and mention the main instantiations of 
conflict it calls our attention to, before quickly assessing the later writings and, in 
the next chapter, delve more deeply into the kernel of the book and the conflicted 
self, torn between archeology and teleology. 
The organization of Freud and Philosophy has a Kantian backdrop. It is 
divided in a “Problematic” an “Analytic” and a “Dialectic”. That is, it is as if 
Ricœur wanted to spell out the reason why he became interested in Freud in the 
first place (the conflict of interpretations, the torn character of language, the 
connection between hermeneutics and reflective philosophy), and then prove the 
seriousness of his reading by traversing and depicting as objectively as possible 
Freud’s works, in order for later put forward his own interpretation of it. A long 
detour indeed. 
In a way, Freud comes to sum up for Ricœur the demystification of all the 
masters of suspicion and thus to be the major representative of one of the sides in 
conflict. He assumes this: 
                                                
1363 Ibid., p. 194. 
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In the beginning, Freud is one combatant among many; in the end, he shall have become 
the privileged witness of the total combat, for all the opposition will be carried over into 
him.1364 
 
Hence conflict appears at the fundamental energetic level. Our psychic life is 
made up of conflicts of instincts, and we have to catch a glimpse of the topography 
of our psychic life, and all the mechanisms of distortion. However, since Ricœur 
contends that his book is a succession of readings, or angles, on Freud’s work, and 
since his main overarching thesis on Freud is that his theory has the status of a 
semantics of desire – in his own words “the energetics implies a hermeneutics and 
the hermeneutics discovers an energetics”1365, what he tries to do is to make sense 
of these conflicts.  
In his Analytic, Ricœur systematically unveils the conflictual aspects 
pervasive in Freud’s theory. For instance, when analyzing The Interpretation of 
Dreams, he highlights the “violence done to the meaning”1366 which is a result of 
the mechanisms of censorship and distortion. The “hidden” is not only masked; it 
is distorted, as it were. Substitution is also a trick. This is why interpretation is 
almost always a (strenuous) work, and why it must be indirect. He explicitly states 
that through the process of repression, the psychical apparatus “receives force and 
conflict”.1367 
Ultimately, Ricœur concentrates on the concept of 
Vorstellungsrepräsentanz or simply Repräsentanz put forward in the discussion of 
Freud’s “Papers on Metapsychology”. According to Ricœur, this mechanism that 
will be the one able to provide a link between force and meaning, consciousness 
and the unconscious, “body and soul” as it were.1368 Because a purely economic 
(or energetic) standpoint makes no sense, if totally separated from the 
representable and the sayable. Otherwise, we would fall short of a “psycho-
logy”.1369 
Likewise, in the chapters on Freud’s take on culture and civilization, 
                                                
1364 Ricœur, Freud and Philosophy, p. 60. 
1365 Ibid., p. 65. 
1366 Ibid., p. 92. 
1367 Ibid., p. 109. 
1368 Ibid., pp. 135 ff. 
1369 Ibid., p. 150. 
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conflict plays an important role. After all, what is culture for Freud if not the 
“great conflict between civilization and the instincts”1370 exemplified in a striking 
manner in the Oedipus myth and the prohibition of incest? The assertion of the 
inherent conflictuality of human beings in society and culture also provides 
Ricœur with the opportunity to make a first approximation between Freud and 
Hegel: 
 
Because the adult remains subject to the infant he once was, because he can lag behind 
and regress, because he is capable of archaism, conflict is no mere accident which he 
might be spared by a better social organization or a more suitable education; human 
beings can experience entry into culture only in the mode of conflict. Suffering 
accompanies the task of culture like fate, the fate illustrated by the Oedipus tragedy. 
Possibility of aberration and necessity of repression are correlative; cultural renunciation, 
similar to the work of mourning mentioned above, holds the place occupied by fear in the 
Hegelian dialectic of Master and Slave.1371 
 
Ricœur is very explicit in the above passage. Entry into culture always entails 
conflict and this partly because the archaic still survives in us. The prohibition and 
the desire to transgress it will always maintain us in an unstable position.  
The problem is always of how to deal with the conflict between instincts 
and the obstacles to them, how to deal with desire. Desire can conflict with reality 
and thus illusion is born. Ricœur mentions how Freud takes religious beliefs as 
being delusional in this sense.1372 Ricœur, as I mentioned, ultimately rejects this 
account and wants to recover the possibility of post-critical faith. But escaping 
from reality is taken, as it were, as a pathological phenomenon; and he takes into 
account the major conflict between the pleasure principle and the reality principle 
such as it unfolds in Freudian theory1373 and the ultimate polarity that is assumed 
between Eros and Thanatos (which eventually leads to the feeling of culpability 
that occupied Ricœur for so long). For Freud, as we have seen above, this polarity 
is tantamount to the struggle of human beings for existence, insofar as culture is 
                                                
1370 Ibid., p. 191. 
1371 Ibid., pp. 196-197. 
1372 Ibid., p. 235. 
1373 See chapter one of part three “The Pleasure Principle and the Reality Principle”, pp. 261-280. 
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supposed to rein in the fundamental conflictual aggressiveness of Thanatos1374, to 
control the instinct of destruction. And psychoanalysis is supposed to play a role in 
this. 
But these are all conflicts detected by psychoanalysis and Ricœur 
recognizes these diagnoses as accurate for the most part. However, a second level 
of conflictuality in the book lies in the conflicts and tensions which Ricœur detects 
in Freud’s take itself, such as that between a “mythology of desire” and the 
“science of the psychical apparatus”1375 or indeed, more broadly put, between 
energetics and hermeneutics. And for him, philosophy’s role, at least in the 1960s 
is precisely that of arbitration.1376 This is all the more important for him given the 
fact that he states that the core of Freud’s concepts gravitates on the model of 
conflict1377 most notably of which “structural conflicts” like those between id, ego 
and superego.1378 Ultimately, Ricœur’s epistemological standpoint in this book 
will hinge in the frontier and intersection between psychoanalysis and 
phenomenology, as his section on dialectics elaborates. I will skip the details of 
this position, because the next chapter will say enough about consciousness-
formation at this point of Ricœur’s philosophy. Suffice it to say for now that for 
Ricœur the “place” of energetic discourse is at the intersection of desire and 
language.1379 Consequently, the energetic metaphors are of a mixed nature. If, on 
the one hand, they are more than energetic, on the other hand they also bear 
witness to something more than a relationship between meaning and meaning.1380 
They are, as it were, a bridge between two different realms. One consequence of 
this is that in psychoanalytical practice, the art of interpretation is part of the art of 
handling the patient’s resistances.1381 And after Freud and Philosophy the 
emphasis turns precisely towards the significance of this practice. 
 
 
 
                                                
1374 Ibid., p. 305. 
1375 Ibid., p. 313. 
1376 Ibid., p. 342. 
1377 Ibid., pp. 349-350. 
1378 Ibid., p. 370. 
1379 Ibid., p. 395. 
1380 Ibid., p. 394. 
1381 Ibid., p. 408. 
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4.2.2 – Psychoanalysis after Freud and Philosophy: the turn towards 
psychoanalytical practice 
 
In his Postface to Écrits et conférences 1: autour de la psychanalyse 
Vinicio Busacchi emphasizes that the turn towards analytical practice can be 
understood against the backdrop of a new way at looking at what could be called 
the “psychoanalytical experience” and which entails the abandonment of some of 
Freud’s own claims.1382 This can in part be explained, as Busacchi contends, by 
the shift in Ricœur’s hermeneutic theory, from an emphasis on symbols to an 
approach based on texts and paying special attention to narrativity.  
Now, if Ricœur slowly gathers the threads that would later allow him to 
make fully explicit his notion of “narrative identity” it goes without saying that 
psychoanalysis plays a meaningful role in his rethinking of the processes of 
narrative self-construction.1383 In fact the psychoanalytical relation slowly appears 
as a model for the intersubjective relation, one in which the life that searches for a 
story that is sometimes structurally impeded is able to overcome its pathological 
condition. Through the psychoanalytical relation the patient comes – or at least 
can come – to see cure and recognition of oneself as being possible. To linguistic 
exclusion psychoanalysis brings the possibility of re-symbolization.1384 
Furthermore, adds Ricœur, desire has a dialogical structure, and this reinforces his 
Hegelian reading of Freud, already presented in Freud and Philosophy. Over 
against Freud’s somewhat monological account, Ricœur emphasizes that desire is 
intrinsically dialogical. As such, if we want to find a good depiction of dialogical 
desire in psychoanalysis, he argues, we are not to find it in Freud’s theoretical 
accounts but rather in psychoanalytic therapy itself, where it is always through the 
mediation of another that desires come to be articulated. 
In these sets of articles, no less than in Freud and Philosophy, Ricœur 
finds in psychoanalysis a way to deal with conflicts. He constantly recalls that 
psychoanalysis is to be understood as a means to struggle against the patient’s 
resistances, even if it risks deepening his or her conflicts.1385 In a very significant 
                                                
1382 Vinicio Busacchi, Postface to Paul Ricœur, Écrits et conférences 1, p. 307. 
1383 See Ricœur, “La vie: un récit en quête de narrateur” in Écrits et conférences 1, pp. 257-276 and 
“Le récit: sa place en Psychanalyse”, pp. 277-290. 
1384 See Ricœur, “Le récit: sa place en Psychanalyse”, p. 281. 
1385 Ricœur, “La question de la preuve en Psychanalyse”, in Écrits et conférences 1, p. 41. 
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article, called “Le Self selon la Psychanalyse et selon la philosophie 
phénoménologique”1386 Ricœur assesses the contributions of Heinz Kohut to 
psychoanalysis and its take on the self. More specifically, he uncovers how there 
is a metaconflict between Freud’s and Kohut’s analyzes over the fundamental 
Oedipus conflict. According to Kohut this latter conflict, stemming from sexual 
instincts, is secondary in relation to a more fundamental conflict revolving around 
the relations between the self and selfobjects.1387 Unlike Freud, Kohut postulates a 
unified self, and the relation to others as being driven by empathy. Likewise, 
contrary to Freudian psychoanalysis, Kohut’s theory of the self is seen by Ricœur 
as contributing to the classical discussions of the conflicts between subjectivity / 
objectivity and understanding / explanation.1388 In the first debate, Kohut 
compares the self psychology to microphysics, where the observer is him or 
herself part of the observed object. In the second one, Kohut, like Ricœur, 
distinguishes between phases of understanding and phases of explanation. In these 
latter phases, the analyst contributes to the patient’s process of working through 
with the objective elements and renewed interpretations he spells out. As it is 
clear, Kohut’s analyzes come close to both hermeneutics and critical theory, in 
their claims about the closeness and mutual implication of subject and object. The 
emphasis on the dependence of the self upon approbation (even if in this case 
these are objects we are talking about) brings Kohut also close to recognition 
theory. As Ricœur emphasizes, for Kohut, we have to be able to have esteem for 
ourselves in order to recognize esteem unto others.1389 This is akin to what 
Honneth calls positive relations to self. 
Like he had done before for Freud, Ricœur proposes to read Kohut with 
comparison with Hegel and the model of struggle. Contrary to Hegel, Kohut 
insists that struggle is not a generative source of our psychic life but rather the 
result of an early “acquired pathology” stemming from a failed relation between 
                                                
1386 This article was originally published in English as “The Self in Psychoanalysis and in 
Phenomenological Philosophy” in Psychoanalytic Inquiry 6, 3 (1986): 437-458 but I only had 
access to the French version, in Écrits et conférences 1, pp. 139-166. On this conflict of the notions 
of self in psychoanalysis and phenomenology, and the way Heinz Kohut’s approach can 
meaningfully intersect with Ricœur’s, namely through the insertion of empathy in his theory, see 
Michel Dupuis, “L’empathie comme outil herméneutique du soi. Note sur Paul Ricœur et Heinz 
Kohut” in Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricœur Studies 1, 1  (2010): 9-20. 
1387 Ricœur, “Le self selon la Psychanalyse et selon la philosophie phénoménologique”, p. 140. 
1388 Ibid., pp. 150-151. 
1389 Ibid., p. 159. 
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the self and selfobjects. To this malaise, empathy will be the main cure.1390 Ricœur 
notes that it is the topic of empathy that brings phenomenology and Kohut’s 
theory of the self close to one another.1391 He also invokes, like he did in Time and 
Narrative, the challenges to the postulate of the unified self brought about not only 
by Nietzsche but also by the literary experimentation of Proust or Joyce (to which 
we could evidently add Pessoa as an even graver example). His solution to this 
problem at this point in time is to make of alterity a constitutively ethical 
dimension, which brings him to the vicinity of Levinas.1392 But he does not 
completely drop the Hegelian model of the generative force of struggle and 
conflicts. This will become very clear in the next chapter of this thesis. 
Likewise, if Ricœur sees in psychoanalysis a way to deal with these 
conflicts, he also sees in the psychoanalytical model of cure a possible model for 
the critique of ideologies, following Habermas. Even if he refuses to accept the 
analogy tout court as we have seen before (because we cannot really cure a society 
like we cure a patient) he at least accepts that the critique of ideologies brings a 
degree of self-knowledge to societies inasmuch as Freudian psychoanalytic theory 
and practice can bring one such self-knowledge to a patient. Again, this is close to 
what Habermas calls a “depth hermeneutics”. These are taken as degrees of 
explanation that help bring about a better understanding of the self, in what he 
calls an “hermeneutical arc” in the second stage of his hermeneutical theory. 
Ultimately, self-understanding or self-interpretation, amid this hermeneutical arc, 
are taken as a limit-idea.1393 
Thus psychoanalysis comes to be fully integrated in hermeneutics, as one 
of its methods in the search for truth / interpretation. Its criteria and proofs are said 
to resort to the whole network of interconnected aspects it puts forward: theory, 
hermeneutics, therapy and narration.1394 That is, to clarify, psychoanalysis is taken 
as a sort of hermeneutics1395 with a mixed epistemology halfway between a 
semantic and a naturalist approach. Nevertheless, its results entail all the different 
approaches here listed. Sometimes Ricœur even argues that Freud does not 
sufficiently take into account the semiotic nature of the analytic experience and 
                                                
1390 Ibid., p. 157. 
1391 Ibid., p. 159. 
1392 Ibid., p. 161. 
1393 See Ricœur, “Psychanalyse et herméneutique”, in Écrits et conférences 1, p. 103. 
1394 Ricœur, “La question de la preuve en Psychanalyse”, p. 62. 
1395 See Ricœur, “Psychanalyse et herméneutique”, p. 87. 
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that the type of discourse adequate to that experience is one made up of images, 
bordering the so called “pictorial language” and using visual presentations.1396 
In a nutshell, and as Busacchi argues, the slight shifts in Ricœur’s take on 
psychoanalysis after Freud and Philosophy are closely tied together with the shifts 
in his philosophy. I will leave a more detailed account of the hermeneutical theory 
of the 1970s and 1980s for the last three chapters of this part. But first, and 
because I already mentioned his first attempts at devising a theory of the self, I 
will need to address the fundamental conflict which for the Ricœur of the 1960s, 
constitutes the self. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1396 Ricœur, “Image et langage en Psychanalyse”, in Écrits et conférences 1, p. 105 and p. 128. 
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4.3 – The Conflicted self, Part One: Archaeological vs. Teleological 
Consciousness 
 
It is in the third part of Ricœur’s Freud and Philosophy, the “dialectic” – 
which is the most creative part of the book – that the fundamental rift in 
consciousness becomes fully apparent. The fact that he chooses to call this part of 
the book “dialectic” attests that he does not want to stop at a simple “antithetic” 
between hermeneutical styles. Indeed, he thinks that both the hermeneutics of 
suspicion, at this moment mainly represented by Freud and encapsulated in the 
archeological model, and the now called hermeneutics of the teleological 
discovery of meaning, represented by Hegel’s phenomenology, reveal essential 
features of our consciousness – and thus of ourselves. Ricœur reiterates that he 
does not have a single, overarching hermeneutic theory capable of totally 
reconciling language to itself.1397 So conflict remains inescapable. But in his own 
dialectical solution he hopes to have attained a greater degree of clarity about the 
self and culture through his double reading of Freud and Hegel. 
 
4.3.1 – Freud’s archeological model 
 
Concerning Freud, Ricœur starts by noting the usefulness of his critiques 
of the cogito. In order to discover ourselves hermeneutically we must go beyond 
immediate consciousness. That is, we must experience “dispossession” and this, 
for him, is what justifies Freud’s naturalism.1398 Therefore, this is not to be taken 
as a reduction to consciousness but as a reduction of consciousness1399, which is to 
be regained, as we know, in the detour through meaningful symbols. As such, and 
in a first approach, such an undertaking is considered as a sort of anti-
phenomenology leading to a “highly mediated reflection”.1400 Ultimately, as we 
have seen above, this is postulated as a task. And how and why is such a task 
                                                
1397 Ricœur, Freud and Philosophy, p. 343. 
1398 Ibid., p. 422. 
1399 Ibid., p. 424. 
1400 Ibid., p. 425. 
 485 
possible? Because, Ricœur argues, “the unconscious is homogeneous with 
consciousness; it is its relative other, and not the absolute other”.1401 
Eventually, the process is confirmed by the status of psychic “reality”. For 
Ricœur, this reality “only exists as a ‘diagnosed’ reality”;1402 that is, the reality of 
the unconscious is relative to the operations that give it meaning. Otherwise, the 
topic and the relation of forces would remain blind and no “cure” would be 
possible. Ricœur’s conclusion is then that there is a (diagnosed) reality of the id, 
but only relative to an ideality of its meaning, inasmuch as we only reach meaning 
at the end of the analytic experience.1403  
Ultimately, this discovery brings him to the notion of “archeology” as the 
archi-concept encapsulating the significance of Freudian methodology. Ricœur 
states that he sees Freud’s metapsychology as “an adventure of reflection”1404 that 
discovers a “wounded Cogito” (cogito blessé), one that “sees its original truth only 
and through the avowal of the inadequacy, illusion, and lying of actual 
consciousness”.1405 Freud’s economic point of view is thus a type of discourse that 
is appropriate to what he decides to call an “archeology of the subject”. 
However, it must be stated that for Ricœur almost all Freudianism is a kind 
of archeology, not only of the subject but also of culture. Allow me to quote a 
slightly longer passage in order to show how Ricœur sees in this archeological 
function that unveils our desire and its masks the fundamental kernel of 
Freudianism: 
 
Insofar as ideals and illusions are the analogues of dreams and neurotic symptoms, it is 
evident that any psychoanalytic interpretation of culture is an archeology. The genius of 
Freudianism is to have unmasked the strategy of the pleasure principle, the archaic form 
of the human, under its rationalizations, its idealizations, its sublimations. Here the 
function of analyzis is to reduce apparent novelty by showing that it is actually a revival 
of the old: substitute satisfaction, restoration of the lost archaic object, derivatives from 
early fantasies – these are but various names to designate the restoration of the old in the 
features of the new.1406 
                                                
1401 Ibid., p. 430. 
1402 Ibid., p. 436. 
1403 Ibid., p. 439. 
1404 Ibid. 
1405 Ibid. 
1406 Ibid., p. 446. 
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Accordingly, in the “return of the repressed”, Ricœur argues, Freud finds a model 
that can be equally applied to the human psyche or to human culture. The archaic, 
its concealment and its return are movements found both in inner and outer nature, 
so to speak. 
Desire masks itself. And if we want to find it, we have to dig deep in our 
soul, in order to understand it. Ricœur’s strong assertion, as we know, is that 
desire is turned towards language. It “wishes to be expressed; it is in potency to 
speech”.1407 It is both the unnameable and the potency to speak. However, even if 
this archeological approach serves to dispossess ourselves, to teach us the hardness 
of life, the truth about ourselves in desire, pleasure and its repression… it itself 
possesses, or so Ricœur argues, its limitations. Namely, the truth about ourselves 
is not to be found only in the deep recesses of our hidden and sometimes shameful 
desire. Sometimes, desire does not come from deep down. Sometimes it pushes us 
forward and its truth cannot help but to be discovered… at the end. So Ricœur 
turns to the teleological aspect of our consciousness. 
 
4.3.2 – Hegel and the teleological process of consciousness-formation 
 
Now, this is an important twist of Ricœur’s argument. Freud uncovers, so 
to speak, our archê. But for Ricœur “in order to have an archê a subject must have 
a telos.”1408 Consequently, all the precedent analyzis is just a preparation for the 
inclusion of this last piece of the puzzle; without it, the mapping of our 
consciousness would remain incomplete. It is not enough to posit the inadequacy 
of immediate consciousness or to find desire at the root of our existence. One must 
also grasp, argues Ricœur, the workings of the process of becoming conscious 
through which we come to appropriate meaning. That is, we must go beyond the 
mere denunciation of meaning as illusory. At the end of Freud and Philosophy, 
the teleological process of consciousness formation and meaning appropriation are 
therefore the privileged path that recollection of meaning assumes. 
However, this too is a mediation and there is no absolutely “certain” or 
“reinforced” subject at the end. Indeed, Ricœur argues that even in this process 
there is a certain dispossession insofar as the “symbols” that will reveal the 
                                                
1407 Ibid., p. 457. 
1408 Ibid., p. 459. 
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meaning of consciousness for us are actually the Hegelian figures of 
consciousness presented in his Phenomenology of Spirit, which I need not recall 
here, since this process was discussed at length in part one of this thesis. That is, 
the emphasis is on “spirit”, broadly put, and not in the individualistic existence of 
my consciousness. Between the two abstractions of the “unconscious” and “spirit” 
Ricœur thus operates the fragile mediations which will constitute our somewhat 
torn, conflicted and yet existent self. Furthermore, it is in this dialectic that he 
finds find the true complementarity between the conflicting hermeneutical styles, 
and hence also of the role of language, philosophy and the interpretation of 
culture. 
His claim is, curiously enough, that Freud and Hegel refer to the same 
phenomena, but that they choose to address them, as it were, in an inverted order, 
through different perspectives. And this even though he acknowledges that they 
are “two different continents” and that all we can do is to find some analogies 
between their theories. However, they both depart from life and desire, and if 
Hegel acknowledged that this is surpassed in spirit and truth and Freud refused to 
do so, Ricœur argues that we can find such a dialectic also in Freudianism.1409 
He chooses to depict what Hegelianism brings to Freudianism as a 
process of adulthood. That is, if Freud discovers behind us, as it were, in the 
depths of ourselves, some of the hidden motivations of our action, if he finds in 
the young child the seed of the adult behavior, Hegel on the other hand through the 
supersession of the figures of spirit shows us how amid the process of struggle and 
recognition we become adults and attain self-consciousness. 
 
Man becomes adult, becomes conscious, by assuming these new forms or figures which 
serially constitute "spirit" in the Hegelian sense of the term. (…) thus all the degrees of 
recognition bring about a movement through regions of meaning irreducible in principle 
to mere projections of instinct, to "illusions." An exegesis of consciousness would consist 
in a progression through all the spheres of meaning that a given consciousness must 
encounter and appropriate in order to reflect itself as a self, a human, adult, conscious 
self.1410 
 
                                                
1409 Ibid., p. 461. 
1410 Ibid., p. 463. 
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Now, it is important to understand how for Ricœur – and also, it goes without 
saying, for Hegel – this path is more than simple narcissism. This is understood as 
a process of consciousness-formation through spirit (even maybe eventually 
ending up in objective spirit and institutions, as in the Hegelian mature Philosophy 
of Right, even though Ricœur does not explicitly claim this in Freud and 
Philosophy). As such, consciousness is only the internalization of a process which 
for Hegel was metaphysical and that we could perhaps characterize in 
postmetaphysical terms as simply a movement of culture. This is what Ricœur 
tentatively calls a “Hegelian metapsychology”.  
 In Hegel, Ricœur finds the production of culture as the movement of 
desire. But a desire which, as we know, is more than a simple desire of objects but 
rather a desire of desire; a desire of recognition. Now, recognition is one of the 
main threads which, for Ricœur, connects Hegel and Freud. In the analytical 
situation, as we have seen before, one seeks recognition too; recognition of truth 
unveiled, and recognition of oneself beyond dissimulation. But it is in the 
Hegelian processes of mutual recognition that the intersubjective mediation really 
becomes creative. Ricœur is not here distinguishing between a monological and a 
dialogical Hegel like Habermas and Honneth do, as we discussed in parts one and 
two. Nor between reciprocity and mutuality as he would do later. But we get the 
idea. Compared with Freud, Hegel places more importance on intersubjectivity, 
desire of desire, creative appropriation of meaning through teleological evolution. 
Ricœur sums up the antithesis in the following terms: 
 
Spirit has its meaning in later forms or figures; it is a movement that always destroys its 
starting point and is secured only at the end. The unconscious, on the other hand, means 
that intelligibility always proceeds from earlier figures, whether this anteriority is 
understood in a strictly temporal or in a metaphorical sense. (…) In general terms, spirit is 
the realm of the terminal; the unconscious, the realm of the primordial. To put the 
antithesis most concisely, I will say that spirit is history and the unconscious is fate.1411 
 
However, as I stated before, this is, for Ricœur, more than a simple antithesis. As 
such, he also undertakes the uncovering of an implicit teleology in Freudianism, 
the details of which I cannot follow here. Suffice it to say that he concludes that 
                                                
1411 Ibid., p. 468. 
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desire is unsurpassable. Desire is mediated, not eradicated and the self will remain 
embattled all the way through.1412 For instance, as I said, the analytical relation 
can be seen as struggle for recognition. Between satisfaction of desire and 
recognition a long and hard mediation needs to take place. Desire is almost always 
intersubjective and taking place in a context of struggle. 
 
4.3.3 – Taking sides in the conflict of interpretations 
 
Ultimately, in Freud and Philosophy, as almost everywhere else, Ricœur 
is hinging on a complicated relation between the recognition of conflicts and the 
search of a fragile mediation and / or conciliation. That much is explicitly admitted 
at the end of the book.1413 Ricœur’s answer, as I stated before, lies in the postulate 
of the overdetermination of symbols, those in which the different hermeneutic 
styles find their place, in a sort of enlarged perspective. This is the exemplary case 
of the Oedipus symbol, which Ricœur takes as being paradigmatic. Both the 
Freudian and the Hegelian perspective on it are valid, as both disclose different 
aspects of it, namely, as an archaic sexual tragedy or as a tragedy of the 
progressive disclosure of truth.1414 However, as I also stated before, for all his talk 
on arbitration, Ricœur is really taking sides here, because what he aimed to do at 
the outset was not only to put forward the claims of the hermeneutics of suspicion 
but also to find its limits and to spell out a post-critical faith and a post-critical 
hermeneutics as recollection of meaning. Ricœur’s conclusion is therefore a return 
to the hermeneutical circle: “believe in order to understand and understand in 
order to believe.”1415 That the subject is first lost and then found after a long 
mediation, and that this mediation is pushed in opposite directions by Freud and 
Hegel is perhaps the main conclusion of the book, but maybe can we say that 
Ricœur’s main goal was precisely to defend the possibility of recovery of meaning 
even after the traversal of suspicion.1416 
As such, Ricœur’s first hermeneutic theory is also an hermeneutics 
centered on the plurivocity of symbols, on their plurality of levels (Freudian 
                                                
1412 Ibid., p. 472. 
1413 Ibid., pp. 494-495. 
1414 Ibid., pp. 515 ff. 
1415 Ibid., p. 525. 
1416 See the section “The value and limits of a psychoanalysis of religion”, pp. 531 ff. 
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regressive symbols, Hegelian prospective symbols, religious symbols and so 
forth)1417 and wagering on the possibility of taking them as being creative, true, 
and as partially addressing themselves to me. From this follows that we can ask, as 
I asked before, if Ricœur is really arbitrating the conflict, or rather taking sides. I 
definitely think it is the latter case. And I don’t see any problem in it. But for our 
typology of conflict, we must realize that up to some extent Ricœur is against the 
hermeneutics of suspicion, and that this is a conflict in which he takes part. 
Ultimately, Ricœur pleads for a “non-narcissistic reconciliation”.1418 But this his 
own particular viewpoint, assumed with his characteristic Redlichkeit. The last 
sentence of the book invokes the love of Creation, over and above mere 
resignation to Ananke.1419 We can only conclude that what is at stake is not only 
the definition of hermeneutics. It is also the viability of Ricœur’s own perspective 
and existential standpoint. So this is for him an act of applied hermeneutics as 
much as it is a theoretical exploration. Which, of course, does not taint in the least 
his conclusions. 
In the transition to the first to the second phase of his hermeneutic theory 
his engagement would be expressed in a different way, assuming a more political 
than religious tone. Its cornerstone is emancipatory utopia, more than post-critical 
faith. At the same time, the definition of hermeneutics as an “arc” between 
explanation and understanding, and the choosing of texts rather than symbols as its 
basic units would ultimately provide a better, more encompassing model. In the 
dialectic whose thread I will follow in the next chapter we will find a model which 
is perhaps better suited to hermeneutic practice, and one in which Ricœur plays a 
less engaged role. As such, that dialectic might tell us less about our existence, but 
it will ultimately prove more creative, and with a result less decided a priori, than 
the previous dialectic of symbols. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1417 Ibid., p. 505. 
1418 Ibid., p. 549. 
1419 Ibid., p. 551. 
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4.4 – Explanation vs. Understanding 
 
As I stated before, the transition towards the mature hermeneutic theory 
starts taking shape in the early 1970s. I already recalled the main traits of this 
phase, so I will skip directly to the dialectic between explanation and 
understanding.  
 
4.4.1 – Interpretation as the result of the dialectic between explanation and 
understanding 
 
In the article called “What is a text? Explanation and Understanding”1420 
Ricœur puts forward his hermeneutical model based on texts. He takes as a point 
of departure Dilthey’s classical opposition between the methods of explanation, 
taken to be the model of intelligibility pertaining to natural sciences, and the 
operation of understanding as an alleged fundamental attitude of the human 
sciences. In my opinion, this is a truly dialectical model in Ricoeurian 
hermeneutics because, unlike in the conflict between suspicion and recollection of 
meaning we have seen above, here there is really the production of a third, original 
position. This is a model whose level of generality is superior to the hermeneutics 
of symbols presented in the first phase of his hermeneutical theory. 
As such, Ricœur’s tactic in dealing with this conflict is to show that it is 
not really a conflict, or rather, that if a conflict indeed exists, the best way to deal 
with it is to let both parties play a role. Firstly, he notes that in his own time the 
methods of explanation are more borrowed from linguistic models than from 
natural science. Today, we might add, it is exactly the opposite; we have come 
back to the dominance of the naturalistic models. But this is irrelevant to Ricœur’s 
claim. 
What is, therefore, a text? It is any discourse fixed by writing. If, as Plato 
argues, the author can no longer answer for a given text (unlike the person with 
whom we speak in live interaction) on the other hand the plurivocity of the 
meanings of that text is opened up by the plurality of potential readers and 
readings of the written text. 
                                                
1420 Ricœur, “What is a text? Explanation and Understanding” in From Text to Action, pp. 105-124 
and the section “Explanation and Understanding”, pp. 125-143. 
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Applied to the text as a hermeneutic object, what does the dialectic 
between explanation and understanding teach us? Should we strive to understand a 
text, or to explain it? If we follow Dilthey’s claim, this is perhaps seen as a strict 
alternative. But Ricœur has a suppler solution to offer. He pleads for the 
depsychologization of interpretation. The meaning of a text is not to be found in 
the intention of his or her author, but rather in the strata of meaning that 
explanation can uncover. Which does not mean that meaning is utterly reducible to 
explanation. But to grasp its inner workings is important. It is in this way that 
Ricœur recovers once again the structuralist explanations, and more specifically 
the semiological analyzes. However, and to reiterate, one of the fundamental 
postulates which he never drops is that we must go beyond these analyzes and 
concede that language is never for its own sake; that it always, one way or another, 
refers back to reality. 
This is partially effected through the coincidence between the 
interpretation of a text and self-interpretation. As such, the detour through 
objective signs and works of culture of which Ricœur spoke before, is now 
coalesced in texts. One is able to understand him or herself better by appropriating 
for him or herself the possibilities contained in texts themselves: 
 
By "appropriation," I understand this: that the interpretation of a text culminates in the 
self-interpretation of a subject who thenceforth understands himself better, understands 
himself differently, or simply begins to understand himself.1421 
 
This of course will be understood as the collision of two worlds, namely 
the world of the text and the world of the reader. What Ricœur asserts is that to 
some extent “the  constitution  of  the  self  is  contemporaneous  with  the 
constitution of meaning.”1422 Since the sentences of a text only make sense to a 
reader, because they are actualized hic et nunc in every act of reading, not only is 
the text not completely closed in itself. Indeed, its significance – ethical or 
otherwise – is also a significance for me. 
The inner mechanisms of this process were to be worked out in what 
Ricœur famously called the “hermeneutical arc”. When trying to find a theoretical 
                                                
1421 Ricœur, “What is a text”, p. 118. 
1422 Ibid., p. 119. 
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support to the attitude of “explanation” Ricœur often mentioned structuralism or 
semiology, but one can argue that different levels of explanation can be found, 
supported by different angles. Be that as it may, he stipulates that the explanatory 
phases are what allow for the mediation between a naïve interpretation and a 
critical interpretation: 
 
If we regard structural analyzis as a stage – and a necessary one – between a naive and a 
critical interpretation, between a surface and a depth interpretation, then it seems possible 
to situate explanation and interpretation along a unique hermeneutical arc and to integrate 
the opposed attitudes of explanation and understanding within an overall conception of 
reading as the recovery of meaning.1423 
 
We can see what Ricœur is doing here. I mentioned how in the conflict between 
suspicion and recollection of meaning, recollection somehow won the battle 
against suspicion. Now when Ricœur is mentioning the “recovery of meaning” 
(the French reads “la reprise du sens”, using the same exact words of Eric Weil, 
which might provide a lead on the way he is using it) as the “overall conception of 
reading” he is somehow attesting this win and the importance of the appropriation 
of meaning. In the same way he had incorporated suspicion before, as a critical 
mediation between naïve faith and post-critical faith, now he is stepping up a 
notch, elevating the degree of abstraction by replacing suspicion with explanation, 
but the movement is more or less the same. Between a naïve interpretation and a 
critical interpretation there lies explanation, and this all contributes to a clearer, 
better understanding of the text. His definition is therefore the following: “to 
explain is to bring out the structure, that is, the internal relations of dependence 
that constitute the statics of the text; to interpret is to follow the path of thought 
opened up by the text, to place oneself en route toward the orient of the text.”1424 
Now this orientation towards the “orient” of the text, that is, towards its effects is 
very important. Ricœur further explains that beyond the subjective process of 
interpretation (something done “on the text”) there is thus an “objective” process 
of interpretation which amounts to the acts of the text. This is, precisely, a way to 
connect with the Wirkungsgeschichte. What Ricœur sometimes calls the “thing” of 
                                                
1423 Ibid., p. 121. 
1424 Ibid., p. 122. 
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the text (la chose du texte) inscribes itself objectively in the world and produces 
effects. 
In a nutshell, Ricœur solves the conflict between explanation and 
understanding by arguing that we need to explain more, in order to understand 
better (in another of his concise formulae: “expliquer plus c’est comprendre 
mieux”). That is, our main goal will be to understand the text and our hope is that, 
in so doing, we can also come to a greater degree of clarity about ourselves. But 
explanation, as Ricœur sees it, does not necessarily negate understanding. Indeed, 
many times, it is quite the opposite. Explanation corrects and reorients 
understanding, paving the way for a more informed understanding. As such, in the 
dialectics between explanation and understanding what we have is the production 
of a new result: interpretation. Or better put, an open-ended process of 
interpretation and reinterpretation with new instantiations being put forward with 
every new act of reading. As such, this is a place of Ricoeurian hermeneutics 
where productive conflict is really at work. Understanding is both at the beginning 
and the end of the process (insofar as interpretation entails a better understanding) 
but without the mediation of explanatory procedures, it would not be questioned 
and so it would not evolve. Ultimately, in “Explanation and Understanding”1425 
Ricœur wagers on the continuity and reciprocal complementarity between these 
two processes and tries to find an homology between the domains of 
hermeneutics, action theory and historiography, in order to show how this 
dialectics can be applied in these three disciplines. However, his less abstract and 
more simple clarifications and examples of these processes are in fact given in the 
only published debate he had with Gadamer. 
 
4.4.2 – The clarifications in the debate with Gadamer 
 
In 1982 Ricœur and Gadamer participated in a public event in which a 
discussion between the two, as well as questions and answers coming from the 
public, were recorded. This debate was later published in English.1426 In this 
debate, which was very cordial, the affinities but also some of the differences 
                                                
1425 See Ricœur, “Explanation and Understanding. On some remarkable Connections between the 
Theory of Texts, Action Theory, and the Theory of History” in From Text to Action, pp. 125-143. 
1426 See Ricœur “The Conflict of Interpretations: Debate with Hans-Georg Gadamer” in A Ricœur 
Reader, edited by Mário J. Valdez (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), pp. 216-241. 
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between their respective standpoints on hermeneutics are apparent, even if we 
have the impression that Ricœur sometimes refrains from providing a full reply to 
Gadamer, perhaps out of deference, or maybe just because of lack of time. The 
debate mentions the “conflict of interpretations” in its title, and I already discussed 
how important this conflict is for Ricœur, and also how with this notion Ricœur 
distances himself from Gadamer’s insistence on the fusion of horizons. But when 
reading this debate we cannot help escaping the impression that Gadamer was not 
fully aware of the shift in Ricœur’s hermeneutics; that is, we feel that Gadamer 
pays homage but also somehow criticizes the conflict of interpretations, conflating 
it with Ricœur’s approach taken as a whole, whereas Ricœur tries to spell out his 
mature theory, revolving around the connection between explanation and 
understanding, the theory of texts, and so forth.  
Perhaps due to this need to almost present anew the twists and turns of his 
hermeneutical theory, Ricœur turns out to be quite clear when explaining it. 
Firstly, he distinguishes between conflicts within interpretation and conflicts of 
interpretations. The conflict between hermeneutics of suspicion and hermeneutics 
as recollection of meaning is a conflict of interpretations. But the conflict between 
explanation and understanding is, as it were, a conflict within interpretation; or, 
could we say, a conflict which defines interpretation. He claims that the 
philosopher does not only bear testimony to the radical situations of conflict, but 
more often than not tries to mediate them.1427 Also, and very significantly, he 
confirms what I have been alluding to over and again: namely, that these conflicts 
need to be dealt with “step by step” in a “case by case”1428 scenario, rather than 
working out a wholly encompassing hermeneutical theory. He describes the 
several stages in the interpretative arc as going “from naïve understanding to 
mature understanding through learned explanation”1429 and he adds that this is a 
movement of many interpretations.1430 That is, the arc can have many stages, often 
contradictory, many times revisable.  
Emphasizing that this process of mediation and detour might be long and 
painstaking is important for Ricœur. At this point in time, he also distinguished 
between mediated and unmediated conflicts. He asserted that “it is the task of the 
                                                
1427 Ibid., p. 223. 
1428 Ibid. 
1429 Ibid., p. 226. 
1430 Ibid., p. 227. 
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philosopher to learn how to master mediation between being confronted with 
unmediated conflict”1431 and by “unmediated conflicts” he seems to mean the raw 
conflicts of instincts with which psychoanalysis deals. He also stresses the 
importance of the analytical relation, over and above the strictly theoretical texts 
of Freudianism (which is not surprising, since this is a text from the 1980s). 
In this debate, Ricœur seems eager – more than elsewhere – to agree with 
Gadamer. For instance, he stresses that we need to go beyond unmediated 
conflicts, and he compares this to Gadamer’s insistence on dialogue. He claims 
that dialogue is just a position of mediation, and that “the philosopher proceeds 
through progressive mediations”.1432 This is indeed a significant part of his 
method. But as I think I have already shown, there are many occasions in which 
Ricœur does insist on raw conflict. 
At some point, Gadamer expresses doubts about the process of mediation, 
invoking the specter that always haunted Ricœur, precisely that of the distortion of 
the positions he wanted to mediate. Gadamer asks:  
 
Again, how much might there remain of the extreme positions one is attempting to 
mediate? It is possible that they cannot be brought together on a new level and in a new 
form of approach.1433 
 
In his response, Ricœur chooses to center the discussion in the explanation / 
understanding dialectic and to provide concrete examples. Concerning the way we 
can incorporate structuralist or other modes of explanation in the way we read a 
text, he ends up providing examples of the interpretation of cultural artifacts such 
as poems and music: 
 
I may thereafter reincorporate the structural analyzis into an understanding which will be 
no longer a kind of naïve reading, but a learned reading. This is what I think we all do 
when we read a poem, first at the surface of the work, and then in a final reading, when 
we understand the underlying structure. In this final reading we forget all the analytical 
approaches; it is a kind of second life taken up in the reading itself. Isn’t this what we do 
when we study, for example, the sonata structure of the first movement of a symphony of 
                                                
1431 Ibid., p. 231. 
1432 Ibid., p. 235. 
1433 Ibid., p. 236. 
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Beethoven? It’s not lost time to see how the first phrase and the second theme work out in 
the composition, and finally in the coda – that does not spoil our pleasure. On the 
contrary, the understanding of the underlying structure comes also to underlie our 
pleasure.1434 
 
I think this last passage is rather self-explanatory. There is a sort of eulogy of the 
intellectual pleasure of discovery implicit in Ricœur’s words. He does not directly 
answer Gadamer. Indeed, it is possible that something might be, as it were, lost in 
translation, or even lost in interpretation. Some conflicts are maybe left 
unmediated, and other mediations perhaps sometimes do not do justice to each of 
the poles in conflict. But that is the process of interpretation, and Ricœur 
ultimately wagers more in homology than in radical epistemological breaks. 
This phase of Ricœur’s hermeneutical theory would eventually end up in 
strong analyzes of action which, in turn, would make way for his mature 
hermeneutics of the self. Again, these are very complex and nuanced approaches. 
Firstly, I will work out the main details of Ricœur’s analyzes of action. In the next 
chapter I will deal with the descriptive-analytic discourse of action put forward by 
phenomenology and philosophy of language; then, in the final chapter of this part I 
will recall his more general hermeneutics of action, including his peculiar take on 
the debate between hermeneutics and the critique of ideology.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1434 Ibid., p. 237. 
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4.5 – Phenomenology vs. Philosophy of Language in the Discours 
de l’Action 
 
The Discours de l’action has a specific status in the context of Ricœur’s 
production. On the one hand, it is a polycopié of some lectures originally given at 
the Université Catholique de Louvain in 1971 and later republished by the 
C.N.R.S. in 1977 as the introduction to La sémantique de l’action.1435 As such, it 
has the status of any other of Ricœur’s lectures, like the lectures on hermeneutics 
or those on Plato and Aristotle; that is, admittedly, a somewhat inferior status to 
the one granted to his books. The lectures were meant as general introductions, 
and perhaps they do not display the level of complexity and originality reserved 
for his books. This was, we can argue, Ricœur’s assessment. But in many cases, 
we cannot say that the lectures lack in originality or boldness. The Lectures on 
Ideology and Utopia, for instance, are for me one of his most important books. On 
the other hand, even if it is a polycopié we are talking about, these are one of the 
few lectures which have been translated and published in other languages, such as 
Italian an Portuguese. Recently, I revised and introduced the previously existent 
Portuguese translation, taking into account several corrections and additions to the 
original French version added by Ricœur himself.1436 These lectures are Ricœur’s 
first systematic attempt to coordinate phenomenology and analytical philosophy 
(especially philosophy of language). This important task, which assumed a 
pioneering status in the context of the French philosophical landscape of the 
1970s, was later fully developed in Oneself as Another. Because it served as an 
introduction to analytical philosophy in this context, and because it was deemed so 
important that even though these were lectures, they were already republished and 
translated during Ricœur’s lifetime, the Discours de l’action deserves to be 
mentioned here. For the purposes of this thesis, I will mainly tackle the way in 
which Ricœur displays the conflict between philosophy of language and 
phenomenology, and the solution he puts forward for it. 
                                                
1435 See Ricœur, “Le Discours de l’Action” in La sémantique de l’action, edited by Dorian 
Tiffeneau (Paris: Éditions du C.N.R.S., 1977), pp. 3-132. 
1436 See Ricœur, O Discurso da Ação, edited by Gonçalo Marcelo (Lisboa: Edições 70, 2013). I 
thank Catherine Goldenstein for granting me access to the Ricœur materials of these lectures, 
which allowed me to find his corrections and additions, as well as many other illuminating 
explications of the content of the lectures. This section is partially based on the Portuguese 
introduction I wrote for that volume. 
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The Discours de l’action is divided in five chapters: 1) “Le discours de 
l’action”1437 (the discourse of action); 2) “Le réseau conceptuel de l’action”1438 
(the conceptual network of action) which comprises the main chapter and an 
important appendix analyzing Austin’s speech act theory; 3) “L’analyse 
propositionnelle des énoncés d’action”1439 (the propositional analyzis of action 
utterances); 4) “Motif et cause”1440 (motive and cause) and 5) “Phénoménologie et 
analyse linguistique”1441 (phenomenology and linguistic analyzis). To be sure, 
when Ricœur is alluding to “linguistic analyzis” in the last chapter, what he means 
is not linguistics as a separate body of knowledge such as it had been put forward 
in the wake of Saussure, but rather the semantic and pragmatic analyzes of 
analytical philosophy. Indeed, analytical philosophy appears to Ricœur at this 
point in time as providing some kind of liberation. To turn to ordinary language 
philosophy and its pluralized uses, and to be able to find meaning in all these uses 
seems very important for Ricœur, in that it allows him to go beyond the purely 
synchronic structuralist analyzes and the danger they run of completely eliding the 
subject and his or her capacity for creating meaning. However, analytical 
philosophy and its linguistic turn do not seem, in themselves, capable of fully 
depleting the phenomena of human language and action, no more than the 
previous methodologies assessed by Ricœur. As such, there is a tension, a conflict 
even, between phenomenology and analytical philosophy of action that structures 
the whole book; ultimately, Ricœur’s solution is similar to the one proposed 
before in the conflict between structuralism and hermeneutics: the conflict is 
solved, exactly as in Kant’s second set of antinomies, by arguing that both 
approaches are true, albeit in different levels. As such, Ricœur’s own standpoint is 
the one that pretends to encompass (in a hermeneutic manner, it goes without 
saying) both approaches. 
Allow me to sum up the main traits and claims of the book, before 
analyzing with a slightly superior degree of detail its last chapter, where the 
conflict between phenomenology and analytical philosophy is permitted to unfold, 
and then reined in. The first chapter of the Discours de l’action defines the stakes 
                                                
1437 Ricœur, “Le Discours de l’Action” in La sémantique de l’action, pp. 3-20. 
1438 Ibid., pp. 21-64. 
1439 Ibid., pp. 65-84. 
1440 Ibid., pp. 85-112. 
1441 Ibid., pp. 113-132. 
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of a discourse (or a semantics) of action, properly understood as a part of a broader 
philosophy of action. In the next chapter of this part of my thesis, I will show how 
this approach is complemented by a properly hermeneutical take on action. The 
semantic and pragmatic analyzes, coupled with the hermeneutical take, will lay the 
ground for Ricœur’s complex position put forward in Oneself as Another. In this 
first chapter of the Discours de l’action Ricœur emphasizes that a philosophy of 
action, no matter what its emphasis or specific take, is to be distinguished from a 
science of action. It is in the first chapter that we find the description of the main 
contents of the book: the introduction to ordinary language philosophy, the 
delimitation of the conceptual network of action and a particular emphasis on 
speech act theory. And even though Ricœur ultimately aims at going beyond 
analytical philosophy, he emphasizes the importance of ordinary language 
philosophy in the liberation from logical positivism. It is not only descriptive 
utterances, which describe facts, that have meaning. Thus the idea that there is 
meaning to be discovered in other linguistic entities is fundamental for him. 
Ricœur insists that in a philosophy of action the best starting point is a 
linguistic analyzis rather than a phenomenological description because if we start 
from these descriptions we risk falling back in a situation of introspection and 
incommunicability of lived experiences. The analytical philosophy of action, on 
the other hand, points towards objective structures found in everyday use, that is, 
creations of meaning that are constitutively public and intersubjective. However, 
the plurality of language games can in itself fall prey to a problem, namely, the 
impossibility of introducing any type of hierarchization among them. Language 
games are radically plural. As such, there might be a difficulty in subsuming them 
under a common set of rules; or worse, they might tend to be arbitrary, not being 
able to undergo any universalization. In the worst-case scenario, they could be 
only a particularity of the English language, as it were. This type of philosophy, 
thinks Ricœur in the 1970s, finds it difficult to reach a properly transcendental 
standpoint, which is Ricœur’s aim in this domain. And this is why he ultimately 
comes back to phenomenology. To say it quickly, for him, the private lived 
experience that is phenomenologically described will have to be expressed in a 
public utterance to be recognized. However, the latter will in turn be grounded in 
the noema that the phenomenological analyzis uncovers. That is, the noema, and 
its public, linguistic expression are two sides of the same coin. Consequently, even 
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though in the order of exposition the linguistic analyzis is the first quoad nos, 
phenomenology is ultimately, for Ricœur, more fundamental quoad se. Because it 
is phenomenology that grounds the experiences that will be linguistically 
analyzed. Together, phenomenology and linguistic analyzis form what Ricœur 
calls the descriptive-analytic discourse of action which will later be encompassed 
in an hermeneutics of action. 
In the second chapter Ricœur undertakes a conceptual analyzis of the field 
of action, through its main notions: action, intention, motive, cause, agent. One of 
his main claims consists in strongly asserting that the signification of any one of 
these notions presupposes the signification of all the others, in the context of their 
network. That is, even though each one of these concepts is different from the 
other, they have to be grasped as a whole if we are to understand the domain of 
action. Ricœur pays special attention to the distinction between motives and 
causes. Even though they are evidently different concepts, and although the 
psychological motive does not always correspond to the cause of a certain action 
(and so there are different language games at stake here, one pertaining more to 
the physical order, and the other to the psychological domain) Ricœur mentions 
the case of desire. Desires, as he had already seen in Freud and Philosophy are of 
a mixed nature: they are force (energetics) and meaning. In desire, motives and 
causes partially overlap and so we must understand how desires mobilize us; how, 
in spite of being a motive, they can also be considered a cause. In the appendix, 
Ricœur introduces the discussion of the “if’s” and “can’s” in Austin, and he starts 
to explore the modes in which actions can be attributed to agents, as he would do 
in a much more developed manner in Oneself as Another. However, already at this 
point, he mentions Strawson’s identifying reference, imputation and the power to 
act. This would in turn lead to the more systematic uncovering of the agent and its 
insertion in the conceptual network of action in the 15/20 following years of 
Ricœur’s philosophy. 
The third chapter is consecrated, almost in its entirety, to the presentation 
of the several types of speech acts according to J. L. Austin and John Searle, as 
well to the explication of the relationship between illocutionary force and the 
structure of the act of willing. Ricœur claims that the different types of speech act 
correspond to the different dimensions of human will. The chapter ends with the 
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examples of cases in which saying and doing are not equivalent to one another; 
that is, when there is a surplus in doing. 
As for the fourth chapter, it elaborates on the connection between agents 
and causes, and pushes further the claim according to which the strict opposition 
between motives and cause does not always apply. In order to uphold this claim, 
Ricœur makes his first incursions in the anthropology of capacities. He asserts that 
the notion of agent is prior to the modern notion of cause. The agent, by being the 
author of his or her own acts, is simultaneously their cause and the one who is 
responsible for them. Hence, Ricœur tries to redefine and broaden the concept of 
causality, by discerning behind it, as it were, all the capacities, the power to act 
and its dialectical other, namely the ineradicable dimension of passivity that lies at 
the heart of human existence. This latter assertion forces Ricœur to take into 
account the dispositional aspects, which are tied to desires and emotions. In the 
end of the chapter he mentions Charles Taylor’s early book The Explanation of 
Behaviour1442 and the way he puts forward his proposal of teleological explanation 
as an alternative to causal explanation. This is, to my knowledge, the first 
publication in which Ricœur systematically integrates Taylor’s contributions. And 
it is well known how the neo-Aristotelian, teleological standpoint would prove to 
be decisive for Ricœur and his late philosophical anthropology. 
Finally, the fifth chapter undertakes in a more profound manner the 
analyzis of the conflict between phenomenology and analytical philosophy at the 
level of explanation, and ultimately tries to solve it by establishing some sort of 
hierarchy among them. Of all these lectures, this is the chapter with the greater 
interest, because it is here that Ricœur ventures to propose a more original take. 
And how does the conflict play out? In a first, more or less rough approach, 
analytic philosophy could charge phenomenology with the dangers of 
introspection and incommunicability and phenomenology could attack analytic 
philosophy on the grounds of not being able to grasp lived experience or the pre-
linguistic layers of existence. But what Ricœur aims is at dissolving the conflict by 
actually accepting as much as possible from each of these takes, but each at its 
strategic level. This is the result of his enlarged standpoint. Maybe we can argue 
that Ricœur’s theoretical solution is not as creative as the one presented in the 
                                                
1442 See Charles Taylor, The Explanation of Behaviour (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964). 
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conflict between explanation and understanding shown in my preceding chapter. 
But the method of encompassing both approaches at different levels without 
denying any of their major solutions is more or less the same. 
Allow me to flesh out in more detail the workings of Ricœur’s solution to 
this conflict. According to him, there is complementarity between the two takes 
because the analyzis of ordinary language exposes the difficulties of a 
phenomenology which would aim at nothing more than being a kind of 
introspective psychology whereas the eidetic analyzes provide the theoretical 
kernel upon which the linguistic take must be grounded. Phenomenology’s lived 
experience (Erlebnis) is for Ricœur the implicit and non-thematized reference of 
the fine analyzes of meaning unveiled by ordinary language philosophy.1443 This, 
in turn, leads to his stronger claim. Namely, that what will allow the concepts 
unveiled by ordinary language philosophy to attain a transcendental status and 
thus to make intelligible the structuring of language itself – how it actually works 
– is precisely its grounding in the eidetic essences discovered by the 
phenomenological method. And why is this? Because, or so the claim goes, the 
mere description of the uses of language will never be able to determine the 
correction (justesse) of a given use.1444 Furthermore, even though analytic 
philosophy aims at spelling out the connection between language and reality 
(something which, for instance, is not upheld by structuralist analyzes) Ricœur 
argues that it is phenomenology that better grounds this connection. And this 
because it is phenomenology that attests to the connection between the noema and 
its linguistic expression, which is established de jure. Ultimately, it will be 
phenomenology’s contributions which will allow these linguistic analyzes to 
become a real “philosophy of language” since, Ricœur argues, only 
phenomenology brings about the possibility of introducing distinctions, 
classifications and subordinations among language uses and language games, 
something which he does not think Post-Wittgensteinian ordinary language 
philosophy is able to do, because it rather insists in their utter irreducibility and 
plurality. 
Hence, we can see how, exactly like he had done before with 
psychoanalysis, structuralism and so forth, Ricœur assimilates and integrates 
                                                
1443 Ricœur, “Le discours de l’action”, op. cit.., p. 115. 
1444 Ibid., p. 120. 
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analytical philosophy, and in this case ordinary language philosophy more than 
any other strand of analytical philosophy, into his own project. With the particular 
mix of phenomenology and ordinary language philosophy put forth in Le discours 
de l’action Ricœur finds another way to prove one of the main claims of his 
hermeneutical period, namely that language stems from reality and eventually 
aims at coming back to it in different forms. As such, ordinary language 
philosophy is eventually very useful for Ricœur in his polemic against 
structuralism and the alleged closing off of language in itself. Now, as I have tried 
to spell out in a very rapid manner, this option by Ricœur is not tantamount to 
conflating in a confuse manner phenomenology and ordinary language philosophy. 
He tries, as always, to do justice to their different orientations and goals, but also 
to signal their limits and seek a meaningful articulation of their methodologies in 
his own standpoint and project. For instance, he concedes that phenomenology 
ultimately sends us back to the problematic of one’s own body and to an attempt 
to sketch an ontology (following Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty), something that is 
absent from ordinary language philosophy, at least in these terms. He also admits 
that both these methodologies find another limit, that of the “opaque” zones of 
consciousness, such as they are tackled by psychoanalysis. However, according to 
Ricœur, the difference between them in what comes down to recognizing their 
limits is more apparent in phenomenology. That is, phenomenology is more self-
aware of its own limitations insofar as it sends us back to the originary constitution 
of meaning, through the passive syntheses and so on. Phenomenology concedes 
that there is something in those processes that we might not be able to grasp. No 
such thing, Ricœur thinks, happens in ordinary language philosophy and so it runs 
the risk of becoming blind to its own limits. But the important aspect to emphasize 
according to him is that by detecting its respective blind spots and points of 
articulation, both these methods form a possible unity which is that of the 
descriptive-analytic discourse of action. Certainly, this is not yet a hermeneutical 
discourse, and even less a prescriptive discourse, such as the one assumed by 
ethics. But Ricœur will also evidently formulate these two discourses. Let us see 
how in the next few chapters. 
 
 
 
 505 
4.6 – Towards a Hermeneutics and a Philosophy of Action 
 
As I stated before, Ricœur’s mature hermeneutic theory paid particular 
attention to the analyzes of action and the social imaginary. Many texts dealing 
with these topics were published in both Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences 
and From Text to Action. Actually some of the key texts were republished in both 
these collections. These are the cases of the two main texts I wish to recall here, 
before we delve into the practical conflict in the next part of this thesis. They are, 
respectively, “The model of the text: meaningful action considered as a text” and 
“Hermeneutics and the critique of ideology” because they offer two striking 
examples of Ricœur’s hermeneutics of action.1445 The first of these texts lays the 
ground for his specific hermeneutical take on action, while the second is a very 
important programmatic text, because it touches on the social significance of 
hermeneutics. These will set the tone for some of the more applied, practical 
conflicts we will see in the next part.  
 
4.6.1 – The linguistification of action 
 
In “The model of the text: meaningful action considered as a text”1446 
Ricœur takes a significant step towards a linguistification of human action. His 
starting point is a definition of hermeneutics as the interpretation of the written 
documents in our culture1447 and its usual object as being texts as such. According 
to him, as we know, texts open up worlds. For Ricœur, “only man has a world and 
not just a situation”1448 and this world is constituted by the ensemble of references 
opened up by texts, virtually “every text that we have read, understood, and 
loved”.1449 
Now, Ricœur’s bold and innovative move in this article is to consider that 
action itself can be understood as a text, because it shares some of the 
characteristics of texts. And how is this possible? By objectifying it and thus 
                                                
1445 For a discussion of Ricœur’s hermeneutics of action see Paul Ricœur, The Hermeneutics of 
Action, edited by Richard Kearney (London: Sage, 2006). 
1446 See Ricœur, “The model of the text: meaningful action considered as a text” in Hermeneutics 
and the Human Sciences, pp. 197-221. 
1447 Ibid., p. 197. 
1448 Ibid., p. 201. 
1449 Ibid., p. 202. 
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liberating it from the normal situation of everyday interaction. This objectification, 
done for scientific purposes, is taken to be akin to the fixation of texts in writing. 
According to Ricœur, therefore, we can detach the meaning of action from the 
event of action properly speaking.1450 And this because we can identify a 
propositional content in action which has a persistence in time; it can be 
reidentified later, even after the event of action is long gone. Other than that, it 
also has, Ricœur argues, and as we just saw in the last chapter, a noematic content 
that can be grasped phenomenologically and all this suffices, in his opinion, for we 
to speak of a certain “objective” aspect of action as such. The corollary of this fact 
is that there is an autonomization of action from its author, such as there is an 
autonomization of texts.1451 One of the proofs thereof is that an action can, and in 
fact many times has, unintended consequences. Furthermore, this objective trait 
can be inscribed in the temporal dimension itself; as Ricœur contends, “an action 
leaves a ‘trace’, it makes its ‘mark’ when it contributes to the emergence of such 
patterns which become the documents of human action.”1452 
With this mentioning of “traces” left by action, and also of the possibility 
of treating them as “documents”, we reach the core of Ricœur’s argument. Like 
documents and texts, because actions have an objective character, they leave 
indelible marks with their own webs of signification and intersignification, which 
become sedimented and, moreover, accessible to those who wish to study and 
interpret them in new ways. Michaël Foessel has shed some light on an important 
topic concerning this take on social action. He argues that by so emphasizing the 
analogy between textuality and action, Ricœur is being influenced by his choice of 
history as the paradigmatic social science: actions taken as documents are those 
that for instance an historian attempts to reconstitute a posteriori. But this, Foessel 
claims, might result in an undue privilege given to the instituted (instead of the 
instituting, in the sense of Castoriadis)1453 and can actually conceal something of 
the creative dimension of action on which Arendt (and Ricœur on many other 
places) insists. Be that as it may (and I do think Foessel is right in this claim) this 
is the heart of Ricœur’s hermeneutics of action. And it serves as a paradigmatic 
                                                
1450 Ibid., p. 204. 
1451 Ibid., p. 206 ff. 
1452 Ibid., p. 206. 
1453 See Michaël Foessel, “Action, Norms and Critique. Paul Ricœur and the powers of the 
imaginary”, translated by Gonçalo Marcelo, in Philosophy Today, Ricœur, Justice and Institutions 
/ Ricœur, la Justice et les institutions, edited by Gonçalo Marcelo (2014, forthcoming). 
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model for similar takes on social action1454, such as those put forward by Johann 
Michel or Anna Borisenkova; Michel undertakes to spell out an ambitious project 
of a “sociology of the self”1455, largely inspired by Ricœur’s hermeneutic take on 
social action, while Borisenkova1456 explains the significance of a hermeneutic and 
narrative refiguration of social events, also within a Ricoeurian framework. 
And as we know, Ricœur would find a meaningful application for the 
creative use of the social imaginary, namely, utopia. If action can be considered as 
a text and if therefore actions, our human powers, are also open to new 
applications and interpretations, it must be possible to criticize reified and possibly 
unfair patterns of action and sedimentation of power. Let us see how in the next 
section. 
 
4.6.2 – Ricœur’s hermeneutical critique of ideologies 
 
In part two above I mentioned the importance of the Lectures on Ideology 
and Utopia. I now want to come back to the topic of the critique of ideologies and 
the Gadamer-Habermas debate and Ricœur’s position within it, because he adopts 
a very peculiar stance, which reveals an unusual position on the relation between 
language and action. Indeed, it will appear that for Ricœur not only is action 
linguistically mediated, but that when there are reifications of practices which are 
given a linguistic and symbolic undue status, it will be by a mutual reinforcement 
between action and symbolism that these undue reifications will be countered. 
Like Castoriadis, Ricœur insists in the imaginary constitution of society 
and thus in its symbolic dimension. Ideology, as stated before, is the surplus of 
meaning given to the phenomena of belief in the legitimacy of power, because 
exercise of power is more than naked use of force, that is, it needs a legitimation 
and thus constitutively tends to try to provide such a justification. But how would 
Ricœur counter it, and what does this reveal about the nature of the fundamental 
                                                
1454 On Ricœur’s take on social events, see Gilbert Vincent, “Anthropologie philosophique et 
sociologie. Ricœur et l’analyze des phénomènes sociaux” in Revue des Sciences Sociales 40 
(2008): 162-183. 
1455 See Johann Michel, “Construire une sociologie herméneutique en venant de Ricœur” in 
Sociologie du Soi. Essai d’herméneutique appliquée (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 
2012), pp. 21-40. 
1456 See Anna Borisenkova, “Narrative Refiguration of Social Events. Paul Ricœur’s Contribution 
to Rethinking the Social”, in Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricœur Studies 1, 1 (2010), pp. 87-98. 
 508
philosophical stance as such? 
In “Hermeneutics and the critique of ideology”1457 he revisits the 
Gadamer-Habermas debate and describes its decisive status. According to him, 
this debate decides the “fundamental gesture of philosophy”. Ultimately, is this 
“an act of defiance, a critical gesture”1458 or an avowal of finitude and historicity? 
Or, in other words, is it an act of belonging or distanciation? Of “hearing” and 
welcoming, accepting something which preexists us, or rather criticizing, 
eventually denouncing and ultimately transforming it? What should philosophy do 
with the “given” (assuming that such a thing exists), take it as it is, or transforming 
it? 
Now, this strikes me as being a fundamental discussion, indeed a 
fundamental conflict, not only in philosophy, but in human life as such (and 
namely in the aspects pertaining to human action, whether they are envisaged from 
a political or an ethical standpoint). And the originality of Ricœur’s position is to 
want to situate himself, perhaps even more than in other conflicts, in a strict 
middle ground. According to him, it is the alternative that must be challenged 
because it is possible to formulate a hermeneutics which does justice to the 
critique of ideologies: i.e., it is possible to formulate a hermeneutical critique of 
ideologies. Again, Ricœur’s solution, strikes me, in its general traits, to be very 
important and well worked out. 
A hermeneutical standpoint on the social is important because it is what 
allows us to grasp, as much as possible, the “thick” dimensions of everyday life in 
existing, historical societies. And a hermeneutical project which not only aims at 
understanding these historical aspects, but also at eventually criticizing the, so to 
speak, “condemnable” aspects of it, strikes me as being fair. How to do it, that is 
another question. 
To reiterate, Ricœur really wants to reach middle ground. Perhaps (and 
this is episodic, but the fact that it is so does not mean that it is without 
importance) because he wanted to do justice to both Gadamer and Habermas. As a 
consequence, he argues that both belonging and distanciation will play an 
important role in his hermeneutical theory. We are both affected by the 
                                                
1457 See Ricœur, “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology” in Hermeneutics and the Human 
Sciences, pp. 63-100. 
1458 Ibid., p. 63. 
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meaningful traditions which preexist us and condition us, and we must be able to 
criticize what needs to be criticized. Or at least this is, let us say, Ricœur’s 
professed position. He intends to spell out the project of what he himself calls a 
“critical hermeneutics”.1459 Therefore, he recovers both the need of reconstruction 
as a path for understanding1460 and the practical interest on emancipation.1461 In 
the Lectures on Ideology and Utopia Ricœur encapsulates this necessary 
reciprocal complementarity in yet another short formula, paraphrasing and 
adapting Kant’s comment on the relation between concepts and intuitions. He 
states “Hermeneutics without a project of liberation is blind, but a project of 
emancipation without historical experience is empty.”1462 In the text whose thread 
we have been following in this section, he provides a further clarification on this 
connection. According to him, this ultimately means that critique is not the most 
fundamental moment and thus that there is no reason to oppose, as Habermas 
does, the critical social sciences to the hermeneutical sciences. Thus for him 
 
The interest in emancipation would be quite empty and abstract if it were not situated on 
the same plane as the historical-hermeneutic sciences, that is, on the plane of 
communicative action. But if that is so, can a critique of distortions be separated from the 
communicative experience itself, from the place where it begins, where it is real and 
where it is exemplary? The task of the hermeneutics of tradition is to remind the critique 
of ideology that man can project his emancipation and anticipate an unlimited an 
unconstrained communication only on the basis of the creative reinterpretation of cultural 
heritage. (…) It seems to me that critique can be neither the first instance nor the last.1463 
 
So Ricœur’s last word on this article is to propose that only a creative 
renewal of cultural heritage is able to put forward an ideal such as that of a 
consensus, or an emphasis on communicative action itself.1464 In a way, we can 
understand what Ricœur is claiming. If we want emancipation, we have to 
understand what we are emancipating ourselves from, and we have to postulate 
something as an ideal to strive for, and where can we find that ideal if not in the 
                                                
1459 Ibid., p. 87 ff. 
1460 Ibid., p. 92. 
1461 Ibid., p. 95. 
1462 Ricœur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, pp. 236-237. 
1463 Ibid., p. 97. 
1464 Ibid., p. 99. 
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recreation of something which precedes us? Otherwise, the attempts to start 
something strictly from scratch might have its dangers, as in the so-called Reign of 
Terror of the French Revolution. 
In a way, this insistence that “critique” is only a mediating moment, not 
the first nor the last position we adopt, is not surprising in Ricœur. Indeed, this is 
the same role he grants the hermeneutics of suspicion or, later, as we shall see, the 
deontological moment in his little ethics of Oneself as Another. But allow me to 
see in this a tension in Ricœur’s own hermeneutical standpoint, and its influence 
on his practical philosophy. Later, and with Hannah Arendt, he would emphasize 
the importance of the novelty brought about by human action, and even in this 
phase he mentions it, by defining that which he calls “initiative”.1465 However, 
how can there be anything really “new” in society, brought about by human 
action, if anything and everything we can aspire to is always somehow a 
reinterpretation of a pre-existing given? From the standpoint of a social ontology, 
societies would seem to experience novelty only through new combinations of 
already pre-existing elements. And frankly, this claim is as problematic as its 
opposite: namely, the affirmation that something really new and unpredictable can 
show up in existing practice, or at least be postulated as an ideal, out of nowhere. 
Let us at least admit that this tension exists in Ricœur’s standpoint. This 
leads him, as I just noted, to place some boundaries on the notion of critique, and 
also, ultimately, on the ways in which, in his view, emancipation can legitimately 
be sought after. These limitations are evident in a text called “Science and 
Ideology”, also published both in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences and 
From Text to Action. I will undertake a closer reading of this text in part seven, 
where I will explore in a critical manner the discrepancies it bears with the project 
of a critical theory to which I myself adhere. For the moment being, suffice it to 
say that even though Ricœur purports to be halfway between belonging and 
distanciation, interpretation of traditions and critique of ideologies, I think he is 
ultimately closer to the pole of belonging, at least on some notable occasions, as 
he is to the pole of critique. This will lead, in part seven of this thesis, to one of my 
modest critiques towards his own standpoint. 
Be that as it may, at least in his own depiction of his theory, Ricœur 
                                                
1465 See Ricœur, “Initiative” in From Text to Action, pp. 208-222. 
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professes to hermeneutically criticize ideologies, and the last stages of his mature 
hermeneutical theory, such as we have been following them in From Text to 
Action and Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences bear witness to a philosophy of 
action and one which is intrinsically hermeneutical and symbolical. It is, itself, 
open to conflicts, one of the main instantiations of them being the conflict between 
ideology and utopia, which I mentioned many times, but that will only be 
presented with a slight greater degree of detail in part five below. 
Throughout this fourth part that now reaches its end, we have seen 
Ricœur’s initial thematic exposition of the conflict of interpretations in his first 
hermeneutic phase, and the many ramifications it developed afterwards, being 
successively applied to conflicts between hermeneutics of suspicion and 
hermeneutics of recollection of meaning, the constitution of the self in 
archeological and teleological types of consciousness, and the definition of 
hermeneutics itself in the conflict between explanation and understanding, 
belonging and distanciation, and so on. This last chapter also showed how even 
though this is a “hermeneutical phase”, which entails an even greater degree of 
linguistification and symbolization than what he had posited, for instance, in The 
Symbolism of Evil and Freud and Philosophy, Ricœur never loses sight of the 
topic of action and its possible analyzes. 
As such, the ground is laid for us to understand how, ultimately, Ricœur 
would develop, in the last stage of his career, a philosophical anthropology 
decisively grounded in the notion of action, and of one’s capacities. This stage will 
be reached with the preparation and posterior publication of Oneself as Another, a 
decisive book indeed. This renewed emphasis on action, and all the new 
perspectives of conflict it opens, will be the topic of the next, and last stage of this 
“course of conflict”. 
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Part Five 
 
The Practical Conflict 
 
We now enter the last stage of this course of conflict in the thought of 
Paul Ricœur. Up to now we have seen how Ricœur started from the problematic of 
existence and, from the 1960s onwards and due to a shift in his thinking, 
undertook a hermeneutic turn. Hence, the main instantiations of conflict were in 
language and interpretation, due to the linguistification of his philosophy, the long 
detour, and the fragmented philosophy that resulted from the broken status of 
language itself as it was diagnosed by Ricœur in the last stage. 
However, as we have also seen, this broken status does not condemn us to 
despair or relativism. It might entail a perspectivism, but Ricœur never ceased to 
have human action in mind or to believe in the force of convictions. In Fallible 
Man he had undertaken a first attempt to devise a philosophical anthropology. At 
the time, it revolved around the notion of fallibility, as we have seen.  
One striking feature of Ricœur, the citizen, was his willingness not only 
to actively think the events of his time, but also to take position in the most 
significant of them. Sometimes, he was even a committed activist, his opposition 
to the war in Algeria only being the most famous example of such involvement. If 
we follow François Dosse’s claim, this willingness to become involved in the 
matters of the “polis” was precisely reinforced with Ricœur’s coming of age, and 
even more when he retired from the university and therefore had more free time. 
A note on his biography is therefore needed once again. After the 
rejection of Freud and Philosophy by Lacan and his followers, all the trouble at 
Nanterre and so forth, and after the, so to speak, “American exile” the reception of 
Ricœur’s books in France was lukewarm. This was true in the 1970s and lasted 
perhaps more than a decade, which included the publication of such splendid 
books as The Rule of Metaphor. Indeed, allow me to reiterate again that for me 
Ricœur’s most creative, bold and radical period is precisely around 1975, when he 
was deep into the processes of creative imagination and the radicality of basic 
metaphoricity and utopia. However, this was almost overlooked in France at the 
time. 
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Nonetheless, Ricœur’s reception in France changed in the 1980s with the 
publication of the intellectual monument called Time and Narrative. If not for 
anything else, the sheer erudition of this work commanded respect. And so, little 
by little, the reception of his thought grew wider in France and elsewhere. By the 
late 1980s we could already speak of his consecration, and the Cerisy colloquium 
in 1988 was a proof thereof, as often these colloquia are.  
However, Ricœur’s thought was ahead of his publications. In 1986 From 
Text to Action was published, revealing his mature hermeneutical theory in its full 
scope. It is true that most of these texts had originally been published in the 1970s, 
but for occasional readers who only read the books, not the sparse articles 
published in many different places, it might seem that by 1986 Ricœur’s main line 
of work was strictly hermeneutical. And yet, another shift had been taking place 
already. Precisely in 1986 he gave the prestigious Gifford Lectures at the 
University of Edinburgh  and he chose selfhood (or personal identity) as his main 
topic. These lectures would evidently later become Oneself as Another, the book 
that, in a way, changes almost everything. With a notorious difference though: 
whereas Ricœur’s Gifford Lectures, which are an early sketch of the first studies 
of Oneself as Another, ended with two studies pertaining to Biblical hermeneutics 
(“The Self in the Mirror of the Scriptures” and “The Mandated Self”) and that 
were later republished in the latest version of Amour et Justice, Ricœur decided to 
leave these two texts out of Oneself as Another. Instead, he replaced them with his 
tenth study, which is an attempt to devise a postponed and even agnostic ontology. 
Now, Oneself as Another was meant to be a sort of condensed version of 
Ricœur’s overarching contributions to philosophy, with the novelty being that they 
would be encapsulated in a new version of his philosophical anthropology, 
stemming around selfhood, identity and a theory of capacities, of what we are able 
to do. It could have been his definitive work, but it was not. Actually, it was 
followed by a very intense period of publication that lasted 14 years, almost up 
until his demise. Ricœur literally wrote up to death. Even in conditions of very 
fragile health, he kept on writing the fragments which make up a large portion of 
Living Up to Death. And in the meantime, before his death and after Oneself as 
Another, he published the two volumes on the just, Memory, History, Forgetting, 
The Course of Recognition, as well as an astounding number of articles, and books 
in form of direct dialogic exchanges, such as the interviews that make up Critique 
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and Conviction and his debate with Jean-Pierre Changeux.1466 
In my opinion, Dosse indeed captures well this period when he decides to 
call the section of his biography dealing with the last period of Ricœur’s 
production “Le philosophe dans la cité”; and “in the city” here means dealing with 
problems pertaining to the city, to politics in the broadest term, to praxis.1467 In the 
volumes on the just, in his discussions on bioethics, in his incursions in 
historiography what Ricœur is doing is discussing the problems of his time. And 
when I say discussing, I really mean what I say; this was not the isolated 
philosopher, speaking ex cathedra. Quite the contrary, these reflections are almost 
always the result of Ricœur’s lively, engaged debates with jurists, doctors, 
historians, neuroscientists and so forth. It is as if in this period, the quest for the 
“enlarged standpoint” and for the appropriation of the perspectives of others 
through mediations and debates was even more intensified at a personal level. 
Furthermore, there is also a growing decentering, because it seems to me that as 
years went by, Ricœur was less interested in encapsulating the perspectives of 
others in his own standpoint, and consequently even more willing to let his 
thought be guided by the specialized work of others (hence his engagement with 
jurists, and so on). His stance was the opposite of the arrogance of reason. Even 
though he diagnosed, acknowledged and resorted to “conflict” so many times, as I 
have been showing almost exhaustively, his position of humble listening was 
omnipresent. 
In my view, this emphasis on practical philosophy (if indeed we can find 
a domain capable of encapsulating his main productions in this last period) is 
actually the sign of a return. Many times in Ricœur’s philosophy we find ternary 
structures. This is clear, for instance, in his little ethics of Oneself as Another. It is 
perhaps an influence of Hegelian dialectics, even though we know since part one 
of this thesis the reservations that Ricœur expresses towards Hegelianism. Now, I 
think that such a ternary movement can be found in here too. As we recall from 
the third part of this thesis, in the first stage of the course of conflict Ricœur’s 
main topic was existence. After the mediation of the linguistic and hermeneutic 
                                                
1466 See Jean-Pierre Changeux and Paul Ricœur, What Makes Us Think? A Neuroscientist and a 
Philosopher Argue about Ethics, Human Nature, and the Brain, translated by M. B. DeBevoise 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). 
1467 For a presentation of Ricœur’s philosophy from the angle of his practical engagements and the 
development of a practical philosophy, see Marcelino Agís Villaverde, Conocimiento y razón 
práctica. Un recorrido por la filosofía de Paul Ricœur (Salamanca: Kadmos, 2011). 
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detour, it is as if Ricœur comes back to practical problems. It is as if he comes full 
circle. Not a closed circle, evidently. And not exactly to the same problems; 
certainly, to different problems and using different language games, but in the 
neighborhood of the first ones. 
At this point in time Ricœur scarcely speaks about existence, but he 
speaks of selfhood. He does not dare to undertake a direct ontology, but he still 
seeks to sketch an ontology, even though a postponed, mediated one. The 
problems of action come to haunt him once again, even though he now has 
different tools and theories to deal with them. He still maintains a critical 
perspective, conflicts are still at the heart of his thought, but now he has traversed 
the political philosophy of the 20th century, reflected upon Arendt, Rawls, Walzer 
and so many others, as we have seen in part two. In fact, in Living up to Death we 
even find an attempt at a philosophy of life, actually very close to existential 
meditation after all. Clearly, this is not to be considered a vicious circle, or proof 
that there was no evolution in Ricœur’s thought. Nor is it is a strict supersession in 
the Hegelian sense. It is perhaps proof that even though his thought evolved, some 
questions and topics were recurrent. They came back, transformed, in a kind of 
hermeneutic recovery perpetually reinterpreted. 
As such, in this final stage of the course of conflict I will mention a host 
of forms of practical conflict. Firstly, I will show the final form of his 
hermeneutics of the self in Oneself as Another, where attestation of selfhood has to 
struggle to impose itself over and above suspicion. Then I will enter Ricœur’s little 
ethics and traverse the entire region of the conflict of duties and norms, under the 
banner of the tragic of action and its many conflicts, including political ones. After 
that, I will delve in detail in Ricœur’s incursions in applied ethics and mainly in 
the judicial domain in the two books on the just. This interest also has a biographic 
motivation, namely the close connection with Antoine Garapon and his Institut des 
Hautes Études sur la Justice (IHEJ). From there I will proceed to reconstruct 
Ricœur’s social philosophy, intrinsically connected with his political philosophy. 
Finally, I will end with his take on recognition, slightly different from the 
Hegelian and Honnethian direct identification with conflict and struggle. After this 
stage, the “course of conflict” and my traversal of Ricœur’s philosophy will have 
ended, and I will afterwards proceed to my systematization and critical remarks. 
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5. 1 – The Conflicted Self, Part Two: Suspicion vs. Attestation. 
Towards the Capable Human Being (Philosophical Anthropology) 
 
5.1.1 – Selfhood and the capacities: being able to describe, narrate and prescribe 
 
Throughout this thesis, I have mentioned many times Oneself as Another, 
somewhat anticipating the fuller account of it that I am going to offer in three of 
the chapters which comprise this part. This is partly due to the fact that Oneself as 
Another is probably the single, most important book in Ricœur’s production. Now, 
this is the difference between Oneself as Another and the preceding books: 
whereas all the other dealt with specific questions and were, in a way, 
circumstantial answers to well delimited problems that Ricœur encountered, this 
book has a somewhat more encompassing character. In it, his previous incursions 
in phenomenology, analytic philosophy, narrative theory and literary criticism are 
all somewhat integrated. 
Be that as it may, the book also revolves around a specific question: that 
of the existence of what in the English-speaking world has come to be known as 
the self or, if we prefer, the question of selfhood (or still, as Ricœur puts it, of 
ipseity).1468 Except that all his preceding investigations come to be unified by this 
particular question. Who am I? – or, better put, who is the self?  
Of course that this major work does not restrict itself to summing up 
Ricœur’s decisive contributions. It also includes much new material, especially the 
discussions with analytical philosophy (the debates with Davidson and Parfit, for 
instance) and, more significantly, his own sketch of an ontology revolving around 
the crucial capacity of attestation. Let us follow the thread of Ricœur’s argument. 
First of all, if the matter is personal identity, why talk about the “self” and 
not the “I” or, more simply, about “me”? Ricœur sees in the use of a reflexive 
pronoun (the soi that becomes the se in French, much like in the other Latin 
languages, the himself or herself in English) a grammatical support for his 
                                                
1468 For a very detailed account of the topic of ipseity and alterity throughout basically the entire 
works of Ricœur at least up until Oneself as Another, see the two volumes of Joaquim de Sousa 
Teixeira, Ipseidade e Alteridade. Uma Leitura da Obra de Paul Ricœur (Lisboa: INCM, 2004). 
The notion of ipse, of course, precedes Ricœur and is perhaps an offshoot of modernity. For a very 
good reconstruction of the topic of ipseity in Kant, see Paulo Jesus, Poétique de l’ipse. Étude sur le 
je pense kantien (Bern: Peter Lang, 2008). 
 518
reflective philosophy. As before, Ricœur wants to posit the need for a detour in 
order to reach the self, that is “the primacy of reflective meditation over the 
immediate positing of the subject”.1469 He sees his philosophy as being placed 
halfway between a “shattered” or even non-existent Cogito (such as it is described 
in the various strands of the philosophy of suspicion, including its Postmodern 
variants, or even in the skeptical tradition stemming from Locke and Hume and 
extending to Derek Parfit) and the self-positing of a sovereign, almost solipsistic 
Cogito, that is immediately certain as in Descartes’s philosophy, or even self-
producing as in Fichte. Therefore, his “hermeneutics of the self” ultimately derives 
consciousness (and conscience) formation from intersubjectivity. Interaction with 
others and self-knowledge are mediated by a process of the interpretation of 
tradition aided by the sciences. This was already apparent in the first phase of his 
hermeneutics of the self, but the detour is somewhat extended in this second stage. 
Now, one of Ricœur’s main claims consists in asserting, over against a 
certain tendency in Postmodern thought – that tends to consider notions of self or 
identity as purely illusory – that it is possible to maintain the existence and 
pertinence of personal identity if we consider it in the sense of the Latin ipse, and 
not of idem. Basically, this comes down to accepting a certain kind of identity that 
persists in time but without, as it were, a metaphysical unchanging core. Usually, 
when Ricœur uses the word selfhood, he is directly designating ipse-identity, 
while he reserves “sameness” for idem-identity.  
Finally, the use of the expression “Oneself as Another” indicates that the 
self that we are talking about here is intersubjectively constituted and so that there 
is a particular dialectic between self and other, and between activity and passivity, 
ipseity and otherness. All the complicated aspects of this dialectic become 
apparent in Ricœur’s last chapter of this book. 
He also chooses to define the self as the one who is able to respond to the 
question who?, namely, who am I (or, in the neutral version, who is the self?). He 
reserves the question what for the topic of sameness; because the self is not a 
thing, he cannot ask, what am I; if he or she did, this would be tantamount to an 
admission of reification, as Luckács and Honneth would put it. Therefore, the 
whole book can be seen as responding to this question by undertaking a 
                                                
1469 Ricœur, Oneself as Another, p. 1. 
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subdivision of the subject’s capacities. Who is the self, and how can we be sure 
that he or she exists? In this book, the question is more like: what is he or she 
capable of? And Ricœur turns the question around, by starting from a list of basic 
capacities, those defining every capable human being; he asks “Who is speaking? 
Who is acting? Who is recounting about himself or herself? Who is the moral 
subject of imputation?”1470 And to all these questions Ricœur answers: the self. He 
or she who is able to speak, act, narrate his or her life, and be held accountable by 
his or her moral actions. This progression also reveals another one, which consists 
in the main topics of the different chapters of the book: describing, narrating, 
prescribing. 
So the whole book takes the detour of the philosophy of language 
(semantics and pragmatics), the philosophy of action, hermeneutics and moral 
theory, in order to later culminate in an ontology. It is important to note that in this 
philosophical anthropology that determines who the self is, ontology is not taken 
as a given, as an a priori determination. Rather, Ricœur submits reflection to 
analyzis, to the detour of philosophy and the human sciences, in order to take the 
results of those investigations as determining who the self actually is. In this 
sense, we can take it to be an investigation, an inquiry or research, in the literal 
meaning of these terms. As he puts it: “The recourse to analyzis (…) is the price 
to pay for a hermeneutics characterized by the indirect manner of positing the 
self”.1471 The way to the self, one could say, is indirect; but there is a way 
nonetheless and at the end, what we have learnt in the process of arriving there, is 
able to give us a clearer picture of who (not what) the self is. 
Even though the book has a systematic style, Ricœur insists that its 
studies are constituvely fragmentary, and that they only have a “thematic unity” 
which is provided by their dealing with human action.1472 In a way, even though 
the book has a lot of “theoretical” content, what Ricœur seems to be aiming when 
writing is at a “practical philosophy”. As such, the conflicts with which it deals are 
mainly “practical conflicts”, as would be almost all the conflicts he analyzed from 
this moment on, also in his later books. 
The last study – whose ontology, Ricœur asserts multiple times, is 
                                                
1470 Ibid., p. 16. 
1471 Ibid., p. 17. 
1472 Ibid., p. 19. 
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“fragmentary” – aims at developing an ontology of potency, somewhat inspired by 
Aristotle’s dynamis, and where the specific being of humans is depicted as being 
defined by its potentialities and acts. It is, fundamentally, an ontology of our 
capacities. Ultimately, this would end up in what Ricœur calls attestation, which 
is, for him, our modality of being, and that corresponds to something like a 
veritative – or, if we prefer the Heideggerian term, an alethic – mode of existing, 
which has an epistemic status somewhat weaker than absolute certainty, but 
certainly stronger than suspicion. Ricœur affirms that attestation belongs to the 
grammar of “I believe-in”.1473 And in what do I believe, could we ask? The answer 
is: I believe in myself, and in my power to act. 
And it is here that a fundamental conflict is unveiled. We have seen 
before how in Ricœur’s first hermeneutic of the self, consciousness formation was 
itself a process, and how this process ultimately unfolded in the great conflict 
between archaeological and teleological consciousness. At that point in time, the 
opposite of suspicion was recovery or recollection of meaning. In the second stage 
of the hermeneutics of the self – and of self-formation through conflict – there is a 
slight shift in the way the process is described. In fact, now the opposite of 
suspicion is attestation. And this because all the capacities hitherto described 
always face the possibility of being put under suspicion: am I really able to act? 
To speak? To narrate?, and so forth. In fact, these are vulnerable capacities, and 
activity has its dialectical counterpart in passivity. Ricœur does not deny that 
suspicion is possible; but he does see attestation as the solution to it: 
 
This vulnerability will be expressed in the permanent threat of suspicion, if we allow that 
suspicion is the specific contrary of attestation. The kinship between attestation and 
testimony is verified here: there is no "true" testimony without "false" testimony. But 
there is no recourse against false testimony than another that is more credible; and there is 
no recourse against suspicion but a more reliable attestation.1474 
 
A more reliable attestation. This latter passage allows us to admit that 
there are degrees of attestation. And in fact Ricœur explicitly states that attestation 
as trust is tantamount to attestation of conscience, of Gewissen. Moral conscience 
                                                
1473 Ibid., p. 21. 
1474 Ibid., p. 22. 
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exists, and I am capable of acting morally; it is something other than an illusion. 
As such, if suspicion lurks, if I am subject to accusation, I can answer, like 
Levinas, me voici. Here I am. I am capable of responding for my own actions, and 
to act on your behalf, if needed. So what does attestation amount to? According to 
Ricœur: 
 
And if one admits that the problematic of acting constitutes the analogical unity within 
which all of these investigations are grouped, attestation can be defined as the assurance 
of being oneself acting and suffering.1475 
 
Now this assurance of “being acting and suffering” is the attestation of being 
oneself, through all the peripeteiai of human existence. 
The next few chapters will unfold a fundamental locus of conflict for 
Ricœur, the one that takes place in moral life and is later extended to legal theory,  
facing conflicts of laws (both at a moral level, where what are in conflict are moral 
duties, or at a strictly judicial level) that will be solved, when possible, by 
phronetical means. However, in order to fully analyze the conflict between 
suspicion and attestation, I will reverse Ricœur’s order of argumentation, skipping 
to his conclusion right away. 
 
5.1.2 – The attestation of the self (a postponed ontology) 
 
In the last study of Oneself as Another, titled “What ontology in view?” 
(or maybe, in an alternative translation, “Towards what ontology?”, vers quelle 
ontologie?), Ricœur defines attestation as “the assurance that each person has of 
existing as the same in the sense of ipseity, of selfhood”.1476 
However, he argues that “assurance” is something more than a merely 
epistemic order. He places his investigation under the aegis of Aristotle’s meta-
categories of being-true and being-false, and he re-reads his whole philosophical 
style through this lens. He asserts that his mediation of reflection by analyzis is 
attested as being-true, because it is “objectification” that grants a “realist twist”1477 
                                                
1475 Ibid. 
1476 Ibid., p. 298. 
1477 Ibid., p. 300. 
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to what could have otherwise been a purely idealistic construction. He thus seems 
to consider that analytic philosophy and its fine, detailed analyzes are what keeps 
him, in a way, close to reality, in a first approach (and mentions Strawson’s and 
Frege’s insistence on reference, as well as Davidson’s analyzes of events). 
His ontology is given a second support, he argues, by the hermeneutical 
insistence on building a transcendentalism able to ground these detailed analyzes 
and establish hierarchies among them (a point that, as we have seen, he had made 
earlier, in the “Discours de l’Action”). He further extends his ontological realism 
to the domain of languages that seem the least referential, reaffirming once again 
the ontological vehemence of language, even in the domains of the metaphoric and 
the poetic, as he had done in the 1970s and 1980s.  
In order to ground this alethic dimension of language, he seeks 
confirmation in Aristotle’s claim according to which the meanings of Being are 
analogical. Furthermore, Aristotelian ontology seems suited to Ricœur’s 
philosophical anthropology, since the pair dynamis-energeia is capable of 
ontologically grounding both an emphasis on human action and its transformative 
possibilities.1478 He further connects this with Spinoza’s notion of conatus – noting 
in passing that he wrote very little on Spinoza, some say that to leave that subject 
to his friend Sylvain Zac who he mentions in this book1479 – arguing that action is 
anchored in life. As he had done before with Nabert, he reasserts that life, and 
existence, are the “effort to exist”. And we might recall how this provided him 
with the force to say yes, in spite of the sorrow of finitude, as we have seen in 
Fallible Man. 
Nonetheless, it goes without saying that Ricœur’s philosophical 
anthropology is not a mere voluntarist affirmation of one’s power to act. Indeed, 
he inscribes the self and its powers in an intricate and complicated dialectic with 
many different foci. On the one hand, activity is mixed with passivity and 
suffering. On the other hand, selfhood or ipseity cannot be understood without 
alterity and intersubjectivity. Alterity, in turn, can also be taken to constitute a 
kind of passivity, it becomes a part of what Ricœur calls a “triad of passivity”1480, 
that is, a depiction of three fundamental levels of passivity inscribed in our ipseity 
                                                
1478 Ibid., p. 304. 
1479 Ibid., p. 315. 
1480 Ibid., p. 318. 
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itself. 
According to Ricœur, passivity is also polysemic. As such, the attestation 
of the point of connection between ipseity and the alterity which resides in us is 
“the object of an attestation that is broken, in the sense that the otherness joined to 
selfhood is attested to only in a wide range of dissimilar experiences, following a 
diversity of centers of otherness”.1481 He chooses to emphasize three such 
experiences: one’s own body, our “flesh” (Leib) as the mediator between the self 
and the world; the foreign, that is, the other with whom I enter into an 
intersubjective relationship; and finally the experience of conscience, of Gewissen. 
I will not delve into the details of this threefold passivity, for lack of 
space. I will just say that even though these are disperse experiences, they can all 
be said to exist, in the factical (faktisch) sense of the word: I have a body, I am in a 
relation with others, and I hear my conscience. Consequently, even though I might 
doubt many things, even though suspicion lurks and I am conflicted, I can say that 
I exist in the mode of ipseity. And this not only because, as Ricœur contends, I am 
able to exercise my capabilities – for instance, to tell my story or to hold the 
ethical capacity of keeping promises through time – but because even the 
attestation of passivity is factical. 
Ultimately, this has interesting corollaries for Ricœur’s philosophical 
anthropology. As I said, the ontology of Oneself as Another is a postponed 
ontology. It only becomes apparent after the long detour. And attestation has to 
struggle through conflict with suspicion in order to assert itself. But when the 
debate is centered on conscience towards the last pages of the book, there is one 
level in which Ricœur decides to stop. That is, he attests the factical existence of 
conscience but, qua philosopher, he refuses to determine whence it comes. 
Firstly, he asserts that it is in the phenomenon of conscience that we find 
that the attestation of selfhood is inseparable from an exercise of suspicion.1482 
And this because, as we might recall, it is precisely the possibility of conscience as 
a lie that Nietzsche and the other interpreters of suspicion put forward. 
Consequently, we “enter the problematic of conscience by the gate of 
suspicion.”1483 Ricœur also asserts that “conscience is that place par excellence in 
                                                
1481 Ibid. 
1482 Ibid., p. 341. 
1483 Ibid. 
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which illusions about oneself are intimately bound up with the veracity of 
attestation”.1484 As we already know, the way through to the “true” cogito is a way 
of dispossession, of shattering our narcissist features. A “broken” or a 
“wounded”1485 cogito is a more realistic one. 
Ricœur recalls the critiques of Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger to the 
“good conscience” and evokes how they lead to a certain “demoralization of 
conscience”1486 that is, an attestation of conscience as being “beyond good and 
evil”. However, he chooses to emphasize a different aspect. Namely, the 
phenomenon of “injunction” as being constitutively tied up with that of 
conscience. Conscience enjoins me. And in this being-enjoined, I feel a deep 
experience of otherness within myself. The metaphor of voice, of hearing, is here 
appropriate. Listening to the voice of conscience is tantamount to being enjoined 
by an other.1487 Ricœur goes so far as speaking of “being enjoined as the structure 
of selfhood”.1488 This depiction is of the utmost importance because if it is correct, 
it means that we are constitutively made up of a mode of specific interaction. 
Ready to hear. To be summoned. And eventually to answer. Not monads anymore. 
Which is not without important, and positive, outcomes. 
However, the end of this book is very interesting, because Ricœur 
chooses to leave unanswered the questions about the origin of this injunction and 
identity of the one (or, better put, the other) who puts it forward. He expresses this 
very forcefully: 
 
Perhaps the philosopher as philosopher has to admit that one does not know and cannot 
say whether this Other, the source of the injunction, is another person whom I can look in 
the face or who can stare at me, or my ancestors for whom there is no representation, to so 
great an extent docs my debt to them constitute my very self, or God – living God, absent 
God – or an empty place. With this aporia of the Other, philosophical discourse comes to 
an end.1489 
 
                                                
1484 Ibid. 
1485 On this topic of the “wounded cogito” see the excellent account provided by Jeanne Marie 
Gagnebin. See Jeanne Marie Gagnebin, “Uma filosofia do cogito ferido: Paul Ricœur” in Estudos 
Avançados 11/30 (1997): 261-272. 
1486 Ricœur Oneself as Another., p. 351. 
1487 Ibid. 
1488 Ibid., p. 354. 
1489 Ibid., p. 355. 
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With this rather paradoxical – even agnostic might we say – conclusion Ricœur’s 
mediated ontology comes to a halt. As is easy to see, Ricœur’s prudence regarding 
ontological claims came a long way. In his first books on Jaspers and Marcel he 
still dared to put forward direct ontological claims. Ever since the discovery of the 
great detour, and hermeneutics, in the mid-fifties to early sixties, his ontological 
claims became ever more mediated and toned down. This is the height of this 
humbling of ontology. Perhaps could we say that not only is there a wounded 
cogito in Ricœur’s philosophy, but also, somehow, a wounded ontology. And yet, 
in the same manner there is a cogito, after all, in spite of the humiliation, the same 
can be said for ontology. But the imposing of limits – Kant, once again – and the 
refusal to objectify what properly cannot be known (or at least not empirically 
verified) is here reasserted. Ontology is spelled out, but reined in. 
Amid all of this, the self is once again conflicted, but holding its own. He 
or she is certain of existing in the mode of ipseity, acting and suffering, choosing 
and being chosen. In a word: interacting. 
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5.2 – The Conflict of Duties (Ethics and Morality) 
 
In the last chapter the ground was laid for us to understand the overall 
framework of Oneself as Another, with its affirmation of the self, mediated 
ontology and ultimately agnostic tone. Now I have to take a step back, in order to 
analyze the major instantiation of conflict in this book, one which opens up a 
whole new field in practical philosophy. I am alluding to the conflict of duties, or 
conflict of laws and which finds its application both in moral theory and in the 
Law. However, in order to do justice to this instantiation of conflict I will first 
have to spell out the main traits of Ricœur’s “little ethics”. 
 
5.2.1 – Ricœur’s “little ethics”: ethics encompassing morality 
 
The part of Oneself as Another to which Ricœur called with a certain 
affection his “little ethics” is a bold project, one in which he attempts to conciliate 
Aristotle’s, Kant’s and Hegel’s ethical theories, which is no small feat. Ultimately, 
his is a neo-Aristotelian stance, affirming the primacy of the good over the right, 
and advocating a continuist approach between ethics and morality, as well as 
between is and ought, desires, convictions and norms.1490 
Allow me to briefly recall the main traits of this theory. Out of 
conventional reasons, Ricœur chooses to reserve for the term ethics the 
qualification of “that which is considered to be good” and to morality “that which 
imposes itself as obligatory”.1491 His claim is threefold: that ethics enjoys primacy 
over morality (both quoad se and quoad nos: it is our first preoccupation, and it 
encompasses more than morality strictly speaking); that the ethical aim needs to be 
formalized, to “pass through the sieve of the norm”; finally, that the norm needs to 
go back to the ethical aim and to reinvent itself through phronetical means, 
whenever it reaches an impasse, coalesced under the figure of the “conflict of 
norms”. 
Confirming his knack for short, concise but encompassing formulae, 
Ricœur offers yet another of these definitions in his little ethics. According to him, 
                                                
1490 For a presentation of Ricœur’s ethics, and its connection with hermeneutics, see Tomás 
Domingo Moratalla y Agustín Domingo Moratalla, La ética hermenéutica de Paul Ricœur. 
Caminos de sabiduría práctica (Valencia: Hermes, 2013). 
1491 Ricœur, Oneself as Another., p. 170. 
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the whole three studies and their theoretical ambitions could almost be summed up 
in his definition of the ethical aim, or ethical intention (visée éthique): “aiming at 
the ‘good life’ with and for others in just institutions”.1492 In this definition many 
aspects are emphasized. Firstly, the Aristotelian topic of the “good life” or 
“happiness” reveals itself as the first practical problem and also the ultimate goal 
in our lives. Secondly, it becomes clear that the self-esteem thereby revealed and 
consolidated in the quest for the good life, and which serves as a basis for our 
ipseity, is incomplete and constitutively flawed without an intersubjective 
mediation. Caring for the self also entails caring for the other, opening him or 
herself up to alterity, and recognizing how it is the other who constitutively also 
forms the self. In a word, self-esteem is complemented by its reciprocal 
counterpart of solicitude for the other. Finally, at a societal level this process 
would be incomplete without the anonymous third constituted by institutions, and 
their objective mediations and instantiations of our freedom, as Hegel put it. For 
Ricœur, to reiterate, this is all part of the ethical aim. This is what we want. 
I cannot delve into the full details of this very rich and encompassing 
ethical theory. Suffice it to say that even though for Ricœur the ethical level is 
primordial, it would remain naïve, flawed and incomplete if it would not 
eventually be forced to pass the test of universalization. Desires to live well can be 
egoistic. They can be imperfectly formulated. They can infringe upon the 
autonomy of others. As such, an even though the tendentially universal moral 
norms do not deplete the surplus of meaning of ethical aims, Ricœur thinks that 
the moment of coercion, obligation and universalization cannot be escaped. As 
such, the transition to the second stage of the little ethics is marked by the 
transformation of the “good” by the “right”, that is, the “obligatory” and the 
“universal”.  
 
5.2.2 – The moral norm 
 
The ethical aim was marked by the development of self-esteem. In the 
second stage, what objective rights confer is self-respect (for Ricœur like, in a 
way, for Kant, and certainly for Honneth). In this stage, which corresponds to the 
                                                
1492 Ibid., p. 172. 
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eighth study of Oneself as Another, Ricœur’s ethical theory acquires a greater 
degree of formalization. However, his claim, to be sure, is that there is a continuity 
between the teleological and the deontological levels. Namely, he argues that the 
moral norm and the rule of justice are nothing but the more abstract, formalized 
versions of the ethical aim and the sense of justice that each of us already 
possesses. In a very controversial and certainly unorthodox move, he contends that 
even Kant’s categorical imperative is nothing but a formalization of the golden 
rule – which is, as we know, merely empirical, and so for Kant entirely 
pathological and not properly moral. 
Ricœur’s claim is that we can find, even in Kant, traces of this continuity. 
One of these traces is, according to him, Kant’s insistence on the “good will” as 
the only thing that can be taken to be “good without qualification”.1493 Now, of 
course that Kant rejects all things empirical and pathological. The only feeling he 
accepts is “respect” as a “rational feeling” that amounts to an affection of reason 
by itself, a “humiliation” of sensibility and self-esteem. Obviously, Ricœur cannot 
agree with this. For him, self-respect is an objective ground on which to found 
self-esteem, a further exploration of the capabilities of the self on objective 
grounds. It is also an instantiation of the dialogic nature of the ethical aim, that is, 
of solicitude. And this because the golden rule can be seen as a first attempt at 
formulating a rule of reciprocity, one which the formalized moral, or legal norm 
will only, in the eyes of Ricœur, further develop. 
However, it is when Ricœur comes to analyze the several formulations of 
Kant’s categorical imperative that one of the most severe objections against Kant 
is formulated. On the one hand, duty is not “simple” as Kant claimed. That is, 
there might be situations in which I want to act morally, but in which I am not sure 
what exactly I should do, as we will see in the next section, on the “tragic of 
action”. And Ricœur finds a very problematic tension in the respect for the moral 
law, and the respect for persons, in the framework of Kant’s moral theory. Persons 
are supposed to be taken as ends in themselves. Kant draws our attention both to 
“my person” and “the person of anyone else”. As such, with the mentioning of 
persons, plurality is inserted in the application of the imperative. But what would 
happen if by applying a law (even a moral one) I should be put in the position of 
                                                
1493 Ibid., p. 205. 
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disrespecting a particular person or group of people? This is what next section will 
analyze in detail. 
As I stated before, Ricœur places Rawls in the continuity of Kant. His 
social contract theory is seen as a social extension of Kantian formalism. In this 
second level, the Rawlsian rule of justice expresses in the domain of social 
institutions the same normative requirement that Kantian autonomy demanded at a 
moral and individual level. Ultimately, such a formalization would lead Ricœur’s 
ethical theory to the neighborhood of a purely procedural conception of justice. 
Nevertheless, his claim would always be that there is a “residue” of the 
teleological conception even in the most formalized forms of justice; and this is, in 
turn, and according to Ricœur, what allows justice to come back to the teleological 
aim when the deontological moment reaches an impasse. I already discussed in 
part two Ricœur’s main objections to both Rawls’s and Habermas’s procedural 
approaches – the ahistorical pact is a fiction, autonomy is not so radical as we 
might think, the formalization process cannot eliminate all the vestiges of the thick 
conception of the good – so I will proceed directly to this impasse, which is the 
kernel of Ricœur’s contention. 
 
5.2.3 – The tragic of action, the conflict of duties and political conflicts 
 
It is in the ninth study of Oneself as Another, “The Self and Practical 
Wisdom: Conviction”1494 that we find the most important account of practical 
conflict in this seminal book. It is also, probably, the most serious account of 
conflict of the last stage of Ricœur’s philosophy, because it is this model that 
would later be extended to encompass the theory of justice of both books 
dedicated to the topic of the just. 
From the outset, Ricœur spells out what he is aiming to prove. According 
to him, in the complex relation between ethics and morality, and when faced with 
the aporias revealed by conflicts in morality, a renewed form of convictions is the 
only way out. This does not mean that the deontological point of view is to be 
completely discarded. On the contrary, “the very conflicts that are produced by the 
rigorousness of formalism give moral judgment in situation its true 
                                                
1494 Ricœur, Oneself as Another, pp. 240-296. 
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seriousness.”1495 In what is a very significant and rare move in Ricœur’s 
production, he decides to place this ninth study under the banner of an interlude 
forcefully called “Tragic Action” (or, more precisely, The Tragic of Action, Le 
tragique de l’action) which he dedicates to the tragic memory of his son Olivier. 
Now, this interlude assumes a very specific status. Firstly, Ricœur 
chooses to “make a voice heard other than the voice of philosophy”1496, that is, the 
voice of Greek tragedy. This voice is, for Ricœur, one of the most important 
“voices of nonphilosophy”. As such, it is not philosophy itself, but he believes that 
these other voices (religion being another example) can sometimes have 
something to teach to philosophy. Philosophy can let itself be guided, instructed 
by these others. And its role is in here clear: it is supposed to “restore to conflict 
the place that all the analyzes up to now [i.e., up until that part of Oneself as 
Another] have avoided granting to it”.1497 As I have been showing, conflict is 
almost omnipresent in Ricœur’s philosophy. But it is not always given thematic 
attention. With this last assertion what we find is probably Ricœur’s first explicit 
emphasis on conflict and its revealing power since the depiction of the conflict of 
interpretations in the first phase of his hermeneutic theory. 
Ricœur is careful enough to avoid a full equivalence between philosophy 
and Greek tragedy. Tragedy resists, he tells us, a complete “repetition” – the 
French word is “répétition”, that is, the famous re-enactment he invoked in the 
Symbolism of Evil, when reflecting on what the experience of evil meant for the 
philosophical consciousness – in the discourse of ethics or morality. Tragedy is 
probably inescapable. But as such the powers it unleashes are almost too much for 
philosophical discourse to bear. Philosophical discourse is not tragic discourse; but 
tragedy is put here precisely in order to rein in on the over-rationalization and 
exacerbated optimism of philosophical formalism. Tragedy is here to recall us that 
sometimes following the law is complicated and that we might be faced with hard 
cases, hard choices. The ones where no option is good. 
In order to illustrate – I think this word is here exactly appropriate – this 
claim Ricœur chooses to delve into the Antigone, rather than in Oedipus Rex, 
which is what he had done before in Freud and Philosophy. And the fact that he 
                                                
1495 Ibid., p. 240. 
1496 Ibid., p. 241. 
1497 Ibid. 
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does so is testimony, once again, to his recurrent return to Hegel. The narrative of 
Antigone is well known. Polyneices, Antigone’s brother, dies in battle in Thebes’s 
civil war. The ruler of the winning party, Creon (who is Antigone’s uncle) decides 
Polyneices cannot be buried, because as a rebel he is considered a traitor. Creon 
represents positive law, the law of the city; as such, according to his rule, 
Polyneices must be dishonored and left to rot, as it were. But Antigone decides to 
oppose her uncle’s ruling. Claiming the binding power of tradition and holy law, 
she opposes Creon’s ruling and eventually ends up burying Polyneices; her tragic 
faith, as is known, is to be buried alive as a consequence of her actions. She 
eventually commits suicide, in spite of Creon’s repentance. The tragedy is thus 
seen as displaying the hubris of those who want to rule over and above divine law. 
Creon commits such a sin, and falls in disgrace. 
Ricœur sees in this tale the perfect example of two opposing laws: the 
law of the city and divine law; and he chooses to analyze things from Antigone’s 
viewpoint. Faced with the decision to bury or not to bury her brother, what should 
she do? This is, indeed a choice between the “bad” and the “worse”, a grey area, 
as it were. From this analyzis, Ricœur draws a metatheoretical consequence, and 
one which confirms our insistence on conflict throughout this thesis. According to 
him, conflicts are persistent in human life; and one comes to be oneself through a 
traversal of them: 
 
If the tragedy of Antigone can teach us something, it is because the very content of the 
conflict – despite the lost and unrepeatable character of the mythical ground from which it 
emerges and of the festive environment surrounding the celebration of the spectacle – has 
maintained an ineffaceable permanence. The tragedy of Antigone touches what, following 
Steiner, we can call the agonistic ground of human experience, where we witness the 
interminable confrontation of man and woman, old age and youth, society and the 
individual, the living and the dead, humans and gods. Self-recognition is at the price of a 
difficult apprenticeship acquired over the course of a long voyage through these persistent 
conflicts, whose universality is inseparable from their particular localization, which is, in 
every instance, unsurpassable.1498 
 
That self-recognition must come at the price of a “difficult apprenticeship”, indeed 
                                                
1498 Ibid., p. 243. 
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a course, over these persistent conflicts, is a strong claim. Allow me to find in it a 
metaphor for the revelation of Ricœur’s philosophy in this thesis, and namely in 
the three parts of the “course of conflict” properly speaking. This is the place 
where conflict is granted more generative power in the context of Ricœur’s 
practical philosophy. If, in the theoretical and hermeneutical level, it was the 
conflict of interpretations which had creative power, in the practical level it is the 
conflict of duties or norms which reveals us something: the hardship of life and its 
instruction, leading up to a difficult, and yet existent, recognition of oneself even 
amid these conflicts. In a way, this is a radical claim that will find no parallel 
elsewhere in Ricœur’s philosophy, not even in The Course of Recognition, where 
the study dealing with the “recognition of oneself” is constructed in very different 
terms. In this and connected passages in Oneself as Another, Ricœur speaks about 
the “unavoidable nature of conflict in moral life”1499 and lauds its capacity to 
“outline a wisdom”, namely, tragic wisdom. 
However, as always, for Ricœur, there is more to it than the mere 
admission or recognition of conflicts. They are not, in themselves, fully eliminable 
but that does not mean that they are intractable. Indeed, he suggests that they are 
“open to negotiation”1500 which reminds us of Foucault’s observations about the 
possibility of “negotiating” our identities, even amid the complicated processes of 
subjectification. Ricœur’s tragic wisdom is not, or at least not only, a “resignation 
to the insoluble”. On the contrary, Ricœur claims that even though conflicts are 
unavoidable, there must be a way to reply to them. And it is in that context that he 
calls for practical wisdom. 
He argues that the two main protagonists, Antigone and Creon, have a 
strategy of avoidance of conflicts. As such, their perspective is “narrow”. It goes 
without saying that Ricœur is choosing to place himself in the position of the one 
who tries to develop an enlarged perspective, in the sense I defined above with the 
help of Kant, even though in this particular instance he is more or less following 
Hegel’s interpretation of the Antigone. The difference between tragic wisdom and 
practical wisdom is that tragedy itself leaves the conflict unresolved. Man is 
crushed because of the hubris. But this is why a gap between philosophy and 
tragedy exists, and why we are left to reinvent some response to the tragedy that 
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befalls upon us: 
 
One of the functions of tragedy in relation to ethics is to create a gap between tragic 
wisdom and practical wisdom. By refusing to contribute a “solution” to the conflicts made 
insoluble by fiction, tragedy, after having disoriented the gaze, condemns the person of 
praxis to reorient action, at his or her own risk, in the sense of a practical wisdom in 
situation that best responds to tragic wisdom. This response, deferred by the festive 
contemplation of the spectacle, makes conviction the haven beyond catharsis.1501 
 
The meaning of “at his or own risk” is here that one is left to seek a solution, to 
invent one, as it were, without however being able to anticipate its result, or to find 
it in any pre-established procedure. Conviction is here only hope. 
After the interlude, in the more specifically philosophical and 
argumentative part of this ninth study of Oneself as Another, Ricœur 
systematically detects conflict and applies its generative power to the level of 
institutions, respect and autonomy. He states that conflict “is the goad that sends 
us to this court of appeal in three areas (…) the universal self, the plurality of 
persons and the institutional environment”.1502 These are, indeed, inversed orders. 
But he chooses to follow the order institutions-respect-autonomy. In so doing, he 
recovers Hegel’s theory of institutions and namely the thick notion of Sittlichkeit. 
This allows him to discuss political practice and the conflicts pertaining to it. 
On the one hand, the problems of distribution and apportionment of social 
goods which occupy Rawls are inherently conflictual. This is why Ricœur chooses 
to characterize Rawls’s take on society as inherently consensual-conflictual, as I 
mentioned in part two. He discusses in passing Walzer’s criticism of Rawls, and 
mentions the need to arbitrate the conflict between spheres of justice as one 
striking example of social conflict.1503 
In the pages that follow, Ricœur analyzes the possibility of solving that 
conflict through Hegelian means, since the theory of objective spirit seems in 
principle to be able to provide the mediations and hierarchizations that would 
solve the problem. The first step to achieve it, is a step which Ricœur decides to 
take and that brings him closer to a post-metaphysical interpretation: namely, he 
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decides to recover the notion of Sittlichkeit without the ontology of Geist.1504 The 
part of Hegel which Ricœur here refuses is the objective spirit in the strictest of its 
meanings, that is, the State in its metaphysical form, self-knowing State as self-
knowing Spirit. That also allows us to avoid the reification of different forms of 
Sittlichkeit, i.e., even though collective identities exist, they are changing and 
adapting, they can absorb critiques and transform themselves as a result of them. 
First and foremost, the possibility of a “deadly” Sittlichkeit must be 
curtailed.1505 This means that the invasion and domination of a Volk over another 
is not justifiable in itself, not even disguised as a “cunning of reason”. This is for 
us, today, self-evident. But Ricœur grounds it theoretically in the distinction 
between legitimate and illegitimate uses of power, as he had done before in the 
Lectures on Ideology and Utopia. He recalls the distinction between power in 
common and power over (domination), invoking Arendt. Political practice is a 
locus of specific conflicts because the exercise of power is elusive. The desire to 
live together is the most fundamental of desires, and entails the exercise of a 
specific, legitimate power. But that kind of reciprocal, symmetric use of power can 
turn to asymmetric relations of domination. And these, in turn, need to be reined 
in. 
As such, the exercise of power is itself described as being inherently 
conflictual. Consequently, even within the scope of a thick Sittlichkeit, the 
apportionment of power and roles needs to be addressed. And if we are to avoid 
that conflict turns to violence, one way to deal with it is through discussion. This 
provides Ricœur with the opportunity to claim that a type of Aristotelian 
phronesis, one able to make decisions, is needed to correct the conflictual 
processes taking place within different forms of Sittlichkeit. This leads him to seek 
a definition of democracy not far from that of Claude Lefort; according to Ricœur 
we should not seek a consensus that would simply end conflicts (this is 
impossible). What we need is to negotiate conflicts: 
 
It is useless – when it is not actually dangerous – to count on a consensus that would put 
an end to the conflicts. Democracy is not a political system without conflicts but a system 
in which conflicts are open and negotiable in accordance with recognized rules of 
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arbitration. In a society that is ever more complex, conflicts will not diminish in number 
and in seriousness but will multiply and deepen. For the same reason, the free access of 
the pluralism of opinions to public expression is neither an accident nor an illness nor a 
misfortune; it is the expression of the fact that the public good cannot be decided in a 
scientific or dogmatic manner.1506 
 
Now, this strikes me as being a very balanced and accurate position. Ricœur puts 
forward the need for a pluralism of opinions and he is inherently anti-dogmatic. 
The public good cannot be determined “scientifically”, as it were. It is rather the 
result of a choice and one which must be democratically taken. As such, conflicts 
in opinion are inevitable, but they are to be solved by deliberation and collective 
decision-making. An overall consensus is probably a sham. But if the “rules of 
arbitration” are agreed upon, even though “conflicts will multiply and deepen” the 
resurgence of conflicts will probably be a sign of the vitality of a democracy, not 
its decay. Indeed, the opposite would be true. A totally consensual society would 
probably be a dead society, operating at a standstill. Again, we find the positive 
role of conflicts in society: they bring vitality to what would otherwise be a 
moribund order. 
The second order of conflicts analyzed by Ricœur is what properly 
defines the conflict of duties. He decides to explore, as I hinted at before, a 
possible tension in Kant’s categorical imperative. This tension is between the 
universalist version of the imperative (respect the idea of humanity, follow the 
moral rule in any circumstance whatsoever) and its pluralist version (respect it as 
applicable to each and every person, who must be treated as an end in itself). Now 
this is the core of Ricœur’s objection: 
 
The possibility of conflict arises, however, as soon as the otherness of persons, inherent in 
the very idea of human plurality, proves to be, in certain remarkable circumstances, 
incompatible with the universality of the rules that underlie the idea of humanity. Respect 
then tends to split up into respect for the law and respect for persons. Under these 
conditions, practical wisdom may consist in giving priority to the respect for persons, in 
the name of the solicitude that is addressed to persons in their irreplaceable singularity.1507 
 
                                                
1506 Ibid., p. 258. 
1507 Ibid., p. 262. 
 536
This is the thick of his argument. In human affairs, sometimes we are divided, 
torn, between different options. Take Antigone’s case: if she respects the law of 
the city she disrespects divine law, and vice versa. But her decision, was it not also 
a decision to respect the person of her brother, over and above the law of the city?  
In a nutshell, Ricœur’s claim is that as a rule of thumb, when respect for 
an allegedly universal law and respect for the situation of a given individual clash, 
priority should be given to respect for the person. This will probably not be the 
case in every specific occasion. As we will see in more detail in chapter 5.4 below, 
the important point is that there is no ready-made solution, or one-size-fits-all rule 
to follow. But generally speaking, people are above laws, this is the spirit of 
Ricœur’s observation. Ultimately, this will serve to ground once again the 
deontological moment in teleology. It is not that rules are irrelevant, this has been 
sufficiently proven. But for Ricœur the notion of “respect for persons” is really 
grounded in solicitude. If we decide to place persons over and above the law, this 
is because solicitude is ultimately superior to the mere obligation to follow rules in 
general. 
In this chapter, I will stop short of spelling out all the details of Ricœur’s 
practical wisdom, because I think that this conflict of norms gains in insight and 
extension when it is compared with legal (that is, both juridical and judiciary) 
forms of conflict, because Ricœur adapts a very similar model to the domain of the 
just. Because of this reason, I will now go straight to these forms of conflict 
developed after the publication of Oneself as Another in order to later come back 
to Ricœur’s proposed solution, the invention of the rule, after having laid out the 
main traits of these conflicts. 
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5.3 – Legal Conflict (Theory of Justice) 
 
As I mentioned before, in the 1990s Ricœur became interested in the topic 
of justice, mainly by being influenced by Antoine Garapon and the invitations to 
collaborate with the IHEJ. The deepening of his reflections ultimately led to the 
publication of many articles, the most important of which were republished in the 
two books which bear the predicate “just” in their title. 
In this chapter I will focus mainly in the first of these books. The latter 
volume will prove more decisive in the next chapter. In The Just Ricœur mentions 
his main motivation for writing on those topics. He wanted “to do justice to the 
question of right and law, to do justice to justice.”1508 But in order to do so he had 
to unveil a whole group of conflicts specifically pertaining to this order, and he 
had to put forward the mediations and procedures which would allow for these 
conflicts to be treatable. 
According to Ricœur, the topic of the “just” introduces itself in both the 
orthogonal axes (the horizontal, dialogical constitution of the self and the vertical, 
hierarchical constitution of the predicates that qualify human actions in terms of 
morality)1509 of the little ethics of Oneself as Another. That this is a book dealing 
with Ricœur’s theory of capacities and thus adding up to his philosophical 
anthropology is evident from the start, since he decides to put the article “Who is 
the Subject of Rights” at the opening of this collection.1510 This essay is 
complemented by a second one, entitled “The Concept of Responsibility. An 
Essay in Semantic Analyzis”1511 where he shows how the notion of responsibility 
is intrinsically connected to that of imputation which was one the main capacities 
emphasized in Oneself as Another and more specifically in the little ethics. 
Let me follow the thread of the main conflicts dealt with here, which will 
reveal the specificities of the domain of the just in Ricœur’s philosophy. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1508 Ibid., p. 9. 
1509 Ricœur, The Just, p. xii. 
1510 Ibid., pp. 1-10. 
1511 Ibid., pp. 11-35. 
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5.3.1 – Judicial intervention as a way to solve conflicts without violence 
 
Ever since History and Truth, as we have seen in part three, the topic of 
peace is recurrent in Ricœur. In The Just he proposes an analogy which has its 
limitations, but that is put forward in order to emphasize the function proper to the 
judicial domain according to him. He argues that war is the insistent theme of 
political philosophy (even though war is perhaps a very specific topic; maybe we 
can say that conflict and struggle are in the semantic neighborhood of that notion) 
while peace is that of the philosophy of law. Accordingly, the long-standing goal 
of judicial intervention will be the maintenance of peace. But in order to do that, 
philosophy of law has to recognize the legitimate existence of conflicts and to find 
a proper way to deal with them: 
 
If, in fact, conflict, and therefore, in some sense, violence, remains the occasion for 
judicial intervention, this can be defined by the set of means by which the conflict is 
raised to the rank of a trial process, this latter being in turn centered on a debate in words, 
whose initial incertitude is finally decided by a speech act that says what the law is and 
how it applies. Therefore there exists a place within society – however violent society 
may remain owing to its origin or to custom – where words do win out over violence. 
Yes, the parties to a trial do not necessarily leave the courtroom pacified. For that, they 
would have to be reconciled, they would have to have covered the path of mutual 
recognition to its end. The short-term effect of this act is to decide a conflict – that is, to 
put an end to uncertainty – whereas its long-term effect is to contribute to social peace – 
that is, to contribute finally to the consolidation of society as a cooperative enterprise.1512 
 
This distinction between the short-term and the long-term goal of judicial 
intervention is indeed very important. On the one hand, its point of departure is the 
recognition of conflicts. These conflicts could be solved violently; the person who 
seeks reparation could instead choose to take vengeance. But what happens in a 
court of law, specifically when a sentence is reached, is an attempt to find a 
legitimate solution to that conflict. It is, as Ricœur puts it, “a speech act that says 
what the law is and how it applies”. That is, it is an act of language and an attempt 
at legitimacy, but one which ultimately produces effects. Maybe this does not 
                                                
1512 Ricœur, The Just, p. ix. 
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attain the status of mutual recognition – in order for this to take place, even the 
condemned person would have to recognize the justice of the condemnation and 
this is not, as we know, frequently the case – but this act will have accomplished 
its long-term goal if at least the litigants accept the outcome (even if they do not 
do so in a first instance, instead resorting to courts of appeal, and so forth, but that 
they ultimately recognize and yes, obey the final sentence). Because this will be 
proof that the justice system is there to impede utter mayhem and anarchy; it will 
show us that society, with all its flaws, still is a cooperative enterprise. This is the 
point Ricœur puts forward and spells out in more detail in the short but incisive 
article “The Act of Judging”.1513 
In this latter article he develops in a more acute manner the path that goes 
from the short-term end to the long-term end of social peace. He argues that this 
long-term end is somewhat concealed, but that it is the long-term perspective that 
ultimately justifies the juridical system as such. He explicitly invokes Weil. If 
between discourse and violence one must choose, the act of judging, of emitting a 
judgment on some issue, means at the same time separating (Ur-Teilen), and 
deciding in a context that is discursive. By renouncing violence, the State of right 
chooses to solve its conflicts in a reasonable manner. Ricœur invokes indignation, 
the cry “unfair” as both a denunciation of injustice and an attestation of the 
peaceful way in which justice must be exercised. In this model Ricœur refuses to 
speak of reconciliation, but poses mutual recognition as a sort of limit idea that 
would attest to the reasonableness of the decision. Ultimately, each person would 
be given its own role, which is also its right place, its share in the division of roles 
that is a society. Hence Ricœur’s conclusion: 
 
I conclude then that the act of judging has as its horizon a fragile equilibrium of these two 
elements of sharing: that which separates my share or part from yours and that which, on 
the other hand, means that each of us shares in, takes part in society.  
It is the just distance between partners who confront one another, too closely in cases of 
conflict and too distant in those of ignorance, hate, and scorn, that sums up rather well, I 
believe, the two aspects of the act of judging. On the one hand, to decide, to put an end to 
uncertainty, to separate the parties; on the other, to make each party recognize the share 
                                                
1513 Ricœur, The Just, pp. 127-132. 
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the other has in the same society, thanks to which the winner and the loser of any trial can 
be said to have their fair share in that model of cooperation that is society.1514 
 
This article is indeed important to understand Ricœur’s take on judicial 
and juridical conflicts. His definition of the “just distance” (which he shares with 
Garapon) would become paradigmatic of this approach. Maintaining this just 
distance itself involves a fragile equilibrium. This is a fundamental conflict, one 
that deals with particular procedures and that has a very important practical 
function. However, there are also other types of conflict present in The Just, which 
assume a more theoretical, but no less important role in this book. 
 
5.3.2 – The conflict between argumentation and interpretation 
 
One of Ricœur’s goals in The Just is to determine the conceptual status of 
argumentation. However, when doing this, he does not attempt to hide his own 
hermeneutical background. As such, he decides to compare argumentation with 
the notion with which he is much better acquainted – interpretation. We have seen 
in part four how Ricœur defined interpretation as the result of a dialectic between 
explanation and understanding, and how this procedure was intrinsically creative: 
out of a polarity a new position was born. In the debate between the procedures of 
interpretation and argumentation he adopts a similar stance. 
Hence in the article “Interpretation and/or Argumentation”1515 Ricœur 
sets out to dialectically define argumentation against the backdrop of 
interpretation. As is easy to see, “argument” is one of these notions with strong 
conceptual ties with conflict. It is, let us say, a rationalized form of conflict, with 
its own set of rules. Ricœur departs from a definition of argument as “a verbal 
battle without violence”. Accordingly, the “clash of arguments” (a specific type of 
conflict) is deemed to be the major characteristic of what takes place during the 
processes taking place at a court of justice. 
Adopting a move very characteristic of his style, he asks if we must 
“cling to a purely antinomial conception of the polarity of interpretation and 
argumentation or whether, [as he believes], we must attempt to elaborate a 
                                                
1514 Ibid., p. 132. 
1515 Ricœur, The Just, pp. 109-126. 
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properly dialectical version of this polarity”.1516 Furthermore, he explicitly 
acknowledges that this is to be taken as a deepening of the relation between 
explanation and understanding. He takes as the representatives of the positions of 
interpretation and argumentation, respectively Ronald Dworkin (for interpretation) 
and Alexy and Atienza (for argumentation). According to him, juridical 
hermeneutic needs to draw from both sides. This attests that for him there is a 
partial analogy between juridical argumentation and the epistemology of 
argumentation; with the difference, however, that whereas in the domain of 
interpretation taken in its abstract level, what he have is always new conciliations, 
or fragile mediations (new combinations, really) which at each time produce a new 
interpretation, in the juridical plane, as we have seen, what we have as a result of 
the interpretation is a practical consequence: a decision, a sentence. 
Ricœur’s substantive argument consists in saying that interpretation is the 
organon of inference. That is, it is the path followed by productive imagination in 
reflective judgment.1517 This means the following: in argumentation one usually 
puts forward facts and draws inferences from these facts. But there is, obviously, a 
to and fro from the fact and the theories that validate it. But sometimes general 
rules fail to encapsulate the particularity of the given case under consideration. 
That is, the universality of rules might have its problems and difficulties in the 
case of the law, no less than in the case of moral norms we have seen in the last 
chapter. Thus Ricœur invokes Dworkin’s allusion of “hard cases”, that is, those 
whose solution is not immediately apparent and which allows for “possible 
conflicts among norms”.1518 Indeed, and retrospectively, this notion of “hard 
cases” can equally be applied accurately to the case of the conflict of duties of 
Oneself as Another. The situation is the same, even though the domains change. 
The fact is, Ricœur recalls, that the judge is not a legislator. What he does 
is to apply the law, “that is, he incorporates into his arguments the law in 
effect”.1519 But even this, he argues, constitutively relies on interpretation. When 
one resorts to jurisprudence, when one mentions “similar cases” the logical 
operation at stake is akin to interpretation: it is, according to Ricœur, the 
interpretation of an analogy. There is thus a double interpretation of laws and 
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1517 Ibid., p. 122. 
1518 Ibid., p. 123. 
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facts, because “we must always interpret at the same time the norm as covering a 
case and the case as covered”.1520 Therefore, even in argumentation, there is 
interpretation. 
In part four we have seen how Ricœur’s conclusion concerning the 
dialectic between explanation and understanding was that “to explain more is to 
understand better” and that in the hermeneutic arc one interpolates moments of 
explanation with moments of understanding in order to reach ever new and better 
interpretations. The process of reflective judgment, to which I will come back in 
the next chapter, is also a creative process of this sort. Because it makes use of 
productive imagination, because it needs to find, as it were, a new rule, it is a 
process of creation. And in creating it is, so to speak, interpreting and, in this this 
case, renewing the juridical domain. 
 
5.3.3 – The conflict between conscience and the law 
 
The last article of The Just, “Conscience and the Law. The Philosophical 
Stakes”1521 addresses yet another conflict, that between “subjective” conscience 
and the apparently objective character of the law. Nonetheless, and as often, 
Ricœur refuses to see in this a pure restrictive dichotomy. In order to escape a 
radical opposition, he proposes to distinguish a plurality of degrees of constitution 
of “the moral”. One of the most important contributions of the article though is to 
provide a further clarification on the moral judgment in situation, which will 
provide us a mediation towards the next chapter. 
In a moral judgment in situation, in a way, what decides is our 
conviction; and this conviction is to a large extent determined by our conscience. 
However, as we shall see in a more detailed fashion below, conscience applies the 
case to a norm (or bluntly invents it). As such, both parties of this dialectic play a 
role here. Indeed, Ricœur states, “The tie between inner conviction and the speech 
act consisting in stating the law in a particular circumstance removes the judgment 
in situation from pure arbitrariness.”1522 
Finally, in a remark that sets the tone for his overall vision on these 
                                                
1520 Ibid., p. 122. 
1521 Ricœur, The Just, pp. 146-155. 
1522 Ibid., p. 154. 
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matters, he states that in the tragic dimension of action, what is needed are fragile 
compromises because we are never choosing between black and white but rather 
between shades of gray. More often than not, this is a decision between bad and 
worse.1523 In here, the “better” is tantamount to the “less bad”. Moreover, the 
better is only an “apparent better” because what we have here is conviction, not 
utter certitude. But let us see how this process unfolds in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1523 Ibid., p. 155. 
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5.4 – The Invention of the Rule (Applied Ethics) 
 
In the last two chapters I provided a detailed account of the main 
instantiations of conflict to be found both in the moral and the juridical domain of 
Ricœur’s philosophy. I also mentioned cursorily his admitted attempts to negotiate 
these conflicts, and namely by resorting to an invention of rules. However, I fell 
short of articulating in a more comprehensive manner how this worked, because I 
wanted to dedicate a full chapter to this creative proposal of Ricœur. Such as there 
are many conflicts tied up with the deontological moment of Ricœur’s ethics, and 
with its judicial realm, so there is also a reflection on the procedures needed to 
solve or at least negotiate these conflicts. So now I will spell out these procedures, 
which always strive to mutually adequate rules to cases and vice-versa, but in 
slightly different manners. Firstly, I will sketch his Aristotelian solution to the 
conflicts of duties; secondly, I will articulate in a brief manner his insistence on 
reflective judgment on the judicial domain; lastly, I will mention his more applied 
incursions in “regional ethics”, and specifically medical ethics, in his Reflections 
on the Just. 
 
5.4.1 – Practical wisdom: adapting behavior through phronetical means 
 
At the end of chapter 5.2 above I left Ricœur’s little ethics at the point in 
which he detected in Kant’s categorical imperative the possibility of a split 
between respect for the (moral) law and respect for persons; as we saw, there 
seemed to be a rule of thumb indicating that in case of doubt, preference should go 
to persons rather than the abstract law, also because respect for persons is 
ultimately grounded in solicitude as an inbuilt structure of the teleological desire 
to live well. Now what is practical wisdom, and how is it mobilized in these hard 
cases of our moral life? According to Ricœur, “Practical wisdom consists in 
inventing conduct that will best satisfy the exception required by solicitude, by 
betraying the rule to the smallest extent possible.”1524 As we can see, at this stage, 
the first approach is not so much one of directly inventing the rule, but of adapting 
it. As Ricœur clarifies, “Practical wisdom consists here in inventing just behavior 
                                                
1524 Ricœur, Oneself as Another, p. 269. 
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suited to the singular nature of the case.”1525 That is, Ricœur’s claim at this point is 
not so much that there is no rule guiding the particular case, but that exceptions to 
that rule might be admitted, depending on the case at hand. 
Already in his little ethics, Ricœur conceives the possibility of extending 
his reflection to “applied” domains. The examples he chooses to illustrate this 
“invention of just behavior” are examples pertaining to bioethics. They are indeed 
inherently tied to life, and more specifically to its extremes: the “end of life” and 
the “beginning of life”. In the first one, Ricœur asks: shall we always tell the truth 
to the dying? Suppose the conditions of extreme frailty. We can either tell the truth 
without taking into account their capacity to bear such truth, or just lie, out of fear 
to aggravate the situation. According to Ricœur, this decision will depend on the 
evaluation of each case. There is no optimal solution here, and in each case 
different solutions might be taken. But this is not, he argues, simply arbitrary. 
Rather, it depends on “a meditation on the relation between happiness and 
suffering” and should not be taken lightly. Furthermore, at this stage, the 
exception is not really transformed in rule. Indeed, in the strictly moral domain, 
law, in the objective sense, is not an aid. He states 
 
Even less should one legislate in an area where the responsibility for difficult choices 
cannot be made easier by laws. In such cases, one must have compassion for those who 
are morally or physically too weak to hear the truth. In certain other cases, one must know 
how to communicate this truth.1526 
 
As such what is needed is both moral responsibility (it is I who must decide what 
to do in each situation) and a certain sensibility, in order to know what is the 
decision that will better protect those who are in a fragile position. As Beatriz 
Contreras Tasso has shown in a very insightful manner, Ricœur is calling for the 
use of a very specific capacity, namely “tact”.1527 Concerning the topic of the 
“beginning of life” and the complicated problem of knowing when does human 
life actually begin, and when is the right of abortion applicable, Ricœur follows 
the same principle and nuanced position: case by case evaluation, always with the 
                                                
1525 Ibid. 
1526 Ibid. 
1527 See Beatriz Contreras Tasso, “Tacto, promesa y convicción: Conjunción ética de tradición e 
innovación en Paul Ricœur” in Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricœur Studies 2, 2 (2011): 33-47. 
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solicitude for the other in mind. When commenting on this delicate process, he 
goes so far as to speak of “moral invention”1528 and of the need to conceive, 
conciliate and apply different rights – such as the right not to suffer, the right to 
protection, the right to be respected and so on – again according to the specificity 
of each case. 
Ricœur’s conclusion then, as is easy to foretell, is that solicitude is 
ultimately the main criterion that must guide us in these hard case where respect 
for the law and respect for persons diverge. The solution to the conflicts of duties, 
rights and norms therefore is, in his little ethics, the application of a “situated 
judgment” guided by a “critical solicitude”.1529 According to him, “this critical 
solicitude is the form that practical wisdom takes in the region of interpersonal 
conflicts.”1530 As we can see, once again, the “critical” moment is placed between 
two stages of a different sort. Here, the moment of critique, embodied by norms 
and the test of universalization, is the mediating moment that allows naïve 
solicitude to become critical solicitude. The deontological test thus forces the 
teleological aim to mutate itself, to go through, so to speak, a process of 
instruction, a learning of its limits… but in order to be better equipped to decide 
and deal with everyday difficult situations. It is the coming of age of solicitude, 
might we say. 
The last pages of Ricœur’s little ethics are a thick discussion of the 
problem of autonomy and universalization of rules, where he comes back to 
discuss once again Kant, Rawls, Apel and Habermas. I already alluded to this 
discussion in part two, and to the more definitive version it assumes in Reflections 
on the Just. Consequently, I will only recall here that for Ricœur it is only in a 
return to convictions that a truly ethical stance can take place. Therefore, the 
desire for the good life, later formalized and transmuted in the deontological 
moment, after having traversed the hard cases of the conflict of norms and having 
developed a critical solicitude and the capacity to decide, to formulate situated 
judgments… must ultimately come back to espouse his or her own (critical) 
convictions, those that have passed all the meaningful tests.  
                                                
1528 Ricœur, Oneself as Another, p. 272. 
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Ricœur mentions in passing the “stumbling search for solutions”1531 that 
sometimes characterizes our moral life. This only means that decisions are 
uncertain and not established a priori. Ultimately, Ricœur wants to encompass 
both universalism and contextualism, by not dropping universal demands and 
simultaneously forcing them to be context-sensitive. His last pages of this study 
are a plead for a “reflective equilibrium between the ethics of argumentation and 
considered convictions”.1532 There is evidently, in the democratic public scene, a 
conflict between convictions, including those that are “considered”. In order to 
solve this conflict by peaceful means, one is called to argue (as we can see, we 
have both Rawls and Habermas in this description). Accordingly, Ricœur claims, 
one of the forms that practical wisdom can assume is an “art of conversation”.1533 
Inchoate universals will only become “real universals” if they are mutually 
recognized in the concrete, thick contexts upon which they bear a claim. As 
Ricœur puts it, “the path of eventual consensus can emerge only from mutual 
recognition on the level of acceptability”.1534 
Ricœur’s little ethics is, as we have seen, traversed by conflicts, 
especially in its ninth study. Nonetheless, as he himself admits, his final aim is 
somewhat conciliatory. He states that the standpoint of practical wisdom is his 
ultimate goal, and that trough it he seeks to somewhat reconcile “Aristotle’s 
phronesis, by way of Kant’s Moralität, with Hegel’s Sittlichkeit”.1535 Of all the 
three influences felt in this group of studies comprising the little ethics the 
Aristotelian one is the more decisive. Ultimately, not only is a critical solicitude 
put forward, but also a critical phronesis. Accordingly, moral judgment in situation 
is described as a critical phronesis operating in the context of a more modest, non-
metaphysical and toned down (but still thick and context-bound) Sittlichkeit. 
Ricœur also thinks that after the traversal of so many conflicts and mediations, this 
type of phronesis is safe from anomie. It has learned how conflictual this process 
is; and because of that, it is through debate, discussion and so forth that it puts 
forward its “considered convictions”. This is, as is easy to admit it, a very 
complex, and yet balanced model. Conflicts are not ignored, and yet they are not 
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left without a reply. Ricœur already hints at the invention of the rule as a result of 
situated judgment. However, his emphasis at this point in time is still more on the 
adaptation of behavior, and less in the creative refashioning of rules. A further step 
would be taken in the books dedicated to the just. 
 
5.4.2 – A further degree of formalization: reflective judgment 
 
As I hinted above, the greater degree of formalization of this process, 
where Ricœur indeed speaks about “inventing a rule” is thematically spelled out in 
The Just, and namely in “Interpretation and/or Argumentation”, when Ricœur uses 
Kant’s reflective judgment. He had already mentioned it before in the same book, 
in “Aesthetic Judgment and Political Judgment According to Hannah Arendt”1536, 
which I briefly mentioned above, when discussing the notion of enlarged 
perspective, stemming from Kant’s erweiterte Denkart. 
It is well known that Kant conceived of judgments as operations of 
subsumption, and that the determinative judgment of the first Critique consisted of 
placing facts under rules. Now, in the third Critique, on the other hand, Kant 
presents the novelty of cases in which what one would have to do was to find a 
rule that would fit the singular (whether a case, a fact or an experience, could we 
say). As Ricœur recalls, “This judgment is ‘merely’ reflective because the 
transcendental subject does not determine any universally valid objectivity, but 
instead only takes into account the procedures the mind follows in the operation of 
subsumption, proceeding in a way from below to above”1537, whereas in 
determinative judgment the operation takes place, so to speak, “from above”. 
It is important to note that in this operation no universally valid 
objectivity is claimed, but a rule is found nonetheless, even if it is a rule applicable 
only in that specific case (leaving open the question of future applicability in 
analogous cases). If there is an exemplarity to be found here, it is the exemplarity 
of the particular, as Arendt claimed; now this is of course a problematic 
exemplarity, because no constraining obligation to follow the particular case is 
enforced. And this even though Ricœur many times speaks about inspiring 
particular gestures, and so forth. 
                                                
1536 Ricœur, The Just, pp. 94-108. 
1537 Ibid., p. 95. 
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In “Interpretation and/or Argumentation”, applying this notion of 
reflective judgment to judicial practice Ricœur further clarifies this point: 
 
The question this poses is as follows: under what rule should a particular case be placed? 
Universalization, then, only provides a check on the process of mutual adjustment 
between the interpreted norm and the interpreted fact.1538 
 
A rule might be found, or it might be invented. The important point to stress is that 
experience – this particular case before me – is what guides reflection; and in this 
process there needs to be a mutual adjustment of case to rule and rule to case. This 
is what guides action. It is, to reiterate, a procedure that requires productive 
imagination and this is why interpretation is called for. Therefore, there is a triple 
interpretation at work here: of the fact, the rule, and of their mutual adaptation. 
Only thus can we reflectively validate our course of action. 
Consequently, and to recap, Ricœur’s notion of practical wisdom does not 
do away with the deontological moment of obligation and universalization. It does 
not eliminate norms, quite the contrary. But it does call for the adaptation of 
behavior and even the invention of rules that allow inchoate universals to be 
attentive to thick contexts where particular cases need particular solutions. 
Ultimately, this is even clearer in applied ethics, where Ricœur finds almost all of 
his examples of choices between the bad and the worse. But the thematic attention 
given to it would require yet another slight reworking of his framework. Let us see 
how in more detailed fashion. 
 
5.4.3 – The new framework of Ricœur’s practical philosophy 
 
In the last chapter we have seen how Ricœur argued that the topic of “the 
just” and its capacities inscribed itself in the little ethics in both a vertical and a 
horizontal axes. Reflections on the Just deepens and in a way shifts the emphasis 
in the relation between these two domains. He reaffirms that the just is inscribed in 
the horizontal relation between self, “neighbors” and “others”.1539 He also sees the 
vertical axis now passing through the good, the obligatory and the “fitting”, which 
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is a useful expression he finds to express what is “adequate”, in the sense of the 
“tact” we mentioned above. Furthermore, at this point in time he thinks that when 
practical wisdom is used to solve conflicts or avoid violence, this is a sign of the 
preeminence of the just in practical philosophy,1540 probably because these are 
taken to be “reasonable” solutions. Ricœur still continues to see the deontological 
moment of morality as mediating between two ethical moments. Ethics is still 
more encompassing than morality, and so the general structure and movement are 
maintained. But there is a shift in vocabulary, and also in the point of departure. 
Instead of speaking of “ethical aim” or “phronesis” now Ricœur adopts a 
somewhat more conventional approach. He decides to speak about “fundamental 
ethics” and “applied ethics” or, alternatively “anterior ethics” and “posterior 
ethics”. What is more important, he now pays more attention to these “posterior” 
or “applied” types of ethics, and the specific challenges and problems they pose. 
He mentions medical, judicial, business and environmental ethics as being relevant 
domains in this area, even though he really just pays attention to the first two of 
these domains, not really delving into business or environmental issues.  
In the article “From the Moral to the Ethical and to Ethics”1541 he lays the 
ground for this new set of distinctions. The existence of norms is the point of 
departure. But on the one hand they are rooted in life and desire (anterior ethics) 
and, on the other hand, their insertion in concrete situations (posterior ethics) 
needs to be reflected upon. One of the novelties in Ricœur’s approach is that he 
decides to grant a fundamental role to moral sentiments in his new framework. 
According to him, moral sentiments provide a connection between the anterior 
realm of desire, and the realm of norms. I think that for Ricœur – even though this 
is not fully explicit – these feelings serve to detect what is right or wrong in a pre-
reflexive manner, as it were, and to point towards the norms that provide objective 
normative reality to the standards aimed at by those feelings. He cites shame, 
modesty, admiration, courage, devotion, enthusiasm and veneration… but chooses 
to highlight indignation as a refusal of humiliation and, a contrario, a revelation of 
our (and the others’) own dignity.1542 This is, in my opinion, not only one of the 
paths that led him to the study on recognition, but also one of the hints that more 
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clearly connects Ricœur’s social philosophy to contemporary movements – and 
the mentioning of the Indignados movement is more than obvious here. 
In “Justice and Truth”1543 he defines these notions as being regulative 
ideas, arguing that the just ultimately structures the practical field. Justice is a 
virtue but our views on it are often conflicted. Ricœur claims that frequently 
justice requires impartiality as a capacity to transcend our individual point of view, 
and equality, that is, the maximization of the minimal shares. But this often leads 
to a “mixed judgment” where capacities and obligations are somewhat confused. 
After all, when pursuing justice, what can and what can we not do?1544 As such, 
operating a reconciliation between our capacities and these asymptotic ideals is 
also, in itself, a task. 
In the conclusion of this article Ricœur draws the epistemological 
conclusions stemming from his procedure of invention of rules in practical 
wisdom. He speaks about this process as having both “an inventive and a logical 
face”1545; the type of truth sought here is “a truth that fits”, a “certitude that in this 
situation this is the best decision, what has to be done”.1546 This rapid overview 
allows us to grasp some of the main differences in emphasis in this new 
framework. But the more important part, in terms of application of the rule, is 
reserved for Ricœur’s articles on applied ethics. 
 
5.4.4 – Applied ethics: the case of medical and judicial judgments 
 
In Reflections on the Just Ricœur dedicates two articles to applied ethics, 
namely “The Three Levels of Medical Judgment”1547 and “Decision Making in 
Medical and Judicial Judgments”.1548 The first of these articles is a detailed 
discussion of bioethics. One of its striking features is the reversal of the order of 
exposition, which reveals the specific nature of bioethics as an applied ethics. 
Indeed, for Ricœur, the three levels are those of his little ethics, but 
starting from practical wisdom. The three levels are thus, the “prudential”, the 
“deontological” and the “reflective”. This means that in this domain the first level 
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of decision is indeed a level of application or invention of the rule, in the sense we 
have seen above. We are faced with concrete cases. We must decide. But in order 
to do so, we often use deontological codes or other norms in our search for the 
better solution. Finally, judgments of a reflective type (and the use of the word 
“reflective” here probably entails a connection with the type of reflective 
philosophy Ricœur usually evoked when grounding his philosophy on existence 
and circumscribing the domain of the self) are there to legitimate the judgments of 
the other levels by referring them back to their grounding in life, existence and 
desire (mobilizing notions such as those of happiness, health, life and so forth). 
It is almost as if Ricœur wants to prove the circularity of his little ethics, 
in a Hegelian fashion; starting from its endpoint he is able to remake the 
dialectical movement and arriving at similar conclusions; so even if the path is 
obviously different, its results are not. Obviously, this alternative path brings new 
specificities to the whole project. For instance, the deontological level is now not 
only tied up to the operations of obligation, universalization and formalization; it 
now also has to deal with conflicts pertaining to clinical interventions and rules of 
different kinds. Also, at the last level, Ricœur now seems to admit the recourse to 
different encompassing ethical theories, and not only the strictly Aristotelian 
standpoint of Oneself as Another. Now, this is very important, and it seems in tune 
with the actual practice of ethics committees and the way in which these conflicts 
and decisions are truly played out. Not only strictly ethical, but also religious 
worldviews in the broadest sense can be summoned to play a role in these 
decisions – for instance, should someone receive a transfusion of blood or not – 
and in most of the cases actually cannot be overlooked. As such, this inverted 
course starting from the prudential level also allows for a radical pluralization of 
the reflective level (no longer called “teleological”, perhaps to free it from the 
strictly Aristotelian stance), which is a striking feature. 
Ricœur mentions the agreement between patient and physician, the 
relation of caregiving as a relation based on trust, and also the need to take into 
account the narrative of suffering spelled out by the patient; he also emphasizes 
that this agreement is fragile, and that at each step (since these are delicate 
situations) suspicion might lurk, and trust be challenged. As a step towards the 
deontological moment, Ricœur mentions the existence of prudential precepts (we 
might call them rules of thumb) such as respecting the singularity and 
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indivisibility of each person, or keeping one’s self-esteem and balancing it with 
the respect for others. In the deontological level, as always, these non-formalized 
rules (akin to the golden rule or the sense of justice in the little ethics) need to be 
formalized, and universalized (to see if they can stand that test). Furthermore, the 
deontological moment needs to connect the medical rules with other sorts of rules 
operating in society at several levels. Finally, like in the little ethics, this 
deontological level produces conflicts that need to be addressed.  
Ricœur mentions two main sets of conflicts. Firstly, the conflict between 
a medical ethics oriented towards the clinic, versus a medical ethics oriented 
towards research. What should the main aim be? Improve caregiving or advance 
science? Where should we set the limits to research? What is there not be allowed? 
Cloning, for instance? Ricœur seems to think so. He also mentions the limits of 
experimentation on the human body, principally when consent is not explicitly 
provided. “Informed consent” is, for him, a very important rule. As often, he 
pleads for compromise, acknowledging that in this field matters are sometimes 
murky – informed consent is important, but there is also “double blind” 
experimentation; some seek to limit medical power and research, but its valuable 
use in discovering new treatments cannot be overlooked; other types of conflicts, 
such as patients turning against doctors and accusing them of malpractice and so 
on, are ever more abundant; there are cases in which concern for the individual 
patient might clash with concern for public health (the topic of secrecy is a case in 
point, for instance in cases of HIV, should or should not the physician be required 
to inform the sexual partner of the patient?) 
His conclusion is that this is an intrinsically paradoxical field. As 
patients, we are torn between conflicting positions. We are not things, but our 
bodies are part of nature, not commodities but health maintenance costs money, 
suffering is private but health is public… in order to make sense of this, Ricœur 
invokes the several philosophical traditions and theories which can help us to shed 
some light on the confusion and, to some extent, orient our decisions. He mentions 
the Aristotelian “virtues” underlying a good medical practice, the Hippocratic 
oath, Augustine and the nonsubstutability of persons, the Enlightenment and 
autonomy, and so forth. 
Among this conflict of interpretations – because this is what it is about, in 
the last analyzis – Ricœur calls for the recognition of a plurality of convictions in 
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democratic societies, but also for the need of an overlapping consensus.1549 
According to him, this will be all the more important in the conflict between the 
care for the individual patient and problems pertaining to public health. One of the 
most important of his conclusions is the acknowledgment of the constitutive 
fragility of medical ethics. Ultimately, like society, this can be understood as a 
consensual-conflictual microcosm: 
 
But it is quite clearly on the reflective plane of moral judgment that the most intractable 
kinds of fragility belonging to medical ethics are revealed. What connection can we make 
between the request for health and the wish to live well? How can we integrate suffering 
and the acceptance of mortality into the idea that we have of happiness? How does a 
society integrate into its conception of the common good the heterogeneous strata 
deposited in contemporary culture by the sedimented history of solicitude? The ultimate 
fragility of medical ethics results from the consensual yet conflictual structure of the 
“sources” of common morality. The compromises I have placed under the heading of the 
two notions of an overlapping consensus and reasonable disagreements constitute the only 
replies democratic societies have when confronted by the heterogeneity of the sources of 
their common morality.1550 
 
In the above passage we find some of the long-standing polarities inhabiting 
Ricœur’s practical philosophy: suffering and fragility versus happiness and the 
desire to live well, conflict and consensus. And the need to find at least fragile and 
provisional solutions to this. 
In the article “Decision Making in Medical and Judicial Judgments” 
Ricœur does not add much meaningful information or reformulate his model, but 
he further develops the parallelism between the two domains. In both cases, there 
is a back and forth movement between rules and cases. Their starting points are 
different – medical act stemming from suffering and the need to take care of it, 
and judicial judgment coming from the need to solve a conflict – but in both cases 
we seek a solution, the integration of the case in a more encompassing project. 
Also, in both cases (the conflicting parties, or doctors and patients) we need the 
establishment of “a just distance”. Ultimately, the parallelism is taken even further 
since the long-term goal of the judicial system (which is to maintain public peace, 
                                                
1549 Ibid., p. 210. 
1550 Ibid., p. 212. 
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as we have seen above) can be seen as “taking care” of society. In Ricœur’s own 
words: 
 
If this is indeed the case, the question of the long-term purpose of justice arises. If the 
short-term purpose is to settle a conflict, is not the long-term one to reestablish the social 
bond, to put and end to conflict, to establish peace? If so, the medical judgment clarifies 
the judicial one. The whole juridical apparatus appears as one vast enterprise meant to 
take care of social ills, even while respecting the different roles of the physician and the 
judge.1551 
 
To sum up what we have seen in these last chapters, I will say that the 
intrinsically conflictual character of human life, the tragic of action revealed by 
Ricœur’s little ethics finds an adequate field of expression in the domain of 
applied ethics, which he explores in the judicial domain and also, to a lesser 
extent, in the domain of bioethics. However, the two books on the just also bring 
with them not only the pluralization of conflicts but a rethinking of the procedures 
leading up to prudential choice, the choice which requires tact, a case by case 
evaluation and a look for the “action that fits” (to borrow Laurent Thévenot’s 
notion). 
As such, it is as if the pluralization of conflicts in the practical level was 
almost always accompanied by a further degree of exploration of productive 
imagination in the search to negotiate these conflicts. This last passage I quoted 
indeed speaks volumes about Ricœur’s take on the judicial realm, and also reveals 
a striking feature of his practical philosophy: a knack for tackling social problems 
and ultimately hinting at the possibility of developing a practical philosophy 
(without however fully articulating one). Indeed the whole metaphor of “social 
ills” and of the juridical apparatus as possibly “curing them” is a striking metaphor 
often used by social philosophers. This lead will allow me to briefly mention in 
the next chapter Ricœur’s social philosophy. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1551 Ibid., p. 222. 
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5.5 – Social Conflict (Social Philosophy) 
 
Ricœur never wrote a “social philosophy”, at least not in the same 
manner we can say he wrote a philosophical anthropology or a hermeneutic 
theory. He very seldom used the term “social philosophy” and more often than not 
he preferred to discuss matters pertaining more to political than to social 
philosophy in the strictest sense. Be that as it may, there are sparse elements that 
we can find in his writings and which allow us to “reconstruct”, as it were, what a 
Ricoeurian social philosophy would be, should he have chosen to thematically 
tackle it.1552 
Because this is a reconstruction, I cannot really take a chronological 
approach in this chapter; as such, my method is here a little different, and the 
chapter is an exception in the overall methodology of these three parts which 
constitute the “course of conflict”. The reason why it is placed here has to do with 
the fact that social conflicts can be considered as being “practical conflicts” in the 
broadest sense of the term.  
In this chapter, I will not deplete the main topics of this possible social 
philosophy, because many of them have already been mentioned before. In order 
to understand Ricœur’s social philosophy we need to bear in mind Ricœur’s 
elaboration of a narrative identity, and the possibility that narrative identities be 
applied to collective entities. We also need to remember many of the traits that 
make up his general practical stance, and which have already been expounded in 
my presentation of Oneself as Another and both books on the just. Among these 
traits, allow me to recall his description of society as a consensual-conflictual 
phenomenon, of conflicts as being simultaneously unavoidable and possibly 
creative and subject to negotiation; the emphasis on capabilities and human action, 
which are however always tied up to constitutive passivity and the inescapability 
of suffering; and ultimately the long standing goals of the desire to live well and 
societies as needing to strive for peace, the embeddedness of the self in 
                                                
1552 Some commentators have highlighted some of these aspects before. See for instance Joseph 
Bien, “Ricœur as Social Philosopher” in The Philosophy of Paul Ricœur, edited by Lewis Edwin 
Hahn (Chicago: Open Court, 1995), pp. 287-305 and Alain Loute, “Philosophie Sociale et 
Reconnaissance Mutuelle chez Paul Ricœur”, in Affectivité, imaginaire, création sociale, edited by 
Raphaël Gély and Laurent Van Eynde (Bruxelles: Facultés Universitaires de Saint-Louis, 2010), 
pp. 125-147. 
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intersubjective networks without which he or she would not exist (autonomy 
always being only relative); his criticism of abstract and merely formal theories of 
justice and his emphasis on thick descriptions, thick concepts of the good and 
strong evaluations (like Taylor). And also, on a more personal note, his personal 
commitments to the (Christian, somewhat liberal) Left. This must all be taken into 
account when considering Ricœur’s own possible version of social philosophy, but 
I will not in this chapter repeat what has been said before. Furthermore, this 
proposal of a Ricoeurian social philosophy will only be complete with what he has 
to say about recognition, but I will leave that for next chapter. For now, I will only 
mention three small topics. Firstly, the ethical and political elements underlying 
his social philosophy, since I have not dedicated an autonomous chapter to 
Ricœur’s political philosophy, but it is important to mention it. And then, what in 
my opinion is Ricœur’s strongest contribution to social philosophy, namely, the 
conflict between ideology and utopia. Finally, I will mention Ricœur’s take on the 
phenomena we can call “crises”, which brings him back to the present day. 
 
5.5.1 – The ethical and political elements underlying Ricœur’s social philosophy: 
from the political paradox to the emphasis on tolerance and hospitality 
 
What I said above for social philosophy can be applied, to some degree, 
to political philosophy in the context of Ricœur’s works. He also did not 
thematically write a “political philosophy”, in the sense of Eric Weil. However, 
his contributions to such an effort were so many that they cannot be neglected. I 
will mention only a few of them. For a more systematic reconstruction of these 
elements, and their importance for a theory of human action, one will read the 
works of Johann Michel1553, Bernard Dauenhauer1554 and Pierre-Olivier 
Monteil.1555 
One of Ricœur’s most important contributions to thinking politics and the 
political is, as I mentioned before, what he called the “political paradox” in 
History and Truth. This was, as often, a reflection spawned by a political event. In 
this case the Hungarian revolts of 1956 (their botched attempt at a revolution) that 
                                                
1553 See Johann Michel, Paul Ricœur, une philosophie de l’agir humain, op. cit.  
1554 See Bernard Dauenhauer, Paul Ricœur, The Promise and Risk of Politics, op. cit. 
1555 See Pierre-Olivier Monteil, Ricœur politique (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2013). 
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were violently repressed by Soviet rule. As we know, for many in the West at this 
point in time (and Ricœur was no exception) the Soviet Union was not yet 
regarded as the brutal state it actually was. As such, the events in Hungary in 1956 
had for Ricœur the effect of a wake-up call and it was in their wake that Ricœur 
defined the political paradox. According to him, power entails both a progress in 
rationality but also in the possibilities of its perversion. According to him: “This 
paradox must be retained: that the greatest evil adheres to the greatest rationality, 
there is political alienation because polity [le politique] is relatively 
autonomous.”1556 Power is prone to evil, and this is why it must be closely 
watched. Political alienation is a danger that lurks every time power is exercised. 
This is why, Ricœur argues, we must “devise institutional techniques especially 
designed to render possible the exercise of power and render its abuse 
impossible.”1557 In other words, the State must be controlled by its citizens and, 
might we add, by democratic processes of decision-making. For Ricœur, the State 
cannot perish, but precisely because it is necessary, it must be just. And one of the 
ways to control it will be by the exercise of public opinion – and in this he 
anticipates one of the main claims that Habermas would put forward in The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, as we have seen in part two. In 
Oneself as Another he refined these analyzes with the distinction between power-
over and power in common. 
These analyzes of domination and abuse of power have their dialectical 
counterpart in Ricœur’s insistence that democratic societies must be geared around 
the values of tolerance and hospitality. According to him, “Tolerance is the fruit of 
an asceticism in the exercise of power. It is a virtue.”1558 This asceticism is what 
prevents power-over to become pervasive. When exercised properly, tolerance 
means the renunciation of imposing on others a specific way of life, or a value. 
Because it is taken to be an asceticism, Ricœur distinguishes several stages up 
until the following final form: 
 
I approve of all ways of life, as long as they do not manifestly harm third parties; in short 
                                                
1556 Ricœur, “The Political Paradox” in History and Truth, p. 249. 
1557 Ibid., pp. 261-262. 
1558 See Ricœur, “The Erosion of Tolerance and the Resistance of the Intolerable” in Tolerance 
Between Intolerance and the Intolerable, edited by Paul Ricœur, Diogenes 176 44/4 (1996): 189. 
See also Ricœur, “Tolérance, intolérance, intolérable” in Lectures 1, op. cit., pp. 295-312. 
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I leave be all types of life because they are expressions of human plurality and diversity. 
Vive la différence!1559  
 
Certainly, this final stage has its perils too. Tolerance might indeed turn to 
indifference, as Ricœur acknowledges.1560 Thus there are things to which we 
cannot be indifferent. And these are, in political terms, the intolerable things. 
These are, for him, the figures of evil, many times detected by indignation: crimes, 
positions that harm or make the exercise of tolerance itself impossible (disrespect, 
racism, xenophobia, and so forth). In a nutshell, that which causes harm.1561  
Nonetheless, the “do no harm” attitude amounts to a “minimal politics”. 
Therefore, tolerance is perhaps a minimal base for a democratic and value pluralist 
society, one which allows for many forms of life, but it is in itself an insufficient 
condition to guarantee a sane functioning of that society. As such, and perhaps in 
order to be able to go beyond the mere stage of tolerance as indifference, Ricœur 
sometimes proposes that we adopt a stance towards the other which can be 
properly be called one of hospitality. This is, of course, a position shared by him 
and Levinas, one which puts the emphasis on otherness (and Levinas evidently 
goes beyond Ricœur in this).1562 One of the main forms this assumes in Ricœur is 
evidently what he calls “linguistic hospitality” within the scope of an ethics of 
translation.1563 Richard Kearney has done remarkable work in analyzing the forms 
that otherness assumes, and also the many different aspects that hospitality can 
take.1564 
An ethically controlled exercise of power. This might be one of the 
descriptions used to sum up an important part of Ricœur’s political philosophy. 
And a society which implements a critical vigilance on the way power is 
                                                
1559 Ricœur, “The Erosion of Tolerance”: 191. 
1560 Ibid., p. 196. 
1561 Ibid., p. 198. 
1562 On the hypothesis of a relation of recognition centered on the other, besides the next chapter, 
see Gonçalo Marcelo, “O que seria um reconhecimento sem a exigência de reciprocidade? Levinas, 
Ricœur e a hipótese de um reconhecimento centrado no outro” in Emmanuel Levinas, Entre 
Reconhecimento e Hospitalidade, edited by Maria Lucília Marcos, Maria João Cantinho and Paulo 
Barcelos (Lisboa: Edições 70, 2011), pp. 273-288. 
1563 See Ricœur, On Translation, translated by Eileen Brennan (London: Routledge, 2006). See 
also Domenico Jervolino, “Rethinking Ricœur: The Unity of His Work and the Paradigm of 
Translation” in Reading Ricœur, edited by David. M. Kaplan (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2008). 
1564 See Richard Kearney, Strangers, Gods and Monsters (London: Routledge, 2003) and also 
Hosting the Stranger: Between Religions, edited by Richard Kearney and James Taylor (London: 
Continuum, 2011). 
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exercised, this is another feature of his social philosophy. As I have been 
mentioning over and again, the specific form this assumes in Ricœur’s philosophy 
is mainly the conflict between ideology and utopia. 
 
5.5.2 – The conflict between ideology and utopia 
 
In part two above we have seen many of Ricœur’s assessments of 
ideology, and ideology critique, specifically in Marx and Habermas. In part four I 
also mentioned how Ricœur wants to put forward a hermeneutical critique of 
ideologies (thereby somehow reconciling Gadamer’s and Habermas’s projects) 
and I stated many times how the dialectical counterpart of ideology is, for Ricœur, 
the notion of utopia. 
Allow me just to briefly develop further this relation in a few words. It is 
important to do so because, to reiterate, the Lectures on Ideology and Utopia are 
Ricœur’s most important contribution to a critical theory, and they were written in 
the context of Ricœur’s more radical – and one of the most fertile – period (around 
1975). 
As is obvious, the relation between ideology and utopia is also 
conflictual. And as usual Ricœur also thinks that they are both necessary in their 
constitutive functions, and that they both need to be combated in their pathological 
forms. If reified ideological forms must be countered by positive utopias, escapist 
utopias must also be avoided, because the u-topos leads us nowhere. Furthermore, 
utopias are nothing more than a blueprint, what they provide is a general 
indication, not a detailed plan or program. If they do, they risk becoming as reified 
as the ideologies they are opposed to. 
Ricœur quotes Lewis Mumford and the distinction between utopias of 
escape and utopias of reconstruction.1565 This means that there can be a conflict of 
utopias, such as a conflict of ideologies. There can also be conservative or 
progressive utopias. Sometimes a utopia can be a backlash, nostalgia for 
something past. And, as such, a utopia is not intrinsically just. It is a desire, and a 
projection of a given value or state of affairs, but as I will argue later, it still needs 
to be assessed. It goes without saying that Ricœur’s favorite type of utopia is 
                                                
1565 Ricœur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, p. 270. 
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precisely that of reconstruction, given that for him only by creatively renewing our 
traditions can we somehow achieve a healthy state of society. 
Part of Ricœur’s claim is that an inventive type of imagination, a 
hermeneutic projection of a different type of reality is ultimately already an 
attempt at changing it. This is the reason of his criticism of Marx’s famous 11th 
thesis on Feuerbach. For Ricœur, interpreting the world is already eo ipso 
changing it. This might sometimes be clearer than in other times. But when the 
topic is the social imaginary, he is probably right. This is akin to what Castoriadis 
called the instituting powers of the imaginary. Now, it remains to be known when 
and how these instituting or constituting powers of imagination really do succeed 
in altering or creating new types of institutions, and whether or not novelty is 
capable of really altering the social order. This is, perhaps, the difference between 
successful or botched attempts at revolution. 
Ultimately, Ricœur does not think that utopia contains in it the power to 
cure all of society’s malaises. A full reconciliation is evidently out of reach, also 
because democratic societies cannot fully eliminate conflicts, only institutionalize 
and try to solve them in a non-violent manner. What utopia does, on the other 
hand, is to confront ideology and to expose it in its contingency. Utopia can work 
as a sort of epoché. It suspends the thesis of the necessity of (this given 
configuration) of the real.1566 Therefore, it is “the arm of critique”1567 and an arm 
which, furthermore, can assume many forms. Ricœur mentions, for instance, the 
possibility of using irony to formulate utopias or, better put, to help utopias 
criticize and expose ideologies.1568 With utopias, the power of fiction is put 
forward in order to help us reshape and redefine reality itself. It is in this sense that 
Ricœur speaks about “prospective identity”.1569 According to Ricœur, our 
identities (and, importantly, he mentions that this applies both to individual and 
collective identities) do not depend only on symbols of what we are or were, but 
also, significantly, on what we might be. That is, expectations for the future are, 
for him, fundamental in the definition of our identity. He goes on to say that in this 
respect our identity is “in suspense” because it is “open to surprises, to new 
                                                
1566 Ibid., p. 300. 
1567 Ibid. 
1568 Ibid., p. 303. 
1569 Ibid., p. 311. 
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encounters”1570 which might be decisive. And this is why we need utopias. It is 
also, as I will argue later, why we need projects. 
Consequently, the “horizon of expectation” is a very important feature for 
a given community, a given society. We badly need utopias, especially in difficult 
times, when anomie might lurk. But in order to avoid that these be escapist 
utopias, in order for them to be able to orient action, what we need is to be able to 
break up encompassing ideals and utopias in a set of intermediate goals. This is 
what Ricœur argues in “Initiative”, when he resorts to Koselleck’s notions of 
space of experience and horizon of expectation. Ultimately, the bad utopia is the 
one who keeps further away our horizon of expectation. If utopia is understood as 
an asymptotic ideal, if it is to have a hold on reality it must lead to responsible, 
modest commitments. As he claims, expectations must be determined; and for that 
to happen and action to be oriented, we need a series of intermediary projects.1571 
Utopia is thus the motor of Ricœur’s social philosophy, and one of its 
main solutions. However, any social philosophy usually wants to be able to put 
forward diagnoses of social situations. These diagnoses can be of healthy, or 
pathological situations.  One of the particularly delicate situations is the one we 
call a “crisis”.  Ricœur’s assessment of this notion will be the last trait of his social 
philosophy that we will see in this chapter. 
 
5.5.3 – Ricœur on the phenomena of crises 
 
Ricœur never downplayed the importance of action, or of political 
intervention. But in some situations, the real significance of politics is given even 
a more decisive status. And when? 
 
If the political function, if polity [le politique], carries on without interruption, one can 
say in a sense that politics only exists in great moments, in “crises”, in the climactic and 
turning points in history.1572 
 
The notion of “crisis” is polysemic and it can indeed be applied to many different 
                                                
1570 Ibid. 
1571 Ricœur, “Initiative” in From Text to Action, p. 221. 
1572 Ricœur, “The Political Paradox”, in History and Truth, p. 255. 
 563 
situations. In Ricœur’s writings, for instance, we can find traces of diagnosis of a 
crisis of the cogito1573, a crisis of memory, intrinsically tied up to the abandonment 
of meaningful traditions, occasional detections of crises of democracy, political 
ideals or utopias. But when he turns to Koselleck he sees the present itself as being 
torn up between the space of experience and an ever-receding horizon of 
expectation, this being one of the conditions of our modernity.1574 In “La crise: un 
phénomène spécifiquement moderne?”1575 Ricœur undertakes a semantic analyzis 
of the many possible meanings of this notion and asks whether or not we can 
consider it is a “total social fact” and one which indeed is recurrent and almost 
unavoidable amid modernization processes and the acceleration of time. It might 
just be that our time is the time of the never-ending crises. He does not fully 
assume it is, but he expresses concern about the crisis of values, political 
demobilization and anomie. 
And on many other occasions, furthermore, Ricœur directly undertook 
analyzes of his present time and the political events that marked it, including its 
crises.1576 Consequently, there is, at least in some of its traits, a tendency of critical 
theory in Ricœur. Critical theorists, as we know, always claimed that a critique of 
the present time was a fundamental task. I tried before to assess the current crisis 
of Europe, and capitalism, through a Ricoeurian lens, and in so doing I tried to 
spell out what a “Ricoeurian answer” to this crisis would be.1577 Other meaningful 
attempts to try to answer to this crisis have been put forward by others, most 
notably of which by Myriam Revault d’Allonnes.1578 I will come back to this 
possibility in part eight of this thesis. 
For now, the final feature of Ricœur’s social philosophy I want to look at 
is also a phenomenon that touches upon other domains: ethics, philosophical 
                                                
1573 On this matter, see Constança Marcondes César, Crise e Liberdade em Merleau-Ponty e 
Ricœur (Aparecida-SP.: Idéias e Letras, 2011). 
1574 Ricœur, “Initiative”, p. 219. 
1575 Ricœur, “La crise: un phénomène spécifiquement moderne?” (1987), available at the website 
of the Fonds Ricœur: http://www.fondsricoeur.fr/photo/crise%284%29.pdf 
1576 See for instance Ricœur, “La crise de la démocratie et la conscience chrétienne” in 
Christianisme Social 55/4 (1947): 320-331 and Ricœur, “La crise du socialisme” in Christianisme 
Social 67/12 (1959): 695-702. 
1577 See Gonçalo Marcelo, “Is there a Ricoeurian Answer to the Crisis? (Or How to Save The 
Capable Human Being From Social Disintegration)” in Archivio di Filosofia LXXXI 1-2 (2013): 
137-152. 
1578 See Myriam Revault d’Allonnes, La crise sans fin. Essai sur l’expérience moderne du temps 
(Paris: Seuil, 2012). See also the whole volume of Archivio di Filosofia “Attraverso la Crisi e il 
Conflitto. Pensare Altrimenti con Paul Ricoeur”, edited by Chiara Chinello, Claudia Pedone and 
Alberto Romele, vol. LXXXI 1-2 (2013). 
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anthropology, and so on. It would also be Ricœur’s last contribution to 
philosophy, and it will end these three stages of the “course of conflict”. This is, of 
course, his take on recognition. 
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5.6 – The Struggle for Recognition (or the Recognition of a 
course…)1579 
 
The Course of Recognition was Ricœur’s last published book. It is in this 
book that his philosophical anthropology assumes its definitive form, and as such 
it cannot be overlooked. Furthermore, we have seen many times in this thesis how 
Ricœur goes back and forth in his relation with Hegel, many times criticizing him, 
other times using him in different manners, one time even vowing to renounce 
him. And yet, in this final book, here we have Hegel once again, and certainly a 
Hegelian topic (even though one the intentions of the book is to go, as it were, 
beyond Hegel on recognition). Finally, I also mentioned many times Ricœur’s 
proximity to Honneth’s own critical theory, so here we have the only book in 
which he explicitly analyzes, follows and then at some point distances himself 
from Honneth. Moreover, as I said in the last chapter, this is a decisive book for 
Ricœur’s social philosophy. For this variety of reasons, I must conclude the three 
parts of the course of conflict with an analyzis of The Course of Recognition. But 
this analyzis has to start from the assessment of its status amid its peculiar 
reception. 
 
5.6.1 – The status and reception of The Course of Recognition 
 
What status should we grant to The Course of Recognition, the work that 
has put an end to the prolific production of Paul Ricœur? It is interesting to note 
that even if Ricœur expressed concern for his alleged “tour de France en trop”, 
Charles Taylor, for his part, did not hesitate to describe The Course of Recognition 
as “vintage Ricœur”. Taylor’s quotation put at the cover of the English translation 
reads “As with Ricœur at his best, [The Course of Recognition] suggests a number 
of wholly different ways of thinking our way through the major questions of 
modern philosophy”. 
                                                
1579 I borrow this title from Dosse, who decided to call the last chapter of his biography, “La 
reconnaissance d’un parcours”. The largest part of this chapter I am presenting here is a partial 
reproduction of an article I published earlier in Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricœur Studies. See 
Gonçalo Marcelo, “Paul Ricœur and the Utopia of Mutual Recognition” in Études Ricoeuriennes / 
Ricœur Studies 2, 1 (2011): 110-133. 
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I will try to understand Ricœur’s book in the process of its conception 
and also to resituate some of the debates it has spawned. And I will start by saying 
that, not surprisingly, its reception has been bigger and more important in France 
than elsewhere, but that it has had an international scope too. This reception can be 
roughly divided into three main groups, each with its specific aim. There are, on 
the one hand, traditional Ricœur scholars who are interested in this book because it 
represents the culminating point of Ricœur’s philosophical production, therefore 
transforming decisively his lasting contribution to the history of philosophy. This 
interest is evident since no Ricœur scholar can ignore the importance of the book, 
whether he or she agrees with the claims present in it or not. Not surprisingly, 
most of the appreciations coming from this group are positive. These readers know 
the whole of Ricœur’s production and tend to integrate the book in the big picture. 
However, they are sometimes more interested in explaining its significance for 
Ricœur’s philosophy than in critically debating Ricœur’s accounts. A second and 
important group is made of traditional recognition scholars most of which come 
from a Hegelian or sometimes Marxist-Hegelian tradition. These scholars seem 
surprised to see Ricœur give an account of recognition whose terminus a quo is 
lexicographical rather than conceptual and that starts, both chronologically and 
thematically, way before Hegel, with recognition as identification, and whose 
terminus ad quem aims to go beyond Hegel in a way not always comprehensible to 
them. They analyze and criticize Ricœur’s claims on recognition sometimes 
accepting some of them as very valuable, other times somewhat misreading them 
or not putting them in the context of Ricœurian philosophy as a whole, but most of 
the time trying to show that the Hegelian standpoint is still and after all the best 
way (maybe the only way?) to address recognition in a satisfactory matter. And 
there is still a third group of scholars also interested in recognition but coming 
from different traditions and disciplines, who become interested in this book and 
who try to develop autonomous investigations by using it in their models and 
claims.  
In my opinion, this is indeed a very important book, for all the reasons I 
mentioned above. Also, it is a book that might change our take on recognition, and 
I will try to explain in what manner below. But let me start by offering a quick 
presentation of the book and also the way in which it deals with conflict. 
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5.6.2 – The framework of the Course of Recognition and its take on conflict 
 
The Course of Recognition stems from a series of lectures given by 
Ricœur at the Institut für Wissenschaften vom Menschen in Vienna.1580 As I stated 
before, the book results from a wager, that of conferring to the occurrences of the 
concept of recognition in philosophy the status of a rule-governed polysemy. 
Ricœur finds many such instantiations, from Homer (Odysseus being recognized 
when he returns home) to Honneth and Taylor, not forgetting Cartesian 
(recognizing the distinction between what is true and what is false) and Kantian 
(Rekognition in the third synthesis of the first Critique, as a connecting function) 
philosophies. Adopting once again a triadic organization, he decides to group 
these many significations in three stages of the course, namely, recognition as 
identification, recognizing oneself and mutual recognition. He himself admits that 
this is a course “from the active to the passive voice”1581, that is, from the situation 
of actually recognizing something, to being put in the situation of demanding 
recognition (thus of desiring to be recognized). His conclusion eventually makes 
him go beyond this opposition, insofar as in the states of peace what one does is 
actually to actively recognize the other, and to, so to speak, cordially invite him or 
her to also recognize me, in what is supposed to be a mutual engagement. 
In this course Ricœur therefore traverses the domains of knowledge and 
perception (first stage) philosophical anthropology (second stage, where he revisits 
and revises the capacities asserted in Oneself as Another, and adds to them the 
capacities to remember and to promise) and ethics and social philosophy (third 
stage). Aside from the Lectures on Ideology and Utopia this is thus the book in 
which Ricœur’s thought really acquires a blatant social dimension. In the fourth 
chapter of the second study, “Capacities and Social Practices”1582 Ricœur makes a 
bridge between the individual forms of human capacities and their social forms. 
One of the consequences of this connection is that we can speak of recognition not 
                                                
1580 Other than The Course of Recognition, one will also read “Capacités personnelles et 
reconnaissance mutuelle”, in Paul Ricœur, Écrits et Conférences 3, pp. 445-451. This is the 
acceptance of speech of the Kluge Prize, awarded to Ricœur in 2004. The original text, written in 
English (“Asserting Personal Capacities and Pleading for Mutual Recognition” is available at 
http://www.loc.gov/loc/kluge/prize/ricoeur-transcript.html.This is an important little text, since it 
explicitly mentions the connection between personal capacities and the quest for recognition. 
1581 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, p. 20. 
1582 Ibid., pp. 134 ff. 
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only of personal identities, but also of collective identities, no matter how 
problematic these might be from a conceptual point of view. Using for the first 
time in his works the notion of “capabilities”, taken from Amartya Sen, he 
analyzes how the recognition of capabilities is instrumental in our passing from 
abstract freedom to substantive freedom, to real capabilities and opportunities. He 
quotes Sen’s claim that we need to ensure the “rights to certain capabilities”1583 
and with this he asserts that “attestation has become a demand, a right to require, 
under the rubric of the idea of social justice.”1584 Therefore, at least at this stage, 
Ricœur subscribes fully to the idea of struggle for recognition, as well as to the 
need to make sure that groups which are socially vulnerable are granted the 
recognition they deserve. 
Furthermore, conflict and the negative play an essential role in The 
Course of Recognition. He asserts that in order for recognition to be demanded, 
received or granted, or indeed valued as an essential feature in our lives, it has to 
stand the traversal of the negative. He explicitly claims that it is misrecognition 
that gives recognition its full autonomy.1585 Misrecognition indeed is present 
almost at each stage in this course, in varying degrees, from cognitive 
misrecognition or nonrecognition, to the existential tone of suspicion or doubt 
concerning our capacities, to the forms of disrespect that go along with denial of 
recognition at an intersubjective level. At each step, recognition is, so to speak, 
recognized as being essential, as being something we want for ourselves, after the 
experience of its being denied. Moreover, the bulk of the first four chapters of the 
third stage of The Course of Recognition are dedicated to Hegel and Honneth, as I 
mentioned before in parts one and two of this thesis. As such, more than half of 
this decisive last stage in Ricœur’s book is a deeply positive appraisal of the idea 
of the struggle for recognition (one of the main instantiations of conflict analyzed 
in this thesis) and only after this very long positive reevaluation does Ricœur pose 
the objection which I also mentioned before, namely, that there must ultimately be 
a limit to the idea of struggle, lest we not fall prey to a situation of utter 
victimization and bad infinity. But this ultimate objection should not make us 
blind to the huge and indeed almost overwhelming role that conflict, negativity 
                                                
1583 Ibid., p. 144. On this topic, see also Vereno Brugiatelli, “Paul Ricœur e Amartya Sen su facoltà 
di agire e giustizia sociale” in Archivio di Filosofia LXXXI 1-2 (2013): 117-128. 
1584 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, p. 148. 
1585 Ibid., p. 36. 
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(and overcoming thereof) play in this Course of Recognition. Eventually, Ricœur’s 
alternative model of recognition wagers on the possibility of understanding 
recognition as a gift, something to be granted, more than demanded. And in order 
to ground this possibility, he strives to define the states of peace as “clearings” of 
recognition. That is, even though struggle will continue being the main form of 
recognition, that is, the main motor through which recognition patterns are formed 
and reconfigured (Ricœur never denies this) he still humbly proposes that we think 
about a different possibility, a different, let us say, ideal, eventually capable of 
inspiring another set of practices. Let us see exactly how. 
 
5.6.3 – Ricœur on gift-giving, mutuality and the states of peace 
 
By all accounts, the single most decisive book having influenced Ricœur 
in the Course of Recognition, besides Honneth’s Struggle for Recognition, has 
certainly been Hénaff’s masterpiece, Le prix de la vérité. What depiction of the 
gift do we find in Hénaff’s account, and what is its connection with recognition? 
In a very schematic way, I will sum it up1586 by mentioning the following features: 
according to Hénaff, gift-giving is to be reciprocal. He does not want to give an 
account of the moral, disinterested act of giving without expecting anything in 
return. Rather, he is interested in giving an account of ceremonial gift-giving as an 
act of reciprocal recognition, which is, according to him, at the core of the social 
bond. His breakthrough is the following: by giving something, the giver is 
investing himself in that which he gives. This is, according to him, what makes the 
specificity of human communities, contrary to the acts of gift-giving that we can 
find in the experiences of interaction of the communities of the big apes, whose 
ethology he investigates. According to him, the gift is neither purely free nor 
purely constrained. On the one hand, not being the moral disinterested gift, the 
giver can legitimately expect something in return, but only insofar as this is the 
sine qua non of the existence of the social bond. Of course, the one who receives 
                                                
1586 Besides Marcel Hénaff, Le Prix de la Vérité: Le don, l’argent, la philosophie (Paris: Seuil, 
2002) one will read on this topic the many precisions given by Hénaff in a long list of e-mail 
exchanges with Alain Caillé and Jacques T. Godbout in De la reconnaissance. Don, identité et 
estime de soi in Revue du MAUSS n.º 23 (2004): 242 – 288. See also Alain Loute, “The Gift and 
Mutual Recognition: Paul Ricœur as a Reader of Marcel Hénaff”, in Paul Ricœur and the Task of 
Political Philosophy, edited by Greg Johnson and Dan Stiver (Lanham: Lexington, 2013), pp. 105-
123. 
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the gift may not want to give anything back (he is free to act accordingly) but this 
will amount to a disintegration of the bond. The giver, in the act of giving, is 
defying the other to respond. He is recognizing the other in the gift he offers. 
Therefore, the gift is symbolic. Hence, it is because the gift is, up to a certain 
extent, free, that it enjoins the other to respond. This is not, primarily, a matter of 
the goods exchanged. And let us recall that it is not the same object that is given in 
return. It is a matter of the relationship of mutual recognition that is established. 
By recognizing the other, I am enjoining him or her to recognize me back. 
Ricœur definitely follows Hénaff in his account of mutual recognition. In 
depicting the “states of peace” and the “clearings of recognition” as an alternative 
to the paradigm of the struggle for recognition, Ricœur is most certainly following 
a suggestion given by Hénaff himself in a footnote of Le prix de la vérité in which 
he notes, in passing, that what is lacking in Honneth’s approach is an “ethology of 
the encounter” [éthologie de la rencontre] in the context of an anthropology of the 
gift.1587 For Hénaff, this relationship of recognition [rapport de reconnaissance] is 
precisely opposed to Hegelian struggle for recognition. Nonetheless, Ricœur does 
not follow Hénaff in all his claims. Hénaff is very prudent in his use of the 
expression “economy of the gift”, which Ricœur uses several times. For Hénaff, to 
want to replace capitalist market-driven exchanges for something such as an 
“economy of the gift” would make absolutely no sense. This is not what Ricœur 
wants either, but he expressly connects his critique of the omnipresence of market 
logic to his notion of an economy of the gift. And Hénaff also disconnects in a 
decisive manner the moral gift from the ceremonial gift. According to him, the 
purely detached gift, of which he finds the perfect example in Seneca’s De 
Beneficiis, loses all the dimension of the defiance, of the injunction to reciprocity 
that founds the social bond. Therefore, he is not primarily interested in the moral 
gift. 
Ricœur, on the contrary, challenges this radical uncoupling. His reading, 
it seems to me, is halfway between the moral gift and the ceremonial gift. Ricœur 
                                                
1587 “Quant au potlatch, même le plus agonistique, c’est une lutte de dons, c’est-à-dire un duel à 
travers des biens qui ‘symbolisent’ les protagonistes, ce n’est pas un combat par les armes. Le 
modèle hégélien suppose en somme que l’esprit du don cérémoniel a disparu. Ce modèle définit la 
relation conflictuelle des individus modernes. Quand la médiation de la chose donnée n’est plus là, 
la dialectique produit le Trois à partir du Deux. C’est une éthologie de la rencontre dans le cadre 
d’une anthropologie du don qui fait défaut dans certaines approches, ainsi A. Honneth, La Lutte 
pour la reconnaissance, Paris, Éd, du Cerf., 2000.” Hénaff, Le Prix de la vérité, p. 183.  
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pays special attention to the second part of Le prix de la vérité, the one dealing 
precisely with the gift. In a small text called “Considération sur la triade: ‘le 
sacrifice, la dette, la grâce’ selon Marcel Hénaff”1588, Ricœur formulates the 
following hypothesis: can we not consider that the moralization of the experiences 
of gift-giving is the process whereby they cease to be mere historical examples 
and attain the status of something fundamental?1589 In fact, Ricœur interprets 
Hénaff’s account of the “challenge” to give in return as containing, in nuce, a 
moral metaphorical power capable of universalizing this ceremonial device, even 
if in our societies, ceremonial recognition has largely disappeared. Allow me to 
sum up this discussion. Hénaff is claiming: ceremonial recognition is less 
important in our societies than it was in ancient societies; anthropologists and 
philosophers have not been able to grasp this ceremonial nature of gift-giving as 
mutual recognition founding the social bond because they have largely misread it 
as an unconditional moral gift, therefore missing its symbolic character. And 
Ricœur is responding: but it is precisely the interpretation of the gift as free gift-
giving, that is, every gift being as if it were a first gift – that is, a moral gift – that 
grants the symbolic, ceremonial gift-giving the nature of a transcultural symbol. 
Therefore, it seems that in this Ricœurian interpretation we are dealing with a 
second degree symbol: recognition is symbolic exchange and even if ceremonial 
gift-giving has lost its importance in our societies, this does not mean that this 
festive experience of recognition, which still exists somehow, in practices different 
from those of archaic societies (“the simple gesture of extending our hand to 
someone”, he says on “La reconnaissance, entre don et réciprocité”1590) has lost its 
power. In fact, it can still be considered as a metaphor, a symbol of a transcultural 
experience of real recognition that we can normatively project as an ideal that 
could and should always be accomplished. This is his utopia of recognition. And it 
is to the effectuation of this utopia, that exists but still in a very exceptional 
manner, in the form of “clearings”, that Ricœur calls the states of peace, under the 
banner of agape.  
                                                
1588 See Ricœur “Considération sur la triade: ‘le sacrifice, la dette, la grâce’ selon Marcel Hénaff” 
in Le Don et la Dette, org. M.M Olivetti, (Padova: CEDAM, 2004), pp. 37-44. 
1589 “on peut se demander si la moralisation n’est pas la voie sur laquelle l’une ou l’autre de ces 
expériences-témoin s’arrachent aux limitations culturelles qui en constituent l’historicité et ainsi 
s’élèvent de l’historique au fondamental.”Ibid., p. 37. 
1590 See Paul Ricœur, “La reconnaissance, entre don et réciprocité. Propos recueillis par R. 
Hebding”, in Réforme 3063 (2004), p. 8. 
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The remaining part of this section will deal with Ricœur’s very specific 
notion of mutuality, and the way it distinguishes itself from reciprocity. First of 
all, let me turn to the states of peace. What is, according to Luc Boltanski, a state 
of peace? Boltanski, in L’amour et la justice comme compétences1591 adopts a 
standpoint that is not very different from the Ricoeurian approach of the 
interaction between love and justice. According to Boltanski, justice is incapable 
of stopping, by its own means, violence. And peace excludes any violent means 
used to settle a dispute, that is, every confrontation that can ultimately lead to the 
destruction of one of the parties engaged in the conflict.1592 According to the 
traditional distinction of love into philia, eros and agape, so we can have different 
engagements according to these three forms. However, the one that interests here 
the most is agape. Boltanski characterizes the general attitude of those in these 
states of peace as the “silence of equivalence”.1593 That is: justice is always 
measuring and comparing, looking for reciprocity. In a state of agape, by contrast, 
there is a certain insouciance characterizing the social bond.1594 Agape does not 
remember neither the offenses made against it, nor the deeds accomplished. Its 
complete indifference to any sort of scheming is one of its main features.  
Boltanski refuses to consider agape as a utopia, and it is easy to understand why: if 
it is to have any sociological relevance, the state of agape must exist, if only in a 
partial and imperfect way, in practice.1595 Therefore he rejects the approaches that 
would make of agape a goal worthy of respect but impossible to defend up until its 
last consequences1596 – Boltanski is not happy with the interpretations of agape 
that make of it a mere regulative model of people’s conducts.1597 He follows 
Ricœur’s accounts of the phenomena of metaphor and parable (mainly in The Rule 
of Metaphor), therefore implicitly recognizing the poetic content of the depictions 
of love, but insists upon the pragmatic character of the situations described in the 
parables.1598 One of the most interesting features of Boltanski’s depiction though, 
is that agape is disconnected both from desire and from the merit of those who are 
                                                
1591 See Luc Boltanski L’amour et la justice comme compétences. Trois essais de sociologie de 
l’action (Paris: Éditions Métailié, 1990). 
1592 Ibid., p. 120. 
1593 Ibid., p. 121. 
1594 Ibid., p. 177. 
1595 Ibid., p. 154. 
1596 Ibid., p. 200. 
1597 Ibid. 
1598 Ibid., p. 197. 
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its object, as we can see in the example of the Fioretti1599: those who are in a state 
of agape spread love to all the people they encounter, whoever they are. They give 
without expecting anything in return. And they do not even anticipate the future 
(they have no expectation, so they have no desire), they simply concentrate on the 
needs of those they meet, trying to provide for them.  
Certainly, not everybody is in these states. People can inhabit other cities, 
or orders of standing, as those we have seen in part two of this thesis. Thus the 
possibility of misunderstanding exists: when the man of love interacts with the 
man of justice they interpret each other’s actions differently. This is a way in 
which the desire can reenter in this sphere of exacerbated love: if, by some reason, 
there is a disruption in this relation – let us say that the receiver rejects the gift of 
the man of peace1600 – then he can, faced with this difficulty, desire that the other 
accepts the gift. But in doing this he will already be exiting the logic of pure love, 
according to Boltanski. Pure love is immediate, absolutely concentrated in the 
present and ignorant even of any abstract idea. Those in this state focus themselves 
on the concrete others that they encounter. This is a purely horizontal relationship 
of gift-giving, with no vertical dimension. Love makes no distinction between 
these concrete others in that everyone, the criminal as the most virtuous man, are 
all deserving of being its object. In sum, for Boltanski, in the states of agape: 1) 
everyone is the protector of those that he encounters; 2) love is free from anxiety 
because the one who gives expects nothing in return; 3) even the receiver of the 
gift does not expect anything because he himself is in this state, free from anxiety 
(and therefore, if he receives, he can only be grateful); 4) this state naturally tends 
to equality (even though without calculation): those who have more tend to give 
more, because they have it; 5) This feature is so extreme that no one accumulates 
goods in a selfish manner. People do not worry about their future; 6) Even 
production has as its only goal the satisfaction of the immediate basic vital needs, 
nothing more; 7) the insistence upon the present is so great, that the past (and 
possible past debts) are not taken into account. Boltanski’s conclusion: for this 
regime to hold, it is necessary that everybody remains disinterested. Consequently, 
no economy is possible in that world. 
                                                
1599 Ibid., p. 185 ff. 
1600 Ibid., p. 236. 
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Ultimately, what can we say about this depiction? First of all, that even 
though it is anchored in real, empirical experiences (love always resurfaces, albeit 
partially, in one way or another, in society), Boltanski’s reconstruction of the 
perfectly coordinated state of peace is perfectly utopian, and he himself 
acknowledges it. Hence, even if love is not everywhere every time, its practices 
still exist, and they form a sphere of meaning. This dual structure: the states of 
peace have an empirical ground that we can find in everyday practices and still 
they have a normative surplus of meaning that is able to project their purest 
achievement as a kind of utopia or regulative ideal that tends to attract us and 
regulate praxis is, I contend, what we will find in the Ricoeurian approach of 
recognition in the states of peace. 
Ricœur does not retain all these elements of Boltanski’s model of agape, 
nor does he contend that in the clearings of recognition people behave like 
Boltanski said they would in his reconstruction of a utopia of agape. In his 
depiction of a state of agape, Ricœur considers that the dialectic of love and justice 
will be mediated by the symbolic gift-exchange. Reconstructing the long debate 
that has taken place around this notion by anthropologists such as Mauss, Lévi-
Strauss and Hénaff1601 Ricœur ultimately arrives at his distinction between 
reciprocity and mutuality. His point of departure is Walzer’s: we live in a society 
where we have achieved, more or less, an equal attribution of rights, but not an 
equal attribution of goods.1602 And we tend to resist, up to a certain extent, the 
encroachment of the commercial sphere.1603 Some goods are nonvenal. Ultimately, 
Ricœur notes that history shows us the recurring defeat of that which is without 
price (every teacher demands a payment) and he prefers to speak of 
“noncommercial goods” such as moral dignity or the integrity of the human 
body.1604 Recognition will be taken to be a good of that nature: a noncommercial 
good. Therefore, his utopia of mutual recognition, as I see it, will also be a utopia 
of the redistribution of recognition. 
                                                
1601 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, p. 225 ff. 
1602 This is, for Ricœur, one of society’s main problems: “il y a un lien étrange entre la production 
de richesse et la production d’inégalités – mais nous vivons de cela, n’est-ce pas, cruellement.” See 
“La lutte pour la reconnaissance et l’économie du don” in Hermenéutica y Responsabilidad. 
Homenaje a Paul Ricœur, org. Marcelino Agís Villaverde (Santiago de Compostela: Campus 
Universitario, 2005), p. 23. 
1603 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, p. 233. 
1604 Ibid., p. 237. 
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The most curious distinction that Ricœur establishes is between 
reciprocity and mutuality or, as he calls it, “good reciprocity” and “bad 
reciprocity”.1605 What is reciprocity? Ricœur places it in a semantic field close to 
the notions of justice, equivalence and the market. He states that “the marketplace, 
we could say, is reciprocity without mutuality”.1606 Its main feature is the 
emphasis on the impersonal, systematic relation. As such, reciprocity is blind. I 
think this appreciation might be close to the Ricœurian account of Kantian moral 
law: it is charged of being blind too. As I mentioned before, Ricœur puts the value 
of the person above the respect for the law. In talking about mutuality, he is also 
emphasizing the importance of the persons engaging in concrete interaction, over 
and above the systematic nature of the relation binding them. Mutuality focuses on 
the persons, reciprocity on the relation.  
And this is the point where the notion of dissymmetry becomes 
fundamental. Ricœur sees a threat in taking reciprocal recognition too far. He is 
probably accusing all Hegelian forms of recognition of falling into this trap. The 
one is not the other. As he claims “Forgetting this asymmetry, thanks to the 
success of analyzes of mutual recognition, would constitute the ultimate 
misrecognition at the very heart of actual experiences of recognition.”1607 Here, it 
is worthwhile to mention an article of Laurent Thévenot, in which he himself links 
his project with Ricœurian and Honnethian recognition.1608 Not entering into the 
detail of this articulation, I will still mention that Thévenot goes even further than 
Ricœur. In speaking about the constitutive asymmetry of recognition, he speaks of 
the “double dissymmetry” of love1609; the loved one depends on the lover, insofar 
as the lover recognizes in the loved person a value that was foreign to the loved 
person. In this, the lover seems to know, and to recognize the other even better 
than the other knows and recognizes him or herself. In the experiences of true 
love, we might add, sexual or otherwise, even if one experiences the communion 
of some sort of fusion – and in this there is some sort of horizontal recognition – 
the truth is that there is also a sense of verticality, in that each person values the 
                                                
1605 Ibid., p. 241. 
1606 Ibid., p. 231. 
1607 Ibid., p. 261. 
1608 See Laurent Thévenot, “Reconnaissances: avec Paul Ricœur et Axel Honneth” in La quête de 
reconnaissance: nouveau phénomène social total, edited by Alain Caillé (Paris: La découverte, 
2007), pp. 269-283. 
1609 Ibid., p. 280. 
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other above him or herself. Thus true love is like a naturalization of Augustine’s 
confession: Tu autem eras interior intimo meo, superior summo meo. 
Ricœur does not go as far as Thévenot in this matter. But he emphasizes 
that each person is irreplaceable. We exchange gifts, but not places.1610 This is 
why there is no obligation to give a gift in return. Reciprocity would force a 
return: do ut des. In mutuality, by contrast, respect and distance is introduced into 
intimacy.1611 Therefore, I feel motivated to give, that is, to recognize the other by 
means of my symbolic gift in which I am myself engaged (in this Ricœur follows 
Hénaff), and this is a voluntary act: “Undertaking to give a gift is the gesture that 
initiates the whole process”.1612 The other, upon receiving this gift, is therefore not 
forced but called to respond (here is the similarity with Fichtean Aufforderung that 
Robert Williams rightfully detected). Let us recall that this is disinterested gift-
giving: we are in a state of agape. In this sense, like Boltanski noted, there is no 
remembrance of the past. A gift that would demand a return would not be a gift: it 
would be market economy. On the contrary, a successful gift, in this sense, forgets 
about itself in the act of giving itself. So the gift in return is a “second first gift.” I 
would add that it is not necessary that the gift really forgets itself: it might be 
enough that we simply do not attach to it so much importance that we put the other 
in the place of someone who has a debt towards ourselves. If someone has a debt, 
it is the self rather than the other. Ricœur notes that in order for this mutuality to 
be possible we should emphasize the right way to receive, and this is by becoming 
grateful (reconnaissant). It is gratefulness that, as some sort of a moral sentiment 
towards the person that engaged him or herself in the gift given to us, does not 
force us, but rather enjoins us to respond, and to recognize the other that has 
already recognized us: “A good receiving depends on gratitude, which is the soul 
of the division between good and bad reciprocity”.1613 Ricœur calls these mutual 
exchanges “festive”.1614 
By introducing this notion of the festive, Ricœur is recalling the small 
gestures of recognition present in our everyday lives. These are the proof that the 
                                                
1610 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, p. 263. 
1611 Ibid. 
1612 Ibid., p. 242. 
1613 Ibid., p. 243. 
1614 Ibid., p. 244. 
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struggle for recognition really strives for something that exists.1615 They are the 
empirical rooting of this approach, which can be qualified as being ideal-typical, 
in the Weberian sense, in that it simultaneously looks for conceptual precision and 
empirical exemplification.1616  
 
5.6.4 – A utopia of recognition 
 
The time has come to define the status of Ricœurian recognition. As we 
have seen, his interpretation of mutual gift-giving as a process of symbolic 
recognition is halfway between the ceremonial and the moral. What is Ricœur 
doing, when he denounces the “unhappy consciousness” or the “bad-infinity” of 
an all-demanding subject? In a way, he is saying: before demanding recognition, 
we should happily grant it. Want recognition? So recognize. Recognize, before 
demanding recognition for yourself. By introducing dissymmetry at the heart of 
reciprocity, Ricœur is not only affirming the gap between people. He is also 
saying: put the other before yourself. And if the “small miracle of recognition” 
shall be granted to you, act gracefully: be grateful. And, if possible, recognize in 
return (not that you are obliged to do it, but if you do not do it, as Hénaff shows 
us, you will be breaking the social bond). Consequently, in a certain sense, Ricœur 
is proposing an asymmetrical, altruistic relation of recognition whereby the other 
assumes a certain verticality: I must recognize the other first. 
This verticality does not make him or her inaccessible. The ceremonial 
character of recognition presupposes the possibility of horizontal experiences of 
interaction. However, amidst this ceremonial character, Ricœur is constructing a 
pure ethics of recognition. Therefore, recognition also expands the little ethics of 
Oneself as Another. In a way, in the Course of Recognition, solicitude is placed 
above ipseity. This reminds us of the hyperbolic ethic of Emmanuel Levinas. In a 
certain manner, I think that what is at stake is the definition of a new figure in 
Ricœur’s anthropology: that of the altruistic subject. Human being is therefore 
capable of recognizing. And this recognition might become inspirational. This is 
of course presupposing that recognition can assume a volitional character: instead 
of striving for the recognition of my identity, responding to a constitutive need, 
                                                
1615 Ibid., p. 246. 
1616 Ibid., p. 236. 
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what I should be doing is simply recognizing those who come across me. Honneth 
understood well this aspect of Ricœurian recognition1617: what Ricœur has in mind 
is a volitional, unilateral act of recognition, even though this act calls for a 
response. For Honneth, this is never possible without a previous relationship of 
reciprocal recognition. In sum, this discussion is over the point of departure. For 
Honneth, reciprocal recognition always precedes, from a constitutive viewpoint, 
individual identity. Thus, any volitional act of recognition has a process of 
reciprocal recognition as a sine qua non. For Ricœur ipseities are also 
intersubjectively grounded, but the individual identity of the person is not lost 
within intersubjectivity, nor are its capacities to act in an intentional manner. This 
makes the moral, intentional act of giving and recognizing his initial standpoint. 
It seems obvious that this discourse on recognition is an alternative 
discourse. What is original in Ricœur’s approach to recognition is not only the 
effort to find the philosophical relevance of the “rule-governed polysemy” of 
recognition. Rather, when he is criticizing the all-demanding subject and 
assimilating the model of the struggle for recognition to a market-based approach 
(like the capitalist, the all-demanding subject wants it all) what he is doing is 
denouncing an ideology possibly present in the model of the struggle for 
recognition. And over and against this ideological stranglehold on the discourse 
about recognition, he is proposing his own utopia, an ethical utopia of recognition, 
driven by hope. 
How can this attack on the model of the struggle for recognition be of 
help? On the one hand, it helps us to get rid of reified forms of identity. Honneth 
has expressed concern with these degenerate forms too, by denouncing the attitude 
of a purely “detectivist”1618 approach towards one’s identity. By insisting that 
identity is not sameness but ipseity, and that it has a narrative, changing character, 
and also that what we should strive for is the recognition of capacities, not reified 
identities, Ricœur certainly is providing a good service to recognition theory. His 
insistence that the capacities are individual and that individual ipseities have a 
certain precedence over collective identities points in the same direction. As K. A. 
Appiah noted, an identity provides us with a script. This script is important in the 
                                                
1617 See Michaël Foessel, “La philosophie de la reconnaissance: une critique sociale, Entretien avec 
Axel Honneth”, in Esprit 346 (7/2008): 94. 
1618 See Honneth, Reification, p. 67. 
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orientation of our lives. But we want our lives “not too tightly scripted”.1619 Thus 
the importance of the emphasis put in the changing character of identities. 
As Ricœur has shown in his Lectures on Ideology and Utopia1620 both 
ideology and utopia make up our social imaginary. Ideology has a reproductive 
function, whereas utopia is productive imagination at work. The status of this 
critique to the dominant discourse on recognition has therefore the status of a 
utopia. And this not only because it is giving new meaning to the concept of 
recognition: also because it is projecting a possible alternative social order. Ricœur 
takes the effective experiences of recognition as his point of departure. However, 
his goal is to enlarge the spheres of mutual recognition. These are horizontal, 
mutual experiences of gift-giving and symbolic gestures. Individual symbolic 
gestures, might I add. In History and Truth Ricœur spoke about the gestures of 
exceptional individuals, like Willy Brandt or Martin Luther King, who can inspire 
other people. This symbolism of the gestures of recognition is very important to 
Ricœur. Honneth does not ignore it either: it is, for instance, a gesture of 
recognition, mere sympathy, that can prevent the horrible experience of social 
invisibility. 
But for Ricœur these gestures are the symbolic basis of the act of 
recognition. He seems to expect that the gestures of exceptional individuals spread 
to the whole of social reality: 
 
Such gestures, cannot become an institution, yet by bringing to light the limits of the 
justice of equivalence, and opening space for hope at the horizon of politics and of law on 
the postnational and international level, they unleash an irradiating and irrigating wave 
that, secretly and indirectly, contributes to the advance of history toward states of 
peace.1621 
  
It is not easy to see how that reality can come about. These gestures, 
which Alain Loute analyzed and questioned, associating them with the notion of 
                                                
1619 See Appiah’s comment of Taylor’s Multiculturalism. K. Anthony Appiah, “Identity, 
Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction” in Charles Taylor, 
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, op. cit., pp. 149-163. 
1620 See Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, ed. George H. Taylor (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986). 
1621 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, p. 245. 
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courage1622, are difficult to understand. On the one hand, even if exceptional 
individuals can have an inspiring, exemplary role, it is up to “normal” individuals 
to take up the task of enlarging the spheres of mutual recognition. On the other 
hand, as Loute rightfully notes, it is not even sure that the symbolic dimension of 
this gesture is going to be well understood.1623 Moreover, even if it is understood, 
it will still be necessary that we actively decide to emulate it.1624  It is not enough 
to contemplate the beauty of the gesture and let ourselves get carried away, 
dreaming about it. Utopias are sometimes beautiful. But we still need them to 
mobilize us. Loute recalls us that what we need is a collective appropriation of that 
possible. The problem is that these gestures, and the procedures of mutual 
recognition as such, seem only to be able to touch those who are the closest to us, 
or that come across us. This contagion is individual. Moreover: it cannot be 
forced. Does this mean that it is inchoate? Before answering, I will compare it 
with Honneth’s project. 
In my view, both Ricœur and Honneth’s projects of recognition have an 
inbuilt normative character. This normative character does not mean a set of rules 
coming from nowhere and opposed to reality. Rather, they reflect a set of already-
existing social practices and senses of justice that are present in our ethical lives. 
But inasmuch as both Ricœur and Honneth envisage social change, inasmuch as 
their social philosophies condemn injustice and conceptually analyze the need for 
recognition, they have in nuce the normative expectation of an expansion of those 
already-institutionalized practices. Theirs is a project of improvement and 
expansion of those practices. Of course they envisage them very differently. 
Ricœur seems not to have understood that in Honneth this surplus of meaning of 
recognition also prevents it from being fully institutionalized. Honneth, on the 
other hand, is not denying the existence and pertinence of volitional, one-sided 
recognition, he is just saying that this is not the fundamental act of recognition. 
                                                
1622 See Alain Loute, “La logique excessive du geste courageux: une force de création sociale? 
Réflexions à partir de Paul Ricœur” in Dissenssus. Revue de philosophie politique de l’ULG, n.º 2, 
(9/2009): 166-177. 
1623 “Outre la question de la production du geste excessif, se pose la question de sa réception 
sociale. Pour qu’il initie un mouvement de transformation sociale, il faut qu’il soit entendu et reçu 
par les membres de la société. Il faut, tout d’abord, que ces derniers comprennent le sens que le 
geste excessif leur donne à penser. Or, le geste excessif, dans sa dimension symbolique, ne rend-il 
pas possible, comme du reste tout discours poétique, une pluralité de lectures possibles? N’est-il 
pas possible d’interpréter le geste excessif comme le geste d’un naïf, d’un idiot ou comme une 
forme subtile de raisonnement stratégique?” Ibid., p. 174. 
1624 Ibid., p. 175. 
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Ultimately, I would say that they have much more in common than is usually 
acknowledged. Both envisage the possibility of a society whose members are duly 
recognized. 
In 1992, when he wrote The Struggle for Recognition, Honneth probably 
would have left the task of bringing about a society whose members are duly 
recognized for the action of social movements. Today, he is perhaps paying more 
attention to the institutionalization of the practices of recognition and to our 
democratic ethical life. He is, however, very prudent in what comes down to the 
distinction between the role of the citizen and that of the theoretician, whereas I 
tend to agree with those interpreters, like Emmanuel Renault and Jean-Philippe 
Deranty, who tend to try to more directly politicize his theory of recognition. 
Ultimately, even if we conceptually define the “decent society” as Margalit 
does1625, or the “recognized society”, the empirical situation tends to be far more 
complicated. This society might not be more than a regulative ideal. A utopia. But 
it is a utopia that we must strive to accomplish. Ultimately, both Honneth and 
Ricœur seem to be saying to us, albeit in different ways: when it comes down to 
recognition, we cannot only talk the talk. We also have to walk the walk. If we 
want recognition, than we should struggle for it (Honneth) or grant it (Ricœur). 
These might be the two sides of the same phenomena. Probably we must strike a 
balance between the two approaches and do both. Struggling for recognition at the 
political level. Recognizing others at an ethical level. 
Ricœur is prudent enough not to state that this horizon of reconciliation 
shall be definitive. He only speaks about the “clearings” of recognition. It is in 
these that he finds the festive character of recognition. The clearings are 
provisional states of conciliation, amidst the conflict. This means that we have to 
think about what David Pellauer calls “peaceful conflict”1626, that is, forms of 
conflict that do not involve violence. Maybe these might be arbitrated by the 
procedure of compromise, such as it appears in the works of Boltanski and 
Thévenot. Other authors, such as Nathalie Frogneux, argue that in the context of 
interpersonal relationships, conflict is precisely what allows us to keep violence 
                                                
1625 See Avishai Margalit, The Decent Society, translated by Naomi Goldblum (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1996). 
1626 See David Pellauer “Que les hommes capables se reconnaissent!” in Rue Descartes Hors-série 
“L’homme capable: autour de Paul Ricœur” (2006), p. 164. I thank David Pellauer for his useful 
remarks on this topic, which is of the utmost importance. 
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away.1627 
Ultimately, I think Ricœur’s proposal is edifying. His utopia is anchored 
in the hope that step by step, individuals will start acting more ethically. As such, 
this utopia has the character of a hymn. I will end this article with a perplexity. 
Might it be that a very modest effectuation of this ethical proposal be tied with the 
destiny of the reception of this book? We can never anticipate what the reception 
of a book will be, or the success of its author. Many a genius only had posthumous 
success. Fernando Pessoa, the greatest of Portuguese poets, published scarcely 
during his lifetime, and was widely acclaimed posthumously. What is more, as 
Kierkegaard duly noted, ethics is not a matter of a communication of knowledge, 
but instead of communication of power: I can be the greatest specialist in ethics in 
the world, and still be morally dubious. In this sense, if ethical behavior cannot be 
imposed, only proposed, maybe the inspiring gesture and the edifying proposal 
can have more success than any command. It remains to be known whether or not 
a book is ever capable of making someone act better. Many a reader has probably 
read the whole of Kantian practical philosophy without ever respecting a 
categorical imperative. As such, the fate of The Course of Recognition, and of 
Ricœur’s ethical theory in general remains unknown. However, by analyzing the 
experiences of recognition and by redefining the conditions of possibility of 
something such as recognition, Ricœur is certainly contributing to reshape our 
own understanding of it. As such, the world of this work is colliding with our 
worlds, the worlds of its readers. He is refiguring it. Will this help? Let us hope so. 
 
* 
 
With this incursion in The Course of Recognition our own “course of 
conflict” in the works of Paul Ricœur finds its completion. I have analyzed the 
majority of Ricœur’s books and many of his articles, some of them well known, 
others not as much. I think I have been successful in proving the centrality of the 
notion of conflict in the thought of Ricœur with these last three parts, in the same 
way I had done for the history of philosophy in part one, and in the contemporary 
                                                
1627 See Nathalie Frogneux “Lorsque cesse le conflit surgit la violence” in Violences et agressivités 
au sein du couple. Vol. I, Mieux comprendre par le croisement des disciplines, edited by Nathalie 
Frogneux and Patrick de Neuter (Louvain-la-Neuve: Bruylant-Academia, 2009), pp. 35-50. 
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philosophical and sociological landscape in part two. All together, these five parts 
constitute what is already a long thesis. In them, I have been as exhaustive as my 
capacities allowed for, also given the limitations of time and space involved in 
writing a doctoral thesis. 
In the remainder of this thesis, which will be shorter and more incisive 
than the preceding parts, all that there is left to do is, firstly, to sum up and try to 
provide some order to what has been said before about the significance of conflict 
for Ricœur in its many uses (part six), to spell out some of the reservations that I 
ultimately have concerning his philosophy (part seven) and, ultimately, to try to 
articulate in a condensed manner a project of hermeneutic social philosophy and a 
new critique of reason (part eight). These will largely be independent claims I will 
be putting forward, even though they will be building on what has been expounded 
before. 
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Part Six 
  
An Attempt at Systematization: Way Beyond Conflict 
 
After the very long mediation of the last five parts of this thesis, I will 
allow myself to draw some provisional conclusions. To my knowledge, no one has 
ever written a history of conflict in philosophy. These last five parts are my 
modest contribution to such a history, should anyone ever decide to write it. Some 
philosophers tried – and more or less succeeded – in providing systematic 
accounts of conflict in human history and reality. Hegel and Marx are a case in 
point, whether or not we believe that they grasped something essential, or instead 
charge them of delivering nothing more than fancy fantasies. In these following 
pages, I will recall some of the figures of conflict we have seen before. I will start 
from the accounts seen in parts one and two, and then proceed by summing up the 
instantiations of conflict in Ricœur. And the first thing that needs to be said is that 
this is only a possible reading. A reading that finds confirmation in what Ricœur 
himself states, but that has no systematic ground (in the strong sense of the word) 
to draw from. As such, it is an attempt at systematization without a system, a 
reconstruction that proposes a possible ordering of fragments and dispersed uses. 
In fact, Ricœur has no general, all-encompassing theory of conflict. In a 
way, even though we can say that conflict is indeed an overarching concept for 
him, he stops short of developing a fully systematic theory of conflict. The reasons 
for that are fully stated above; if he decided to posit conflict as the key to all 
philosophy and to the very development and apprehension of reality, he would fall 
back into full-blown Hegelianism; were he to adopt the same procedure only in 
social terms, he would fall back into full-blown orthodox Marxism, even if he 
tried to update some of its categories. Either way, he would probably adopt an 
ambitious, all-explaining stance that certainly was alien to his own philosophical 
standpoint, his affirmation of finite existence and of the finite act of interpretation 
and all its corollaries.  
He also criticizes Hegel for adopting and using the term “negative” or 
“negativity” in so loose a way that he risks dissolving it, at the weight of its own 
semantic shifts. The negative can be anything and everything. Up to a certain 
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extent, Ricœur’s use of the term “conflict”, and our own depiction of it runs the 
same risk, because so many different phenomena can be understood, according to 
him, as being conflictual without, however, these conflicts having the same inner 
workings and results. And yet, the negative, and conflict, do play, as we have seen, 
a fundamental role in Ricœur’s philosophy. This is proved by his unflinching 
interest in the several philosophies of negation, as we can see in Alison Scott-
Bauman’s work and also, clearly, in the many occurrences of conflict that were the 
object of the last three parts of this dissertation. 
Since Ricœur did not have a single universal hermeneutic key to organize 
and rank all these different occurrences of conflict such as he saw them, the most 
we can say is that he depicted conflicts as they were presented to him, on a case-
by-case basis, one by one. But this does not prevent us from finding a certain 
“rule-governed polysemy” in it, as Ricœur himself claimed to have found in the 
uses of recognition in philosophy. He seems to have taken the notion of “rule-
governed polysemy” from Saussure. In The Conflict of Interpretations, when 
explicating the “mechanism of language” in the context of Saussurian linguistic, 
Ricœur cites Godel to explain that we are in an intermediate position between 
system and execution1628, that is, between the synchronic structuration of a 
semantic field (stable at given points in time) and its renewal by use. Ricœur 
explains that rule-governed polysemy is at the crossroads of two processes. One of 
them is cumulative; it is a process of expansion. This is the case of “words which, 
because they signify too many things, cease to signify anything”.1629 However, this 
polysemy is limited because it is controlled by another process. If signs tend to 
expand, their fields tend to be limited. This is what, in Wittgensteinian and Post-
Wittgensteinian philosophy is called a language game. Within a certain language 
game there are rules, and these rules decide which counts for what. Meanings can 
be cumulative, or some meanings can eliminate others. It is not a situation in 
which anything goes; but it is certainly a situation where there is space for 
renewal. 
Ricœur many times analyzes applied cases of this polysemy. Let us recall 
that in The Rule of Metaphor Ricœur mentioned how, in the metaphoric process, 
the metaphoric meaning entered in conflict with literal meaning and eventually 
                                                
1628 See Ricœur, “The Problem of Double Meaning” in The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 69. 
1629 Ibid. 
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trumped it. Moreover, when he examines philosophical concepts, or even notions 
taken from ordinary language, frequently what he does is to try to find the rule-
governed polysemy structuring them. Often, his starting point is language itself 
and its uses; and when he has found striking similarities between different uses of 
a given word, he tries to think them through philosophically. This is what he does 
both with the notion of self and selfhood in Oneself as Another and recognition in 
The Course of Recognition. In rule-governed polysemies, there is a dialectical 
interplay between identity and difference. In them, a given notion accepts different 
uses which ultimately are analogical. This means that these notions are not 
entirely univocal, or entirely equivocal. And all their richness is discovered 
precisely in the dialectical process (in the Platonic sense of the Phaedrus, in this 
case) of discovering, or establishing, their similarities and differences. 
It might seem that this is a mere semantic phenomenon. But indeed it is 
not. We have seen before that Ricœur thinks that language is never for the sake of 
itself. Instead, language and semantics are grounded in reality and existence. And 
this is valid not only for the hermeneutics of the self, but for hermeneutics in 
general. Even when Ricœur goes further in his linguistification of reality (with the 
analogy of text to grasp action, and so on) never does he cease to bear in mind that 
this is always language grounded in reality, or opening up and revealing, maybe 
even instituting new domains of reality. This is evident when he speaks of the 
basic metaphoricity that structures reality, one of the bold claims of the 1970s. 
Ultimately, for Ricœur, language is polysemic because being itself is also 
polysemic. He very often quotes Aristotle’s assertion that the meanings of being 
are analogical. Consequently, if the notion of conflict has many meanings, and if 
we can find these meanings in the history of philosophy and in the philosophy of 
Paul Ricœur himself, it is because conflict itself has – at least some – of the 
properties identified by all these authors. Because conflict, in each of these uses, 
occupies a specific place in the language games of these different philosophies 
and, furthermore, can sometimes extrapolate its situated and contextual character 
(its origin in each of the language games) and cut across them. 
With these brief notes in mind, we will proceed to draft a provisional 
typology of conflict. We have seen how in Ricœur there are at least three main 
groups of conflicts, according to the course followed by the figures of conflict in 
the last parts: existential, hermeneutic and practical conflicts. This is, we could 
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say, a division of conflict according to its domain of occurrence, the domain in 
which they are felt, or to which they apply. But other classifications can be made. 
We can look at conflict through other angles. As we shall see, Ricœur both 
recognizes conflicts in their fertility, and want to solve or mediate them, while also 
allowing that some of them are irreducible. Let us see how in a more detailed 
fashion. 
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6.1 – The Typology of Conflict 
 
Any typology of a philosophical notion is somewhat arbitrary and 
contingent. It depends on the criteria put forward and their processes of validation. 
Allow me to put forward the following tentative division: conflicts can be 
distinguished according 1) to their status (or, if we prefer a more traditional 
notion, their nature, or their quid); 2) origin; 3) domain(s) of application; 4) 
treatability (inside of which the possibility of productivity can be applied, or not, 
according to the case) and 5) results. In what concerns authors who spell out 
conflict theories, or use the notion of conflict in their works, they can be divided in 
those who merely acknowledge the existence of conflicts, and those who actively 
take part in them, and also between those who see in conflict the key to explain or 
even to transform reality, and those who see no such role, and instead view 
conflicts as being mere incongruities that need to be eliminated. Finally, in the 
case of authors like Ricœur, who, as we have seen, acknowledges the existence of 
so many different types of conflict, and uses this notion in such a wide array of 
different manners, we can also distinguish between cases of conflict they merely 
want to arbitrate, or cases of conflict in which they take sides, actively 
contributing to the “victory” of one side over the other. Allow me to explicate in a 
few words what these categories – five categories concerning conflicts themselves, 
and two other concerning the place of conflict in the work of different authors – 
mean, and to illustrate them by showing how each one of them allows us to answer 
specific questions. 
Firstly, what I called the “status” or the “nature” of a conflict. This is, 
indeed, the primordial question that any typology must be able to answer: what is 
this conflict, i.e., what type of conflict is it? Allow me to distinguish, in this 
category, ontological and methodological conflicts. Ontological conflicts, in turn, 
can be understood in a strong or a weak sense. In a strong sense, ontological 
conflicts can perhaps be seen as metaphysical conflicts, those which, in certain 
philosophies, are taken to structure reality. These are the types of conflicts that we 
can probably find in Heraclitus, as we have seen in part one. His depictions of 
strife, war, conflict and so forth are so pervasive and play on so many different 
levels that we can affirm that for him conflict is indeed fundamental and 
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multilayered, dynamic and metaphysic. The same probably applies, with an 
infinitely greater degree of complexity, to Hegel and his process of Aufhebung. In 
a weak sense, the “ontology” of a given conflict is merely its definition, the 
determination of its quid. Or, if we prefer a more Heideggerian terminology, its 
“ontic” determination. In that sense, we say that a conflict is x and not y, so we are 
circumscribing it. In both these senses, what we do is to understand a conflict, to 
grasp it. On the other hand, when we speak about methodological conflicts, these 
are processes we can create, rather than only discovering them. A conflict of 
interpretations can be something which imposes itself on us, as it were; or it can be 
something we decide to promote, for creative or epistemic reasons. This is true in 
Ricœur, even though he does not spell this out thematically. Or for instance in 
Hunyadi, for whom the virtue of conflict discloses the normativity of rules. Can 
we not discover this normativity by willingly imposing a conflict of interpretations 
on it? 
Secondly, we can ask about a conflict’s origin. This is its terminus a quo. 
That is, whence comes this conflict? Where does it come from? What is its origin? 
This has so many possible answers as the specific occurrences of conflict we have 
seen throughout this dissertation, and possibly many more. Conflicts can sprout 
from within or without human reality. To name only a few such origins: 
metaphysical conflicts, originating in struggles between gods and/or other mythic 
figures (Homer, Hesiod) or more anonymous and abstract forces (Heraclitus) such 
as determinations of Spirit itself (Hegel); they can be endogenous conflicts 
stemming from our psychic life, such as energetic conflicts between instincts 
(Freud) or conflicts of interpretation about the meaning of those conflicts, conflicts 
of our imaginary, and so forth; or they might come from the domain of action. 
These can structural impediments to our action in the world, such as the situations 
of domination. Or they can affect interaction, such as in the case of exacerbated 
struggle for recognition (Kojève) or assume other forms: discussion (Apel and 
Habermas) or more violent possibilities (such as Hobbes’s state of war of all 
against all). 
In the third place we find the terminus ad quem of conflicts, i.e., where do 
conflicts apply, where are they felt, and where can we find the putative solutions 
to them? This is a domain which is coextensive with the first two. By this I mean 
that there are probably as many origins as there are domains of application of 
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conflicts and their respective solutions. But this does not mean that the area 
affected by conflict is exactly the same as its origin. For instance, a conflict 
originated in our psychic life can have effects not only in it, but also affect our 
action and interactions. Reciprocally, a solution to that conflict sought by our own 
(volitive) means – e.g., psychotherapy – can perhaps result in solving the conflict 
in both domains. 
After we have sufficiently diagnosed the existence of conflicts, following 
the preceding stages: 1) they exist; 2) they are of nature x and y; 3) they originated 
in a given domain, and can affect some other areas (e.g. of our existence)… we 
can discuss our fourth category, their treatability. Now that a given conflict is 
identified, what should we do with it? Merely bear testimony to it, as Lyotard 
suggests, in the cases of differends? Should we let it be, or try to influence it? And 
what do we mean by influencing, or taking a part in it? Is this akin to dissolving it? 
The answer to these questions certainly depends on the nature of the type of 
conflict at hand and also on the results of such an intervention. 
Again, to ask for the consequences or results of the conflict (or our 
intervention in its process) probably determines the answer to apply to the set of 
questions listed in the preceding paragraph. So the assessment of this fifth 
category influences all the preceding categories. What happens if we pursue the 
conflict and even attempt to carry it further? This amounts to putting forward 
counterfactual scenarios. A situation without conflict, would it result in a better or 
a worse scenario? And what about the means to end conflict, or to transform the 
situation, are they acceptable? This is where a whole host of ethical, and other 
types of criteria can be called to help determine the best possible course of action. 
All the preceding types of question determine conflicts themselves. But 
we can also evaluate philosophies according to whether or not they leave or do not 
leave room for conflict, and see what strategy their authors pursue when dealing 
with (or ignoring) conflicts. In this category, we find authors who totally ignore 
(for voluntary or involuntary reasons) the existence of conflicts, and those who 
acknowledge them. Of those who concede that conflicts exist and are relevant, 
some think they explain (social or other type of) reality and must be used to 
transform it (Marx), others that they must be controlled (Hobbes) or if possible 
fully mitigated and solved (Rawls). 
Finally, in the philosophies of those authors who acknowledge the 
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existence of conflicts there are those who, like Ricœur, sometimes merely arbitrate 
them, and other times take part in them. Other authors take more general positions. 
For instance, we can argue that Rawls and Habermas provide mostly procedural 
models aimed at finding a solid enough degree of generality to solve all conflicts 
(in specific domains of application, such as the redistribution of social goods, or 
the search of the best arguments in a situation of discussion) irrespective of one’s 
particular position in the struggle – whether or not it is possible to fully occupy 
such a detached position, that is another question. On the other hand, for someone 
like Marx, who identifies the fundamental conflict between the owners of the 
means of production and those who sell their working force in order to make ends 
meet, it is not hard to foretell the engaged and indeed very active position he takes 
in this, or on whose side he is. Consequently, we can establish a distinction 
between authors who merely want to arbitrate or impartially assess conflicts from 
a detached standpoint, or those who take a passionate, or even partisan position 
within conflictual processes. 
With this tentative grid of categories in mind, we could go back and re-
read the preceding parts, asking to the many occurrences of philosophical conflicts 
we have seen the same general questions I am listing here: where do they come 
from, where are they felt, what should we do about them, and so forth. It is 
completely impossible and out of the scope of this very brief chapter to undertake 
such an analyzis for all types of conflict, and all authors we have seen before. I 
think I sufficiently determined at least the quid of many of them in the preceding 
pages, even though I refrained from answering to all the questions in this grid, in 
each case. Furthermore, any such attempt at categorization is itself subject to a 
conflict of interpretations, and as such is nothing more than a possible reading. But 
before I delve into Ricœur’s instantiations of conflict once again, I can further 
develop the example of Marx (easier to grasp than other authors, because it is 
more one-dimensional than many of them). Let us consider once again social 
conflict in Marx and provide a simplified reading of it, according to this grid. 
What is this conflict? It is an ontological conflict in which two classes almost 
represent two entities, namely, “capital” and “labor”. This ontological conflict is in 
turn grasped by a methodology that gives conflict a central role: “historical” or 
“dialectical” materialism, and its scientific pretentions. Where does it originate? In 
the economic infrastructure of societies, more specifically in the relation between 
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productive forces and means of production. Where is it applied? In those same 
societies, when the state of accumulated tension in latency bursts out in the open, 
and conflicts escalate. What can we do about it? For Marx, we should take part in 
it and in fact he, identifying himself with the interests of the Proletariat, did walk 
the walk. And where does it lead us, what is its result? For Marx, hopefully, it 
results on social revolution and thus in the overcoming of capitalism as a historical 
reality. It results in socialism, or in its endpoint, the communist society where man 
no longer has to endure exploitation. For Marx, moreover, this telos is well 
identified and this historical process allegedly necessary. This is, of course, only a 
possible reading of Marx, and indeed a very conventional one. It cannot lead us to 
ignore the tensions present in Marx’s account, such as those I alluded to in part 
one: for instance, between determinism and free agency of social actors, and so on. 
Now what typology of conflict can we draw from what we have seen in 
Ricœur’s works? A first division is the one parts three, four and five have drawn. 
That is, the rough division into existential, hermeneutic and practical conflicts, 
which more or less amounts to the diachronic evolution of Ricœur’s thought as it 
was being made. It has, as I noted, a vague circularity in it, insofar as the third 
moment renews with the first one, without however relinquishing what has been 
acquired in the second one, namely linguistification and the long detour. But now 
we can retrospectively assess it with the help of the grid put forward in this 
chapter. 
Firstly, is conflict ontological in Ricœur? At least in the strong sense? 
The answer is yes, but it must be a qualified answer, as this matter evolved in his 
works, as did his take on ontology. Actually, I do not think we can say that Ricœur 
put himself at the level of a fundamental ontology, as did Heidegger, even if 
sometimes he hinted at it (for instance, when describing basic metaphoricity in the 
1970s). Consequently, there is no “metaphysical” conflict in his works, in the 
same manner there is one in Heraclitus or Hegel. Be that as it may, there are in 
fact ontological assertions on conflict to be found in his works. In the third part we 
have seen this in his books on Jaspers, and the overarching role that conflict 
assumes in Freedom and Nature. The same also applies in Fallible Man with its 
conflict between finite perspective and infinite verb, which is a transcendental 
conflict, in the strong sense of the word. The conclusion to be drawn is that the 
ontological conflict detected by Ricœur is not so much metaphysical as it is 
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human. It touches on human affairs, and in a philosophical anthropology. And this 
even if it ventures to extend to specific domains, such as language. We recall from 
the fourth part Ricœur’s assertion that language is broken and that this is what 
renders the conflict of interpretations inescapable. Ontology is postponed in 
Oneself as Another, as we know, but even there, the long detour and the long 
mediation across the other disciplines evolve through a revealing power of 
conflict. 
This revealing power of conflict brings us to conflicts of another nature in 
Ricœur’s thought, namely, methodological conflicts. We can, in a nutshell, argue 
that Ricœur uses the conflict of interpretations as a powerful motor of his own 
philosophy. And that indeed he almost always did so, even if he only thematically 
defined it in the hermeneutical phase. Already in Freedom and Nature he argued 
that it was the revealing power of conflict that helped him to phenomenologically 
delimitate the voluntary and the involuntary. However, this revealing power of 
conflict, this detectivism, to speak like Honneth, is complemented by a sort of 
constructivism. This means that Ricœur does not only detect conflicts. Sometimes, 
he also construes them, in order to make room for his own theoretical position. 
And this can even be a dialectical relation, in that it might be in the process of 
submitting something to a conflict of interpretations that the true constitution of 
something appears. This is akin to what Hunyadi called the virtue of conflict. And 
it means that there is a voluntary aspect of the conflict of interpretations which 
feeds Ricœur’s perspectivism (close to Nietzsche’s peculiar notion of objectivity) 
and whose result is an enlarged standpoint, as I argued in parts three and four, 
picking up the thread of an interpretation of Kant put forward by Arendt and 
Mário Jorge de Carvalho. 
In what concerns the domains of origin and application of conflicts in 
Ricœur’s works, as well as their treatability and alleged solutions, the three stages 
of the course of conflict should have demonstrated in a sufficient manner how 
radically plural they are. Conflict is given a proper ethos, and a certain 
productivity, right at the outset of the existential level, with the appraisal of 
Jaspers’s loving struggle. At that stage, it stems from both an interpersonal and an 
existential level, and it comes to bear in our action and our relation with the 
history of philosophy. In Freedom and Nature and Fallible Man the many 
conflicts that phenomenology and philosophical anthropology reveal stem from 
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ethics, in the broadest sense (the conflict of values and modes of life, duties and 
the value of happiness, passion and the law, and so on) and affect our stance 
towards reality in general, and our perception of our position within it, and the 
possibilities for our action (saying yes to a world that says no). In History and 
Truth and later, in the hermeneutic phase, conflict stems from an appropriation of 
the history of philosophy and its properly philosophical assessment, and comes to 
bear on both an evaluation of reality, language (its broken character) and decide 
both the general status and the inner workings of the process of interpretation. This 
is evident in the way perspectives are enlarged by the process of the conflict of 
interpretations. Indeed, they find their domains of application in the conflicts of 
interpretations (the conflict between hermeneutics of suspicion and recollection or 
restoration of meaning, the conflicts between hermeneutics, psychoanalysis, 
structuralism and phenomenology) or conflicts within interpretation (the conflict 
between explanation and understanding and the hermeneutical arc of the second 
stage of Ricœur’s hermeneutics). In the chapters on unconscious conflict and the 
traversal of psychoanalysis we have seen energetic conflicts originating in our 
psychic life, having effects in all our life, and eventually seeking cure through 
hermeneutic interpretation and/or psychoanalytical practice. In both chapters on 
the conflicted self we have seen how these psychic conflicts, and conflicts of 
interpretations in general affect our identity and how we are, as it were, torn 
between many different interpretations about our selves and our action, and how a 
sense of self must be won over in the fight against suspicion. Finally, in the last 
chapters of the practical conflict, we have seen conflicts originating in both 
fundamental ethics (the conflict of duties) and applied ethics (the conflict of norms 
in the medical and judicial domains) and being given practical solutions that 
involved adapting behavior and/or finding (or inventing) new rules. 
Consequently, as we can see, Ricœur adopts mixed diagnoses and varying 
strategies according to the specific conflicts he is dealing with. Some conflicts, he 
argues, are ineluctable. This is the case of “tragic conflict”, the “tragic of action”. 
This is also, many times, the case of obeying laws in complex situations, hard 
cases in which following a rule automatically entails violating another one of a 
different order, and we are forced to make a decision. It is also the case of the 
conflict between application of an abstract law, and solicitude for the particular 
case of a given person. In the practical domain, moreover, Ricœur deems it fit to 
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detect conflicts, and evidently not to create new ones. If we are “acting and 
suffering human beings” there is no need to add further weight to the burden of 
suffering. In the theoretical domain, on the other hand, and as I just mentioned, 
this detectivism is complemented by a strategy of creating conflicts for 
epistemological reasons. That is, Ricœur sometimes opposes different theories in 
order to show their respective blind spots. Moreover, there are cases in which the 
result of the conflict is a creative new position: for instance, when interpretation is 
postulated as a result of the hermeneutic arc, i.e., when the different phases of 
explanation and understanding do add up and result in ever new, more complete 
interpretations. Or when from the conflict of duties and norms there is a new norm 
discovered or invented, through the application of a reflective judgment. These are 
conflicts in which Ricœur really displays a skill not only of arbitration, but really a 
creative talent, because from the arbitration and the setting up of limits and 
dialectical interaction, something new is put forward. But there are also other 
conflicts in which even though there is dialectical interaction, Ricœur really is 
taking sides and ultimately defending some positions in relation to others (whether 
or not he explicitly acknowledges this). This is the case when he defends 
hermeneutics as recollection of meaning and post-critical faith against 
hermeneutics of suspicion; hermeneutics against reductionist structuralism; the 
primacy of the teleological standpoint over the deontological one; or attestation, 
once again, over suspicion. In these cases, Ricœur is not so much the referee, as 
one of the parties, even though he adopts a mixed strategy of back and forth 
between the argumentative, interested position, and the allegedly more general and 
disinterested standpoint. 
Ultimately, what are the provisional conclusions about the status of 
Ricœur’s philosophy, and of the way he deals with conflicts within it? What type 
of philosophy is it, and what are its more decisive conflicts, and their respective 
consequences? 
Let me start by mentioning the most fundamental conflict for his 
theoretical framework. This is, without doubt, the conflict between Kant and 
Hegel that defined his self-professed paradoxical Post-Hegelian Kantianism. It is a 
conflict between Hegel’s all-encompassing, pervasive, creative dialectics ending 
up in the standpoint of the Absolute and Kant’s more sober philosophy of limits 
which refuses the totalization of any given object beyond the bounds of 
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experience, and ultimately results in the standstill of the antinomies. It is a conflict 
between limit and mediation, between creative production and the dispelling of 
temptation in the name of sobriety and, why not say it, a principle of reality 
anchored in a philosophy of finitude. Let us call this conflict, as it was understood 
and appropriated by Ricœur, the overarching theoretical conflict that defines the 
framework of his philosophy. If understood well, this conflict, which is twofold, 
allows us to grasp both Ricœur’s methodological creativity and its inner 
delimitation. Providing the limits to his philosophy we find the Kantian grasp of 
conflict as reciprocal (de)limitation: never can we reach the standpoint of the 
Absolute and never can we proclaim to know total objects such as God or the 
immortality of the soul; within these strict limits Ricœur follows the Hegelian 
inspiration of conflict as a semi-formal dialectics moved by a dynamic of 
productive, creative opposition. Kant wins over Hegel in what comes down to the 
most fundamental question: Kant’s critical philosophy draws an inner delimitation 
of the outer contours of philosophy’s legitimate domain, against Hegel’s 
pretentions. What we cannot know, we can only believe or hope for. But 
ultimately, Hegel’s pervasive, dialectical – if you allow the wordplay –, partial 
victory consists in this: all that happens within these strict limits provided by the 
Kantian framework is a result of the Hegelian inspiration of creative conflict. This 
is, of course, a very formal description. And even Hegelian dialectics taken up as a 
“fragmentary dialectics”, without Aufhebung would assume different forms and be 
more influential in some domains than others, depending on how far Ricœur is 
willing to recover Hegel in a particular sphere. For instance, as we have seen, 
Ricœur thinks that the domain of the “objective spirit”, namely that of action, 
freedom and institutions, and the intersubjective background that frames it 
(recognition-patterns, the recovery of the Sittlichkeit, and so forth) are the 
privileged domain of Hegelian dialectics, and in these domains he allows himself 
to recover Hegel, at least partially, in both form and content. In the rest of his 
philosophy, Hegelian dialectic’s form and content would be somewhat truncated, 
but its inspiring intention was there, moving Ricœur.  
Now, as I just said, this is only a formal description of the creativity 
promoted by Ricœur’s appropriation of Hegelian dialectic. Indeed, this form will 
have to be filled with a particular content and help determine it; if the Hegelian 
content and overambitious claims are for the most part set aside, Ricœur and his 
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philosophy of finitude inspired by Kant, Husserl, Jaspers and so many others 
would finds its privileged instantiations in hermeneutics. With hermeneutic 
philosophy and the meaningful analyzes of language, imagination and semantic 
innovation, Ricœur’s philosophy is pervaded by many creative conflicts that 
provide the flesh to the bones of his antithetical philosophy.  
Within this antithetical, hermeneutic, creative philosophy many other 
conflicts take place, as we have seen in part four. I will still come back to one of 
them in the next part, the conflict between belonging and distanciation in 
hermeneutics, and its consequences for a project of practical philosophy. We 
should bear in mind that the insistence on conflict and negativity notwithstanding, 
Ricœur still wagers on the primacy of affirmation over negation (like he did in 
History and Truth) and on the inescapability of our rooting in pre-existing 
conditions of belonging. But for now I will just emphasize the dialectical 
counterparts to the notion of conflict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 599 
6.2 – From Conflict to Conciliation and Back Again 
 
Throughout this thesis we have seen the contributions of many authors 
who reappraised and used the notion of conflict in their philosophies, and their 
interpretations of human action and interaction. I said in the previous section that 
one of the distinctions that the typology of conflict allows pertains to the way in 
which conflicts can or cannot be treated, and the strategies put forward by the 
philosophers who “deal” or at least acknowledge the existence of conflicts. 
On this matter, I think we can say more or less the same thing Ricœur 
stated about the presence or absence of the cogito in several philosophies: that 
there is always either too much or too little of it.1630 What is more, even the role 
that conflict occupies in each of these philosophies is subject to conflicts of 
interpretation. Honneth’s social philosophy, and namely the figure of the struggle 
for recognition in it, is a case in point. In parts one and two, as well as in part five, 
I treated the topic of the struggle for recognition as one of the main figures which 
conflict assumes in philosophy and social theory, today as in the past. And we 
have seen how there are different treatments of this topic, and different depictions 
of how to understand the conflictual processes in it. If, on the one hand, 
interpreters like Robert Williams see in recognition a positive form of 
intersubjective relations at work in all of Hegel’s philosophy, other people like 
Kojève stress the inherently conflictual part of it. And Honneth, in turn, sees an 
inherent interaction between development through the struggle for recognition and 
the apparition of new forms of social integration. And while he himself refuses to 
accept that his theory does not leave enough space for conflicts, some other 
interpreters of his philosophy, such as Bertram and Celikates, argue that 
reconciliation plays too big a role in his philosophy and that Honneth does not 
sufficiently take into account the generative power of conflict precisely because, at 
each step, it seems as if the new forms of integration are the conciliatory goal of 
the struggle for recognition. In what comes down to this topic, as we have also 
seen in part five, Ricœur insists even more in conciliation than Honneth, because 
his alternative to the model of the struggle for recognition is precisely the model of 
the states of peace of mutual recognition trough symbolic exchange. 
                                                
1630 Ricœur, Oneself as Another, p. 4. 
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As such, if we take a retrospective look on the authors analyzed in this 
dissertation and their respective takes and strategies on conflict, we see many 
different possibilities. On one of its extreme points, we find people who 
acknowledge conflicts, but seem to want to avoid them at all costs, and develop 
strategies that if followed – at least this appears to be their belief – would allow for 
conflict to be not only tackled, but eliminated. This seems to be Rawls’s position, 
and the many strategies he puts forward, from the veil of ignorance and the 
original position, to reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus, are likely to 
be an attempt to devise a complex enough model to solve conflicts in each case. In 
Habermas matters are somewhat more complicated because he undergoes a 
significant intellectual evolution. But even though he almost always speaks about 
the interest in emancipation, the truth is that ever since his Kantian turn, his efforts 
(even those of the ethics of discussion) seem to be geared towards the construction 
of a procedural model to deal with (and perhaps eliminate) conflicts.  
On the other extreme we find authors who plead for a deepening of 
conflicts. This is the case of Marx. If what we want is a revolution, the way to 
force it is to exacerbate conflicts. In that case, and in the context of “bourgeois” 
societies riddled by class conflicts, the worse the situation gets… the better it will 
be, on his account. In a different way, authors like Celikates and Bertram, and 
even Rancière, also plead for a deepening of conflicts, because they see them as 
productive and possibly positive. The same can be said for authors who couple the 
productivity of conflict with the appearance of better outcomes. This is evidently 
the case for Hegel and his rationalized version of History. It is also the case for 
Honneth, and perhaps even the later Foucault and the early Habermas, insofar as 
they all seem to see in political resistance and struggle the possibility of at least 
partial emancipation. In a different way, this is also true of Hunyadi and his 
“virtue of conflict”. Other authors also recognize conflicts but take a more 
pessimistic account on them. This is the case of Adorno and his negative 
dialectics, as well as Lyotard and the main possibility he recognizes to deal with 
conflict, namely testifying about it. Of course that all these different positions are 
adopted not only because authors have a different “attitude” towards conflicts, but 
also because they are dealing with different types of conflict, as I think should be 
clear from the reading of this dissertation. 
And so the time has come to pose the following question: amid this 
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somewhat complex cartography, what is the position occupied by Ricœur? In this 
short section I want to argue that in his nuanced and plural accounts of conflict, he 
is in fact closer to those authors who recognize conflicts but see in them both the 
possibilities of negative and positive phenomena. Suffering is a negative 
phenomenon, and the tragic of action too. The inner rift of the conflicted self, and 
psychic conflict can cause suffering and, as such, be entirely negative. But over 
and above suspicion and inner rift there is the possibility of attestation of the self, 
out of the tragic of action there can sprout a creative invention of behavior and 
rules, and so forth. As such, and as I have argued before, perhaps the best way to 
capture the specific dynamic of Ricœur’s thought is to depict it as being a dialectic 
between conflict and conciliation, one in which, in methodological terms, conflict 
is the guiding procedure but that never ceases to try and find mediations and new 
solutions to specific problems.1631 
This is, furthermore, a consequence of Ricœur’s attitude towards 
philosophy (and life, why not mention it) in general: an attitude that is 
encapsulated in the formula according to which man is “la joie du oui dans la 
tristesse du fini”. Ultimately, primary affirmation trumps negativity. As such, and 
even if conflicts are primarily negative phenomena which cannot be ignored, there 
is, more often than not, the possibility to turn them into positive phenomena. And 
thus, to be able to say yes, in spite of negativity. Consequently, if there are many 
forms of conflict in Ricœur’s works, and if they have been listed for the most part 
in this dissertation, there are also many forms of conciliation, or mediation, which 
accompany them. Ricœur explicitly stated this in his first books on Marcel, as we 
have seen in part three. Even in Freedom and Nature, the figure of paradox, taken 
from Jaspers, and which is a somewhat conflictual figure, had as its dialectical 
counterpart the figure of mystery, and Ricœur often spoke at this time about the 
“secret conciliation” of philosophy. 
As time went by, and as he probably wanted to distance himself more 
both from Hegel(ianism) and from what could be dubbed an overt “Christian 
philosophy”, that is, as he traversed the hermeneutic turn and the thematic 
discovery of the broken character of language and its inherent conflict of 
interpretations, Ricœur dropped this language of “secret conciliation”. But if, at 
                                                
1631 See Gonçalo Marcelo, “From Conflict to Conciliation and Back Again: Some Notes on 
Ricœur’s Dialectic” in Revista Filosófica de Coimbra 38 (2010): 341-366. 
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this point in time, conflict became a more encompassing methodological tool as 
the ontological claims began to be toned down, the truth is that the figures of 
conciliation undertook a similar turn, and continued accompanying conflict. Thus, 
at least in a way, symbols conciliate conflicts of interpretations in the first phase of 
his hermeneutic theory, interpretation conciliates the modes of explanation and 
understanding in the second phase, psychoanalytic theory and practice provide (at 
least hope for) a conciliation of ourselves through a resolution of our inner 
conflicts, even if this comes at the price of a hard recognition of truth and an 
abandonment of illusion; similarly, in his practical philosophy the attestation of 
our capacities is a response to suspicion which conciliates us with the existence of 
our own identity in the mode of ipseity, judicial and juridical intervention are a 
way to peacefully solve conflicts and at least in a partial way to conciliate the 
litigants and to contribute to social peace, and in the Course of Recognition the 
clearings of recognition and the “states of peace” can be seen as partial pauses in 
the struggle where both parties in conflict recognize each other and are at least 
partially conciliated. 
Why do I insist on saying that conciliations are “partial”? Because at both 
the theoretical and the practical level, Ricœur claims, mediations are “fragile” and 
“provisional”, as he states in Amour et justice. This means that the possibility of 
conflict is so widespread that there is always the possibility of conflict’s second 
coming. And this, in itself, can be good or bad. At the hermeneutical level of the 
conflict of interpretations, it is in itself a creative phenomenon. Through 
metaphors, narratives and the dialectic between explanation and understanding, 
new conciliations are new provisional interpretations that at a given moment take 
shape. And new critiques and conflicts are the procedures which will destabilize 
these prior forms and keep the movement of reinterpretation going. As such, this 
can be an unending process. But this is not necessarily a negative phenomenon. 
Quite the contrary. It is what keeps interpretation dynamic. If, on the other hand, 
in the practical domain, a fragile equilibrium of peace between two parties at war 
ends up in a rekindling of social conflict, this is probably a bad phenomenon, as 
peace can be an end in itself. But even this might be contested, since, arguably, in 
some situations a position of resistance can be a better solution, and lead to a 
better result, than, for instance, an unjust occupation. 
Ultimately, there is one step which Ricœur never takes, and this is to 
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postulate the possibility of a full and total reconciliation (of everything: thought, 
reality, praxis, and so forth). This would be tantamount, perhaps, to the last stage 
of Hegel’s philosophy. And this Ricœur refuses to accept, for reasons explained 
above. But as he makes clear in one interview with Olivier Abel, mentioned by 
Dosse, and which I quote in the epigraph of this dissertation, we cannot think 
about conflict, if we do not also at the same time think about the possibility of 
reconciliation. This is a bold claim. It means that these notions are connected 
almost in a transcendental manner. But, reinforcing his Kantian stance, Ricœur 
also states that this cannot really be fully instantiated in real institutions. That is, 
even if we pose it as an ideal, it is an asymptotic ideal. Even if the desire for just 
institutions is part of our aiming for the good life, even if we ultimately want to be 
reconciled (with ourselves, with one another, and so forth) this is always an 
asymptotic ideal. And this is the reason why, refusing to objectify what we cannot 
know, there is a number of things we can only hope for. Reconciliation is one of 
those things. This does not mean that we cannot strive for it in practice. Ricœur 
often speaks about forgiveness. A “difficult” forgiveness, it is true, but a possible 
forgiveness after all. And one which is eventually considered to be one of our 
main capacities. 
As such, for me at least, in my individual reading, Ricœur’s supple, 
complex thought revolves around a multi-layered dialectic between conflict and 
conciliation. Acknowledging conflicts, calling our attention to their huge 
importance, but also trying to deal with them and to posit the possibility of 
conciliations, while at the same time also indicating the limits to this approach. 
Displaying trust in action and in our power to attest our capacities. But never 
forgetting that we are always “acting and suffering” human beings. 
At the end of the sixth part of this dissertation, the multilayered 
complexity of conflict phenomena and their interpretation has become apparent. 
Conflict can be seen as a process structuring reality and guiding human relations. 
Ricœur, for his part, acknowledges its presence, tries to mitigate or solve practical 
conflicts in human reality in order to minimize suffering, and uses the conflict of 
interpretations as a methodological tool to enlarge the domain of the thinkable and 
to provide new solutions to theoretical problems with which he is confronted. In 
order to do that, he resorts to mediation (the dialectial crisscrossing between the 
different positions in conflict), most notably of which in his famous long route; 
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but also to conciliation properly speaking. Conciliation must be here understood in 
two different ways. In the practical domain, conciliation is intrinsically connected 
with a horizon of peace. It is accomplished and maintained through practices of 
intersubjective cooperation and the maintenance of just institutions. It likely 
entails the exercise of power in common that Ricœur calls for in Oneself as 
Another, and can perhaps find a metaphoric and / or utopian model in the states of 
peace of The Course of Recognition. As we have seen in part five, these states are 
envisaged as only provisory “clearings” amid what is otherwise an inherent 
struggle; be that as it may, conciliation is, in the practical domain, a goal that 
Ricœur puts forward. 
In the theoretical domain, however, the dialectic between conflict and 
conciliation is, in my opinion, constitutive of Ricœur’s thought, taken as a whole. 
In order to grasp this, we have to position ourselves in the hermeneutical conflict 
of interpretations, taken at a methological level. If, as I stated before, there is an 
instrinsic constructivism in the process of the conflict of interpretations, and if 
what is at stake is solving theoretical problems by providing innovative solutions, 
it is in my belief that Ricœur often resorted to a back and forth dialectical 
movement between conflicts and conciliations. If there is a phenomena of 
overdetermination of symbols, cultural artifacts and so forth, and if only a 
theoretical pluralism can provide the right solution to this problem, Ricœur’s 
provisional conciliations of different theories in conflict amount to his own 
interpretations of the phenomena at stake. However, since every interpretation can 
in turn be challenged, when rethinking his own positions, or the positions of others 
(through the act of reading, debating, and so forth) Ricœur reassessed ancient 
positions, trying to think them anew. That is, he challenged previously established 
theoretical conciliations, by reintroducing the process of the conflict of 
interpretations. 
This is, in a nutshell, my interpretation of his overall methodology. By 
going from conflict to conciliation and back again, his philosophy was able to 
constantly put forward new interpretations and strive to do justice to a project of 
informed original thinking – even though this is my own assessment, not Ricœur’s 
depiction of it. 
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Part Seven 
 
Critical Remarks 
 
In the last part I tried to offer a synchronic approach of Ricœur’s 
philosophy, through a systematization of my rational hermeneutical reconstruction 
and discussion of his thought, and namely of the conflicts present in it, how they 
reveal the core cartography and dynamic of his philosophy, and also the 
meaningful ways he attempts to deal with them. Now I want to offer the dialectical 
counterpart of last chapter, by pointing out not so much the consistency, fertility 
and overall richness and brilliance of his thought (I think that work is done) but 
rather by signaling some discrepancies in it, and also some of the points in which I 
distance myself (a little) from his philosophy. 
As I stated before, Ricœur’s is a very balanced philosophy, halfway 
between many theoretical influences and somehow trying to juggle them together 
in his creative solutions, and many times doing his best to manage fragile 
mediations and unstable balances. This is his way of orienting himself in thought 
and being a radical pluralist and believing in the conflict of interpretations; he 
would never have thought that this should be, strictly speaking, any one else’s 
position in philosophy. Or, better put, we can admire his style and erudition, and 
agree with many of his claims, either in general or specific terms, without however 
having to adhere to them as a whole, in every detail. This is made even more 
obvious by the fact that his is no systematic thought, by the fact that clearly he 
sometimes changed ideas and by the recognition that if looked at from a 
diachronic point of view, contradictions in his thought will evidently appear. 
As such, in my opinion, one can still claim to be inspired by 
“Ricœurianism”1632 or even to be “Ricœurian” in a narrow sense, while 
simultaneously expressing disagreement with the positions taken by Ricœur at 
some point. Indeed, given his to and fro in some key areas, some of these 
“disagreements” might stem only from a decision to leave his middle ground in 
                                                
1632 I am not sure if this word has been used before and I admit its strangeness, but perhaps it is 
now time to coin some expression to express Ricœur’s philosophy taken as a whole, its overall tone 
and the whole complex of theoretical and practical questions (including its problems and 
contradictions) that it puts forward. 
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some areas, and to take a left turn in a crossroad where he kept dialectically 
zigzagging between left and right. This is precisely what I intend to do in this short 
part of this thesis. In its two brief sections I will ask two main questions: how 
radical is Ricœur’s hermeneutics? And how “critical” is his “critical theory” – 
even though I am fully aware that Ricœur never really wanted to develop a 
“radical hermeneutics”, or even a “critical theory” for that matter. 
Nonetheless, since other authors before me tried to develop critical 
projects inspired by Ricœur, and since I do think that these projects can be spelled 
out and put forward using some of the tools he provided us, I want to ask these 
questions as critical assessments of his philosophy in order to, in a second 
moment, better situate myself against that backdrop. 
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7.1 – How Radical is Ricœur’s Hermeneutics? Reassessing the 
Dialectic Between Belonging and Distanciation 
 
The first example of this balanced position, in which Ricœur keeps going 
from one pole to the other, can be found in his hermeneutics, which wants to 
encompass both a position of hearing, understanding and recollecting, and another 
one of suspecting, criticizing and distancing (eventually later complemented by a 
moment of appropriation). He sometimes argues that we need to do both: to hear 
and to criticize. Many times, he also states that critique is a second moment, 
mediating between a naïve first moment (of conviction, for instance) and a critical, 
better equipped third moment, which appears after innocence is lost by its being 
put to the critical test. As one of the paradigmatic moments of this polarity, I will 
choose the dialectic between belonging and distanciation. Indeed, it might seem 
that this is really a middle ground which is occupied by Ricœur. And indeed in 
some texts it is, and “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideologies” is one such 
case. In the following pages I will argue for the need to actually choose the pole of 
distanciation (without however dropping the fact that we still need to start from 
the pole of belonging) and deepen it. But in order to show the differences with one 
of the positions adopted by Ricœur, I will tackle one of the texts in which Ricœur 
actually shows himself to be radically… on the side of belonging. This is the case 
of “Science and Ideology”. 
In “Science and Ideology”1633 Ricœur undertakes yet another assessment 
of the phenomenon of ideology. As in his other texts on this matter, he aims at 
criticizing ideologies, while also leaving open the possibility that they fulfill a 
positive, constitutive role, as a function of reproductive social imagination. For 
reasons similar to those I spelled out in parts one and two of this thesis, when 
assessing Marx’s own standpoint on the critique of ideologies, he totally refuses to 
adopt a position akin to that of Marx or Althusser, i.e., to oppose to ideology an 
alleged “scientific” position – whether this is the supposed scientific standpoint of 
dialectical materialism or any other type of “scientific”, “objective” stance on 
ideology which would assume (and reserve for itself) the extravagant possibility of 
placing its own perspective outside of any type of ideology whatsoever, as it were. 
                                                
1633 Ricœur, “Science and Ideology”, in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, pp. 222-246. 
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For Ricœur this is itself an illusory position since he believes that ideology is first 
and foremost a positive, constitutive function of the social imaginary, and because 
of that we can never be completely rid of ideologies. What we can do, on the other 
hand, is to try to detect those ideologies which are really pathological, secondary 
and distorted reified forms. Those we can legitimately criticize. But this is done by 
playing the ideological (or utopian) game, not by pretending to be outside of it. 
This much, I think, is a crystal clear position. 
However, in this article Ricœur goes a little further when criticizing the 
“scientific” takes on the critique of ideology. Firstly, he states that ideology 
“operates behind your backs, rather than appearing as a theme before our eyes” 
and that we “think from it, rather than about it”.1634 As such, it tends to conceal 
itself and since one of its functions is to perpetuate a founding act “in the mode of 
representation”, it ultimately is both “interpretation of the real and obturation of 
the possible”.1635 He then proceeds to criticize those who, criticizing ideologies, 
surreptitiously claim that historical agents have no real subjectivity1636 but at the 
same time pretend to have risen to a subjectless (that is, “objective”) discourse 
from which they exercise their critiques. 
Then, in a second moment, he turns against the possibility of critique as a 
combatant science, arguing that if we exercise critique in such a manner, then we 
cannot “avoid surrendering it to the quasi-pathological phenomena denounced in 
the adversary’s camp”.1637 To be sure, he does clarify that by “combatant science” 
he means the Leninist interpretation of Marxism, which he connects directly with 
Althusser; his foe in this article is thus the scientific postulation of the 
“epistemological break” and so forth. In “partisan science” Ricœur sees the risk of 
Marxism becoming itself… ideological. Thus Marxism as the “science of the 
party” gets lambasted, as well as its own oversimplifications, such as the division 
of societies in two rigid classes. His conclusion is that after Marx, orthodox 
Marxism paradoxically became one of the greatest examples of an ideological type 
of discourse.1638 To be clear, Ricœur aims his attacks precisely at orthodox 
Marxism, and not at other forms of Marxism. Indeed, he actually pleads for an 
                                                
1634 Ibid., p. 227. 
1635 Ibid. 
1636 Ibid., p. 233. 
1637 Ibid., p. 235. 
1638 Ibid., p. 236. 
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unorthodox Marxism, more or less in the same vein as the one defended by critical 
theorists. But in order for it to be valid, he claims, it must be dissociated from the 
exercise of power, authority and enforced orthodoxy. That much is clear, and I see 
no reason to criticize this position. 
However, the last pages of this article are proof of an even deeper 
criticism. Firstly, he argues that since the social bond is itself symbolic, it is futile 
to try to reach “reality” beyond symbolism. He explicitly claims that there is an 
“impossibility of reaching a social reality prior to symbolization”.1639 
Consequently, as we can see, this is not only the linguistification of action at its 
height, but also a linguistification of society, and indeed reality, at its apex. It is, 
obviously enough, a problematic contention, and it is at odds with some of 
Ricœur’s phenomenological studies, where he sometimes argues that there are pre-
linguistic layers of reality, perceived through passive syntheses, and so on. 
But the critique of critique goes on. According to Ricœur, there is an 
“impossibility of exercising a critique which would be absolutely radical” because 
such a critique would entail a “total reflection”.1640 Again, in my opinion, this is a 
very problematic claim. According to Ricœur, any critique which wants to be 
“radical” surreptitiously acquires totalizing pretentions; and these pretentions 
infringe upon his philosophy of limits, as we have seen in part one of this thesis. It 
is not very clear how this should be so. In order to spell out this argument, Ricœur 
invokes Ladrière and his distinction between two models of explanation: that in 
terms of projects and that in terms of systems.1641 According to him, both involve 
pretentions of totalization, and the contemporary forms of Marxism (those of 
Ricœur’s time) appear to him as falling prey to this desire of totalization, because 
they offer explanations either in terms of projects, or in terms of systems. 
That this is the case of explanations in terms of systems, I think is a rather 
undisputable argument. A system, by definition, aims at completion. That this is 
the case of a project, on the other hand, seems to me incomprehensible. Here is the 
claim and its justification: 
 
Explanation in terms of projects is necessarily an explanation in which the theoretician 
                                                
1639 Ibid., p. 237. 
1640 Ibid., p. 238. 
1641 Ricœur is here recurring to Jean Ladrière, “Signes et concepts en Science” in L’articulation du 
sens (Paris: Cerf, 1970), pp. 40-50. 
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implicates himself, hence requiring that he clarify his own situation and his own project in 
relation to that situation. It is here that the unstated presupposition of total reflection 
intervenes.1642  
 
Why does this require “total reflection”? The claim is unclear. Either Ricœur is 
claiming that in order for one to be involved in a project, and to explain his or her 
action in terms of that project, one needs to be totally clear about oneself, or that 
he or she needs to be totally clear about the situation in which he or she is put 
(which then entails a total clarification of reality, in order that one be able to 
understand oneself within it). Again, this strikes me as valid within a, so to speak, 
“scientific” and/or “systematic” take on human action and its consequences. Such 
a stance would be, in my opinion (and agreeing here with Ricœur) overambitious. 
But why should this be the case with an explanation which involves projects? 
Must a subjective motivation for one’s engaged action and the postulation of a 
project which orients action really entail an elusive and hidden pretention of 
totalization in theoretical terms? I do not think so, and if I here distance myself 
from Ricœur, I am also, eo ipso, in a situation of Ricœur contra Ricœur, because 
in other works he does uphold the project of emancipation as viable and indeed a 
necessary task to be espoused by hermeneutics, as we have seen above. 
Be that as it may, in “Science and Ideology” Ricœur explicitly puts 
himself in the position of an hermeneutics of historical understanding which 
ultimately does not leave enough space for the critical exercise. According to him, 
this is “a relation of belonging upon which we can never entirely reflect”.1643 In 
the last analyzis, in this article, he does not completely renounce the idea of 
interests of reason, or the possibility of acting through projects, or even the interest 
in emancipation.1644 But he does argue that we can never sever our ties with 
belonging, and thus that “ideology always remains the grid, the code of 
interpretation”.1645 It is my Sittlichkeit, Ricœur claims. Curiously enough, and 
adopting a dubious wordplay, he claims that even if this is so, and if we must 
recognize it, we still need “distancing”. But he severely curtails the possibilities of 
critique, by criticizing its “arrogance” and, at the same time, severing the position 
                                                
1642 Ricœur, “Science and Ideology”, p. 238. 
1643 Ibid., p. 243. 
1644 Ibid., p. 245. 
1645 Ibid. 
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of “distancing” from the exercise of “critique”. His final sentence in this article 
states: “nothing is more necessary today than to renounce the arrogance of critique 
and to carry on with patience the endless work of distancing and renewing our 
historical substance”.1646 
If we decide to undertake an exercise in psychologism and try to find 
Ricœur’s intentions behind the text (always a dubious method) we can perhaps 
find the motivation for these attacks in a criticism of orthodox Marxism, and 
namely Althusser’s. Ricœur does not think it is possible to renounce our 
Sittlichkeit and his target is the overambitious “scientific” claims of forms of 
thought which, for their arrogance, risk becoming (or indeed do happily become) 
totalitarian. That might be a partially valid reason for this virulent attack. But in 
this Ricœur risks, so to speak, throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Because, 
after all, what would philosophy, and indeed human action be, without the 
dynamism of critique even in its sometimes extreme forms? 
Ricœur is more confortable with reconstruction than with Heidegger’s 
Destruktion or Derrida’s deconstruction, and even though he uses suspicion, he 
handles it with care. But can we not argue that such as he many times calls for 
utopia to dethrone ideology, can it not be possible that sometimes, in some 
situations, what is called for is precisely a radical critique? Or even, that in some 
practical situations, the orientation by projects – arrogant or not, is that even the 
important matter? – is a valuable guidance, and indeed does not necessarily entail 
an implicit or explicit effort at totalization? In this article, Ricœur seems to fall 
prey – and this is almost never the case within his philosophy – to the straw man 
fallacy. However, as is obvious and as I mentioned many times throughout this 
thesis, in many other places we find positive assessments of the function of 
critique in his philosophy. 
Nonetheless, taking into account this typified and somewhat caricatured 
version of critique he presents in this article, I will have the opportunity to present 
a different take on a hermeneutical social philosophy in the next part of this thesis. 
But this already provides an occasion to discuss exactly how critical is Ricœur’s 
critical theory, and how radical his hermeneutics is. 
As these few lines above already hint, I envisage the relation between 
                                                
1646 Ibid., p. 246. 
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belonging and distanciation in a slightly different manner. Of course that we are 
not born nowhere. No man is born in Rawls’s original position. We are the product 
of historical societies, with their concrete values and practices. As such, we belong 
to somewhere; that much is granted. However, my claim is that we need to further 
develop the pole of distanciation. Ricœur admits that distanciation is productive 
and he often equates distanciation with methodology and critique. As such, he 
admits that it is distanciation, for instance within the scope of a theory of reading, 
that brings about new interpretations. As such, it is one of the processes of 
perspective enlargement and renovation of meaning. In the first phase of his 
hermeneutical theory, and of his hermeneutics of the self, he also grounds 
semantics in existence, as we saw. But what he never does is to draw all the 
existential consequences of a serious and radical use of distanciation and critique. 
Within the scope of that first phase of his hermeneutics, one of the criteria to 
validate good theories amid the conflict of interpretation was their disclosing 
power. If a given theory was able to reveal a certain aspect of myself which, 
without it, would remain silent and unknown, then this theory would be valid (at 
least within certain limits). This is what allows him to validate psychoanalysis, at 
least up to some extent. But if this is the case, couldn’t a relentless use of critique 
(exercised, after all, in the name of truth and justice, even if these are only yet 
another asymptotic ideals) result in such a radical alteration of our perspective that 
it would ultimately lead to a profound revision of our point of departure? Of our 
condition of belonging (of our identification with certain values, practices, and so 
forth)? 
In other words, what Ricoeurian hermeneutics does not sufficiently take 
into account is the experience of conversion (by which I do not necessarily mean 
the religious experience, strictu sensu, but rather the deep change in convictions, 
whatever its nature). As we have seen, convictions are very important for Ricœur, 
as is our point of departure and our condition of belonging. In Oneself as Another, 
convictions are recuperated in a revised form, after the critical moment. They are 
no longer naïve convictions, but, so to speak, “informed” convictions which have 
traversed the proof of critique. But the question then is: how seriously does 
Ricœur take into account the possibility that the traversal of critique really 
radically transforms our spontaneous conviction? Can it not be that in this process 
I convert myself to another ideal or value, if I see that my point of departure, 
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indeed my condition of belonging and adhering to something was proven wrong? 
And if this possibility is totally out of my reach will not my hermeneutical 
positioning ultimately reveal itself to be more closed, less receptive of otherness 
than what I would like to admit? If critique proves me wrong, can or should my 
initial position survive just out of tenacity? Would this not be, alas, a profession of 
bad fate?  
I understand that this depiction might be problematic to what is usually 
called the “hermeneutical circle”, i.e., of believing to understand and vice-versa. 
However, if this circle is to function in a virtuous and not a vicious way (as 
Ricœur and hermeneutical philosophers contend) the possibility of radical revision 
of the starting point needs to be left open. Any other positioning amounts to bad 
faith. I do not believe that Ricœur fell into this position in his own practice. He 
actually changed ideas a lot, in spite of the more or less coherent synchronic 
account I provided in the last part. What I am doing now is only to pinpoint the 
problems in a very specific part of his hermeneutical theory, and trying to 
reformulate matters in a slightly different manner. 
Now, by emphasizing the pole of distanciation what I am also doing, 
obviously, is accentuating the pole of critique. And what I am proposing to spell 
out is a more radical version of hermeneutics; allow me to call it, for lack of a 
better designation, a “radical hermeneutics”, even though this should not be 
mistaken with John Caputo’s own project1647; a hermeneutics suitable to found a 
                                                
1647 See John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics. Repetition, deconstruction and the hermeneutic 
project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987). Caputo indeed spells out the project of a 
radical hermeneutic, but one whose emphasis is different from mine. He claims that part of his 
project entails reminding us that life is difficult (see his introduction, “Restoring Life to Its 
Original Difficulty”, pp. 1-10). According to him, his project should be understood as a 
prolongation of Heidegger’s Destruktion and Derrida’s deconstruction. Through epoché, he wants 
to radically criticize the metaphysics of presence and the “given”. He wants us to consider 
ourselves as a question (like in Augustine) and therefore insists in the “differences”, “ruptures” and 
“abysses” which he claims constitute us. As such, he attempts to radicalize Derrida’s différance 
and to apply it to our own existence. I am sympathetic towards his project, insofar as it insists on 
the hardship of life, and the criticism of the given. However, I have different starting and ending 
points in my own reflection. Caputo follows the thread Kierkegaard-Husserl-Heidegger-Derrida 
and he distances himself both from Gadamer and Ricœur, because they are allegedly thinkers of 
the “metaphysics of presence”. I do not think this is entirely fair and, as is evident, I take Ricœur as 
my point of departure, in order to afterwards emphasize one of the points he puts forward. 
Ultimately, Caputo also wants to go beyond critique and nihilism and he comes back to the topic of 
mystery. Consequently, his ultimate project entails a blurring of the limits between philosophy and 
theology. As for me, I keep my emphasis on critique and Critical Theory. Caputo ultimately 
anticipates his point of arrival (encountering in the abyss the religious element). I honestly do not 
know if we can anticipate that point of arrival, even though we formulate projects. Because the 
results might be surprising, the questions must be, in my opinion, open-ended. Finally, and even 
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specific type of Critical Theory. I will spell this out in more detail in the next part. 
But for now allow me to question Ricœur’s own critical theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                 
though I eventually mildly criticize Ricœur, it goes without saying that I do not find him to be as 
conservative or irrelevant as Caput seems to imply. Ultimately, my project is also post-
metaphysical, like the ones of Habermas and Honneth; this is not the case for Caputo. My last point 
of connection with him is to be found in the reappraisal of humor and irony as denunciations of the 
given (something which he recuperates from Kierkegaard and Nietzsche). In that point, I totally 
agree with him. 
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7.2 – How Critical is Ricœur’s Critical Theory? 
 
The title of this section might be unfair and somewhat misleading, 
because Ricœur never claimed to be a “critical theorist”. Nonetheless, he himself 
asserted in “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideologies” that he wanted to put 
forward a “critical hermeneutics” and this project has been further developed by 
John B. Thompson.1648 Such a project interests me very much because, as I see it, 
a “radical hermeneutics” is also, certainly, a “critical hermeneutics”, for reasons I 
explain in the next section. Since Ricœur claimed to want to undertake such a 
project, and since there is indeed the possibility to at least find in Ricœur the 
elements to reconstruct a version of a “Critical Theory” in his writings, an effort 
forcefully spelled out by David Kaplan1649, the question thus begs to be asked: 
how critical is his Critical Theory? At the same time, answering this question will 
allow me to detect a few more tensions in Ricœur’s own standpoint. 
Let me start with these critical remarks in order to afterwards move on to 
Ricœur’s Critical Theory and the way his philosophy must be interpreted if it is to 
lead the way to a truly Critical Theory. Firstly, Ricœur is not always entirely clear 
about his own standpoint and procedures. He almost always claims playing a role 
of arbitration in the conflict of interpretations but, as we have seen, many times he 
is actually committed to one of the sides. Furthermore, he also does not always 
spell out the criteria that could validate theories amid the conflict of 
interpretations. For instance, as we have seen, in Interpretation Theory he 
mentions Hirsch’s topic of subjective validation and stresses the need for some 
“rules of thumb” but he falls short of elaborating them. For this reason, we are left 
wondering what these might be. Thirdly, there is a tension in Ricœur’s account of 
freedom and in other related accounts. Even though they are situated at different 
levels, there is a certain discrepancy between Ricœur’s insistence on consenting to 
necessity (in Freedom and Nature) alongside his apology of a “loving obedience” 
(in Thinking Biblically), and the more voluntarist emphasis on human capacities in 
Oneself as Another, complemented by the exploration of recognition and the 
assertion of “rights to capabilities” in The Course of Recognition.  
                                                
1648 See John B. Thompson, Critical Hermeneutics. A Study in the Thought of Paul Ricœur and 
Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
1649 See David M. Kaplan, Ricœur’s Critical Theory (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2003). 
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Finally, there is also a certain lack of radicality in the passage from some 
of the adhesions of his youth and the positions of his maturity. For instance, in 
political terms, and as Johann Michel has argued, there is a “Rawlsian turn”1650 in 
Ricœur and within this turn, and the partial conversion of Ricœur to political 
liberalism, there is something of the emphasis on critique of the social reality and 
of the push for political equality that is lost, and that was present in his early years. 
Even the insistence on the hermeneutics of suspicion, and in the interest of reason 
in emancipation, became less and less frequent in Ricœur as years went by. At the 
ontological level, Ricœur’s prudence in Oneself as Another is only the culmination 
of a process of toning down of some of his more radical claims. For instance, the 
level of radicality of the proposal of “basic metaphoricity” found in The Rule of 
Metaphor is not to be found elsewhere and in a way, when Ricœur decides to drop 
the vocabulary of reference and substitute it for “redescription” in Time and 
Narrative, he already loses most of that radicality (this is something that has been 
argued by George H. Taylor). Accordingly, the most interesting and radical of 
Ricœur’s attempts at developing a Critical Theory is to be found precisely in the 
Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, and these are unparalleled elsewhere. Indeed, 
without the efforts of George H. Taylor, this immensely valuable writing would 
probably have been left unpublished for many years.  
With these remarks I do not wish to claim that Ricœur’s position lost in 
insight throughout the years, or that he just adopted conservative positions. In fact, 
nothing could be further from the truth and as Pierre-Olivier Monteil1651 argued, 
there is a continuity of a political project underlying Ricœur’s philosophy, and this 
is a project from which a Critical Theory can draw many elements. For instance, 
as Monteil claims, we can find in Ricœur a critique of capitalism and market 
domination. Furthermore, and to reiterate, it is in the later years that Ricœur fully 
embraced his position of the “philosophe dans la cité” as Dosse argues, and some 
of his most interesting claims for the development of a political and social 
philosophy, or a Critical Theory, are to be found in these years (the distinction 
between power in common and power over, the emphasis on indignation and 
recognition, and so forth).  
                                                
1650 See Johann Michel, Paul Ricœur, une philosophie de l’agir humain, op. cit., pp. 384-394. 
1651 See Pierre-Olivier Monteil, “Paul Ricœur. Variations et continuités d’un projet politique” in 
Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricœur Studies 4/1 (2013): 170-183. 
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Be that as it may, my critical remarks are here to show that these tensions 
and slight discrepancies in Ricœur’s thought do exist and that there is no point in 
hiding them. As such, even though Ricœur’s intellectual production and life 
command immense respect, because no official Ricoeurian “school” exists (and he 
would probably have preferred to keep it that way) and since his thought is so 
complex, multi-layered and allows for so many different possibilities, I think that 
in being inspired by his philosophy it is important to read him properly. And this 
means that even though we can try to present his philosophy in the more 
exhaustive way we are capable of (and this is what I tried to do through the notion 
of conflict, and its ultimate dialectic with conciliation), and also to rationally 
reconstruct the main movement guiding it, we should recognize the crossroads in 
which he sometimes was. As such, depending on the nature of the project we want 
to develop further, it is important to choose the right paths in these crossroads. 
For me, thus, choosing the right path in here means following the path of 
critique when putting forward what I think is a Ricoeurian inspired project of 
social philosophy. As such, and from my own limited standpoint, how critical is 
Ricœur’s Critical Theory? It depends on the particular features of his work that we 
wish to emphasize. If we follow the account provided in “Science and Ideology”, 
is is inevitable to conclude that by “criticizing critique” his standpoint is lacking 
both in radicality and in critical attitude. Likewise, if we choose to emphasize the 
practical aspects of consenting to necessity (for instance, those of Freedom and 
Nature), it is also very likely that the result is some sort of political and 
philosophical Quietism. 
But it goes without saying that if we choose to emphasize other aspects in 
Ricœur’s philosophy, the result will be very different. We can possibly find in it a 
very critical, and very useful Critical Theory, if we choose to read Ricœur 
emphasizing the following elements: human agency, the capacity to devise 
practical projects as our aim for the good life, the depiction of power in common 
and the novelty of human action, the rights to capabilities and to recognition, the 
right to indignation as a moral compass, thick descriptions of intersubjective 
ethical lives coupled with a strong normative content, basic metaphoricity and the 
productive power of utopia. If we choose these elements in Ricœur’s philosophy, 
then we can see in him a radically powerful thought, capable of founding an 
informed practical philosophy with many possible fertile developments in ethics, 
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political philosophy, social philosophy, and Critical Theory. This is the path I 
choose to follow, within Ricoeurian philosophy. I am pretty sure it is not the only 
possible one. Far from it. But it is ultimately the path that makes Ricoeurian 
philosophy useful for my own purposes. In the few pages I have left in this 
dissertation, allow me to spell out in a very brief manner what this amounts to. 
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Part Eight 
 
Towards a Renewed Hermeneutic Social Philosophy 
 
In the pages that follow, besides spelling out my proposal, I will try to 
illustrate in a very brief manner in what way social philosophy can draw from 
hermeneutics and I will also try to provide some provisional answers as to the 
status and importance of social philosophy. I will argue that hermeneutics is useful 
in making sense of the social1652 and also how it can found a social philosophy. 
We have seen in parts one and two some of Kant’s, Hegel’s, Marx’s and 
Honneth’s contributions to social philosophy, and I think part four sufficiently 
determined how Ricoeurian hermeneutics works. As such, I will not repeat these 
analyzes and will instead only add a few traits to the definition of social 
philosophy, and recap some of the elements of Ricoeurian hermeneutics that can 
fit in this project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1652 In the following pages I reproduce, in a modified manner, some parts of the article “Making 
Sense of the Social” previously published in Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricœur Studies. See Gonçalo 
Marcelo, “Making Sense of the Social. Hermeneutics and Social Philosophy”, op. cit. 
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8.1 – Making Sense and Transforming the Social 
 
My aim is to investigate what relation, if any, hermeneutics can have with 
what we call “social philosophy”, understood as the branch of practical philosophy 
that deals with the description of everyday practices of living communities and 
with the normative project of liberation through critique. The problematic can be 
stated as follows: is hermeneutics an appropriate tool to understand the social 
world? If it is, will it also be a sufficient and sound basis to found a social 
philosophy in the aforementioned sense? My working hypotheses will be that 1) 
hermeneutics is indeed a pre-condition to social philosophy but that 2) it is in itself 
insufficient to fulfill all the tasks that a social philosophy sets for itself. In a 
nutshell, I contend that a hermeneutical methodology will be an interesting point 
of departure to making sense of the social, although it is ultimately an insufficient 
way to radically transform social reality. As a result, all social philosophy, if it is 
not to become a purely constructionist and abstract project, must start with 
hermeneutics but, if it is to fulfill its emancipatory agenda, must go beyond it.  
Recently, we have seen a rehabilitation of “social philosophy” as a specific 
discipline, separate both from political philosophy and sociology. For some 
readers, it might be surprising that it be so. What could a social philosophy be, 
after the emancipation of sociology from philosophy? In his Manifeste pour une 
philosophie sociale, Franck Fischbach defines social philosophy as an 
interdisciplinary effort, drawing from the insights of the social sciences and 
philosophy alike.1653 It is still a branch of philosophy, different from sociology 
(even from theoretical sociology) in that it has a strictly conceptual (and 
sometimes normative and transformative) aim. As a result, the concepts stemming 
from social philosophy are prone to be more general and encompassing in their 
scope, and less precise in their empirical applications than those which are 
specifically sociological. Nonetheless, social philosophy puts forward concepts 
that can be put to the test in more refined sociological analyzes. If these, in turn, 
transform and expand the original concept, a more enriched social philosophy will 
likely ensue. It can therefore be argued that social philosophy, with the help of a 
hermeneutical approach, might provide an interesting theoretical framework that 
                                                
1653 See Franck Fischbach, Manifeste pour une philosophie sociale (Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 
2009). 
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could be taken up and further elaborated by sociologists. Fischbach further claims 
that the difference between classical political philosophy and social philosophy is 
that the latter does not presuppose individuals as being purely autonomous and 
rational agents, naturally capable of providing themselves with the means of their 
own existence. Instead, it takes individuals to be intersubjectively constituted 
fragile beings of needs and feelings, capable of social suffering.1654 As we can see, 
this is not very different from Ricœur’s own account, at least the one we find in 
Oneself as Another and The Course of Recognition. 
Another key feature of social philosophy is the tendency to use an organic 
metaphor to describe societies in terms of health or pathologies. Social 
philosophy, pursuing this medical metaphor, tends to produce diagnoses of social 
life. Consistent with the Critical Theory tradition, Honneth, as we have seen in 
part two, sometimes examines societies in terms of the social pathologies that their 
patterns of social reproduction and organization can foster, pathologies that 
prevent a successful human flourishing. This task is also taken up by Ricœur, 
insofar as, for instance, reified forms of ideology (and also utopia) are, as we have 
seen above, taken to be social pathologies. As such, and at least in a certain 
interpretation, Ricœur’s project of a critical hermeneutics (if read by emphasizing 
the elements I listed in the last chapter) can be connected in a productive manner 
with the Marxist-Hegelian notion of immanent critique, such as it is practiced by 
Honneth, and others. 
This type of critique is not inherently normative, in the sense that what we 
are dealing with are not abstract ideals, the best sets of norms or practices 
imagined under a veil of ignorance or something of the sort, regardless of the 
concrete set of practices and norms already existing in concrete societies and 
communities. To reiterate, for this strand of Critical Theory, rules do not appear 
out of nowhere. There is no “view from above” or even liberal “neutrality”. 
Instead, societies are taken as they are, and their contradictions are exploited in a 
way that makes possible for them to be at the same time understood and 
overcome. This critique has, it can be argued, a twofold objective. First, it aims at 
detecting the main traditions that make up the ethical lives of communities; it is an 
investigation into the Sittlichkeit of peoples. Thus, the norms that are pertinent to 
                                                
1654 Fischbach, Manifeste pour une philosophie sociale, p. 50. See also Emmanuel Renault, 
Souffrances Sociales, op. cit. 
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this sort of investigation are the rules that already are in some way 
institutionalized, if not in formal law, at least in the current everyday practices of 
intersubjective interaction. What becomes important is to understand why rules 
and practices already have a certain degree of normative stability in a given 
community. As we have seen in part two, this is the type of path ultimately chosen 
by Honneth, Walzer and, at least in one interpretation, Ricœur. It is the path of 
social criticism to which Walzer calls “Interpretation” and Honneth 
“Reconstruction”. It also comes very close to what Ricœur calls “restorative 
critique” or the “recollection of meaning”. However, it is also very important to 
emphasize that this is only a first step, because the second step is a ruthless 
critique of the point of departure, as I argued above. In other words, we need a 
yardstick.  
Again, this is close to Honneth’s version of Critical Theory. In presenting 
his claim, Honneth argues that what we must add is a left-Hegelian premise of 
development and progress1655; at each new level of social reproduction reason 
must present itself in a more developed form. Thus, in each society, the immanent 
ideals chosen must be those that represent the most developed form of social 
rationalization. If a given society has available, among its guiding ideals, an ideal 
that can be shown to embody a higher form of rationalization or, to borrow a better 
concept, a more developed stage of moral progress, we have found the yardstick 
that we can use to criticize and transform reality. This also involves, as I argued in 
the last chapter, using the critical standpoint to attack the point of departure; 
deepen the distanciation; and if needed, transform it completely. 
With the Honnethian definition of reconstructive social criticism, 
understood as this hybrid between the hermeneutical recovery of immanent values 
and norms, and the teleological tendency towards rationality, we come closer to 
understanding how hermeneutics and a project of social philosophy might be 
intrinsically connected. The striving towards a progressive rationalization points 
toward the goal of emancipation inherent in all critical theory; and the way 
immanent values are recovered is always to be rooted in a hermeneutical 
procedure, even if we presuppose its left-Hegelian complement.  
                                                
1655 See Honneth, “Reconstructive Social Criticism with a Genealogical Proviso”, op. cit. 
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Now, how can Ricœur’s hermeneutical project be of use here? Firstly, we 
find in it both hermeneutics as recollection of meaning (useful for understanding 
the point of departure) and hermeneutics of suspicion (useful for criticizing that 
point of departure and, by deepening distanciation, radically transform it, if 
needed). Secondly, Ricœur’s account of ipseities, his confidence that these can be 
applied to collective identities and, furthermore, that these are narrative and thus 
constitutively changing and non-reified identities, provides us with a supple model 
to both attest the existence of these identities (thus being able to ontologically 
ground their claims for recognition) and allow for innovation to meaningfully 
transform tradition and keep them evolving. Finally, his notion of utopia is, to 
reiterate, invaluable for the making of our meaningful transformative projects. 
Thus a critical hermeneutics, if it is to succeed, must be able to fulfill all 
the tasks we have been describing up until now: recognition of the historical 
character of existing societies, identification of the core values that make up their 
symbolic orders, evaluation of the fairness of these orders, genealogy of their 
values and verification of the right application of each value in the existing social 
order (as well as the significant shifts of meaning that the value has undergone in 
its evolution) and finally, when confronted with unambiguous unjust social orders, 
formulation of sharp critiques able to bring about better symbolic orders that could 
foster societies that would be fairer and more decent. This is a tremendously 
demanding task. But if a critical hermeneutics were to fulfill, even partially, these 
tasks, it would make the transformative interest of social philosophy much more 
viable, because “immanent critique” would be provided with the necessary tools to 
really make explicit the immanent sense it is trying to grasp. 
And ultimately, as is evident, the practice of transformation calls for more 
than just interpretation. Let me recuperate a somewhat old-fashioned but perhaps 
still pertinent formula, according to which praxis must walk alongside theory. The 
practice of transformation calls for more than interpretation. It is just a terminus a 
quo whose terminus ad quem might be the partial fulfilling of a very specific 
ought, the utopian ought, as George Taylor recently called it.1656 That is, going 
from interpretation to action, to social praxis. But for now, allow me to still 
                                                
1656 George Taylor, “Delineations in Ricœur’s Concept of Utopia”, unpublished conference 
delivered at the International Conference on Ricœur Studies: New Perspectives on Hermeneutics in 
the Social Sciences and Practical Philosophy (September 16 2011, Moscow, Russia). 
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emphasize the only missing element of this puzzle. I have been highlighting the 
need to deepen the pole of critique. And throughout many places in this 
dissertation – firstly in my analyzis of the Greek cultural source, secondly in my 
incursion in Critical Theory in part two, mainly in the early efforts of Adorno and 
Horkheimer – I invoked the particular mix of rationality and irrationality, and the 
project of a critique of reason. In the last chapter of this thesis what I want to put 
forward is what a critique of reason could look like today. 
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8.2 – The Need for a New Critique of Reason 
 
The title of this section might seem somewhat pompous, if not 
anachronic. Why should we, in our own allegedly post-metaphysical day and age, 
speak about “reason” and call for a critique of such an entity? Is there not the risk 
of a hypostatization of a given faculty – something like Nietzsche’s famous virtus 
dormitiva – and should not an entirely deflationary approach be preferable? Is 
there really something such as “reason”? And if there is, after Kant, Adorno, 
Sartre, Sloterdijk, Habermas, Honneth, and so many others, was this “reason” not 
lambasted enough? Why not give it a rest? Why should we come back to it, after 
all? 
I concede that these are possible questions, and some of them are even 
pertinent. However, allow me, after the very long mediation of this thesis, to put 
forward a claim to which I can only hint at as an intuition, and not fully ground or 
explicate. As such, this chapter will be the part of this dissertation that points 
towards the future, rather than the past. The future of a research to follow, if time 
and my capacities allow it. I include here a tentative first approach of it because I 
see it as being a continuation and indeed a segment of a hermeneutic social 
philosophy as I defined it in the last chapter, and because in order to put forward 
such a project, I am taking for granted many of the contributions of authors such 
as Ricœur, Honneth, Habermas, Charles Taylor, Arendt, and so many others we 
have seen in the five first parts of this work. 
Indeed, I do think that in our own day a new critique of reason is called 
for; that these notions are not depleted yet and that indeed they must be renewed. I 
propose to characterize the prevalent, widespread manifestation of reason today as 
being a “miserable” reason but without, however, this feature fully being 
acknowledged as such. Consequently, a “critique of miserable reason” is also a 
critique which aims at freeing it from its misery. Whether or not this task is at least 
partially realizable, I do not know. But this should not prevent us to spell out our 
claims. 
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8.2.1 – The Critique of Miserable Reason 
 
Firstly, what is “reason” and why should we come back to it? I see reason 
as a human faculty, one in which radically positive potentialities are intrinsically 
tied up with also radically negative perversions. This is, more or less, what Ricœur 
detected in the use of political power in his famous “political paradox”, which I 
mentioned many times in this dissertation. As Foucault noticed, the use of reason 
is intrinsically connected with the use of power and its putative abuses. Moreover, 
as we saw already in the Greek source (recall Dodd’s analyzis of the first chapter) 
and with renewed vigor in the Dialectic of Enlightenment proposed by Adorno and 
Horkheimer, the use of reason, or rationality, can lead to violence or even be 
intrinsically connected with it – control of inner and outer nature, domination of 
other people, and so forth. 
If it is true that this is a faculty, one which we can exercise in different 
manners, it is also a radically intersubjective one. Ricœur’s and Honneth’s 
philosophical anthropologies, coupled with what we have learned with 
developmental psychology, show us how radically embedded in thick webs of 
intersubjective relations our own identities are. If acting rationally is many times 
tantamount to acting in a purposive manner, acting with an end in mind, the way 
this ideal is embedded in us certainly comes from intersubjective sources; and our 
use of it in different manners certainly also finds in intersubjectivity a privileged 
domain of application (whether good or bad). 
Consequently, allow me to treat reason as a historical transcendental. 
That is, it is transcendental because it is what allows our conditions of experience 
and action in the world, as Kant saw. But it is not entirely a priori, and its concrete 
instantiation (even in biological, evolutionary terms) is certainly subject to change 
and in many aspects it is also context-bound, since different instantiations of what 
it might mean to “act rationally” acquire different meanings in different cultures. 
Allow me also to admit that even though reason as a faculty has 
obviously been used in different ways and in different societies throughout history, 
there is at least one strong sense of it that is intrinsically connected with what 
came to be known as “Modernity”. Admittedly, at least in some versions, this is 
also related with the Enlightenment project, as it came to embody an ideal of 
emancipation and, furthermore, one with a potentially “universal” and context-
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transcending force. 
It goes with saying that this capacity to attain universal validity has been 
attacked over and again, and even the project of emancipation might be put into 
question. Why emancipation, and emancipation of whom and from what?, might 
we ask. “Reason” itself is sometimes seen as an offspring of Western cultural 
forms, as is universalism (in the many forms it assumes, such as, for instance, the 
defense of human rights).  
I will refrain from tackling the problem of universalism in this brief 
section. Perhaps specific values with inbuilt universal claims are only inchoate 
universals in search for recognition, as Ricœur sometimes argued. And maybe the 
project of reason, in the dominant forms we know here in the North Atlantic, is 
indeed an offspring of the West. Its alleged contingency and specific origin do not, 
in my opinion, curtail its potential validity. 
But if indeed there is a form of rationalization specific to our own culture 
– and of course nowadays pervasively invading into other cultures and life forms, 
because of globalization and its wide-reaching effects – and if this form was 
partially embodied in the cultural project of the Enlightenment, I want to reiterate 
that this is a project which contains radically different and indeed contradictory 
possibilities within itself. 
In one of its forms, Modernity and its rationalization procedures were 
seem as a putative liberation from oppressive traditions – even if not all traditions 
are oppressing, as Gadamer, Ricœur, Walzer and Taylor show –, from unjust 
authority. It was also seen as a project of progress, and of a radical belief that in 
many areas evolution was indeed possible. If we take Marx’s philosophy as being 
one of the offshoots of this belief, emancipation – at least in his project – was not 
only from tradition but from economic and social exploitation. Foucault carries 
this project further with his denunciation of the micro-physics of power. Certainly, 
many of these authors do not recognize themselves as pursuing a project of 
Enlightenment, or of Modernity. Indeed, through proposals of radical rethinking of 
these processes, Lyotard and others proposed to start speaking about “Post-
Modernity” or other such configurations; many of their efforts are directed 
precisely at denouncing and criticizing the abuses of these notions: Modernity, 
Enlightenment, Reason… 
And yet through their critiques and denunciations of pathological forms 
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of rationality, domination, abuse of power and so forth, it can be argued that what 
they are denouncing are perverse, distorted aspects of these phenomena. But that, 
at the same time, we do not need to completely lose faith in reason, in the 
possibilities of emancipation and so forth, just because distorted phenomena exist. 
As Ricœur argued for ideology and utopia, so we might also argue for reason: a 
social philosopher must be able to distinguish the positive (here I dare not speak of 
a “constitutive” function) from the perverted and distorted phenomena. Because if 
reason can indeed give birth to different, and contradictory, possibilities, what we 
have to do is to learn how to find the positive possibilities and to use them to 
denounce and criticize the perverted ones. Again, when Habermas states that there 
are a plurality of interests of reason, and that even though there are uses of reason 
leading to instrumental action, these do not necessarily completely occlude other 
potentialities, such as the interest in emancipation and in communicative action, he 
is not saying something very different from what I am arguing here. 
Consequently, the effort I am undertaking here, as stated before, can be 
seen as adhering to and renewing a project of Critical Theory. And this because I 
believe, like critical theorists, that it is by exercising critique that we will find the 
yardstick with which we will distinguish positive from negative uses of reason. It 
will be through that diagnosis that we will aim at delimiting the uses of reason and 
put forward alternatives which will also serve to underpin normative ideals 
contained in potential uses of reason. 
Accordingly, if there are indeed contradictory uses of reason, and if 
reason is a historical transcendental subject to change, the historical forms it 
assumes are also dependent on the enforcement of interpretations and the 
influence of social practices. As such, at any given moment, a social practice 
might have the upper hand and become dominant, without however the need for us 
to believe that things will always be as they are right now, without alternatives 
being conceivable. This is tantamount to Ricœur’s distinction between constitutive 
and pathological forms of ideology as the constitutive powers of the social 
imaginary. The fact that a certain use of reason becomes socially dominant at any 
given time does not mean that through critique (indeed, sometimes through 
conflicts of interpretations) social actors cannot change something in the way 
practices are conceived. 
With these introductory notes laid out, I can proceed to a brief diagnosis 
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of what, to me, seems the dominant use of reason in our own day. Allow me to 
start by making a methodological distinction between more theoretical and more 
practical uses of reason (without however pretending to establish a strict division 
between these two uses). In the theoretical level, as Kant argued, we are moved by 
the question what can we know, and what are the procedures used to determine the 
answers to that question. In the practical level, by contrast, what is at stake is both 
a description of our capacities, and a normative questioning: what can or should 
we do. And it seems to me that in both levels, we are nowadays faced with the risk 
of a possible imposition of several types of reductionism. 
In the theoretical level, the prestige of the natural sciences – which is not, 
in itself, a negative phenomenon – sometimes risks eliminating the possibility of 
concurrent explanatory procedures, at different levels; as such, the social and 
human sciences can sometimes fall prey to a certain colonization (to use 
Habermas’s vocabulary) of the natural sciences; this is evident even in the 
terminology used to describe what “researchers” in what used to be called the 
humanities are now supposed to do in their “labs”. This type of reductionism can 
perhaps go by the name of scientism, and its effects are not only epistemological 
(a tendency to favor only one type of explanation) but also social (“research” 
funds canalized almost exclusively to the “hard” sciences, and so on). 
In the practical level, where the question of how we should live our lives 
appears, we must also be attentive to the patterns of social organization around us; 
i.e., what are the meaningful values which orient our practices, and how people are 
actually living their lives (as such, this is not merely an individual, but really a 
social question). And besides the many values put forward by our existing 
traditions and institutions (such as religious or ethical values) a particular attention 
needs to be shed on the role economics has come to play in contemporary societies 
and in their organization. This means, simply put, that any attempt to ask questions 
about how we should orient our lives in society cannot avoid posing questions 
about the form of economic organization that became dominant in the last 
centuries. As Boltanski and Chiapello have shown, and of course Weber before 
them, capitalism is not only a set of practices guiding economic organization, 
production and work; it is also a set of ideals and justifications, with its specific, 
ever-changing values. And because we simply cannot choose to live, as it were, 
completely outside capitalism, we cannot avoid questioning it. 
 630
And again, inside capitalism, it is difficult to avoid the diagnosis 
according to which, at least in the last few decades, and with a particular force felt 
in the West, the specific form of organization and the set of ideals and practices 
put forward is one that has been called “neo-liberalism” with its current features of 
market deregulation, growth of the financial sector over and above the other 
sectors, and so forth. This dominance of the prestige associated with economics, 
the emphasis put on capitalism as the natural and unavoidable system of economic 
coordination – after all, socialism did fail spectacularly in the 20th Century – and 
even the new techniques of management so well analyzed by Boltanski and 
Chiapello all concur in showing that one of the dominant set of values in our 
societies, perhaps even more than in the past, are what came to be known as the 
values of the homo economicus. What exactly these values are, can be a subject of 
contention. But one usually identifies self-interest, or greed as some of them; other 
times, even manipulation, or at least maximization of expected utility and / or 
efficiency, that all-encompassing value, used to exert pressure on people at 
different times and in different contexts. 
And if this is true – or even if it is not in every case, let us take it as an 
ideal type –, can we not find in the behavior of economic agents in the market, 
those driven by these strong motivational bases: profit, (eventually greed, and so 
forth) what could maybe be described as an insatiable thirst, a situation of bad 
infinity? Moreover, as we have seen with Walzer in part two, in our countries of 
the North Atlantic, today, the greatest danger of domination is not the political 
one, as we, fortunately, live in liberal, democratic societies; rather, it is the danger 
of domination of money over any other social goods; and the risk is aggravated 
when inequalities are higher. Today, the invasion of the market sphere (and of 
private interests) over the public and political spheres is taken to be undisputable, 
as is the commodification of what, until recently, we held to be priceless goods. 
The prestige of money, and of those who can control it or own it more than others 
do, is almost infinite. Furthermore, a set of beliefs associated in recent years with 
mathematical and statistical models used to assess risk in market transactions, and 
to predict economic growth at a macroeconomic level also eventually concurred to 
lead some people to believe that the theory of economic cycles had been proven 
wrong, that economic growth could carry on indefinitely, and that risk behavior in 
the marketplace could virtually be rewarded the overwhelming majority of the 
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time, provided that the right models (the value at risk model, devised by JP 
Morgan in the 1990s, was popular for some time) for assessing risk were used.  
And yet, the recent events in the U.S.A. and in Europe proved that all 
these certainties could fail, and that the possibility of an economic, financial and 
social crisis was indeed very real. When the subprime crisis became apparent in 
the U.S.A. and when, in turn, European policy shifted from growth stimulus to 
austerity, in the name of debt sustainability and allegedly rational measures, the 
degree of social suffering increased dramatically in the countries affected by these 
measures. The question thus begs to be asked: what rationality, and for what 
purposes?  
My claim is thus that we are trapped in a situation of bad infinity that 
results in a contemporary figure of the unhappy consciousness. And this because 
we are conflicted, torn in different directions by opposing imperatives, both of 
which seem to stem from rational demands. At an individual level, people are 
encouraged to seek success, to thrive, attain recognition, status and, most of all, 
money. At a societal level, and after a frenzy of spending, many sovereign states 
see themselves trapped in spirals of austerity which lead to a height in 
unemployment, economic inequality, and increasing degrees of social suffering. 
Amid this situation, it is the social bond that becomes threatened, since the 
conditions of solidarity seem to be severely curtailed. As such, in many places, the 
exercise of an alleged rationality (and even efficiency), leads people to a state of 
misery, in the double sense of the word: unhappiness and poverty, because both 
their material conditions and the possibilities of approximating their horizons of 
expectations and their spaces of experience are threatened. 
As such, the exercise of rationality risks throwing us in a situation of 
double misery. The exercise of reason, in its dominant economic form, and the 
risks it entails, is, at least in this interpretation, an exercise of miserable reason. 
And this because neo-liberalism, deregulation, and the threats they pose to the 
social well-being and harmony of societies when inequality rises, can have serious 
consequences. And these can, in turn, have ethical (we risk not grasping 
alternative values, leading to different practices), psychological and economic 
effects. 
These are, partly, the consequences of the development of a group of 
tendencies already contained in Modernity, with its emphasis on the exploration of 
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technique, competence, individualism and pursuit of self-interest, namely in the 
marketplace. However, what I want to argue is that there are different ethical and 
social alternatives and while it is not clear that these could lead to a different type 
of economic organization (socialism and communism have failed in their historical 
instantiations, and other alternatives, such as the so-called “economy of the gift” 
are not modes of economic coordination capable of offering an alternative to 
capitalism) they can at least be the touchstone for a critique of miserable reason. 
This critique, if not anything else, can at least serve as a denunciation of the 
pathological forms of social organization (economic or otherwise) and to envisage, 
as it were, partial and localized remedies for it. 
Today, it thus seems that the task of the critique of reason is one of 
imposing limits to the dominance of money, like Walzer claims, of denouncing the 
contemporary forms of domination1657 and of trying to conceive perhaps modest 
but effective “real utopias”1658 which would allow us to change some aspects of 
the ways in which societies are organized and our lives are lived. In so doing, and 
by engaging in a process of a conflict of interpretations about what is really 
important in society, perhaps it will succeed in freeing up other, more positive, 
“interests of reason”, such as those which found the social bond, our “desire to live 
well with and for others in just institutions”, as Ricœur would put it. 
This critique of miserable reason, if successfully undertaken, would 
therefore amount to the spelling out of a practical philosophy that would strive to 
do justice to the neglected possibilities of human action. I am still not in a position 
to fully articulate such a critique, let alone its positive outcome. But I do feel it is 
an urgent task. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1657 On these many and widespread forms, see Béatrice Hibou, Anatomie politique de la 
domination (Paris: La Découverte, 2011). 
1658 See Erik Olin Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, op. cit. 
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Conclusion 
 
Ricoeurian Philosophy After Ricœur 
 
Every conclusion is fragile and provisional. It is, as such, a temporary 
closure, a petrification of what is in itself a dynamic process of thought. A book, 
or in this case a dissertation, comes to a stop after a complex maze of crisscrossing 
interpretations. Consequently, it is given a specific form, and from the moment 
writing stops and is offered to the readers, it escapes any little control its author 
might want to have over it. But this only means that closure is never absolute. 
With this dissertation, I hope to have sufficiently proven that conflict 
plays an essential role in the history of philosophy, in the thought of Paul Ricœur, 
and in contemporary debates in ethics, political philosophy and social philosophy. 
Throughout these chapters, it has been argued that even though conflict can be, 
prima facie, a negative phenomenon it can also, in turn, have positive and fertile 
aspects. Conflicts can have a disclosing power. For instance, of the normativity of 
rules, as Hunyadi argues. Conflicts of interpretations can contribute to the 
enlargement or our perspective, as I also claimed many times. And they can lead 
to better practical outcomes, as in successful struggles for recognition at a societal 
level. 
From the reading of these pages, it should have become clear that conflict 
has a wide array of intersecting significations. These are organized in several 
semantic fields which partially overlap, but that we can distinguish through 
analyzis. Assuming that this undertaking was at least partially successful, it should 
have provided an historical reminder of the importance of conflict in philosophy, 
and also of the need to take it into account in our own day and age. It is by now 
clear that I adopted a transhistorical approach and a mixed strategy of historical 
reconstruction and conceptual clarification, not very far from the ones put forward 
by Charles Taylor in Sources of the Self and Ricœur in The Course of Recognition. 
Depending on the semantic field within which we position ourselves, 
conflict can thus be seen as structuring reality, or at least social interaction. And 
even if we fall short from accepting an overarching conflict theory, I think one of 
the undisputable conclusions of this study, at least if one is to recognize some 
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merit in it, is that conflicts do exist (at least in the hermeneutical, social and 
political level) and that to ignore them or choose not to address them results in a 
severe occlusion of a meaningful part of our world. Therefore, any strategy of 
depiction of the social world, and of our way to orient ourselves within it, must at 
least recognize this fact, or else run the risk of providing a fully detached and as it 
were probably merely idealized version of it. If this recognition is a starting point, 
the next step in the strategy will probably be the one of assessing their treatability. 
As I see it, we cannot be conflictual about everything. We need to discern 
good from bad conflicts, and learn to reject the latter in the name of the former. 
This is why many authors, and Ricœur among them, try to devise ways to 
transform conflicts, to make them dialectical and productive – such as, for 
instance, Ricœur’s moral judgment in situation as a response to the conflict of 
duties. As Ricœur, I also think that we need to live in pacified societies. But I 
deem it preferable to live in conflictual societies which, through their own 
conflictual evolution, tend to moral progress, than in unjustly reified anomic 
societies where there is peace, but there is also silent injustice.  
Conflict does not have to be, and perhaps should really not be, an end in 
itself. But it can be an appropriate mean to attain positive ends. Political struggles, 
for instance, can lead to the enforcement of rights. And conflicts of interpretations 
can disclose the meaningful alternatives to situations where the There Is No 
Alternative discourse impinges upon us. I believe that we always act under the 
implicit guidance of normative backgrounds; that we need rules and ideals to 
guide our action. And that, as Hunyadi suggests, these rules are not eternal; that 
indeed they sprout, like Walzer argues, from our meaningful already-constituted 
traditions. But because they are not eternal they can be changed and must indeed 
be so, if they are proven to be unjust. 
Consequently, in order for change to be brought about in society, we need 
a yardstick. But this yardstick can come from nowhere else than the procedure of 
critique, through distanciation, and through conflicts of interpretations. This is, 
indeed, one of the applications of a hermeneutical practical philosophy. And in 
order to undertake such a massive endeavor, one of the tasks it needs to fulfill is a 
critique of reason, which I today see as being a “miserable reason” which leads to 
two reductionisms: a theoretical one, which reduces reason to its techno-scientific 
use; and a practical reductionism, which only sees human action as being moved 
 635 
by self-interested reasons. The result of these two reductionisms combined is the 
silencing of alternative forms of human reason; it is a poor theoretical construction 
and it can lead to an unhappy consciousness since it can be self-defeating, and 
because it can ultimately lead to a destruction of the intersubjective social bond. 
But given that this is a dissertation on Ricœur, inspired by Ricœur, even 
if it engages in so many other discussions, allow me to end with a Ricoeurian tone. 
As I stated at the outset of this investigation, the corpus of Ricœur’s works is now 
simultaneously closed and open. Closed because he stopped writing, open because 
previously unknown or very rare writings keep being published and, perhaps even 
more importantly, the reception of his works keeps growing in scope. As I also 
argued, one can be inspired by Ricœur while at the same time criticizing some 
points of his philosophy, or choosing to follow slightly different paths. My own 
proposal put forward in this dissertation, as is clear, is halfway between 
“Ricoeurianism” and Critical Theory. The diagnosis of a “miserable reason” risks 
leaving the courageous reader who has accompanied me in this lengthy trajectory 
with a slight pessimistic impression. But nothing could be further from my 
intentions. For only by acknowledging and confronting the hardship of reality can 
we come up with the meaningful alternatives for transforming it. Because, 
ultimately, our attitude is none other than that of saying yes to a world that says 
no… L’homme est la joie du oui dans la tristesse du fini. 
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